Davutoğlu: Turkey’s new foreign policy chief

With the recent Cabinet reshuffle, Professor Ahmet Davutoğlu has been appointed as Turkey's minister of foreign affairs. Such an appointment was hardly a surprise since it is no secret that he has been the architect of Turkey's foreign policy under the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government as the chief foreign policy advisor to the prime minister.

Professor Davutoğlu's appearance on the stage is timely. He brings a strong personality to tackle tough issues such as the Armenian rapprochement, the rebuilding of Turkish-US relations and the brokering of peace in the Middle East, the Caucasus, and Afghanistan. His vision, experience, and personal contacts, all backed up now by political power in the Cabinet, will be needed to address these issues.

He is presented as a "strategist" due to his seminal book, "Strategic Depth," but such a label undervalues his vision for Turkish foreign policy. During the AK Party years, he initiated policies that went beyond simple realpolitik strategic calculations.

Take the example of policy of "zero problems with neighbors," which marks a revolutionary change in the Turkish perception of the external world. I say revolutionary because it is a radical departure from the conventional view that Turkey is surrounded by enemy countries against which it should be prepared to defend itself. This was a worldview based on an amalgam of insecurity, antagonism, confrontation, and short-sighted realism. Moreover, this "siege mentality" was used to create and justify authoritarian elements in Turkish politics.

The zero problems policy has redefined Turkey's relations with its neighbors. The avenues of mutual understanding, trust, and cooperation were opened with this change of perspective. As such, a liberal approach based on cooperation instead of confrontation was inserted in foreign policy, embracing a non-zero sum strategy benefiting all parties involved.

In sum, the Davutoğlu perspective has broken the siege mentality in Turkey's regional politics, contributing democratic openings at home while establishing good neighborly relationships with surrounding countries. That is to say that democratic peace at home turned into a vision for peace in the neighborhood.

All these help Turkey emerge as a center of "soft power" in the region. Davutoğlu, the architect of this policy, made clear that "Turkey's most important soft power tool is its democracy." Thus, it is expected that Turkish foreign policy under Davutoğlu is likely to also contribute to democratization in order to improve Turkey's attractiveness in the region.

Engaging with all actors in the region to settle problems will also continue in the new era. Turkey has invested much to win the trust of all actors in the region. No one doubts Turkey's sincerity. This is due to the fact that Turkey does not see its engagements with regional actors as means to increase its influence in the region, but to build peace in the surrounding area, because peace and stability are needed for Turkey to continue with the consolidation of democracy at home, secure full membership in the EU and sustain its economic development. Nothing else.

We will continue to see culture and identity being brought into Turkish foreign policymaking. This is, in fact, in line with the theoretical discovery of these issues in international relations literature.

Turkey's cultural and economic space goes beyond its political boundaries, as is the case for many other countries. The trick is to conduct foreign policy that goes in line with this reality. Turkey's wider cultural geography may enable it to reach out to people in the region and develop contacts at the inter-societal level, thus creating a social bond of understanding and interaction, while its wider economic geography establishes unbreakable linkages and interdependencies.

All this is likely to make cooperation stronger and even unbreakable by engaging with social and economic sectors, rather than mere political entities.

Yet Davutoğlu's emphasis on multi-dimensional and integrated foreign policy may be interpreted by some circles as turning away from the West, including the EU. He may be portrayed as a person preferring Turkey's greater engagement in the East and the region with a "neo-Ottoman" perspective. On this, I think Davutoğlu should be very careful and emphasize that Turkey's engagement in the region is complementary to its Western vocation.

04 May 2009

The Armenian question, Turkey and the US

US President Barack Obama spoke but did not use the word "genocide," though he meant it, while describing the events of 1915 as a "great atrocity." He had given the signal that he would do so while on his visit to Turkey a few weeks earlier. So another April has passed without major trouble for Turkish diplomacy. Let's see what happens next year.

Can you imagine a foreign policy strategy in which a particular issue turns into a constant source of problems that cannot be resolved permanently? I am personally fed up with this issue and the way in which it has been dealt with by Turkish diplomacy year after year. It appears that Turkish foreign policy has been taken hostage by the genocide issue and as if Turkey is prepared to do anything to make the word "genocide" be forgotten or prevent it from being spelled out. I think Turkey has more important things to do then devote such a large amount of energy into bargaining over what to say and what not to say on the Armenian question.

Such a position only narrows Turkey's foreign policy perspective and wastes its potential. The issue at hand is largely historical, constructed and imagined on both sides. As such, it does not have much to do with current policies, challenges, and opportunities. It is just a matter of how 1915 is seen: genocide or mutual atrocities that claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands from both the Armenians and the Turks.

Yet attributing such great symbolic and even political importance to the way in which 1915 is viewed gives much leverage to foreign governments to use against Turkey. It's very simple: First, move closer to the Armenian perspective of history and then use it as a bargaining chip against Turkey to get whatever you want in return for changing your position on what happened in 1915. This simple! Turkey has created this trap for itself over the years. It is time to get rid of it. A Turkish foreign policy that is free of such burdens as the Armenian issue and the Cyprus question can fully reach its potential.

The day before the American president was to make his annual speech, Turkey and Armenia agreed on a roadmap for normalization of relations, which is expected to involve the establishment of diplomatic ties, an opening of their mutual border and setting up a commission of historians.

Turkey can and should start the normalization process with Armenia, but this should not appear as a move to prevent the US president from saying the "g-word." Turkey's policy of "no problems with neighbors" necessitates Turkey having a working relationship with Armenia. Moreover, while trying to mediate between conflicting parties in the region -- between the Israelis and the Syrians, for instance -- it would be inconceivable for Turkey not to engage with Armenia and settle issues that fester between the two countries. The process of normalization between Turkey and Armenia has its own logic independent of what the US president says or what the US Congress decides upon.

It is diplomatically wrong to link Armenian rapprochement with American policies as it weakens Turkey's bargaining position vis-à-vis the US. By not saying the "g-word," the Americans do not give Turkey anything concrete; they simply refrain from saying a word. Then in return, they think (in fact, we Turks make them think) that they can ask for something in return.

Such linkage is politically wrong, too, for it gives the impression that Turkey's efforts to normalize ties with Armenia are being sought by the Americans. Such an impression renders the mobilization of public support for this policy even more difficult, provoking further nationalist sentiment.

The rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia should go further, but both sides cannot afford to have it appear as an American project.

27 April 2009, Monday

Turkey between Armenia and Azerbaijan

Is Turkey going to establish diplomatic representation with Armenia and open its border with this neighboring country? Since the Turkish president's attendance at a soccer match between the two countries' national teams in Yerevan last year, a process of rapprochement has been on the table.

The need for stability in the Caucasus and the increasing assertiveness of Russia in the region, as well as the imperative for addressing historical animosity between the peoples of the two countries, requires a properly working relationship between Turkey and Armenia.

This is a rational choice. But governments do not act only on rationality. They are sentimental, like individuals. Yet the sentimentality of the Turks and the Armenians has not brought anything but enmity between these two peoples and their imprisonment in history. Now the two neighboring countries are being tested: They will either move along a path toward removing the burden of the past, seeing many opportunities along the way or remain hostage to history.

Anyhow, it is not civilized to be neighbors and keep the borders closed and not establish diplomatic contacts.

It is a question of whether they will surrender to nationalism or not. We know that the Armenian issue in Turkey and the Turkish question among the Armenians fan nationalism. Some groups on both sides have obvious interests in keeping this issue bleeding so that nationalism can remain alive.

Visionary politicians can change history. The pain and suffering of the past are real. But how long can we live in the past? Politicians should, of course, be respectful to the past generations that suffered, but they also have responsibilities for living people and for future generations.

We are at a crossroads. There are now some positive signs that the dialogue between Turkey and Armenia may result in some concrete steps. Yet it appears that Azerbaijan is unhappy with the diplomatic contacts between Turkey and Armenia. Some in Azerbaijan are even furious, regarding such a rapprochement as a betrayal. There is no doubt that the Armenians should withdraw from the occupied Azerbaijani territories. Neither international law nor universal ethics allow for the annexation of territory by force. The Armenians should be persuaded or forced to withdraw from Azeri territories.

Armenia's international and regional standing will be enhanced with a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. Otherwise, it will be isolated in the region with support coming only from Russia. But Armenia's reliance or even dependence on Russia seriously hamper its standing in its relations with the West. If the tension between Russia and Europe or the US increases, Armenia will be pushed further into the Russian orbit. So in order to reduce its dependence on Russia and be a free agent in global politics, Armenia should resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh issue.

The Azerbaijanis should also be prepared for a negotiated settlement. The country cannot surrender to those who use the Nagorno-Karabakh issue to mobilize the masses and garner political legitimacy and power. It is not hard to see that this issue functions in Azerbaijan as the Cyprus issue functions in Turkey: fanning nationalism and justifying authoritarian tendencies and practices by pointing out a national "enemy" or cause.

This is not the time to play such a simple and silly game.

Concerning the role Turkey plays in the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, Azerbaijanis should ask this question: Has Turkey's boycott of Armenia brought about a solution? It may be time to come up with some new initiatives to resolve the territorial dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Stability and peace in the southern Caucasus require a solution to this problem. No party involved can benefit from disturbances in the region.

Azerbaijan's strong reaction to Turkey is not reasonable at all. It is likely to push Azerbaijan toward Russia, the primary supporter of Armenia's occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh. Can the Azerbaijani leadership explain this to its people: turning their back on Turkey and embracing Russia, the ally of Armenia, to solve the Nagorno-Karabakh question?

Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has threatened to cut off natural gas sales to Turkey. It has not been mentioned yet, but he can also close the Baku-Ceyhan-Tbilisi pipeline. These would certainly harm Turkey, but they would result in Azerbaijan's dependence on Russia. They should understand that Turkey is their only outlet for reaching out to the world beyond Russia.

It is time to bury historical animosities in the southern Caucasus.

13 April 2009

Islamic identity in post-Kemalist Turkey and the West

The new US president, Barack Obama, is visiting Turkey in early April. It is going to be Obama’s first visit to an Islamic country. Many commentators attributed this early visit to the value of Turkey’s “identity” for Obama’s foreign policy priorities, not to its “geopolitical location” as it used to be.

The value of Turkey lies in its ability to reconcile its Islamic identity with democratic politics, free-market economy and pro-Western foreign policy orientation. Thus the “new Turkish identity” has become a more valuable “strategic asset” to prevent a clash of civilizations.

With such attributes the new Turkey is ever more capable of bridging the Islamic world and the West, contributing to the global coexistence of different cultures and civilizations.

What enabled this was not the practice of “authoritarian secularism” in an Islamic country but, on the contrary, an embracing of modern political values such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law by Islamic circles, leading to a transformation of Islamic political identity in Turkey over the last decade. Questioning their past identity, political strategy, discourse, and objectives, the Islamic elements have abandoned the notion of an Islamic state -- not only out of political prudence but also incompatibility between Islam and an ideological Islamic state. In the end, they have settled for a democratic Turkey aiming for EU membership.

The process of rethinking Islamic identity and its political model was begun by confronting the old notions of the West and Westernization. The trauma of the early encounters in the 19th century between Islam and the West was overcome as Muslims have grown confident in their relationship with the West after the years of modernization and economic development. A century after being labeled the “sick man of Europe,” Turkey is now a country with the biggest army in NATO after the US, the 16th largest economy in the world and the sixth-largest in Europe. This self-image has helped change Turkey’s positioning vis-à-vis the West.

In rethinking the West, the experience of the Turks living in Europe was also crucial for demonstrating that it is possible after all to be in the West, part of the West and still remain Muslim. Moreover, they realized they were better off in Europe in terms of freedom of belief, as the European states interfered less in the way they dressed, organized and practiced their religion than Turkey, especially in the late 1990s.

Thus, Islamic groups, under the pressure of the authoritarian Kemalist institutions at home, started to view the EU as an opportunity to curb the power of those Kemalist/secularist centers. In this context, Islamic groups realized that the EU demands for greater democratization, respect for human rights and a restrained military role in politics overlapped with their practical priorities.

Moreover, following Sept. 11 and the Justice and Development Party’s (AK Party) ascendance to power in Turkey, the new justification for Turkey’s membership in the EU -- namely the “alliance of civilizations” argument -- led the Islamic groups to embrace the EU accession project. Turkish membership was no longer presented as the accession of a successful “secular” but authoritarian model in the Middle East, but of a “Muslim” democratic country with capabilities for bridging Islam and the West. It should be noted that the latter rationale is embracing and presuming the “Muslim identity” of Turkey while the former is reflective of Turkey’s republican departure from the past/Islam. Islam was no longer an identity abandoned but preserved in the EU context.

Thus the EU membership process served as a catalyst for the Islamic circles to revisit their historical stand about the West and the Westernization. Mainstream Islamic circles in the social realm, in politics and in business turned to be strong adherents of Turkey’s EU membership, a goal they used to oppose as part of their anti-West stance. The departure of the Islamic elite from a conventional anti-Western position to embrace modern political values and the EU membership constitute a unique opportunity to construct a new Islamic “political” identity in the 21st century, disproving the thesis of a clash of civilizations and abandoning a burden of the past that produces animosity.

This is an opportunity not to miss. Western leaders like Obama are on trial. It is time to see the potential of a post-Kemalist democratic Turkey.

16 March 2009

Who will stop the AK Party?

As we approach the local elections scheduled for March 29, it appears, according to opinion polls, that the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) will hold on to its popular support, which had reached 47 percent in the 2007 general elections.

So it is time to rethink the strategies that have been employed against the AK Party since 2002. The number one mistake of the opponents of the AK Party was their unprincipled pragmatism, using any means available to get rid of the AK Party, including undemocratic means, which proved ineffective over the years, depriving the opposition of democratic credibility and pushing the democratic masses to support the AK Party.

In April 2007 a memorandum was issued warning the government and, in fact, Parliament about presidential elections. The main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) supported the military's attempt at intervening in the business of Parliament. CHP leader Deniz Baykal even referred to the military as a "civil-society organization." Imagine a professor of political science back in the 1970s describing the military in that way. I am sure Baykal himself did not believe what he said. But this was politics for him: to get rid of the AK Party by any means necessary. Yet, angry about the military's intervention in politics, people voted for the AK Party in the subsequent general elections.

Then in March last year the judiciary, another ally of the opponents of the AK Party, moved in and opened a closure case against the ruling party in the Constitutional Court. The opponents of the AK Party welcomed this undemocratic attempt and supported it at the expense of their democratic credentials. However, political prudence on the part of the court and other segments of the bureaucracy averted the closure.

Then came the global economic crisis. It was the last hope to get rid of the AK Party government. After all, it was the 2001 economic crisis that brought the AK Party to power in 2002. So with the hardship that would fall on the people at large, the AK Party was expected to lose popular support. But this has not happened, either. Despite the effects of the economic crisis, the AK Party has maintained, even increased, its support base. Even Baykal set the AK Party's success threshold at 52 percent, preparing himself to call the AK Party unsuccessful if it manages to get just 50 percent of the vote! By the way, Baykal considers the CHP's 26 percent vote to be significant!

Many have denied the fact that the problem is not the AK Party, but the lack of a viable, principled and democratic opposition. The opponents of the AK Party should understand that people are not stuck to the AK Party. Once they see the ruling party not performing well, they will vote for another one. But for this, they need an alternative party to vote for.

The recent history of elections in Turkey shows that people's preferences are not unchangeable. Just remember the five elections that Turkey had from 1987 to 2002. In five elections we had five different parties winning in the elections: in 1987 the Motherland Party (ANAVATAN) of Turgut Özal, in 1991 the True Path Party (DYP) of Suleyman Demirel, in 1995 the Welfare Party (RP) of Necmettin Erbakan, in 1999 the Democratic Left Party (DSP) of Bülent Ecevit and in 2002 the AK Party of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

These results demonstrate the people's will, ability and power to change governments depending on their performance. So the AK Party, too, has not been elected for good. It has the mandate to rule the country until the next election. Meanwhile, the thing to do is to come up with one, two or even three viable, credible and principled alternatives. If the opponents of the AK Party still expect Baykal to bring down the AK Party, they are doomed to fail. Can you imagine a leader who lost two general elections and who will, by the end of this month, have lost two local elections against the AK Party still being the only option the opponents of the AK Party can come up with?

The question is not the ruling party -- we have one -- but an alternative, which we still do not have.

09 March 2009, Monday

Is democracy possible with this military?

With each passing day it becomes quite obvious that establishing a full-fledged democracy in Turkey requires a radical transformation of civilian-military relations.

The military has been a "political power" with a vested interest in the undemocratic character of Turkish politics that enables them to extract and exercise enormous power.

This is not a baseless and abstract assertion, but a fact. It is the military that has interrupted Turkish democracy four times in the last 50 years. The first such coup in 1960 set a poisonous precedent for the intervention of the military in politics, executed in order to establish and sustain its power and privileges. The justification for unlawful intervention has changed over the years: protect the Constitution, establish public order, fight against communism, stop secessionist Kurdish movements, protect secularism, etc. What has not changed is the objective: keep power and resources in the grip of the military leadership.

This was evident once more in the release last week of a leaked conversation of İsmail Hakkı Karadayı, the former chief of general staff. Everyone interested in civilian-military relations in Turkey should get a copy of this tape, which is an honest confession by a retired chief of the Turkish military about conspiracies against democracy carried out from the 1960s to the end of the 1990s.
The content and style of his remarks remind us that a politicized Turkish military constitutes one of the greatest obstacles to achieving a genuine democracy in Turkey. From the tape we can see that the tradition of toppling democratically elected governments by the use of force is part of the institutional culture in the military, which sees itself as above the law, democratic principles and the will and wishes of the nation; they regard themselves as untouchables.

Gen. Karadayı admits his role in military coups from the 1960s onwards. On the more recent coup of 1997, carried out when he was the chief of general staff, Karadayı explains how they threatened an elected government in order to force them to resign, then how they offered the government to a political party, and how the president at the time, Süleyman Demirel, worked with them. He referred to Demirel as the one who "did whatever we asked him to do." I cannot repeat here how Gen. Karadayı referred to former Prime Ministers Tansu Çiller and Mesut Yılmaz!

This and other revelations about the military's role in the "power game" in Ankara explain a lot about Turkish domestic politics and foreign affairs. They have naturally resisted -- and will continue to resist -- reforms that take away those powers deemed unacceptable in a normal democracy. Since the EU noted in 1997 (Agenda 2000) that the nature of civilian-military relations in Turkey was an obstacle to Turkey's accession, the military has guarded the nation against the EU and related reforms.

The military has resisted Turkey's march into an EU membership and an engagement with globalizing dynamics because they want Turkey to be ruled in Ankara, where they have the ultimate say, if not a veto power over economic and political decisions. The military is much aware that its rule over Ankara will not continue if Turkey becomes a member of the EU, so we hear them referring to the need to keep "Turkish independence and the nation-state" intact, a move to justify their resistance. So the position is clear: Keep Turkey ruled in Ankara and don't bring Brussels into the power game played over in Turkey. Isolation of Turkey from the outside world, including the EU, is key for the military to continue to exercise its political power in Turkey. Therefore market economy, democratization, globalization, and the EU accession process are viewed as the greatest threats to the military's established interest to rule Turkey.

When the military starts minding its own business instead of intervening in politics, we will get closer to achieving a contemporary democratic civilization. The question is: Who will persuade or force the military to withdraw to its barracks?

02 March 2009

The liberal turn in Turkish foreign policy

For decades Turkish foreign policy was informed by a "siege mentality" that saw Turkey as surrounded by enemy nations with territorial ambitions over the country. The geopolitical position of Turkey was exaggerated to explain why foreign enemies had their eyes on it. This laid the ground for a perception of the external world in adversarial terms. The foreign policy elite believed that Turkey was located in a region where everyone was at war with everyone else, as in a Hobbesian state of nature.

Such a portrayal of the outside world was extremely convenient for domestic political purposes. Threats from outside justified the authoritarian regime inside. As Turkey was the focus of efforts emanating from the outside, the people at home had to be united against external enemies, and also beware of the internal extensions of these enemies. By such reasoning, democracy, human rights, and pluralism were regarded as luxurious and even risky, as the country was facing a constant threat to its very existence.

The politics of survival was the basis of this thinking. Everything -- any kind of authoritarian regime, radical nationalism, denial of the existence of the Kurds and delays in democratization -- could be explained or excused by reference to the primacy of survival in the face of external and internal threats.

Starting with the 1999 decision of the EU regarding Turkey's candidate status, the country learned to look at its foreign policy matters and regional affairs from a different point of view.

The 1999 candidacy move not only marked the beginning of an EU-stimulated process of domestic reform, but also the Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy. Instead of bullying in the region and projecting power over regional actors, Turkish leaders began to seek genuine peace and stability in the neighborhood, thus abandoning a conflict-based, security-centric and insecure perspective in approaching regional and global affairs. A paradigm shift occurred from pure power politics motivated by a search for survival in a hostile environment to a liberal foreign policy agenda seeing the countries of the region not as adversaries, but as partners prioritizing cooperation over conflict and soft power over military might and bullying.

The reason for this transformation was the restructuring of priorities in Turkish politics and foreign affairs in the late 1990s. Attaining the goals of "democratization, economic development, and EU accession" set the main agenda of Turkish foreign policy, as well as its domestic affairs, in the post-1999 period.

The stabilization of the region through active diplomacy, including mediation efforts, engagement with neighbors and the development of economic interaction and interdependence, have thus come to occupy the central stage. Turkey's rising regional profile has, however, led some commentators to accuse the Turkish government of departing from the West and embracing the East.

What has happened, in fact, is quite the contrary: Turkey is reiterating its "Western vocation" by brokering peace and stability in the region, as reflected in its efforts in the Caucasus and the Middle East. This is so because Turkey has realized that it has a very high stake in peace and stability in its neighborhood. Without peace and stability, it is impossible to attain its broad objectives of democratization, development and EU membership.

Yet such thinking is something new. In the old days, when Turkey offered merely its "strategic value" to allies, regional peace and stability did not matter. The more conflict-ridden, unstable and insecure the region was, the higher the "price" that would be offered to Turkey for its "strategic assets" in the region. Turkey, at the time, loved to be an "island of stability" in a region of chaos and conflict.

This has all changed due to the changing priorities of Turkey in the post-1999 era. A stabilized and war-free region is now essential for Turkey's quest to deepen its democracy, sustain its economic development and secure its accession to the EU. Being part of the conflict, tension or war will only serve the power of authoritarian elements in Turkey. Establishing peace, security, and stability in the region is, therefore, a means to foster Turkish democracy.

Turkey's quest to secure peace, security, and stability in the region by mediating between Israel and Syria, the US and Iran and Fatah and Hamas should be seen from this point of view. It is part and parcel of a liberal foreign policy that is based on cooperation, engagement, and multilateralism.

23 February 2009