A highly critical public attitude toward the United States that emerged after 2003 has certainly damaged Turkish-American relations. This state of mind toward the US, however, is not confined to the public at large but apparently influences some critical sectors and institutions too, including the Turkish military. The institution closest to the US as a natural result of the military alliance between the two countries is not expected to hold an "adversarial" opinion toward an ally. It is obviously hard to measure the exact scope of the negative opinion and attitude within the Turkish military toward the US, but we have some clues. One of these is a book prepared by Fikret Bila, a veteran journalist who is well acquainted with the men in uniform, "Komutanlar Cephesi" (The Commanders' Front.) The book is a collection of interviews conducted with various high-level generals who were involved with the fight against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).
While talking about the fight against the PKK, comments made by retired Turkish generals about the US are striking. Common knowledge that the US and Turkey are allies does not hold entirely true in the eyes of the commanders. It seems that the "comrades in arms" notion from the Cold War years is a thing of the past, even a distant past. What we see instead is deep distrust. Turkish generals expect the worst from the Americans, including an outright occupation of Turkey. There is only one exception, Gen. Hilmi Özkök; the rest speak of the US just as they did of the USSR two decades earlier.
What went wrong?
The most common view is that the US helps the PKK. Gen. Doğan Güreş, then the chief of general staff, said he gave an order to shoot down American helicopters during an operation in northern Iraq in 1992, citing as his reason that "the helicopters were dropping logistical support to the PKK groups" (p.72-73). Güreş does not only speak of the early 1990s. Referring to maps used by American soldiers that show Turkey divided and a statement by US Vice President Dick Cheney saying "the Kurds are America's only friends," Güreş is convinced that Americans help the PKK (Bila, 79-80). He concludes, "Turkey should be very careful." Another general, Necati Özgen, goes even further, claiming that "if the March 1 resolution had passed, the American troops would have been stationed throughout Turkey." He implies that Turkey would have lost its control in the Southeast as a result of events in the region prompted by the presence of American troops. In response to a question on the objective of the US in Turkey, Özgen is clear: "stationing in Turkey and almost occupying [the region]" (Bila, 100-101).
Özgen is prepared to go to war against the US over northern Iraq. Responding to the question of how Turkey can fight against the only superpower, Özgen responds: "It is just an image that the US is a superpower, nothing else. … Let the Americans oppose us. Even if they resist we'll fight and do whatever is necessary" (Bila, 102). Ismail Hakkı Karadayi, another general who served as the chief of general staff, is also convinced that the US is behind the PKK (Bila, 113). He speaks of how they captured the US-made weapons from the PKK, a proof of American support for the terror organization.
Gen. Hasan Kundakçı brings up a document guiding the American plot against Turkey: "The US is following a [congressional] decision made in 1896, a decision more or less like the Treaty of Sèvres," which divided up the Ottoman Empire at the end of the World War I (Bila, 131-132). Kundakci continues; "whenever the US entered Iraq helped the PKK and harmed us" (Bila, 153). Gen. Altay Tokat asserts that "after the [rejection] of the March 1 resolution by the Parliament, the US increased its support to the PKK." Weapons were sent to the Kandil Mountains where the PKK camps were based, according to Tokat (Bila, 181-182).
Are these views representative of the military high command, or their personal opinions? I do not know. But from this and other information in Bila's book, it is clear that some high-ranking generals are "reconsidering" the vision and wisdom of Turkey's alliance with the US. There exists an apparent discrepancy between the perception of the Turkish generals and the continuing cooperation on the ground between the two sides. I wonder how security cooperation can be continued with such a mindset. If our commanders think the US is the enemy, how can Turkey continue to cooperate with this country in a collective defense scheme and continue to buy weapon systems, share information and even cooperate in the NATO command structure?
28.04.2008
While talking about the fight against the PKK, comments made by retired Turkish generals about the US are striking. Common knowledge that the US and Turkey are allies does not hold entirely true in the eyes of the commanders. It seems that the "comrades in arms" notion from the Cold War years is a thing of the past, even a distant past. What we see instead is deep distrust. Turkish generals expect the worst from the Americans, including an outright occupation of Turkey. There is only one exception, Gen. Hilmi Özkök; the rest speak of the US just as they did of the USSR two decades earlier.
What went wrong?
The most common view is that the US helps the PKK. Gen. Doğan Güreş, then the chief of general staff, said he gave an order to shoot down American helicopters during an operation in northern Iraq in 1992, citing as his reason that "the helicopters were dropping logistical support to the PKK groups" (p.72-73). Güreş does not only speak of the early 1990s. Referring to maps used by American soldiers that show Turkey divided and a statement by US Vice President Dick Cheney saying "the Kurds are America's only friends," Güreş is convinced that Americans help the PKK (Bila, 79-80). He concludes, "Turkey should be very careful." Another general, Necati Özgen, goes even further, claiming that "if the March 1 resolution had passed, the American troops would have been stationed throughout Turkey." He implies that Turkey would have lost its control in the Southeast as a result of events in the region prompted by the presence of American troops. In response to a question on the objective of the US in Turkey, Özgen is clear: "stationing in Turkey and almost occupying [the region]" (Bila, 100-101).
Özgen is prepared to go to war against the US over northern Iraq. Responding to the question of how Turkey can fight against the only superpower, Özgen responds: "It is just an image that the US is a superpower, nothing else. … Let the Americans oppose us. Even if they resist we'll fight and do whatever is necessary" (Bila, 102). Ismail Hakkı Karadayi, another general who served as the chief of general staff, is also convinced that the US is behind the PKK (Bila, 113). He speaks of how they captured the US-made weapons from the PKK, a proof of American support for the terror organization.
Gen. Hasan Kundakçı brings up a document guiding the American plot against Turkey: "The US is following a [congressional] decision made in 1896, a decision more or less like the Treaty of Sèvres," which divided up the Ottoman Empire at the end of the World War I (Bila, 131-132). Kundakci continues; "whenever the US entered Iraq helped the PKK and harmed us" (Bila, 153). Gen. Altay Tokat asserts that "after the [rejection] of the March 1 resolution by the Parliament, the US increased its support to the PKK." Weapons were sent to the Kandil Mountains where the PKK camps were based, according to Tokat (Bila, 181-182).
Are these views representative of the military high command, or their personal opinions? I do not know. But from this and other information in Bila's book, it is clear that some high-ranking generals are "reconsidering" the vision and wisdom of Turkey's alliance with the US. There exists an apparent discrepancy between the perception of the Turkish generals and the continuing cooperation on the ground between the two sides. I wonder how security cooperation can be continued with such a mindset. If our commanders think the US is the enemy, how can Turkey continue to cooperate with this country in a collective defense scheme and continue to buy weapon systems, share information and even cooperate in the NATO command structure?
28.04.2008
