Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has been suffering from the absence of a common enemy to justify and cement the alliance. In response, the presence and coherence of the organization is tried to be justified by references to “common values,” as reflected in its revised “strategic concepts.”
The Lisbon summit approved the third such “concept” since 1991, searching for a rationale for the alliance in the absence of a common enemy. NATO is attempting to go beyond a “defense organization” and to evolve into a political entity. In an era with no “common enemy,” NATO has embraced “common values” that were spelled out long ago in the Washington Treaty. Since its foundation, NATO has always claimed to defend the common values of its member states as well as their territories. The confrontation with the Warsaw Pact countries during the Cold War was often justified by reference to defending the “free world” and liberties cherished by it. However, defending liberties and promoting values and institutions of the “free world” was taken up as an essential mission of NATO in the post-Cold War era. The question is, to what extent has NATO succeeded in living up to its claim?
In the aftermath of the Cold War and the demise of a Soviet threat, NATO moved to be a “community of values” more concerned about threats to its core values. The “maintenance of democratic order” was often cited as a rationale for NATO’s assertiveness in the definition of non-Article 5 tasks. It appeared that NATO was moving from a collective defense organization to a Euro-Atlantic politico-military power. Thus it was perceived that repression, economic failure, and human rights abuses leading to massive flows of refugees and environmental degradation could, though indirectly, affect the security and stability of NATO members. In the post-Cold War era, the “new NATO” claimed to have become an institution that intervenes to protect certain principles and values, a power for peacemaking and post-conflict peacekeeping, and a model for developing democratic national security structures. In response to the post-Cold War politico-security environment, the 1991 strategic concept developed a “broader” concept of security threats for NATO that includes instabilities and insecurities prompted by human rights violations. It was then declared that “security and stability do not lie solely in the military dimension” and NATO’s leaders decided to enhance the “political component” of the alliance.
After eight years of experimentation with the 1991 document, the 1999 Strategic Concept observed that “the last 10 years have seen … the appearance of complex new risks to Euro-Atlantic peace and stability, including oppression, ethnic conflict, economic distress, [and] the collapse of political order.” Here the alliance declared that issues of “software security” threaten peace and stability in the NATO area. Among the “purpose and tasks of the alliance,” the 1999 strategic concept committed NATO to “contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations.” Here NATO clearly defined a role that went beyond its conventional task definition that required a constant interest in the state of politics in peripheral states. The strategic concept also talked of “fostering democracy” as a means of reaching the objective of peace and stability. Among the possibilities, the document mentions are uncertainty and instability generated by “ethnic and religious rivalries,” “the abuse of human rights” and “the uncontrolled movement of large numbers of people.” It was understood that security and stability of NATO required an interest in the wider environment, focusing also on software security threats.
Thus, the non-Article 5 tasks of crisis management and crisis response have become some of the fundamental security tasks of the new NATO. In this context, NATO peacekeeping in the Balkans and other parts of the world seem to be long-term commitments. This is reiterated in the new strategic concept approved by NATO leaders in the Lisbon summit. The alliance commits itself to prevent crises, managing conflicts and stabilizing post-conflict situations around the globe. This is obviously not the NATO we knew in the Cold War years. To justify a political role in the absence of a common enemy, the Lisbon concept emphases “common values” among member countries. It is reaffirmed that the “alliance is based on common values of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law.” NATO’s essential mission is described in a similar manner: to ensure that the alliance remains an unparalleled community of freedom, peace, security and shared values.
It is true that a coherent alliance identity requires common values. These, however, cannot be achieved by stating them but by practicing them. Old habits of looking for an enemy (be it Iran or Russia) contradict the claims of the new NATO as a “community of values.”
The Lisbon summit approved the third such “concept” since 1991, searching for a rationale for the alliance in the absence of a common enemy. NATO is attempting to go beyond a “defense organization” and to evolve into a political entity. In an era with no “common enemy,” NATO has embraced “common values” that were spelled out long ago in the Washington Treaty. Since its foundation, NATO has always claimed to defend the common values of its member states as well as their territories. The confrontation with the Warsaw Pact countries during the Cold War was often justified by reference to defending the “free world” and liberties cherished by it. However, defending liberties and promoting values and institutions of the “free world” was taken up as an essential mission of NATO in the post-Cold War era. The question is, to what extent has NATO succeeded in living up to its claim?
In the aftermath of the Cold War and the demise of a Soviet threat, NATO moved to be a “community of values” more concerned about threats to its core values. The “maintenance of democratic order” was often cited as a rationale for NATO’s assertiveness in the definition of non-Article 5 tasks. It appeared that NATO was moving from a collective defense organization to a Euro-Atlantic politico-military power. Thus it was perceived that repression, economic failure, and human rights abuses leading to massive flows of refugees and environmental degradation could, though indirectly, affect the security and stability of NATO members. In the post-Cold War era, the “new NATO” claimed to have become an institution that intervenes to protect certain principles and values, a power for peacemaking and post-conflict peacekeeping, and a model for developing democratic national security structures. In response to the post-Cold War politico-security environment, the 1991 strategic concept developed a “broader” concept of security threats for NATO that includes instabilities and insecurities prompted by human rights violations. It was then declared that “security and stability do not lie solely in the military dimension” and NATO’s leaders decided to enhance the “political component” of the alliance.
After eight years of experimentation with the 1991 document, the 1999 Strategic Concept observed that “the last 10 years have seen … the appearance of complex new risks to Euro-Atlantic peace and stability, including oppression, ethnic conflict, economic distress, [and] the collapse of political order.” Here the alliance declared that issues of “software security” threaten peace and stability in the NATO area. Among the “purpose and tasks of the alliance,” the 1999 strategic concept committed NATO to “contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations.” Here NATO clearly defined a role that went beyond its conventional task definition that required a constant interest in the state of politics in peripheral states. The strategic concept also talked of “fostering democracy” as a means of reaching the objective of peace and stability. Among the possibilities, the document mentions are uncertainty and instability generated by “ethnic and religious rivalries,” “the abuse of human rights” and “the uncontrolled movement of large numbers of people.” It was understood that security and stability of NATO required an interest in the wider environment, focusing also on software security threats.
Thus, the non-Article 5 tasks of crisis management and crisis response have become some of the fundamental security tasks of the new NATO. In this context, NATO peacekeeping in the Balkans and other parts of the world seem to be long-term commitments. This is reiterated in the new strategic concept approved by NATO leaders in the Lisbon summit. The alliance commits itself to prevent crises, managing conflicts and stabilizing post-conflict situations around the globe. This is obviously not the NATO we knew in the Cold War years. To justify a political role in the absence of a common enemy, the Lisbon concept emphases “common values” among member countries. It is reaffirmed that the “alliance is based on common values of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law.” NATO’s essential mission is described in a similar manner: to ensure that the alliance remains an unparalleled community of freedom, peace, security and shared values.
It is true that a coherent alliance identity requires common values. These, however, cannot be achieved by stating them but by practicing them. Old habits of looking for an enemy (be it Iran or Russia) contradict the claims of the new NATO as a “community of values.”
