At the heart of the Kurdish question lies an "imagined Turkish nation" which is assumed to be ethnically homogenous and politically equal. Such an imagined nation came out of a concern that without a unified and homogenous nation, territorial and political integrity of the new republic could not be sustained. Viewing differences as potentially disruptive to unity, the Kurds were assumed to be part of the Turkish nation, and their distinct language, culture and history were denied.
This has not occurred only to the Kurds. The republican regime has always had problems with identities, be it ethnic or religious, or even ideological. Allegiances to entities rather than the state were always viewed with great suspicion, giving the impression that the state was fearful of competing with other social and political entities for the loyalty of its citizens. This sense of insecurity, prompted by a top-down authoritarian modernization project, has resulted in a deep distrust of people who are considered potentially anti-republican or anti-Turkish nation-state. The problem was in fact not modernization, nation building or even secularization, but the exclusionary manner in which the Kemalist state elite conducted these processes. Denying representation to different ethnic and religious groups at the center with their own distinct identities only served to exclude and alienate Islamic/conservative groups and the Kurds, which in turn added to the insecurity of the Kemalist regime.
The way to break this vicious cycle is to broaden avenues of representation for these historically excluded identity groups and abandon the Kemalist policy of imposing an official identity/ideology for the people, be it Turks or Kurds. Though the Turkish military continues to imagine Turkey/Turkish nation/Turkish nation-state as homogenous, the founding myths of the Turkish nation-state have proved to be fallacious. Turkey needs to generate a new social consensus for coexistence among its diverse ethnic groups. One of the grounds for a renewed consensus is a constitution with liberal, democratic and pluralistic elements that will recognize the Kurds as being included. The second ground on which a new consensus can be built is to secure EU membership. These two areas, a new constitution and EU membership, are in fact mutually supportive objectives.
What is the position of the military on these broad objectives as the grounds to address the Kurdish question? There hasn't been a public statement by the military on the new constitution. But it is known that the military views political reforms that further democratization and improve human rights very critically. Democracy and human rights are considered fallacies, as reflected recently in the statement of Gen. [İlker] Başbuğ when he took up the job of chief of general staff. Recognition of the Kurds as an ethno-political group is strongly opposed by Başbuğ.
Concerning EU membership, we know how skeptical the top military brass are. The EU is viewed as a post-modern political project that will destroy the Turkish nation-state. Apart from supranational characteristics of the EU that threaten the Turkish nation-state, the military does not have favorable views on individual European states either. Almost all are depicted as "Turkey's so-called friends and allies," most of whom support the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).
The military wants to fight against PKK terrorism but not to address the root cause of the problem, the Kurdish question. In its public statements the military points to the need for non-military measures to overcome the PKK terror. By such discourse it implies that political leadership is not doing enough to eliminate social and political circumstances that enable the PKK to recruit new militants. Thus, in a way, responsibility for the continuation of PKK terror is placed on political leadership, which does not deal with the roots of terror. However, it is the military that blocks addressing the root cause. The military does not only reduce the problem to the fight against terror but also constantly draws "red lines" to obstruct a political solution. Pluralism is questioned, broadcasting in Kurdish is obstructed, amnesty is opposed, transfer of power to local governments is blocked, and the Democratic Society Party (DTP) is stigmatized. Within such "red lines" drawn so effectively by the military there can be no political solution to the Kurdish question.
Finally, we should keep in mind that the Kurdish question is not only a challenge for the Turkish military but also an opportunity to establish and sustain its hegemonic position in Turkish politics. Through the Kurdish question that social and political space in Turkey is secured, placing the military at the top.
20.10.2008
Monday, October 20, 2008
Monday, October 13, 2008
The PKK as a burden on Iraqi Kurds
The outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party’s (PKK) attacks from northern Iraq on Turkish targets have turned the Kurdish region in Iraq into a primary target of Turkey. It is time for the regional Kurdish administration to stop using the PKK as a bargaining chip against Turkey; it is not a time for the Kurdish people of Iraq to side with the PKK out of Kurdish sentimentality. While the former produces no advantages and incites the animosity of Turkey and pressures of the US, the latter ignores the fact that the PKK threatens to undo the gains Iraqi Kurds have made through their long struggle.
What Iraqi Kurds have today, after decades of struggle, is certainly worth preserving and consolidating, and those gains should not be risked by protecting the PKK.
The Iraqi Kurdish administration and Kurdish people need to understand what the PKK is up to. The objective of the PKK is clear: to keep the Iraqi Kurdish administration under the assault and pressure of Turkey. By doing so the PKK calculates that Iraqi Kurds will be unable to develop a polity which has full sovereignty over northern Iraq and is powerful enough to exclude the PKK from the region.
The PKK is aware that once Turkey and the northern Iraqi Kurdish administration establish mutual trust and cooperation, the PKK’s power in the region will disappear. Thus it does everything possible to block the development of understanding and cooperation between Turkey and northern Iraq. The PKK is pleased that Turkey has launched cross-border operations into northern Iraq, that it threatens the Kurdish administration and that it exerts pressure on the US to turn against the Kurds of Iraq.
Iraqi Kurds should not be naïve: the PKK does not want the Iraqi Kurdish administration to consolidate its power in the region. A powerful and consolidated Iraqi Kurdish administration would mean that the PKK would no longer have a free hand in northern Iraq, nor would it any longer be a force to be reckoned with.
Personalities should not be forgotten when analyzing the objectives of the PKK. Do the Iraqi Kurds and the regional administration really think that the PKK and its leader Abdullah Öcalan care about the fate, success and future of Iraqi Kurds? Just think of the current positions of three Kurdish leaders in the region: Jalal Talabani, Massoud Barzani and Öcalan. Talabani is the respected president of Iraq; Barzani is the recognized head of the Kurdish administration in northern Iraq. What about Öcalan? He is regarded by the world as a terrorist sitting in a Turkish jail! Do you think he could care less about the success of the Iraqi Kurds? I bet Öcalan is sitting in his jail hating Talabani and Barzani out of jealousy over being defeated while the other two leaders are enjoying success and international legitimacy.
It is crystal clear that northern Iraq will not exercise full sovereignty in the region as long as the PKK is present there. As long as northern Iraq is used as a base for the PKK’s attack on Turkey, Turkey’s cross-border operations will be legitimate. The territory of northern Iraq will treated as no-man’s land without a legitimate authority.
The PKK presence in northern Iraq means that the Iraqi Kurdish authority shares its territorial sovereignty with the PKK. In the past Iraqi Kurds and their leaders at times fought against the PKK and at times aligned with it. Now the situation is different. Iraqi Kurds who recognize the historical significance of the federal state they now control within Iraq should act accordingly and forget about the simple politicking of the past.
The PKK is their enemy of as well as Turkey’s. It is the single most important hurdle in the consolidation of their power in northern Iraq and the establishment of a peaceful relationship with Turkey, a relationship which is necessary for the consolidation of their administration.
If Iraqi Kurds want enemies in the region they should tolerate, turn a blind eye to or support the PKK on their soil. Iraqi Kurds should recognize that the PKK has become a burden for them.
It is obvious that the PKK launched an attack on Turkey just to provoke a reaction that would show disregard for the Iraqi authority. The Iraqi Kurdish administration should reflect on the situation and decide its priorities: Will it take the current historic opportunity to consolidate its power, or will it continue to see the PKK in a sympathetic light and be treated like the PKK in the region?
13.10.2008
What Iraqi Kurds have today, after decades of struggle, is certainly worth preserving and consolidating, and those gains should not be risked by protecting the PKK.
The Iraqi Kurdish administration and Kurdish people need to understand what the PKK is up to. The objective of the PKK is clear: to keep the Iraqi Kurdish administration under the assault and pressure of Turkey. By doing so the PKK calculates that Iraqi Kurds will be unable to develop a polity which has full sovereignty over northern Iraq and is powerful enough to exclude the PKK from the region.
The PKK is aware that once Turkey and the northern Iraqi Kurdish administration establish mutual trust and cooperation, the PKK’s power in the region will disappear. Thus it does everything possible to block the development of understanding and cooperation between Turkey and northern Iraq. The PKK is pleased that Turkey has launched cross-border operations into northern Iraq, that it threatens the Kurdish administration and that it exerts pressure on the US to turn against the Kurds of Iraq.
Iraqi Kurds should not be naïve: the PKK does not want the Iraqi Kurdish administration to consolidate its power in the region. A powerful and consolidated Iraqi Kurdish administration would mean that the PKK would no longer have a free hand in northern Iraq, nor would it any longer be a force to be reckoned with.
Personalities should not be forgotten when analyzing the objectives of the PKK. Do the Iraqi Kurds and the regional administration really think that the PKK and its leader Abdullah Öcalan care about the fate, success and future of Iraqi Kurds? Just think of the current positions of three Kurdish leaders in the region: Jalal Talabani, Massoud Barzani and Öcalan. Talabani is the respected president of Iraq; Barzani is the recognized head of the Kurdish administration in northern Iraq. What about Öcalan? He is regarded by the world as a terrorist sitting in a Turkish jail! Do you think he could care less about the success of the Iraqi Kurds? I bet Öcalan is sitting in his jail hating Talabani and Barzani out of jealousy over being defeated while the other two leaders are enjoying success and international legitimacy.
It is crystal clear that northern Iraq will not exercise full sovereignty in the region as long as the PKK is present there. As long as northern Iraq is used as a base for the PKK’s attack on Turkey, Turkey’s cross-border operations will be legitimate. The territory of northern Iraq will treated as no-man’s land without a legitimate authority.
The PKK presence in northern Iraq means that the Iraqi Kurdish authority shares its territorial sovereignty with the PKK. In the past Iraqi Kurds and their leaders at times fought against the PKK and at times aligned with it. Now the situation is different. Iraqi Kurds who recognize the historical significance of the federal state they now control within Iraq should act accordingly and forget about the simple politicking of the past.
The PKK is their enemy of as well as Turkey’s. It is the single most important hurdle in the consolidation of their power in northern Iraq and the establishment of a peaceful relationship with Turkey, a relationship which is necessary for the consolidation of their administration.
If Iraqi Kurds want enemies in the region they should tolerate, turn a blind eye to or support the PKK on their soil. Iraqi Kurds should recognize that the PKK has become a burden for them.
It is obvious that the PKK launched an attack on Turkey just to provoke a reaction that would show disregard for the Iraqi authority. The Iraqi Kurdish administration should reflect on the situation and decide its priorities: Will it take the current historic opportunity to consolidate its power, or will it continue to see the PKK in a sympathetic light and be treated like the PKK in the region?
13.10.2008
Monday, October 6, 2008
The PKK’s raid: predictions and questions
The Kurdistan Workers' Party's (PKK) attack on Aktütün, a military post in Şemdinli near the Iraqi border, took place in the middle of two events.
The first is an ethnic clash which erupted last week between Kurds and Turks in Altınova, a holiday resort on the Aegean coast, leaving two dead. The second is a request from the government that Parliament extend the authorization for cross-border operations into northern Iraq, something which will be voted on this week.
It is clear that the PKK's attack on the Aktütün post is an open challenge to the Turkish military on the eve of the renewal of the authorization for cross-border operations on the one hand and an attempt to provoke further ethnic clashes between Kurds and Turks throughout Turkey on the other.
With the Aktütün raid, the PKK is trying to send the message that it is still strong and capable of staging high-profile operations against military targets. Given the fact that some 350 PKK militants took part in the raid and that the clash continued for seven hours in broad daylight, it would not be inaccurate to assume that the organizational and logistical infrastructure of the PKK is effective despite claims by Turkish security forces that recent cross-border operations destroyed the PKK's infrastructure in northern Iraq.
The latest attack by the PKK will put Turkey's relations with both northern Iraq and the US into question. It was revealed that the terrorists arrived from northern Iraq and hit the military post with long-range weapons from Iraqi soil. This will prompt the question of whether Iraq is a sovereign state capable of controlling its own territory. It is also certain that ability or willingness of the Kurdish authorities in the north to control the PKK's activities will be under debate in Turkey, thus poisoning the development of understanding and cooperation between Turkey and the Kurdish regional government.
The need for continued cross-border military operations in northern Iraq is confirmed by the PKK raid of Aktütün, and Parliament's extension of the authorization for cross-border operations into northern Iraq is now certain.
The US's cooperation will also be questioned. Nationalist anti-Western circles have already started to use the occasion to stir anti-American sentiment, arguing that the PKK is being supported by Turkey's Western allies including the US. Thus it is time for the US to reassert its support for Turkey in the fight against PKK terror.
The government will now face tremendous pressure. Although many, including the military, say that non-military measures are needed to address the root causes of the problem, it will be rather difficult for the government to institute such programs. Even a redirection of funds to southeastern Turkey may encounter bureaucratic resistance and slowdown in the wake of the PKK's assault. Any political scheme put forward to resolve this problem would be unthinkable for some time to come.
The attack by the PKK will certainly put the Democratic Society Party (DTP) in a difficult position, especially in its closure case before the Constitutional Court. Under the influence of growing public anger, the court may well be inclined to close down the party, which is accused of being connected with the PKK.
The Aktütün raid also raises questions in regard to the efficiency of the military's fight against the PKK and its ability to gather intelligence and mobilize its forces in the event of an attack. This time the military will not be able to escape criticism. The loss of 15 Turkish soldiers at a military post that was still vulnerable despite having been attacked five times in the past must be explained to the public. Many questions emerge: Is the Turkish military, which is so outspoken and so uncompromising on domestic political matters, capable of winning the war against the PKK, which is known to have only 5,000 militants? Is the Turkish military wasting its resources and energy on domestic political quarrels, leaving it ineffective against the PKK?
06.10.2008
The first is an ethnic clash which erupted last week between Kurds and Turks in Altınova, a holiday resort on the Aegean coast, leaving two dead. The second is a request from the government that Parliament extend the authorization for cross-border operations into northern Iraq, something which will be voted on this week.
It is clear that the PKK's attack on the Aktütün post is an open challenge to the Turkish military on the eve of the renewal of the authorization for cross-border operations on the one hand and an attempt to provoke further ethnic clashes between Kurds and Turks throughout Turkey on the other.
With the Aktütün raid, the PKK is trying to send the message that it is still strong and capable of staging high-profile operations against military targets. Given the fact that some 350 PKK militants took part in the raid and that the clash continued for seven hours in broad daylight, it would not be inaccurate to assume that the organizational and logistical infrastructure of the PKK is effective despite claims by Turkish security forces that recent cross-border operations destroyed the PKK's infrastructure in northern Iraq.
The latest attack by the PKK will put Turkey's relations with both northern Iraq and the US into question. It was revealed that the terrorists arrived from northern Iraq and hit the military post with long-range weapons from Iraqi soil. This will prompt the question of whether Iraq is a sovereign state capable of controlling its own territory. It is also certain that ability or willingness of the Kurdish authorities in the north to control the PKK's activities will be under debate in Turkey, thus poisoning the development of understanding and cooperation between Turkey and the Kurdish regional government.
The need for continued cross-border military operations in northern Iraq is confirmed by the PKK raid of Aktütün, and Parliament's extension of the authorization for cross-border operations into northern Iraq is now certain.
The US's cooperation will also be questioned. Nationalist anti-Western circles have already started to use the occasion to stir anti-American sentiment, arguing that the PKK is being supported by Turkey's Western allies including the US. Thus it is time for the US to reassert its support for Turkey in the fight against PKK terror.
The government will now face tremendous pressure. Although many, including the military, say that non-military measures are needed to address the root causes of the problem, it will be rather difficult for the government to institute such programs. Even a redirection of funds to southeastern Turkey may encounter bureaucratic resistance and slowdown in the wake of the PKK's assault. Any political scheme put forward to resolve this problem would be unthinkable for some time to come.
The attack by the PKK will certainly put the Democratic Society Party (DTP) in a difficult position, especially in its closure case before the Constitutional Court. Under the influence of growing public anger, the court may well be inclined to close down the party, which is accused of being connected with the PKK.
The Aktütün raid also raises questions in regard to the efficiency of the military's fight against the PKK and its ability to gather intelligence and mobilize its forces in the event of an attack. This time the military will not be able to escape criticism. The loss of 15 Turkish soldiers at a military post that was still vulnerable despite having been attacked five times in the past must be explained to the public. Many questions emerge: Is the Turkish military, which is so outspoken and so uncompromising on domestic political matters, capable of winning the war against the PKK, which is known to have only 5,000 militants? Is the Turkish military wasting its resources and energy on domestic political quarrels, leaving it ineffective against the PKK?
06.10.2008
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