Is the Turkish military in favor of Turkey's accession to the EU? Given the lack of enthusiasm on the part of the EU and the Turkish government at the moment, this question may appear rather irrelevant. But to understand the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government slowing down on the EU reforms, providing an answer to this question is important.
As EU membership is increasingly described in terms of the very survival of the Turkish nation-state it becomes very difficult for the government to push for risky political reforms. An aggressive EU integration process by the government may thus increase the tension and conflict within the state between the reformist government and those resisting bureaucracy, mainly the military and the judiciary. So the government is cautious.
Yet Chief of General Staff Gen. İlker Başbuğ declared recently that the military is not against EU membership provided that the EU doesn't target the "nation-state." So for the military preserving the "nation state" while acceding to the EU is a must.
This is exactly the point. This means that the military leaders merely pay lip service to the EU membership goal but resist reforms needed to get Turkey into the bloc, the reforms that they regard as weakening the nation-state. Everybody knows that EU membership requires a revision of the traditional notion of sovereignty and the nation-state.
Isn't it a nice public relations affair on the part of the military both in Turkey and Europe?
They know perfectly well that in the accession process political reforms have to be continued, including a more transparent military budget and a democratic civil-military relationship. Instead of saying this directly they prefer to refer to the notion of the nation-state.
This gives an image that the military wishes to see Turkey in the EU but not changed, transformed or reformed. My guess is that even if the EU decided to take Turkey in today the military would oppose it. This time the military will ask the EU to change itself before Turkey is allowed to join.
Will the Turkish military be prepared to be part of the EU where there are supranational institutions that are in no way under the control of national governments? The EU is an entity in which supranational institutions, such as the European Commission, the European Parliament, the European Court of Justice and the European Central Bank, have power over national governments. The Lisbon Treaty is meant to increase the supranational character of the EU at large. Decision making in the European Council, an intergovernmental body, will be significantly changed in a way to reduce further "national sovereignty."
So, how would the Turkish military fit Turkey into this increasingly supranational entity while keeping the Turkish nation-state intact? Is the military prepared to give up national currency (it is not a must, but very likely), accept a European Central Bank, European defense and foreign policy and jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice? How would the military defend its business interests such as OYAK Holding in an EU member Turkey?
There is no way to go on with a conventional nation-state in the EU, which is increasingly becoming a transnational entity going beyond traditional functions, organization and duties of a nation-state.
If the military really wishes to be part of the EU it must be prepared to revise the traditional notion of the nation-state. But we see quite the contrary: It puts forth maintaining the traditional nation-state as a prerequisite to membership. This means that either it does not understand what the EU is or just does not want to be part of it.
Let me conclude on why the Turkish military is against EU membership: Turkish generals want Turkey to be ruled in Ankara not in Brussels. They think so long as Turkey is ruled in Ankara they will somehow control or share power with the politicians. They know perfectly well that they will have no seat in the power-sharing mechanisms of Brussels.
29.09.2008
Monday, September 29, 2008
Saturday, September 27, 2008
A matter of conscience and respect for labor
The “reactionary” move of the newly appointed rector at Boğaziçi University sparked a reaction from students and faculty members.
Those who ignore the liberal and liberalizing roles of the universities really have difficult times. Defending the bans in the strongholds of liberal thought, attempting to assume a role to monitor attire and keeping the students away from the classrooms are not things we can approve of.
Is there any “law” prohibiting the headscarf at the universities? No. Quite the contrary, the Higher Education Law states that students are free to wear any clothing or attire at institutions of higher education, as long as it does not violate the legislation in effect. So where does the ban come from? In its interpretation of this legal provision, the Constitutional Court ruled that the headscarf could not be considered proper attire under this law. The law says it is allowed whereas civil servants offer a restrictive interpretation. This is what is called “arbitrary rule.”
In an attempt to end this arbitrariness, Parliament amended the Constitution in February to eliminate discrimination between students by emphasizing the right to education and the equal opportunity principle. But this time, civil servants who are used to arbitrary rule concluded that Parliament was not allowed to amend the Constitution. The Constitutional Court had no right or authority to take such an action.
Let’s just say that it is forbidden to wear the headscarf at universities. Recently, Yasemin Çongar from the Taraf daily expounded on the matter, saying, “Just because it is banned does not necessarily mean that it is just.” The ban does not stop the headscarf from being a right that individuals can claim. The history of humanity is full of examples of rights gained after a struggle against bans. Nobody should be expected to accept the bans. This prohibition closely concerns a vast majority of the people in this country. At least 70 percent of the Turkish people support lifting this ban at the universities. That is to say, the people are asking for the ban to be lifted, whereas public officers, who are supposed to be servants of the people and make a living on the people’s taxes, resist. Can you tell me what the people should do?
Obviously, the headscarf controversy is no longer merely a legal issue. You should listen to your conscience because from now on it is also a matter of conscience. Depriving the students of their right to education at the universities should hurt people and give them sleepless nights.
Can you imagine this: You have to rank in the first 10,000 among 1.5 million examinees to be entitled to placement in a department at Boğaziçi University. To achieve this, you give up playing with your friends at an early age and instead you choose rigorous studying. You attend private courses after school instead of seeing a movie. You study hard instead of having fun with friends and family. At an early age, you feel the need and burden of having a bright future through a good education. You experience sleepless nights. Neither your body nor your mind is actually able to bear this burden. But you put forth the effort; you want to succeed -- and finally you fulfill your dream when you earn a spot at Boğaziçi University after intensive effort over at least five years. But while you are ready to take what you have earned, somebody at the gate of the university tells you that you are not allowed to be there because you are wearing a headscarf.
What would those who do not admit the young women wearing the headscarf at the gate of Boğaziçi University feel if their daughters were turned down at the university gates because of their attire? Wouldn’t they rebel? Wouldn’t they ask for actions or measures to be taken against this invalidation of their intensive labor and efforts?
Imagine the families of these students with headscarves. They have spent money for years to make sure that their daughters will get a good education; they put forth effort; they are proud of their kids. Then, a rector appears in front of the university gate to tell them they are not allowed on the university premises in particular attire.
From where do you get this right to seize the people’s rights and labors? Where is justice and equality? Where is conscience?
27.09.2008
Those who ignore the liberal and liberalizing roles of the universities really have difficult times. Defending the bans in the strongholds of liberal thought, attempting to assume a role to monitor attire and keeping the students away from the classrooms are not things we can approve of.
Is there any “law” prohibiting the headscarf at the universities? No. Quite the contrary, the Higher Education Law states that students are free to wear any clothing or attire at institutions of higher education, as long as it does not violate the legislation in effect. So where does the ban come from? In its interpretation of this legal provision, the Constitutional Court ruled that the headscarf could not be considered proper attire under this law. The law says it is allowed whereas civil servants offer a restrictive interpretation. This is what is called “arbitrary rule.”
In an attempt to end this arbitrariness, Parliament amended the Constitution in February to eliminate discrimination between students by emphasizing the right to education and the equal opportunity principle. But this time, civil servants who are used to arbitrary rule concluded that Parliament was not allowed to amend the Constitution. The Constitutional Court had no right or authority to take such an action.
Let’s just say that it is forbidden to wear the headscarf at universities. Recently, Yasemin Çongar from the Taraf daily expounded on the matter, saying, “Just because it is banned does not necessarily mean that it is just.” The ban does not stop the headscarf from being a right that individuals can claim. The history of humanity is full of examples of rights gained after a struggle against bans. Nobody should be expected to accept the bans. This prohibition closely concerns a vast majority of the people in this country. At least 70 percent of the Turkish people support lifting this ban at the universities. That is to say, the people are asking for the ban to be lifted, whereas public officers, who are supposed to be servants of the people and make a living on the people’s taxes, resist. Can you tell me what the people should do?
Obviously, the headscarf controversy is no longer merely a legal issue. You should listen to your conscience because from now on it is also a matter of conscience. Depriving the students of their right to education at the universities should hurt people and give them sleepless nights.
Can you imagine this: You have to rank in the first 10,000 among 1.5 million examinees to be entitled to placement in a department at Boğaziçi University. To achieve this, you give up playing with your friends at an early age and instead you choose rigorous studying. You attend private courses after school instead of seeing a movie. You study hard instead of having fun with friends and family. At an early age, you feel the need and burden of having a bright future through a good education. You experience sleepless nights. Neither your body nor your mind is actually able to bear this burden. But you put forth the effort; you want to succeed -- and finally you fulfill your dream when you earn a spot at Boğaziçi University after intensive effort over at least five years. But while you are ready to take what you have earned, somebody at the gate of the university tells you that you are not allowed to be there because you are wearing a headscarf.
What would those who do not admit the young women wearing the headscarf at the gate of Boğaziçi University feel if their daughters were turned down at the university gates because of their attire? Wouldn’t they rebel? Wouldn’t they ask for actions or measures to be taken against this invalidation of their intensive labor and efforts?
Imagine the families of these students with headscarves. They have spent money for years to make sure that their daughters will get a good education; they put forth effort; they are proud of their kids. Then, a rector appears in front of the university gate to tell them they are not allowed on the university premises in particular attire.
From where do you get this right to seize the people’s rights and labors? Where is justice and equality? Where is conscience?
27.09.2008
Monday, September 22, 2008
Political actors needed to solve Kurdish question
Foreign observers following Turkish politics naturally may have an image of Turkey as a country where political parties face constant threats of closure by the Constitutional Court. They are, in fact, not mistaken. The ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) has just escaped being closed down by the court.
Now it is the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) that the Constitutional Court is about to issue its judgment on, in a case for closure brought by the chief public prosecutor. So far 24 political parties have been closed down by the court. As for the parties of the DTP line, the number is already four. It will, therefore, be no surprise if the same thing happens to the DTP.
We know for certain that the decisions of the Constitutional Court on party closure cases are not strictly legal but also political. The judges sitting on the court use political reasoning. It is time for them to give serious thought to the function of a political party such as the DTP, and more importantly on how to resolve the Kurdish issue without political actors. Turkey needs political parties like the DTP and the AK Party that represent the Kurdish constituency to first integrate the Kurds into central politics and to address their demands and grievances.
The DTP should therefore not be closed down. Though it is not the sole representative of the Kurdish constituency as it used to be, it nevertheless reflects the views and positions of a significant segment of the Kurdish population. The DTP's presence in Parliament is valuable in itself, as is the representation of the DTP grassroots in central political institutions of Turkey. It is the DTP again where radical Kurdish politics engages in an internal debate on the ways to put their demands forward. The ability of radical Kurdish politics to transform into a legitimate political agent will, therefore, be seen in the internal debate of the DTP. And all of these processes require non-closure of the party. Only if the party is kept open will the DTP evolve over time into a genuine political party, distancing itself from the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and having a life, program, and constituency of its own.
Closure, on the other hand, would only serve to avoid questioning the party's conventional line. The radicals in the party will think that they are vindicated as they continue to argue that political struggle has its limits, and thus they should keep the violence option open.
It is clear that the DTP has not yet completely distanced itself from violence. It could have established its own political entity but instead, its leaders have chosen or were obliged to choose, to remain under the shadow of the PKK. As such they have not only disappointed many in Turkey but also foreign observers in the West. The legitimacy of a political party that does not denounce violence would be questioned in any liberal democracy.
Moreover, as Kurdish people have increasingly been questioning the wisdom of using violence as a method of political struggle, it should have been time for the DTP to emerge as solely a political agent. But it has hesitated in sending messages to the PKK and its extensions in the region. But this seems suicidal for the DTP. They should keep in mind that the DTP now has a rival in representing Kurdish politics, the AK Party. It is a challenge for the DTP to reconsider their conventional approach to politics and the Kurdish issue. I would remind them that the AK Party has succeeded in eliminating the conventional center-right political parties in Turkish politics - such as the Motherland Party (ANAVATAN) and the True Path Party (DYP) -- and replaced them, as such parties failed to renew themselves and change political, social and economic circumstances. The same might happen to the DTP in the region if it does not respond to challenges brought by the AK Party. The July 22 elections presented a clear warning to the DTP that the provision of services to the people in the region matters as much as identity politics. Given the poor performance of the DTP in local administrations and the growing weariness of people with violence, the DTP might face a serious blow in the upcoming local elections of 2009.
To conclude, first, the Constitutional Court should let the DTP evolve. Closing the party would mean siding with the radicals within the party. Second, closing the party would be another embarrassment for democracy in this country. The court should save us from such an embarrassment.
22.09.2008
Now it is the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) that the Constitutional Court is about to issue its judgment on, in a case for closure brought by the chief public prosecutor. So far 24 political parties have been closed down by the court. As for the parties of the DTP line, the number is already four. It will, therefore, be no surprise if the same thing happens to the DTP.
We know for certain that the decisions of the Constitutional Court on party closure cases are not strictly legal but also political. The judges sitting on the court use political reasoning. It is time for them to give serious thought to the function of a political party such as the DTP, and more importantly on how to resolve the Kurdish issue without political actors. Turkey needs political parties like the DTP and the AK Party that represent the Kurdish constituency to first integrate the Kurds into central politics and to address their demands and grievances.
The DTP should therefore not be closed down. Though it is not the sole representative of the Kurdish constituency as it used to be, it nevertheless reflects the views and positions of a significant segment of the Kurdish population. The DTP's presence in Parliament is valuable in itself, as is the representation of the DTP grassroots in central political institutions of Turkey. It is the DTP again where radical Kurdish politics engages in an internal debate on the ways to put their demands forward. The ability of radical Kurdish politics to transform into a legitimate political agent will, therefore, be seen in the internal debate of the DTP. And all of these processes require non-closure of the party. Only if the party is kept open will the DTP evolve over time into a genuine political party, distancing itself from the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and having a life, program, and constituency of its own.
Closure, on the other hand, would only serve to avoid questioning the party's conventional line. The radicals in the party will think that they are vindicated as they continue to argue that political struggle has its limits, and thus they should keep the violence option open.
It is clear that the DTP has not yet completely distanced itself from violence. It could have established its own political entity but instead, its leaders have chosen or were obliged to choose, to remain under the shadow of the PKK. As such they have not only disappointed many in Turkey but also foreign observers in the West. The legitimacy of a political party that does not denounce violence would be questioned in any liberal democracy.
Moreover, as Kurdish people have increasingly been questioning the wisdom of using violence as a method of political struggle, it should have been time for the DTP to emerge as solely a political agent. But it has hesitated in sending messages to the PKK and its extensions in the region. But this seems suicidal for the DTP. They should keep in mind that the DTP now has a rival in representing Kurdish politics, the AK Party. It is a challenge for the DTP to reconsider their conventional approach to politics and the Kurdish issue. I would remind them that the AK Party has succeeded in eliminating the conventional center-right political parties in Turkish politics - such as the Motherland Party (ANAVATAN) and the True Path Party (DYP) -- and replaced them, as such parties failed to renew themselves and change political, social and economic circumstances. The same might happen to the DTP in the region if it does not respond to challenges brought by the AK Party. The July 22 elections presented a clear warning to the DTP that the provision of services to the people in the region matters as much as identity politics. Given the poor performance of the DTP in local administrations and the growing weariness of people with violence, the DTP might face a serious blow in the upcoming local elections of 2009.
To conclude, first, the Constitutional Court should let the DTP evolve. Closing the party would mean siding with the radicals within the party. Second, closing the party would be another embarrassment for democracy in this country. The court should save us from such an embarrassment.
22.09.2008
Saturday, September 20, 2008
Why the DTP should not be shut down
We are approaching the end of the legal case being heard in the Constitutional Court regarding whether or not the Democratic Society Party (DTP) is to be forced to close. But there is a strange silence that abounds as we relive this process, one which the ruling party experienced only two months ago and from which it very nearly did not emerge. This time around, the same national and international factions, which made a real effort to voice their views on the possible closure of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party), even going so far as to exert pressures on this front, are not saying much.
The DTP needs to spend more time thinking about this particular situation, one which cannot be explained away simply by a "lack of principles." It is both what the DTP has done as much as what it has not done that takes partial credit for this silence. The DTP ought not to be closed. As it stands, it looks impossible for even the Venice Criteria to save the DTP at this point. After all, it is impossible for the universal legal criteria that exist in the world to protect a political party that only does not condemn violence but which sees violence as a legitimate vehicle for political intervention. Still, given even this, the correct political path does not lie through the closure of the DTP.
Closing the DTP would mean shutting down one of the four political parties with parliamentary groups. And even more important, it would mean completely discounting the will of voters from the Southeast of the country. If the forced closure of the AK Party were to have struck a blow to the national will, how could the forced closure of the DTP mean anything different? The forced closure -- no matter what the conditions -- of any political party which picked up nearly half of all votes from residents of the Southeast means complete disrespect to the will of the people of that region.
The DTP ought not to be closed. We ought to be able to show even those who do not clearly condemn violence that the political road in Turkey is open to all. If our real problem is with violence and bringing an end to this violence, it would be helpful for everyone to see that every political opportunity possible was used in the attempt to stop this violence. The forced closure of the DTP will only, in the end, weaken those who embrace legitimate political methods and punish those who have some faith in politics.
The presence of the DTP in Parliament, the first such party in the legislature in 16 years, even though turbulent, is ultimately a contribution to the normalization of political life in Turkey. At the very least, factions represented by the DTP have finally transcended the basic problem of representation in Parliament. The meeting between central politics and the DTP under the roof of Parliament and the subsequent influence of central politics on the DTP need to continue. Not forcing the DTP to close will show that a chance has been given to peaceful politics and to the representation in Ankara of varied identities. In exchange for the DTP's political performance, it should be allowed to play a role in politics. The local elections are fast approaching, and the DTP is neither alone nor all that comfortable on its usual bedrock: It is facing off against the AK Party there. So there are two parties, one which depends solely on the politics of identity, against one which alleges it has no problem with the Kurdish identity and which proposes various "services" to the region in order to help transcend Kurdish problems. Such competition ought to be allowed an opportunity to play itself out.
The people of the region ought to be allowed to make their choices. So these upcoming local elections are important for different reasons to the DTP and the AK Party: The former needs to see and understand the limitations of identity-based politics, and the latter needs to be allowed to test just how much it will be able to substitute "services" for its previously hesitant approach to Kurdish identity matters.
In the meantime, people are noticing the silence emanating from the ranks of the AK Party on this all. A political party which itself has just narrowly escaped being forced to close down would normally be expected to come out "categorically" in opposition to all forced party closures. In principle, as the DTP's regional competitor for votes, they should be saying, "We want to beat the DTP at the ballot box." In fact, looked at from a completely pragmatic stance, this is how they should be thinking, for, after all, the forced closure of the DTP would only, in the end, strengthen the DTP throughout the Southeast, much as the AK Party itself would have emerged from forced closure all the stronger.
What the radical factions within the DTP really want is forced closure of their party. They know that this would give them an easier way to explain to voters just how "limited" political methods really are and why it is that "violence" always needs to be maintained as a possible measure. The forced closure of the DTP would offer party radicals a powerful tool with which to reckon with the "defenders of political means" within DTP party ranks. To borrow an expression from Bejan Matur, forced closure of the DTP would mean the "elimination of moderates." If the apparatus we call the "state," including of course the Constitutional Court, wants to see not DTP moderates but DTP hawks, then they can go ahead and force this party to close in good conscience. And if this happens, a new party will be founded along more radical lines, the hawks will take over power and the people of the region, in reaction, will keep on casting their votes for this party. And thus no opportunity will have been given to the people of the region to truly analyze the political performance of the DTP in both local and general political leadership. In the end, the decision rendered by the Constitutional Court will really reveal whether or not the "state" wishes to see a solution to the Kurdish problem.
20.09.2008
The DTP needs to spend more time thinking about this particular situation, one which cannot be explained away simply by a "lack of principles." It is both what the DTP has done as much as what it has not done that takes partial credit for this silence. The DTP ought not to be closed. As it stands, it looks impossible for even the Venice Criteria to save the DTP at this point. After all, it is impossible for the universal legal criteria that exist in the world to protect a political party that only does not condemn violence but which sees violence as a legitimate vehicle for political intervention. Still, given even this, the correct political path does not lie through the closure of the DTP.
Closing the DTP would mean shutting down one of the four political parties with parliamentary groups. And even more important, it would mean completely discounting the will of voters from the Southeast of the country. If the forced closure of the AK Party were to have struck a blow to the national will, how could the forced closure of the DTP mean anything different? The forced closure -- no matter what the conditions -- of any political party which picked up nearly half of all votes from residents of the Southeast means complete disrespect to the will of the people of that region.
The DTP ought not to be closed. We ought to be able to show even those who do not clearly condemn violence that the political road in Turkey is open to all. If our real problem is with violence and bringing an end to this violence, it would be helpful for everyone to see that every political opportunity possible was used in the attempt to stop this violence. The forced closure of the DTP will only, in the end, weaken those who embrace legitimate political methods and punish those who have some faith in politics.
The presence of the DTP in Parliament, the first such party in the legislature in 16 years, even though turbulent, is ultimately a contribution to the normalization of political life in Turkey. At the very least, factions represented by the DTP have finally transcended the basic problem of representation in Parliament. The meeting between central politics and the DTP under the roof of Parliament and the subsequent influence of central politics on the DTP need to continue. Not forcing the DTP to close will show that a chance has been given to peaceful politics and to the representation in Ankara of varied identities. In exchange for the DTP's political performance, it should be allowed to play a role in politics. The local elections are fast approaching, and the DTP is neither alone nor all that comfortable on its usual bedrock: It is facing off against the AK Party there. So there are two parties, one which depends solely on the politics of identity, against one which alleges it has no problem with the Kurdish identity and which proposes various "services" to the region in order to help transcend Kurdish problems. Such competition ought to be allowed an opportunity to play itself out.
The people of the region ought to be allowed to make their choices. So these upcoming local elections are important for different reasons to the DTP and the AK Party: The former needs to see and understand the limitations of identity-based politics, and the latter needs to be allowed to test just how much it will be able to substitute "services" for its previously hesitant approach to Kurdish identity matters.
In the meantime, people are noticing the silence emanating from the ranks of the AK Party on this all. A political party which itself has just narrowly escaped being forced to close down would normally be expected to come out "categorically" in opposition to all forced party closures. In principle, as the DTP's regional competitor for votes, they should be saying, "We want to beat the DTP at the ballot box." In fact, looked at from a completely pragmatic stance, this is how they should be thinking, for, after all, the forced closure of the DTP would only, in the end, strengthen the DTP throughout the Southeast, much as the AK Party itself would have emerged from forced closure all the stronger.
What the radical factions within the DTP really want is forced closure of their party. They know that this would give them an easier way to explain to voters just how "limited" political methods really are and why it is that "violence" always needs to be maintained as a possible measure. The forced closure of the DTP would offer party radicals a powerful tool with which to reckon with the "defenders of political means" within DTP party ranks. To borrow an expression from Bejan Matur, forced closure of the DTP would mean the "elimination of moderates." If the apparatus we call the "state," including of course the Constitutional Court, wants to see not DTP moderates but DTP hawks, then they can go ahead and force this party to close in good conscience. And if this happens, a new party will be founded along more radical lines, the hawks will take over power and the people of the region, in reaction, will keep on casting their votes for this party. And thus no opportunity will have been given to the people of the region to truly analyze the political performance of the DTP in both local and general political leadership. In the end, the decision rendered by the Constitutional Court will really reveal whether or not the "state" wishes to see a solution to the Kurdish problem.
20.09.2008
Monday, September 15, 2008
Will the Turkish military abandon NATO?
Turkey's membership in NATO and its overall security cooperation with the West has been a topic of debate recently, particularly within the country's nationalist/Kemalist circles, including the military.
For them, Turkey's presence in the Western defense structure is not an asset for Turkey's security and territorial integrity, but a liability. The occupation of Iraq and the American support for Kurdish groups in northern Iraq have certainly contributed to this view. But even before 2003, the Turkish military had come to see Turkish-American cooperation in northern Iraq, in the form of "Operation Poised Hammer," as a covert effort to create a Kurdish state with devastating effects on Turkey's territorial integrity.
From a Kemalist/nationalist point of view, not just Turkey's territorial integrity, but also its secular "regime" is threatened by the US. A city legend among the Kemalist/nationalists is that the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) was brought to power by the US in 2002 as part of the American project of promoting "moderate Islam" and implementing its "Greater Middle East Initiative." These two phrases, moderate Islam and the Greater Middle East Initiative have frequently appeared in the speeches of high ranking Kemalists/nationalists, including some retired generals, and former President Ahmet Necdet Sezer and in the indictment of the public prosecutor who opened the case in the Constitutional Court to close down the ruling AK Party.
Thus when the Kemalist/nationalist block, including elements of the civilian-military bureaucracy, have tried to get rid of the AK Party by all means available to them, they justified this on the ground that theirs was a "national" project. To fight against the AK Party, for them, is the way to resist America's designs on Turkey.
The EU, with its call for greater democracy and human rights, is also viewed as a threat. The EU's membership criteria of democracy, human rights, the rule of law, minority rights and civilian supremacy over the military are all believed to have been designed to weaken the Turkish state. But even before 1999, there had been a widespread belief in the security sector that European "allies" of Turkey were trying to revive the Sevres Treaty of 1920 that divided up Turkey. In the memoirs and statements of many retired generals, it is a common view that the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) was created and supported by those European allies of Turkey.
Even beyond political and security-related issues, Turkey's integration with the global economy is seen as a dangerous path for the country, in that privatization is a cover-up for Western companies to take over Turkey's national assets. In their recent speeches, Chief of General Staff Gen. İlker Başbuğ and his eventual successor, Gen. Işık Koşaner, expressed their opposition to globalization, global forces, and trends that were described as "determined to finish off the Turkish nation-state." In his speech Gen. Koşaner explained how "colored revolutions" attempted to destroy nation-states like Turkey. By this Gen. Koşaner was referring to pro-democracy changes in Ukraine and Georgia. From this perspective, democratization and greater integration into the global economy may lead to the end of the nation-state. What they really mean by the "global system" is the US and the EU, which are Turkey's Western allies. The structural integration of Turkey into the West in terms of EU membership, continued security cooperation and inflow of global capital seems unwelcome.
The nationalist/Kemalist block believes that they are waging a "new national struggle" against the West and its allies, including not only the AK Party, but also those liberals who advocate EU membership, globalization, a market economy, and democracy.
No one can deny the fact that the Turkish military has become deeply anti-Western and anti-American in recent years. We remember some high-ranking retired generals who called for abandoning NATO, which they described as a tool of American imperialism. We also recall some others who advocated the establishment of an axis with Russia, Iran, and China against the US and the EU.
Having observed this, I believe that if Turkey had not already been a member of NATO, the Turkish military would be opposed to NATO membership as it is to EU accession. Thank God, the Democrat Party (DP), the leader of which was hanged by the military after the 1960 military coup, brought Turkey into NATO in 1952.
15.09.2008
For them, Turkey's presence in the Western defense structure is not an asset for Turkey's security and territorial integrity, but a liability. The occupation of Iraq and the American support for Kurdish groups in northern Iraq have certainly contributed to this view. But even before 2003, the Turkish military had come to see Turkish-American cooperation in northern Iraq, in the form of "Operation Poised Hammer," as a covert effort to create a Kurdish state with devastating effects on Turkey's territorial integrity.
From a Kemalist/nationalist point of view, not just Turkey's territorial integrity, but also its secular "regime" is threatened by the US. A city legend among the Kemalist/nationalists is that the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) was brought to power by the US in 2002 as part of the American project of promoting "moderate Islam" and implementing its "Greater Middle East Initiative." These two phrases, moderate Islam and the Greater Middle East Initiative have frequently appeared in the speeches of high ranking Kemalists/nationalists, including some retired generals, and former President Ahmet Necdet Sezer and in the indictment of the public prosecutor who opened the case in the Constitutional Court to close down the ruling AK Party.
Thus when the Kemalist/nationalist block, including elements of the civilian-military bureaucracy, have tried to get rid of the AK Party by all means available to them, they justified this on the ground that theirs was a "national" project. To fight against the AK Party, for them, is the way to resist America's designs on Turkey.
The EU, with its call for greater democracy and human rights, is also viewed as a threat. The EU's membership criteria of democracy, human rights, the rule of law, minority rights and civilian supremacy over the military are all believed to have been designed to weaken the Turkish state. But even before 1999, there had been a widespread belief in the security sector that European "allies" of Turkey were trying to revive the Sevres Treaty of 1920 that divided up Turkey. In the memoirs and statements of many retired generals, it is a common view that the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) was created and supported by those European allies of Turkey.
Even beyond political and security-related issues, Turkey's integration with the global economy is seen as a dangerous path for the country, in that privatization is a cover-up for Western companies to take over Turkey's national assets. In their recent speeches, Chief of General Staff Gen. İlker Başbuğ and his eventual successor, Gen. Işık Koşaner, expressed their opposition to globalization, global forces, and trends that were described as "determined to finish off the Turkish nation-state." In his speech Gen. Koşaner explained how "colored revolutions" attempted to destroy nation-states like Turkey. By this Gen. Koşaner was referring to pro-democracy changes in Ukraine and Georgia. From this perspective, democratization and greater integration into the global economy may lead to the end of the nation-state. What they really mean by the "global system" is the US and the EU, which are Turkey's Western allies. The structural integration of Turkey into the West in terms of EU membership, continued security cooperation and inflow of global capital seems unwelcome.
The nationalist/Kemalist block believes that they are waging a "new national struggle" against the West and its allies, including not only the AK Party, but also those liberals who advocate EU membership, globalization, a market economy, and democracy.
No one can deny the fact that the Turkish military has become deeply anti-Western and anti-American in recent years. We remember some high-ranking retired generals who called for abandoning NATO, which they described as a tool of American imperialism. We also recall some others who advocated the establishment of an axis with Russia, Iran, and China against the US and the EU.
Having observed this, I believe that if Turkey had not already been a member of NATO, the Turkish military would be opposed to NATO membership as it is to EU accession. Thank God, the Democrat Party (DP), the leader of which was hanged by the military after the 1960 military coup, brought Turkey into NATO in 1952.
15.09.2008
Monday, September 8, 2008
Why the secularists dislike the EU
Kalypso Nicolaïdis and Hakan Altınay argue really hard to explain "why the European Union strengthens secularism in Turkey." I really hope they convince the secularists of the wisdom of the EU membership for the sustainability of secularism in Turkey.
But I am afraid they will not succeed. The reason is simple: For the Turkish secularists, the question is not just a matter of secularism. For them, secularism is a "discursive tool" to empower one socio-political/economic group while excluding conservative/peripheral social actors and their interests and identities from the power center. Unless one rightly identifies the underlying causes of the secularists' outcry, it is impossible to address the issue.
Secularists would be appeased only if they are offered the continuation of the privileged status they once enjoyed -- this time by the EU, which may decide specifically to protect the interests of the secularists. The point is whether such a position would fit into the European ideal of equality and non-discrimination.
A democratic politics based on the rights of individuals as outlined in the European Convention of Human Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU would provide protection for all citizens. Special protection for a particular group, the secularists, would rightly be called privilege.
The secularists in Turkey should first come to terms with democracy and human rights. The top secularists, high-ranking commanders, declared last week how "democracy threatens the regime and human rights divide Turkey into pieces." This reflects the prevailing mindset of the secularists. How can we go along with such an idea while negotiating membership with the EU?
It is crystal clear that secularists have abandoned the ideal of democracy. They at large view democracy as a system that brought conservative (for them Islamist) political parties into power. One should not think that this is a perception of recent years. Before the existence of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and even before the emergence of the Welfare Party (RP) in the 1990s, the secularists viewed democracy as a game always won by counter-revolutionaries. The whole story started with the victory of the Democrat Party (DP) in 1950, the first free and fair elections in Turkey. Since then they have looked for anti-democratic means (direct military coup or judicial interventions) to stop the "counter-revolutionaries" who were in fact politicians representing identities and interests of "ordinary citizens" outside the Kemalist-secularist power block. For that, the secularists welcomed the 1960 military coup and the trial of DP leaders by a military-appointed special tribunal that executed Prime Minister Adnan Menders and two of his ministers.
The secularists continued to oppose Süleyman Demirel in the 1960s and Turgut Özal in the 1980s as both were representing the social periphery against the hegemony of the bureaucratic/secularist center -- and neither of them was Islamists.
So if the EU wishes to appease the secularists, it should forget about democratization in Turkey.
Isn't it interesting to note that the secularists today are the staunchest opponents of the EU? They used to support the EU membership, assuming that it would strengthen their position vis-à-vis the "ignorant, uneducated, rural people of the periphery." But realizing that the EU membership in the late 1990s means full democracy, respect for human rights for all and that the rule of law meant giving up all the privileges they had accumulated for years, the Kemalist secularists gave up on the EU objective.
Yes, they were once supporters of Westernization. Posing as Westernizers was useful to underline the cultural/social "superiority" of the ruling elite over the masses. Being a Westernizer was instrumental in acquiring the right to rule by alienating themselves from the masses, which were unfamiliar with Western culture. Thus Westernization was instrumental in establishing and justifying the power monopoly of Kemalist secularists.
This monopoly is challenged by the EU membership as Westernization now means emancipation for the masses since it requires greater democratization, empowering people vis-à-vis the bureaucratic/Kemalist/secularist center. This is why the EU is now detested by the secularist elite and loved by the masses.
The secularists should come to terms with democracy and a peaceful notion of secularism. They should give up instrumentalizing secularism to exclude conservatives from power and benefits. We need a "democratic secularism" as called for by European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso. The issue at stake is not secularism per se but the exclusion of the conservative and peripheral social/political/economic forces in the name of secularism, which cannot be overlooked by the EU.
Turkey can become a member of the EU without the blessing of the secularists, who would oppose anyway, or at least try to slow down, Turkey's European integration unless the EU sides with them to sustain their power privileges in Turkey. No one expects the EU to align itself with such anachronistic secularists, who are not only anti-democratic but also anti-Western. Remember the republican rallies of last year at which they enthusiastically chanted "Neither the US nor the EU."
08.09.2008
But I am afraid they will not succeed. The reason is simple: For the Turkish secularists, the question is not just a matter of secularism. For them, secularism is a "discursive tool" to empower one socio-political/economic group while excluding conservative/peripheral social actors and their interests and identities from the power center. Unless one rightly identifies the underlying causes of the secularists' outcry, it is impossible to address the issue.
Secularists would be appeased only if they are offered the continuation of the privileged status they once enjoyed -- this time by the EU, which may decide specifically to protect the interests of the secularists. The point is whether such a position would fit into the European ideal of equality and non-discrimination.
A democratic politics based on the rights of individuals as outlined in the European Convention of Human Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU would provide protection for all citizens. Special protection for a particular group, the secularists, would rightly be called privilege.
The secularists in Turkey should first come to terms with democracy and human rights. The top secularists, high-ranking commanders, declared last week how "democracy threatens the regime and human rights divide Turkey into pieces." This reflects the prevailing mindset of the secularists. How can we go along with such an idea while negotiating membership with the EU?
It is crystal clear that secularists have abandoned the ideal of democracy. They at large view democracy as a system that brought conservative (for them Islamist) political parties into power. One should not think that this is a perception of recent years. Before the existence of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and even before the emergence of the Welfare Party (RP) in the 1990s, the secularists viewed democracy as a game always won by counter-revolutionaries. The whole story started with the victory of the Democrat Party (DP) in 1950, the first free and fair elections in Turkey. Since then they have looked for anti-democratic means (direct military coup or judicial interventions) to stop the "counter-revolutionaries" who were in fact politicians representing identities and interests of "ordinary citizens" outside the Kemalist-secularist power block. For that, the secularists welcomed the 1960 military coup and the trial of DP leaders by a military-appointed special tribunal that executed Prime Minister Adnan Menders and two of his ministers.
The secularists continued to oppose Süleyman Demirel in the 1960s and Turgut Özal in the 1980s as both were representing the social periphery against the hegemony of the bureaucratic/secularist center -- and neither of them was Islamists.
So if the EU wishes to appease the secularists, it should forget about democratization in Turkey.
Isn't it interesting to note that the secularists today are the staunchest opponents of the EU? They used to support the EU membership, assuming that it would strengthen their position vis-à-vis the "ignorant, uneducated, rural people of the periphery." But realizing that the EU membership in the late 1990s means full democracy, respect for human rights for all and that the rule of law meant giving up all the privileges they had accumulated for years, the Kemalist secularists gave up on the EU objective.
Yes, they were once supporters of Westernization. Posing as Westernizers was useful to underline the cultural/social "superiority" of the ruling elite over the masses. Being a Westernizer was instrumental in acquiring the right to rule by alienating themselves from the masses, which were unfamiliar with Western culture. Thus Westernization was instrumental in establishing and justifying the power monopoly of Kemalist secularists.
This monopoly is challenged by the EU membership as Westernization now means emancipation for the masses since it requires greater democratization, empowering people vis-à-vis the bureaucratic/Kemalist/secularist center. This is why the EU is now detested by the secularist elite and loved by the masses.
The secularists should come to terms with democracy and a peaceful notion of secularism. They should give up instrumentalizing secularism to exclude conservatives from power and benefits. We need a "democratic secularism" as called for by European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso. The issue at stake is not secularism per se but the exclusion of the conservative and peripheral social/political/economic forces in the name of secularism, which cannot be overlooked by the EU.
Turkey can become a member of the EU without the blessing of the secularists, who would oppose anyway, or at least try to slow down, Turkey's European integration unless the EU sides with them to sustain their power privileges in Turkey. No one expects the EU to align itself with such anachronistic secularists, who are not only anti-democratic but also anti-Western. Remember the republican rallies of last year at which they enthusiastically chanted "Neither the US nor the EU."
08.09.2008
Monday, September 1, 2008
Why Turkish generals oppose globalization
Political debate and cleavages in Turkey today are between those who hold favorable views of globalization and thus work toward greater integration in the global system, and those who perceive globalization as the "number-one threat," who thus employ all possible means to stop pro-globalization groups.
Last week two top Turkish military commanders gave important speeches outlining their views on Turkish politics as well as global developments. The statements of Chief of General Staff Gen. İlker Başbuğ and Land Forces Commander Gen. Işık Koşaner revealed that the top military brass opposes globalization, global actors and global values.
Well, they may have a point. Though globalization does not have a particular problem with Kemalism, it shakes the fundamentals of all ideological states. An ideological state controlled by a vanguard elite including the military, in the name of Kemalism in the Turkish case, is not sustainable in a globalized world.
With globalization also come transparency, competition, and interconnectedness, all problems for an ideological state and its vanguards. It is impossible to govern a society that is integrated into a globalized world through commands from the top. People, economy and politics will be under the influence of diverse networks, ideas, and interests. Such a society will no longer rely on "official truths" imposed on them and the welfare/ liberties gifted to them by the state elite. Instead, a society integrated with the world is empowered to seek its truth, its welfare, and its liberties. Obviously, such features of globalization make it very difficult to control the state and society. Thus the military naturally prefers a closed society with controllable social, political and economic agents.
For the last six years, the average annual foreign direct investment (FDI) increased considerably, reaching $20 billion in the last couple of years, more than 20 times higher in comparison to earlier periods. Moreover, billions of dollars are traded in the stock exchange and in the banking system. All these make the "management" of the economy difficult from a "nationalist" point of view that prefers a centralized national economy that is not "vulnerable" to global trends. Would a military hostile to global trends and actors be happy with the current inflow and activities of foreign capital? Who is inviting foreign capital and "selling out" Turkey's national assets to them? These are key questions to understanding the underlying reasons for the power struggle in recent years.
To Turkish generals, international organizations, transnational civil society organizations and multinational corporations all pose threats to Turkey, Turkish security and Turkey's political regime. What they really mean is that globalization threatens the Kemalist regime that provides them with discursive justification for the military's power and privileges in the system.
In the generals' speeches a deep-seated hostility towards transnational actors, ideas and movements are clearly visible. Turkish civil society is targeted as being designed by "transnational actors." Democracy and human rights are evaluated as a disguise to divide the country and change the regime. How come these ideas willingly support Turkey's democratization process? "Too much democracy threatens secularism," they argue. So we should conclude that "Western democracies went too far and turned into theocracies." Fear of not only globalization but also of democracy prevails throughout the speeches of the top two military commanders. In fact, globalization is feared because it encourages democratization.
The generals speak of a "global system" that wants to take over Turkey. But thanks to the "Atatürkist thought system," Turkey has not surrendered to the hegemony of the global system. I really wonder if Turkey is an ally of Chaves' Venezuela or the West. These are old-fashioned Third Worldist generalizations with no correspondence to the reality on the ground.
The problem is that the Turkish military used to be the forerunner of modernization in this country. It is also the military of a country that has been a member of the Western alliance for over 50 years. As such, it is supposed to be an institution that is integrated into an international security community, NATO, with close links and cooperative international arrangements. Unfortunately, it turns out now that a reformist and pro-modernization military with international experience and supposedly culture has turned into a pro-status quo institution resisting change.
Yet the reasons are understandable: The "power monopoly" of the bureaucracy, including the military, is being eroded by globalization. This is the bottom line for their fear of globalization and resistance to democratization.
01.09.2008
Last week two top Turkish military commanders gave important speeches outlining their views on Turkish politics as well as global developments. The statements of Chief of General Staff Gen. İlker Başbuğ and Land Forces Commander Gen. Işık Koşaner revealed that the top military brass opposes globalization, global actors and global values.
Well, they may have a point. Though globalization does not have a particular problem with Kemalism, it shakes the fundamentals of all ideological states. An ideological state controlled by a vanguard elite including the military, in the name of Kemalism in the Turkish case, is not sustainable in a globalized world.
With globalization also come transparency, competition, and interconnectedness, all problems for an ideological state and its vanguards. It is impossible to govern a society that is integrated into a globalized world through commands from the top. People, economy and politics will be under the influence of diverse networks, ideas, and interests. Such a society will no longer rely on "official truths" imposed on them and the welfare/ liberties gifted to them by the state elite. Instead, a society integrated with the world is empowered to seek its truth, its welfare, and its liberties. Obviously, such features of globalization make it very difficult to control the state and society. Thus the military naturally prefers a closed society with controllable social, political and economic agents.
For the last six years, the average annual foreign direct investment (FDI) increased considerably, reaching $20 billion in the last couple of years, more than 20 times higher in comparison to earlier periods. Moreover, billions of dollars are traded in the stock exchange and in the banking system. All these make the "management" of the economy difficult from a "nationalist" point of view that prefers a centralized national economy that is not "vulnerable" to global trends. Would a military hostile to global trends and actors be happy with the current inflow and activities of foreign capital? Who is inviting foreign capital and "selling out" Turkey's national assets to them? These are key questions to understanding the underlying reasons for the power struggle in recent years.
To Turkish generals, international organizations, transnational civil society organizations and multinational corporations all pose threats to Turkey, Turkish security and Turkey's political regime. What they really mean is that globalization threatens the Kemalist regime that provides them with discursive justification for the military's power and privileges in the system.
In the generals' speeches a deep-seated hostility towards transnational actors, ideas and movements are clearly visible. Turkish civil society is targeted as being designed by "transnational actors." Democracy and human rights are evaluated as a disguise to divide the country and change the regime. How come these ideas willingly support Turkey's democratization process? "Too much democracy threatens secularism," they argue. So we should conclude that "Western democracies went too far and turned into theocracies." Fear of not only globalization but also of democracy prevails throughout the speeches of the top two military commanders. In fact, globalization is feared because it encourages democratization.
The generals speak of a "global system" that wants to take over Turkey. But thanks to the "Atatürkist thought system," Turkey has not surrendered to the hegemony of the global system. I really wonder if Turkey is an ally of Chaves' Venezuela or the West. These are old-fashioned Third Worldist generalizations with no correspondence to the reality on the ground.
The problem is that the Turkish military used to be the forerunner of modernization in this country. It is also the military of a country that has been a member of the Western alliance for over 50 years. As such, it is supposed to be an institution that is integrated into an international security community, NATO, with close links and cooperative international arrangements. Unfortunately, it turns out now that a reformist and pro-modernization military with international experience and supposedly culture has turned into a pro-status quo institution resisting change.
Yet the reasons are understandable: The "power monopoly" of the bureaucracy, including the military, is being eroded by globalization. This is the bottom line for their fear of globalization and resistance to democratization.
01.09.2008
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)