With the recent Cabinet reshuffle, Professor Ahmet Davutoğlu has been appointed as Turkey's minister of foreign affairs. Such an appointment was hardly a surprise since it is no secret that he has been the architect of Turkey's foreign policy under the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government as the chief foreign policy advisor to the prime minister.
Professor Davutoğlu's appearance on the stage is timely. He brings a strong personality to tackle tough issues such as the Armenian rapprochement, the rebuilding of Turkish-US relations and the brokering of peace in the Middle East, the Caucasus, and Afghanistan. His vision, experience, and personal contacts, all backed up now by political power in the Cabinet, will be needed to address these issues.
He is presented as a "strategist" due to his seminal book, "Strategic Depth," but such a label undervalues his vision for Turkish foreign policy. During the AK Party years, he initiated policies that went beyond simple realpolitik strategic calculations.
Take the example of policy of "zero problems with neighbors," which marks a revolutionary change in the Turkish perception of the external world. I say revolutionary because it is a radical departure from the conventional view that Turkey is surrounded by enemy countries against which it should be prepared to defend itself. This was a worldview based on an amalgam of insecurity, antagonism, confrontation, and short-sighted realism. Moreover, this "siege mentality" was used to create and justify authoritarian elements in Turkish politics.
The zero problems policy has redefined Turkey's relations with its neighbors. The avenues of mutual understanding, trust, and cooperation were opened with this change of perspective. As such, a liberal approach based on cooperation instead of confrontation was inserted in foreign policy, embracing a non-zero sum strategy benefiting all parties involved.
In sum, the Davutoğlu perspective has broken the siege mentality in Turkey's regional politics, contributing democratic openings at home while establishing good neighborly relationships with surrounding countries. That is to say that democratic peace at home turned into a vision for peace in the neighborhood.
All these help Turkey emerge as a center of "soft power" in the region. Davutoğlu, the architect of this policy, made clear that "Turkey's most important soft power tool is its democracy." Thus, it is expected that Turkish foreign policy under Davutoğlu is likely to also contribute to democratization in order to improve Turkey's attractiveness in the region.
Engaging with all actors in the region to settle problems will also continue in the new era. Turkey has invested much to win the trust of all actors in the region. No one doubts Turkey's sincerity. This is due to the fact that Turkey does not see its engagements with regional actors as means to increase its influence in the region, but to build peace in the surrounding area, because peace and stability are needed for Turkey to continue with the consolidation of democracy at home, secure full membership in the EU and sustain its economic development. Nothing else.
We will continue to see culture and identity being brought into Turkish foreign policymaking. This is, in fact, in line with the theoretical discovery of these issues in international relations literature.
Turkey's cultural and economic space goes beyond its political boundaries, as is the case for many other countries. The trick is to conduct foreign policy that goes in line with this reality. Turkey's wider cultural geography may enable it to reach out to people in the region and develop contacts at the inter-societal level, thus creating a social bond of understanding and interaction, while its wider economic geography establishes unbreakable linkages and interdependencies.
All this is likely to make cooperation stronger and even unbreakable by engaging with social and economic sectors, rather than mere political entities.
Yet Davutoğlu's emphasis on multi-dimensional and integrated foreign policy may be interpreted by some circles as turning away from the West, including the EU. He may be portrayed as a person preferring Turkey's greater engagement in the East and the region with a "neo-Ottoman" perspective. On this, I think Davutoğlu should be very careful and emphasize that Turkey's engagement in the region is complementary to its Western vocation.
04 May 2009
Professor Davutoğlu's appearance on the stage is timely. He brings a strong personality to tackle tough issues such as the Armenian rapprochement, the rebuilding of Turkish-US relations and the brokering of peace in the Middle East, the Caucasus, and Afghanistan. His vision, experience, and personal contacts, all backed up now by political power in the Cabinet, will be needed to address these issues.
He is presented as a "strategist" due to his seminal book, "Strategic Depth," but such a label undervalues his vision for Turkish foreign policy. During the AK Party years, he initiated policies that went beyond simple realpolitik strategic calculations.
Take the example of policy of "zero problems with neighbors," which marks a revolutionary change in the Turkish perception of the external world. I say revolutionary because it is a radical departure from the conventional view that Turkey is surrounded by enemy countries against which it should be prepared to defend itself. This was a worldview based on an amalgam of insecurity, antagonism, confrontation, and short-sighted realism. Moreover, this "siege mentality" was used to create and justify authoritarian elements in Turkish politics.
The zero problems policy has redefined Turkey's relations with its neighbors. The avenues of mutual understanding, trust, and cooperation were opened with this change of perspective. As such, a liberal approach based on cooperation instead of confrontation was inserted in foreign policy, embracing a non-zero sum strategy benefiting all parties involved.
In sum, the Davutoğlu perspective has broken the siege mentality in Turkey's regional politics, contributing democratic openings at home while establishing good neighborly relationships with surrounding countries. That is to say that democratic peace at home turned into a vision for peace in the neighborhood.
All these help Turkey emerge as a center of "soft power" in the region. Davutoğlu, the architect of this policy, made clear that "Turkey's most important soft power tool is its democracy." Thus, it is expected that Turkish foreign policy under Davutoğlu is likely to also contribute to democratization in order to improve Turkey's attractiveness in the region.
Engaging with all actors in the region to settle problems will also continue in the new era. Turkey has invested much to win the trust of all actors in the region. No one doubts Turkey's sincerity. This is due to the fact that Turkey does not see its engagements with regional actors as means to increase its influence in the region, but to build peace in the surrounding area, because peace and stability are needed for Turkey to continue with the consolidation of democracy at home, secure full membership in the EU and sustain its economic development. Nothing else.
We will continue to see culture and identity being brought into Turkish foreign policymaking. This is, in fact, in line with the theoretical discovery of these issues in international relations literature.
Turkey's cultural and economic space goes beyond its political boundaries, as is the case for many other countries. The trick is to conduct foreign policy that goes in line with this reality. Turkey's wider cultural geography may enable it to reach out to people in the region and develop contacts at the inter-societal level, thus creating a social bond of understanding and interaction, while its wider economic geography establishes unbreakable linkages and interdependencies.
All this is likely to make cooperation stronger and even unbreakable by engaging with social and economic sectors, rather than mere political entities.
Yet Davutoğlu's emphasis on multi-dimensional and integrated foreign policy may be interpreted by some circles as turning away from the West, including the EU. He may be portrayed as a person preferring Turkey's greater engagement in the East and the region with a "neo-Ottoman" perspective. On this, I think Davutoğlu should be very careful and emphasize that Turkey's engagement in the region is complementary to its Western vocation.
04 May 2009
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