Why is it the right time to solve the Kurdish question?

It has become increasingly clear that the Kurdish question can neither be solved through the use of force by the Turkish state nor by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). This has been understood by all sides.

The current state of affairs does not benefit anyone. The only way out of this “lose-lose” situation is a solution that is a joint settlement by the fighting sides, the PKK and the Turkish state.

Many agree that domestic, regional and international developments are forcing the sides to contemplate new moves in addressing the question. I think the state and the PKK have exhausted all options apart from goodwill in order to achieve peace.

The PKK understands it cannot win a war with the Turkish state. There is no justification for using violence for political objectives in this age of a “global war on terror” in which no political end can justify the use of force as a strategy to get it. Besides, the domestic and international ground on which the PKK took root has changed. Turkey is not the country in which a guerrilla war was waged in 1985 when the Kurdish identity and even ethnicity were denied and speaking Kurdish in public was forbidden. Back then, the Southeast was under martial law, the State Security Court (DGM) was active, sentencing anyone who mentioned the existence of Kurds, and prisons were notorious.

It is still not completely satisfactory, but Turkey's official approach to the question is dramatically different now. The Kurdish ethnicity is recognized as a reality even by the chief of general staff, let alone the prime minister and the president. A pro-Kurdish party with very close links to the PKK is represented in Parliament. Political reforms introduced since 1999 have changed the way in which the Kurdish question is seen. The expression and representation of the Kurdish identity have never been this possible in Turkey. The state established a TV station broadcasting in Kurdish, a development that would have been regarded as inconceivable only some five years ago. Even killings committed by the “deep state” in southeastern Turkey in the 1990s are being investigated as part of the Ergenekon investigation.

Under these circumstances, it is impossible to justify the use of force in the name of “Kurdish rights.” I think this is the sense shared by most Kurds in the region. Political means developed so far are capable of bringing about a peaceful solution. The rise of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) in the region and among Kurds in general also indicates that the Kurds demand not only a recognition of their identity but also welfare and peace. People are tired of the downward spiral of violence.

Moreover, international circumstances force Kurdish politics and the PKK to search for accommodation. The PKK has been listed as a terrorist organization by the European Union and the US, making its political and economic activities in these areas very difficult. Furthermore, these two powerful blocks are increasingly rediscovering Turkey's importance in the region as an ally. Without Turkey, it is hard to make and maintain peace in the Middle East and the Caucasus. Turkey's role as a democratic and secular state is extremely valuable for the West in efforts to avoid a clash of civilizations. Securing energy transfer from Eurasia to Europe in a diversified way requires Turkey's cooperation. Above all, the EU is conducting full membership negotiations with Turkey. Thus it looks for a stabilized Turkey that can develop peaceful relations with neighboring countries to the west, the east and the south.

The US also attributes great value to Turkish cooperation in light of its experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq. As Turkey's political weight increases, as has been the case in recent years, Turkey's ability to use it as leverage over the PKK increases as well. Thus Turkey's Western allies are evermore inclined to buy Turkey's arguments, which are accompanied by a series of reforms on the domestic front toward the Kurds.

What is also important is the attitude of the Iraqi Kurds. After establishing their position in northern Iraq, they began viewing the PKK as an irritant for the consolidation of their power there. The presence of PKK camps in northern Iraq turns this region into a target for Turkey. But Turkey's goodwill is necessary for the economic and political viability of the regional authority. The Kurds in Iraq also see the PKK as a source of tension for their working relationship with the US, without which they cannot survive in the region.

Take all these together, and it becomes clear that the use of violence is neither justifiable nor sustainable. These are thus the best days to find a solution. President Abdullah Gül, in coordination with some state institutions, is taking bold steps. They should be reciprocated before it becomes too late, as some have already moved to weaken President Gül's political power and legitimacy by opening up a legal way for his trial.

25 May 2009, Monday

The militarist right as an alternative to the AK Party

It is an old habit in Turkey to design popular politics by political engineering at the top. As democracy is all about the choices people make at the ballot box among competing parties, some elites in the center hopelessly try to influence this process by introducing “fake” political parties to manipulate the political realm. But the Turkish history of democracy is a graveyard of such political parties and projects.

The latest example of the attempt for political engineering at the top is the election of Hüsamettin Cindoruk as the leader of the Democrat Party (DP) in the extraordinary party congress this weekend. It is a project that is impossible: to convince the center-right people it meant to reach out to. I will explain why.

The DP was originally founded in 1946 by Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, and others. Four years after its establishment, in 1950, it won Turkey's first free and competitive elections, taking over the government from the Republican People's Party (CHP), which had ruled the country in a single-party regime since 1923.

The victory of the DP in 1950 was a reflection of the people's longing for an accountable and representative government after years of an authoritarian single-party regime. By 1950, the public started to matter, power was transferred to the people from the bureaucracy dominated by the CHP.

The DP was a liberal party; instead of dictating what people should think, believe in or wear, it was more concerned with bringing about services to people, fighting poverty, the modernization of agriculture and industrialization, as well as anchoring Turkey in the West by becoming a member of NATO.

From the 1950s onward, the CHP, which represents the ideology of the bureaucratic center, has never won a majority in the Parliament to form a government of its own. As the agent of the single-party rule in the '20s, '30s, and '40s, it was as if the CHP was cursed to lose in a democracy. The DP won two more elections in 1954 and 1957.

But the bureaucratic center hit back with a military coup in 1960, overthrowing the government, closing down the Parliament and establishing a special tribunal to try the DP government and members of Parliament. The military regime eventually closed down the party and hanged Prime Minister Menderes along with two other members of his government.

As such, 1960 not only started a chain of military coups but, due to what it did to the DP, it also shaped the democratic conscience of the Turkish people, at least the people with a center-right orientation, underlining the supremacy of national will and the Parliament vis-à-vis bureaucratic interventions of the judiciary and the military.

Center-right politics thus developed, attributing the greatest value to the supremacy of the Parliament and the elected vis-à-vis the appointed, which includes the military and judiciary. Such political virtues and non-ideological developmentalist approaches to politics in the center-right, under different political parties, dominated Turkish politics in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s as well.

The DP re-entered the Turkish political scene just before the July 2007 elections as part of a project to unite the center-right. But it got only 5 percent of the vote, losing the center-right voters to the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) once more. One of the reasons for this was that DP leaders sided with undemocratic interventions of the time, like the 367 quorum debate in Parliament for the election of the president and the April 27, 2007 e-memorandum issued by the military.

The person who was elected as the new leader of the DP was one of the architects of these pre-2007 election undemocratic intervention attempts. Moreover, Cindoruk had actively supported the Feb. 28, 1997 military intervention, too. Such a personality cannot represent the tradition of the DP and the center-right, let alone unite them. What he can unite is not the center-right, but the “militarist right.”

What is disappointing is that some circles still expect Cindoruk to come up with an alternative. I think they are incapable of understanding the dynamics of Turkish politics. The True Path Party (DYP) and the Motherland Party (ANAVATAN) disappeared in the 2007 elections because they looked to be collaborating with the bureaucratic center (the military and the judiciary) to design politics by non-democratic means. They were punished then. This new attempt led by a politician who champions the military and judiciary's role in intervening in politics will be punished as well. No one should underestimate the democratic conscience and reactions of the masses.

What Turkey needs, as I keep writing, is a political party that is more progressive than the AK Party and one which is committed to democracy, a market economy and membership in the EU.

18 May 2009, Monday

Davutoğlu: Turkey’s new foreign policy chief

With the recent Cabinet reshuffle, Professor Ahmet Davutoğlu has been appointed as Turkey's minister of foreign affairs. Such an appointment was hardly a surprise since it is no secret that he has been the architect of Turkey's foreign policy under the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government as the chief foreign policy advisor to the prime minister.

Professor Davutoğlu's appearance on the stage is timely. He brings a strong personality to tackle tough issues such as the Armenian rapprochement, the rebuilding of Turkish-US relations and the brokering of peace in the Middle East, the Caucasus, and Afghanistan. His vision, experience, and personal contacts, all backed up now by political power in the Cabinet, will be needed to address these issues.

He is presented as a "strategist" due to his seminal book, "Strategic Depth," but such a label undervalues his vision for Turkish foreign policy. During the AK Party years, he initiated policies that went beyond simple realpolitik strategic calculations.

Take the example of policy of "zero problems with neighbors," which marks a revolutionary change in the Turkish perception of the external world. I say revolutionary because it is a radical departure from the conventional view that Turkey is surrounded by enemy countries against which it should be prepared to defend itself. This was a worldview based on an amalgam of insecurity, antagonism, confrontation, and short-sighted realism. Moreover, this "siege mentality" was used to create and justify authoritarian elements in Turkish politics.

The zero problems policy has redefined Turkey's relations with its neighbors. The avenues of mutual understanding, trust, and cooperation were opened with this change of perspective. As such, a liberal approach based on cooperation instead of confrontation was inserted in foreign policy, embracing a non-zero sum strategy benefiting all parties involved.

In sum, the Davutoğlu perspective has broken the siege mentality in Turkey's regional politics, contributing democratic openings at home while establishing good neighborly relationships with surrounding countries. That is to say that democratic peace at home turned into a vision for peace in the neighborhood.

All these help Turkey emerge as a center of "soft power" in the region. Davutoğlu, the architect of this policy, made clear that "Turkey's most important soft power tool is its democracy." Thus, it is expected that Turkish foreign policy under Davutoğlu is likely to also contribute to democratization in order to improve Turkey's attractiveness in the region.

Engaging with all actors in the region to settle problems will also continue in the new era. Turkey has invested much to win the trust of all actors in the region. No one doubts Turkey's sincerity. This is due to the fact that Turkey does not see its engagements with regional actors as means to increase its influence in the region, but to build peace in the surrounding area, because peace and stability are needed for Turkey to continue with the consolidation of democracy at home, secure full membership in the EU and sustain its economic development. Nothing else.

We will continue to see culture and identity being brought into Turkish foreign policymaking. This is, in fact, in line with the theoretical discovery of these issues in international relations literature.

Turkey's cultural and economic space goes beyond its political boundaries, as is the case for many other countries. The trick is to conduct foreign policy that goes in line with this reality. Turkey's wider cultural geography may enable it to reach out to people in the region and develop contacts at the inter-societal level, thus creating a social bond of understanding and interaction, while its wider economic geography establishes unbreakable linkages and interdependencies.

All this is likely to make cooperation stronger and even unbreakable by engaging with social and economic sectors, rather than mere political entities.

Yet Davutoğlu's emphasis on multi-dimensional and integrated foreign policy may be interpreted by some circles as turning away from the West, including the EU. He may be portrayed as a person preferring Turkey's greater engagement in the East and the region with a "neo-Ottoman" perspective. On this, I think Davutoğlu should be very careful and emphasize that Turkey's engagement in the region is complementary to its Western vocation.

04 May 2009