Can we still remain optimistic about the possibility of a final political settlement of the Kurdish question? Recent developments raise serious doubts about that.
Tension had risen even before the June elections, but many attributed this to the politicking of parties competing for an ever greater number of votes. Unfortunately, tension continued to rise after the elections. First, the decision of the Higher Election Board (YSK) to nullify the election of Hatip Dicle as a member of Parliament from Diyarbakir province, and later the verdict of the court not to free six other elected deputies currently in detention played a part in that. The result was the Peace and Democracy Party's (BDP) boycott of Parliament by not taking the oath and holding its weekly group meetings in Diyarbakir instead.
Meanwhile, increased activity by the Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK) in Diyarbakir signaled something was brewing in the region. The killing of two soldiers right in the very center of Yüksekova and the abduction of soldiers and civilians were testimony to that. Despite this upheaval, there were positive indicators as well. The BDP was engaged in a dialogue with the speaker of parliament and the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) to return to Parliament after receiving the go-ahead from Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK. Öcalan had been talking about the progress made in his talks with state authorities. He even disclosed that an agreement had been reached on the formation of a Peace Council and came as close as suggesting a permanent cease-fire.
Then, however, we got word of the killing of 13 soldiers in Silvan last Thursday, sending shockwaves through all parts of Turkey.
Given the recent developments, I summarized in the text above, my first reaction when I heard the news was that this act of violence was not only directed against Turkish soldiers but also against Öcalan. By conducting such an attack, some within the ranks of the PKK sent a message out to Öcalan, saying that he cannot negotiate a peace settlement on his own. The same message was also sent to the state, conveying that Öcalan is not in control of the organization and that the state is talking to the “wrong person.”
Some groups within an organization such as the PKK who think that their sacrifices have been in vain tend to resort to violence or the escalation thereof. This has happened with the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), too, so why not with the PKK?
The PKK has taken responsibility for the attack in Silvan and I guess Öcalan himself will not directly denounce the act because doing so would mean admitting he is not in control. This is the last thing Öcalan would do as the state has engaged in talks with him, assuming that he is still in charge of the PKK. So for him to appear not to be running things will significantly weaken his bargaining position with the state and diminish his hope of somehow getting out of prison one day. So he will swallow this. But the question remains: Who is in control of the PKK if not Öcalan?
This question is important if the government is still interested in talking to anyone associated with the PKK. At the moment I have serious doubts about this. With the latest attack, I think the PKK has risked becoming an irrelevant party in finding a solution for the Kurdish question. The organization and its associates, including the BDP, may never be taken seriously again as partners in political dialogue, leaving the PKK isolated and marginalized due to its continued use and support of violence. And no one in the world will question the decision to cut off all communication with an organization using violence for political purposes, would it come to that.
The signs, for now, are that the government -- while ending political dialogue with the BDP -- may go back to employing the old method of taking security measures and precautions against all kinds of violent acts and their political supporters. In doing so, the government is also in a position to mobilize regional and international pressure on the PKK given the turmoil in the Middle East.
Thus, while targeting the PKK and the BDP, the AK Party government can continue to increase investments in the Kurdish region, making social services available in order to underline its indispensable role in assuring the welfare of Kurds. These social policies may be accompanied with veiled identity policies with some Islamic overtones, but can just as well result in gaining a strong foothold for the AK Party among the Kurds. It is a fact that the support among Kurds for political parties tending to the BDP line is stuck at 5 to 6 percent of the vote in Turkey. This has not changed since 1995. With policies such as those of the AK Party, relying on providing social services and recognition of the Kurdish identity, coupled with Islamic overtones, may well halt the spread of the PKK and BDP's political influence in the region.
This is a strategy. The AK Party government may decide that Turkey is used to living with the threat of PKK terrorism anyway, so why should it take the risk of negotiating with Öcalan or advancing the “democratic opening” while at the same time it enjoys the support of a considerable section of the Kurdish people?
Well, the final analysis will take us back to where we started. The PKK, the BDP, and Öcalan should not take the risk of going back to square one. We have never been this close to resolving the Kurdish question and it should not be sabotaged by the PKK.
