From apology to reconciliation

Thanks to a recent petition prepared and signed by a group of intellectuals, we have found ourselves discussing the Armenian issue. It appears that not only the recognition of genocide claims but also the fact of the massacres against the Ottoman Armenians is a taboo. Those who signed the petition have been accused of treason.

Even Turkish President Abdullah Gül, who recognized the right of individuals to prepare any kind of petition, became a target of a racist assault by Republican People's Party (CHP) deputy Canan Arıtman, who argued that Gül's ancestors may be of Armenian origin. This scandalous statement was, in fact, a logical outcome of the xenophobia that has grown amongst Turkey's secularist circles.

But there also exists a historical aspect of this hatred toward "foreigners." We should not forget that not only Armenian identity, but modern Turkish identity, too, has been shaped by the events of 1915. As Minister of Defense Vecdi Gönül admitted a month ago, many in Turkey believe that the forced deportation of Armenians and Greeks made it possible to establish a "Turkish nation-state" in Anatolia.

This is the bottom line: Anything that is viewed as necessary to form a state, any kind of state, which is the guarantee of the survival of the "nation," is to be justified. For this reason, ultranationalists in recent years have been calling for the need to wage "another war of independence," aware that such a state of affairs would justify anything, including a military coup. Their motto made this very clear: "If the motherland is at stake, the rest is a matter of details." So those ultranationalists were trying to build a consensus on the "essentials" of the national existence: to protect the state (whose characteristics would not matter at all) vis-à-vis the assault of global forces and their domestic collaborators.

The secularists and the "conservative democrats," including Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, have united in defense of what the Committee of Union and Progress did in 1915.

We do not have to, and should not, accept that the 1915 events constituted genocide, but we must stop trying to find excuses for the massacres of Ottoman citizens of Armenian origin. Otherwise, we can find excuses for the suppression of the Kurds, of Islamic dervish orders, of the girls who wear the headscarf, etc. If we allow the raison d'état to reign, then everything will be explainable and justifiable.

The debate over the apology campaign has revealed that many in Turkey, including Islamists, conservatives, leftists and even liberals, continue to think within the paradigm of the nation-state and nationalism.

The fact is that at the turn of the 19th century, all the peoples of the Balkans and Anatolia suffered at the hands of nationalists, be they Bulgarian, Greek, Turkish or Armenian nationalists. There is, therefore, no point in maintaining and reproducing the same nationalist sentimentalities today. What is needed is a process of reconciliation that does not come through by standing behind the crimes of nationalists of all kinds committed a century ago.

22 December 2008

Understanding AK Party’s Kurdish strategy

Given the electoral support the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) received from Kurds in the July 2007 elections and the party's reformist credentials, it was optimistically expected that the long-awaited solution to the Kurdish question was about to come.

Instead of developing a comprehensive approach to address the roots of the question, the AK Party developed a strategy of solving the Kurdish question "without recognizing the Kurdish ethnicity."

This is, of course, an unrealistic strategy but understandable because the party does not really have a free hand in its approach to the question and thus must act within the limits drawn by the security establishment, which claims to have the final say on the issue.

The security establishment realizes that the AK Party's popularity among Kurds is an opportunity and is pushing the party to the forefront to implement policies to buy the Kurds' loyalty. The "state" therefore wants the AK Party to ease the Kurdish question without damaging the basic characteristics of the Turkish nation-state.

What is left for the AK Party is to develop a three-tier strategy.

First up is providing people in Kurdish areas with economic and social benefits. Pumping resources into the region to complete the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) and implementing small-scale benefit projects are part and parcel of this strategy. Acting as a "social welfare state" in the region is expected to generate relative prosperity among the poverty-ridden Kurds and build a bridge to the "Turkish" state. Fighting against poverty is certainly an issue -- especially since large cities in the region are surrounded by hundreds of thousands of people who were forced to leave their villages. The shantytowns around Diyarbakır have made the Kurds' poverty more visible than ever. There is, therefore, a rationale behind providing these poor people with some economic benefits in return for their votes. However, this approach presumes that the Kurdish question is a matter of economic backwardness and that a more affluent Kurdish region will acquiesce to the Turkish state's denial of Kurdish identity. This is an approach that fails to understand the identity aspect of the Kurdish question and one that has been adopted many times by other political parties. Yet the AK Party is allowed to pursue such a policy precisely because it is a policy without an identity dimension.

The second element of the AK Party's Kurdish strategy is to appeal to "Kurdish conservatism," a strong social and political force in the region. Though the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) is a Marxist-nationalist organization, the outlawed Kurds at large are religious people who have very close connections with various religious orders and groups. The AK Party standing as a conservative party in line with the Kurdish social inclination gives the party a great advantage vis-à-vis the Marxist PKK. What is important for the Turkish security establishment is that a notion of "Muslim brotherhood" pursued by the AK Party may be effective in making Kurds loyal to the Turkish state without recognizing the Kurdish ethnicity. Thus a rhetoric employing Islam portrayed as anti-secular in the Western part of Turkey is not a problem in the Kurdish areas so long as it suppresses the Kurdish national identity.

The last element of the AK Party strategy is to develop a closer relationship with Iraqi Kurdish entities and leaders. It is important to note that this is not a unilateral AK Party policy. There is now a broad agreement among the Turkish policy actors -- including the security establishment -- on a policy of rapprochement with Iraqi Kurdish authorities. There has emerged such a consensus because cooperating with the Iraqi Kurdish entity against the PKK does not mean recognizing Iraqi Kurds' right to statehood or the ethnic identity demands of the Kurds in Turkey. Iraqi Kurds may be instrumental in containing and eliminating the PKK forces stationed in Iraqi territory.

On the part of the government, there is a political dimension as well. To recognize Iraqi Kurdish gains in post-occupation Iraq has been the desire of Turkey's Kurds. Visits by Iraqi President Jalal Talabani to Ankara and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to Baghdad have revealed that Turkey is prepared to develop a dialogue with Iraqi Kurds and that it is not unhappy with the newly acquired power of its Kurdish brothers in Iraq.

Given the popularity of Iraqi Kurdish movements in Turkey among the Kurds, the government's dialogue with the Kurdish leaders is certainly welcomed by Turkey's Kurds and will create a political advantage for the AK Party government. The AK Party's opening to northern Iraq can, therefore, also be seen as political maneuvering to reach out to Turkey's Kurdish population just before vital local elections, scheduled for March, without recognizing the Kurdish ethnicity.

15 December 2008

ASAM and ‘poverty of the strategists’

An Ankara-based think tank, the Eurasian Strategic Research Center (ASAM), is being shut down after its main sponsor, Ülker Holding, declared it would cut its roughly $2 million annual contribution.

Thus the apparent reason for the closure is ASAM's inability to diversify its resources as it has continued to rely on a single entity for its income.

But the problem is much deeper: ASAM could not survive because it modeled itself according to Cold War conditions and logic despite the fact that it was established well after the end of the Cold War in 1999. The founders did not have any formal education in international relations and were incapable of accurately comprehending the developments taking place in the world. Their notion of international politics was narrow-minded and outdated, sticking merely to the old notion of power politics, in which "hard power" is treated as the sole element of global politics.

Sponsored by a private company, but standing tightly by the state, particularly the General Staff, ASAM did not mind being seen as an extension of the state. On the contrary, its representatives were proud to claim they were speaking on behalf of the state even when this was not the case. It was an organization exaggerating its connection with the state, expecting to generate power and prestige out of this connection. It was not an independent and neutral institution and was never taken as such.

Led by ultranationalists, the institution was blinded to the realities of the globalized world. Serving as a gathering place for ultranationalist ex-officers and academics, ASAM never hid its advocacy for aggressive, and in the case of northern Iraq, expansionist foreign policy. It was also a "fan club for retired officers," as put forward by a senior diplomat.

ASAM was used as an institution for "psychological operations" in both domestic and foreign affairs. Its ultimate function was to securitize issues related to Turkish domestic and foreign policy areas. As such, it justified and reproduced militarism in Turkey with an authoritarian outlook in domestic politics and a militant foreign policy.

Its first chairman, Ümit Özdağ, turned out to be a contender for the leadership of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). He repeatedly called on nationalist youth to take to the streets in a stand against Kurdish demands and the American policies in the region. He was the person whom the "deep state" wanted to see as the leader of the MHP since its current leader opposed the usage of nationalist youth in the street struggle as had occurred in the 1970s.

Another chairman of ASAM was the late Gündüz Aktan, who was the ideologue of a form of neo-nationalism known as Ulusalcılık. He even wrote that mass deportation of the Kurds, which is nearly ethnic cleansing, may be carried out if the need emerges. He was eventually elected to Parliament as an MHP deputy.

ASAM certainly set an example for the think tank community in Turkey, a bad example. It not only polluted strategic thinking in Turkey but also presented its poverty. Think tanks that try to imitate ASAM will share the same fate: being shut down.

Yes, it had resources, thanks to Ülker Holding, which provided them with millions of dollars that were used to hire researchers and monitor and report foreign developments. But all these resulted in an "information dustbin" instead of deep analytical knowledge. This was because the top executives were looking not for informed analysis but for ideologically inspired prescriptions laying the groundwork for aggressive foreign policies.

Just to display how the logic of ASAM worked over the years, it is sufficient to recall the latest prescription of its founding chairman, Özdağ, who said: "[Iraqi Kurdish leader] Massoud Barzani must be made a friend of Turkey even if it requires using force!" This is the logic, vision, wisdom and the analytical creativity on which ASAM's "reports" are mostly based.

ASAM not only polluted strategic thinking in Turkey but also presented its poverty.

They will be remembered for their so-called experts who, appearing on TV screens just before the occupation of Iraq by US forces, predicted that it would take a long time to defeat the Iraqi military and that Saddam's elite troops would put up long-term resistance. The strategists of ASAM were a joke!

08 December 2008

What ‘Mustafa’ tells us about Kemalism

A documentary on Mustafa Kemal Atatürk by Can Dündar shed light on the mindset of the Kemalists. It has become clear once more that they live in an imaginary world where historical facts and social and political realities of the country do not matter.
What is more worrisome is their ceaseless efforts to turn the country into what they have in their mind: a society homogenized and disciplined by the state apparatus controlled by a bunch of Kemalists. To enable this, they envisage a country isolated from the rest of the world -- and especially from the West.
Kemalism for them is nothing but a dogma with its myths that include a particular narrative about Atatürk. Portraying Atatürk as a normal human being, as Dündar did in his documentary, amounts to blasphemy for the "faithful." Atatürk is not a historical figure for them but a sacrosanct person, a cult figure. So a simple quest for historical facts is attacked by the Kemalists as an assault on Atatürk's personality.
What happened to the documentary "Mustafa" is a case of how ideological dogmatism blinds the Kemalists and closes any free debate about Turkey's recent history. What the Kemalists did to Dündar is an indicator that it is almost impossible to discuss Turkey's recent history. The Kemalists not only try to block Turkey's march toward democratization, Europeanization and a free market economy, but also block it from facing up to its history. They think of themselves as the ultimate veto power.
In so doing, they do not take the realities of the country into account. What a big irony, for the man they adore was a perfect example of pragmatism in politics. From the moment Mustafa Kemal arrived in Anatolia in 1919 to the end of his struggle, he pursued a policy enabling him to mobilize all segments of society and win over their support. He appealed to devout Muslims, to the Kurds, to the pro-Soviet socialists and even to the members of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP).
It is a pity that contemporary Kemalists are far more backward than their leader who lived almost a century ago.
The contemporary Kemalists are not tolerant of different ideas and identities. Even moderate Kemalists, like Dündar, have become targets of their assault, no matter what they did previously. A "deviation" from the true path of Kemalism as perceived by the vanguards deserves an incommunicado. Those who deviate from the true path are accused of heresy, not treason, because what they have on their mind as Kemalism is more than an ideology, it is a faith.
The debate over "Mustafa" once more proves that Turkey's new reactionaries are the Kemalists -- the most dogmatic political formation, unwilling to allow free debate on any issue. Their primary concern is to keep the myths of Kemalist dogma untouched, unaware that in this age such a dogma is doomed to become passé.
01 December 2008, Monday

Does geopolitics bring about EU membership?

“Being strategically important will not make Turkey an EU member-country.” This was the warning from a friend of Turkey, Joost Lagendijk, the co-president of the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Commission, published in a commentary by the Taraf daily last week.

This is a valuable comment to keep in mind. While there have always been strong advocates of the geopolitical argument on the Turkish side, it seems that there are some in Europe who are increasingly emphasizing Turkey’s strategic importance. What should be underlined is that those advocates of the geopolitical argument, both in Turkey and in Europe, are not really enthusiastic about Turkey’s accession to the EU. They are more than prepared to settle with a “special partnership” for Turkey.

The strategic thinking that works on the Turkish side maintains that if the EU really wants, it should take Turkey in without questioning the nature of its political regime. What those who ask for such an offer do not know is that the EU is not a strategic alliance but a union of values.

Even an alliance like NATO has in the post-Cold War era developed a set of political values as the basis of the alliance, thus going beyond strategic cooperation. If Turkey asked for NATO membership today, I doubt very much that it would be qualified to be a member.

The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is an important aspect of the EU’s institutional and political cooperation. Yet, since the Maastricht Treaty, signed in 1992 between members of the European Community, one of the objectives of the CFSP has been to promote and consolidate democracy, human rights and the rule of law worldwide.

For some in Turkey, EU membership is acceptable only if it does not require a restructuring of the state, improving democracy, enhancing human rights and the rule of law. That is to say, some want to get the benefits of the EU without paying the price in return for Turkey’s strategic contribution to the EU. The interesting thing is that the price that these circles, particularly the military, do not want to pay is democratization, human rights and the rule of law.

For sure, some regional and global developments have encouraged advocates of the strategic perspective. Turkey may serve as a transit route for the transportation of energy resources from the East to Europe. It may thus help Europe diversify its energy resources. The Iraq war and the instabilities in the Caucasus seem to have added to the strategic value of Turkey as well.
Do these developments, which underline Turkey’s geopolitical location, make Turkey an indispensable part of Europe or its strategic partner? My answer is that they only convince the Europeans that Turkey should be kept at the periphery with a strategic perspective.
Yet the “strategic thinking” seems to be reviving as Turkey loses momentum in doing what is necessary to do, and Europe still seems hesitant on the overall added value of a democratic and prosperous Turkey to Europe.

What has revived is the old trick; that is, to sell Turkey’s strategic value to the Western allies. It seems that some old guards in Turkey never abandoned this old-fashioned game of seduction. It is a great mistake to think that a strategic location is an asset on its own.

Moreover, putting emphasis on the “strategic perspective” in EU-Turkey relations is a trap for the genuine supporters of Turkey’s EU accession. As Lagendijk rightly warns, the “strategic perspective” is bound to end up with an offer from the EU for a “special partnership” instead of full-fledged membership.

10 November 2008

Obama or McCain for Turkey?

This week the American people are electing their next president. No doubt this election carries global implications. Is it time for a change, as advocated by Obama's supporters, or is it a time to be cautious and carry on with neocon American unilateralism? We will see.

Turkey has always been interested in US elections. Every election season, Turks tune in to hear what the candidates are saying about two particular issues: Cyprus and Armenian genocide claims. It is widely believed that Greeks and Armenians are powerful enough to impose their agendas on candidates during their election campaigns. A Republican president who prioritizes "interests" over "values" is expected to be more sympathetic to the Turkish cause. The logic is simple: A power-politics perspective that is informed by geopolitical necessities in the region understands and appreciates the importance of Turkey much better than an "idealist democrat" would.

This rather old-fashioned analysis was spectacularly invalidated during the presidency of George W. Bush when Turkish-American relations experienced one of their worst periods ever and the popularity of the US and its policies declined drastically.

The Bush presidency proved that instead of being interested only in what the American president thinks of Turkey, we must watch how he runs his own country to understand what he truly means to us. The foreign policies of a statesman are not independent of his general political outlook.
Sticking to an old habit from the Cold War and imprisoning Turkish-American relations to a mere strategic alliance, a policy promoted in some circles in both Ankara and Washington does nothing to improve the relationship between the two countries. What is needed is not merely a strategic alliance but a "democratic partnership."

Thus cooperation against a terror organization is a good starting point for the improvement of relations, but it is not the end of it. The US, as a "democratic partner," should do more than declare the [outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party] PKK a terror organization and share intelligence on the group with Turkey. This is an old paradigm based on the notion of fighting together against the common enemy. What about a positive vision shared between the two countries? How about a partnership to building peace and democracy in the region? It is time for a "positive alliance," one that is not based on "against" this or that, but rather "for" a shared vision.

This requires treating Turkey as a "democratic partner." An American administration that is not sensitive to Turkey's quest to perfect its democracy will lose the faith of the Turkish public by being seen as allied with anti-democratic forces. This is in fact what has happened during the last couple of years when the US administration failed to show solidarity with democratic forces in Turkey. As a result, anti-American nationalists, as well as pro-Western liberals, have grown critical of the American attitude. The result was a "double alienation" of the American administration in Turkey.
To avoid this, America should understand that its partner in Ankara is the elected government, not a "few good men in the Turkish military." Turkish-American relations have gone beyond cooperation for security and into diverse and sophisticated issues. Even in order to continue cooperating on security, America's counterpart in Ankara is the democratically elected government, not the chief of general staff. Treating Turkey as though Cold War conditions are still prevalent would be a grave mistake on the part of an administration headed by Obama or McCain since it would mean that they fail to understand the "democratic reformation" that has taken place in Turkey in recent years, a process Americans could have contributed as much to as the EU has.

I think it is time for a change in Turkish-American relations as well. An Obama presidency in the US is more likely to add a "democratic vision" to the "strategic perspective" that still prevails in Turkish-American relations.

03 November 2008

Turkish military and the Kurdish question

At the heart of the Kurdish question lies an "imagined Turkish nation" which is assumed to be ethnically homogenous and politically equal. Such an imagined nation came out of a concern that without a unified and homogenous nation, territorial and political integrity of the new republic could not be sustained. Viewing differences as potentially disruptive to unity, the Kurds were assumed to be part of the Turkish nation, and their distinct language, culture and history were denied.
This has not occurred only to the Kurds. The republican regime has always had problems with identities, be it ethnic or religious, or even ideological. Allegiances to entities rather than the state were always viewed with great suspicion, giving the impression that the state was fearful of competing with other social and political entities for the loyalty of its citizens. This sense of insecurity, prompted by a top-down authoritarian modernization project, has resulted in a deep distrust of people who are considered potentially anti-republican or anti-Turkish nation-state. The problem was in fact not modernization, nation building or even secularization, but the exclusionary manner in which the Kemalist state elite conducted these processes. Denying representation to different ethnic and religious groups at the center with their own distinct identities only served to exclude and alienate Islamic/conservative groups and the Kurds, which in turn added to the insecurity of the Kemalist regime.
The way to break this vicious cycle is to broaden avenues of representation for these historically excluded identity groups and abandon the Kemalist policy of imposing an official identity/ideology for the people, be it Turks or Kurds. Though the Turkish military continues to imagine Turkey/Turkish nation/Turkish nation-state as homogenous, the founding myths of the Turkish nation-state have proved to be fallacious. Turkey needs to generate a new social consensus for coexistence among its diverse ethnic groups. One of the grounds for a renewed consensus is a constitution with liberal, democratic and pluralistic elements that will recognize the Kurds as being included. The second ground on which a new consensus can be built is to secure EU membership. These two areas, a new constitution and EU membership, are in fact mutually supportive objectives.
What is the position of the military on these broad objectives as the grounds to address the Kurdish question? There hasn't been a public statement by the military on the new constitution. But it is known that the military views political reforms that further democratization and improve human rights very critically. Democracy and human rights are considered fallacies, as reflected recently in the statement of Gen. [İlker] Başbuğ when he took up the job of chief of general staff. Recognition of the Kurds as an ethno-political group is strongly opposed by Başbuğ.
Concerning EU membership, we know how skeptical the top military brass are. The EU is viewed as a post-modern political project that will destroy the Turkish nation-state. Apart from supranational characteristics of the EU that threaten the Turkish nation-state, the military does not have favorable views on individual European states either. Almost all are depicted as "Turkey's so-called friends and allies," most of whom support the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).
The military wants to fight against PKK terrorism but not to address the root cause of the problem, the Kurdish question. In its public statements the military points to the need for non-military measures to overcome the PKK terror. By such discourse it implies that political leadership is not doing enough to eliminate social and political circumstances that enable the PKK to recruit new militants. Thus, in a way, responsibility for the continuation of PKK terror is placed on political leadership, which does not deal with the roots of terror. However, it is the military that blocks addressing the root cause. The military does not only reduce the problem to the fight against terror but also constantly draws "red lines" to obstruct a political solution. Pluralism is questioned, broadcasting in Kurdish is obstructed, amnesty is opposed, transfer of power to local governments is blocked, and the Democratic Society Party (DTP) is stigmatized. Within such "red lines" drawn so effectively by the military there can be no political solution to the Kurdish question.
Finally, we should keep in mind that the Kurdish question is not only a challenge for the Turkish military but also an opportunity to establish and sustain its hegemonic position in Turkish politics. Through the Kurdish question that social and political space in Turkey is secured, placing the military at the top.

20.10.2008

The PKK as a burden on Iraqi Kurds

The outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party’s (PKK) attacks from northern Iraq on Turkish targets have turned the Kurdish region in Iraq into a primary target of Turkey. It is time for the regional Kurdish administration to stop using the PKK as a bargaining chip against Turkey; it is not a time for the Kurdish people of Iraq to side with the PKK out of Kurdish sentimentality. While the former produces no advantages and incites the animosity of Turkey and pressures of the US, the latter ignores the fact that the PKK threatens to undo the gains Iraqi Kurds have made through their long struggle.
What Iraqi Kurds have today, after decades of struggle, is certainly worth preserving and consolidating, and those gains should not be risked by protecting the PKK.
The Iraqi Kurdish administration and Kurdish people need to understand what the PKK is up to. The objective of the PKK is clear: to keep the Iraqi Kurdish administration under the assault and pressure of Turkey. By doing so the PKK calculates that Iraqi Kurds will be unable to develop a polity which has full sovereignty over northern Iraq and is powerful enough to exclude the PKK from the region.
The PKK is aware that once Turkey and the northern Iraqi Kurdish administration establish mutual trust and cooperation, the PKK’s power in the region will disappear. Thus it does everything possible to block the development of understanding and cooperation between Turkey and northern Iraq. The PKK is pleased that Turkey has launched cross-border operations into northern Iraq, that it threatens the Kurdish administration and that it exerts pressure on the US to turn against the Kurds of Iraq.
Iraqi Kurds should not be naïve: the PKK does not want the Iraqi Kurdish administration to consolidate its power in the region. A powerful and consolidated Iraqi Kurdish administration would mean that the PKK would no longer have a free hand in northern Iraq, nor would it any longer be a force to be reckoned with.
Personalities should not be forgotten when analyzing the objectives of the PKK. Do the Iraqi Kurds and the regional administration really think that the PKK and its leader Abdullah Öcalan care about the fate, success and future of Iraqi Kurds? Just think of the current positions of three Kurdish leaders in the region: Jalal Talabani, Massoud Barzani and Öcalan. Talabani is the respected president of Iraq; Barzani is the recognized head of the Kurdish administration in northern Iraq. What about Öcalan? He is regarded by the world as a terrorist sitting in a Turkish jail! Do you think he could care less about the success of the Iraqi Kurds? I bet Öcalan is sitting in his jail hating Talabani and Barzani out of jealousy over being defeated while the other two leaders are enjoying success and international legitimacy.
It is crystal clear that northern Iraq will not exercise full sovereignty in the region as long as the PKK is present there. As long as northern Iraq is used as a base for the PKK’s attack on Turkey, Turkey’s cross-border operations will be legitimate. The territory of northern Iraq will treated as no-man’s land without a legitimate authority.
The PKK presence in northern Iraq means that the Iraqi Kurdish authority shares its territorial sovereignty with the PKK. In the past Iraqi Kurds and their leaders at times fought against the PKK and at times aligned with it. Now the situation is different. Iraqi Kurds who recognize the historical significance of the federal state they now control within Iraq should act accordingly and forget about the simple politicking of the past.
The PKK is their enemy of as well as Turkey’s. It is the single most important hurdle in the consolidation of their power in northern Iraq and the establishment of a peaceful relationship with Turkey, a relationship which is necessary for the consolidation of their administration.
If Iraqi Kurds want enemies in the region they should tolerate, turn a blind eye to or support the PKK on their soil. Iraqi Kurds should recognize that the PKK has become a burden for them.
It is obvious that the PKK launched an attack on Turkey just to provoke a reaction that would show disregard for the Iraqi authority. The Iraqi Kurdish administration should reflect on the situation and decide its priorities: Will it take the current historic opportunity to consolidate its power, or will it continue to see the PKK in a sympathetic light and be treated like the PKK in the region?
13.10.2008

The PKK’s raid: predictions and questions

The Kurdistan Workers' Party's (PKK) attack on Aktütün, a military post in Şemdinli near the Iraqi border, took place in the middle of two events.

The first is an ethnic clash which erupted last week between Kurds and Turks in Altınova, a holiday resort on the Aegean coast, leaving two dead. The second is a request from the government that Parliament extend the authorization for cross-border operations into northern Iraq, something which will be voted on this week.
It is clear that the PKK's attack on the Aktütün post is an open challenge to the Turkish military on the eve of the renewal of the authorization for cross-border operations on the one hand and an attempt to provoke further ethnic clashes between Kurds and Turks throughout Turkey on the other.
With the Aktütün raid, the PKK is trying to send the message that it is still strong and capable of staging high-profile operations against military targets. Given the fact that some 350 PKK militants took part in the raid and that the clash continued for seven hours in broad daylight, it would not be inaccurate to assume that the organizational and logistical infrastructure of the PKK is effective despite claims by Turkish security forces that recent cross-border operations destroyed the PKK's infrastructure in northern Iraq.
The latest attack by the PKK will put Turkey's relations with both northern Iraq and the US into question. It was revealed that the terrorists arrived from northern Iraq and hit the military post with long-range weapons from Iraqi soil. This will prompt the question of whether Iraq is a sovereign state capable of controlling its own territory. It is also certain that ability or willingness of the Kurdish authorities in the north to control the PKK's activities will be under debate in Turkey, thus poisoning the development of understanding and cooperation between Turkey and the Kurdish regional government.
The need for continued cross-border military operations in northern Iraq is confirmed by the PKK raid of Aktütün, and Parliament's extension of the authorization for cross-border operations into northern Iraq is now certain.
The US's cooperation will also be questioned. Nationalist anti-Western circles have already started to use the occasion to stir anti-American sentiment, arguing that the PKK is being supported by Turkey's Western allies including the US. Thus it is time for the US to reassert its support for Turkey in the fight against PKK terror.
The government will now face tremendous pressure. Although many, including the military, say that non-military measures are needed to address the root causes of the problem, it will be rather difficult for the government to institute such programs. Even a redirection of funds to southeastern Turkey may encounter bureaucratic resistance and slowdown in the wake of the PKK's assault. Any political scheme put forward to resolve this problem would be unthinkable for some time to come.
The attack by the PKK will certainly put the Democratic Society Party (DTP) in a difficult position, especially in its closure case before the Constitutional Court. Under the influence of growing public anger, the court may well be inclined to close down the party, which is accused of being connected with the PKK.
The Aktütün raid also raises questions in regard to the efficiency of the military's fight against the PKK and its ability to gather intelligence and mobilize its forces in the event of an attack. This time the military will not be able to escape criticism. The loss of 15 Turkish soldiers at a military post that was still vulnerable despite having been attacked five times in the past must be explained to the public. Many questions emerge: Is the Turkish military, which is so outspoken and so uncompromising on domestic political matters, capable of winning the war against the PKK, which is known to have only 5,000 militants? Is the Turkish military wasting its resources and energy on domestic political quarrels, leaving it ineffective against the PKK?
06.10.2008

Nation-state, Turkish military and the EU

Is the Turkish military in favor of Turkey's accession to the EU? Given the lack of enthusiasm on the part of the EU and the Turkish government at the moment, this question may appear rather irrelevant. But to understand the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government slowing down on the EU reforms, providing an answer to this question is important.
As EU membership is increasingly described in terms of the very survival of the Turkish nation-state it becomes very difficult for the government to push for risky political reforms. An aggressive EU integration process by the government may thus increase the tension and conflict within the state between the reformist government and those resisting bureaucracy, mainly the military and the judiciary. So the government is cautious.
Yet Chief of General Staff Gen. İlker Başbuğ declared recently that the military is not against EU membership provided that the EU doesn't target the "nation-state." So for the military preserving the "nation state" while acceding to the EU is a must.
This is exactly the point. This means that the military leaders merely pay lip service to the EU membership goal but resist reforms needed to get Turkey into the bloc, the reforms that they regard as weakening the nation-state. Everybody knows that EU membership requires a revision of the traditional notion of sovereignty and the nation-state.
Isn't it a nice public relations affair on the part of the military both in Turkey and Europe?
They know perfectly well that in the accession process political reforms have to be continued, including a more transparent military budget and a democratic civil-military relationship. Instead of saying this directly they prefer to refer to the notion of the nation-state.
This gives an image that the military wishes to see Turkey in the EU but not changed, transformed or reformed. My guess is that even if the EU decided to take Turkey in today the military would oppose it. This time the military will ask the EU to change itself before Turkey is allowed to join.
Will the Turkish military be prepared to be part of the EU where there are supranational institutions that are in no way under the control of national governments? The EU is an entity in which supranational institutions, such as the European Commission, the European Parliament, the European Court of Justice and the European Central Bank, have power over national governments. The Lisbon Treaty is meant to increase the supranational character of the EU at large. Decision making in the European Council, an intergovernmental body, will be significantly changed in a way to reduce further "national sovereignty."
So, how would the Turkish military fit Turkey into this increasingly supranational entity while keeping the Turkish nation-state intact? Is the military prepared to give up national currency (it is not a must, but very likely), accept a European Central Bank, European defense and foreign policy and jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice? How would the military defend its business interests such as OYAK Holding in an EU member Turkey?
There is no way to go on with a conventional nation-state in the EU, which is increasingly becoming a transnational entity going beyond traditional functions, organization and duties of a nation-state.
If the military really wishes to be part of the EU it must be prepared to revise the traditional notion of the nation-state. But we see quite the contrary: It puts forth maintaining the traditional nation-state as a prerequisite to membership. This means that either it does not understand what the EU is or just does not want to be part of it.
Let me conclude on why the Turkish military is against EU membership: Turkish generals want Turkey to be ruled in Ankara not in Brussels. They think so long as Turkey is ruled in Ankara they will somehow control or share power with the politicians. They know perfectly well that they will have no seat in the power-sharing mechanisms of Brussels.
29.09.2008

A matter of conscience and respect for labor

The “reactionary” move of the newly appointed rector at Boğaziçi University sparked a reaction from students and faculty members.
Those who ignore the liberal and liberalizing roles of the universities really have difficult times. Defending the bans in the strongholds of liberal thought, attempting to assume a role to monitor attire and keeping the students away from the classrooms are not things we can approve of.
Is there any “law” prohibiting the headscarf at the universities? No. Quite the contrary, the Higher Education Law states that students are free to wear any clothing or attire at institutions of higher education, as long as it does not violate the legislation in effect. So where does the ban come from? In its interpretation of this legal provision, the Constitutional Court ruled that the headscarf could not be considered proper attire under this law. The law says it is allowed whereas civil servants offer a restrictive interpretation. This is what is called “arbitrary rule.”
In an attempt to end this arbitrariness, Parliament amended the Constitution in February to eliminate discrimination between students by emphasizing the right to education and the equal opportunity principle. But this time, civil servants who are used to arbitrary rule concluded that Parliament was not allowed to amend the Constitution. The Constitutional Court had no right or authority to take such an action.
Let’s just say that it is forbidden to wear the headscarf at universities. Recently, Yasemin Çongar from the Taraf daily expounded on the matter, saying, “Just because it is banned does not necessarily mean that it is just.” The ban does not stop the headscarf from being a right that individuals can claim. The history of humanity is full of examples of rights gained after a struggle against bans. Nobody should be expected to accept the bans. This prohibition closely concerns a vast majority of the people in this country. At least 70 percent of the Turkish people support lifting this ban at the universities. That is to say, the people are asking for the ban to be lifted, whereas public officers, who are supposed to be servants of the people and make a living on the people’s taxes, resist. Can you tell me what the people should do?
Obviously, the headscarf controversy is no longer merely a legal issue. You should listen to your conscience because from now on it is also a matter of conscience. Depriving the students of their right to education at the universities should hurt people and give them sleepless nights.
Can you imagine this: You have to rank in the first 10,000 among 1.5 million examinees to be entitled to placement in a department at Boğaziçi University. To achieve this, you give up playing with your friends at an early age and instead you choose rigorous studying. You attend private courses after school instead of seeing a movie. You study hard instead of having fun with friends and family. At an early age, you feel the need and burden of having a bright future through a good education. You experience sleepless nights. Neither your body nor your mind is actually able to bear this burden. But you put forth the effort; you want to succeed -- and finally you fulfill your dream when you earn a spot at Boğaziçi University after intensive effort over at least five years. But while you are ready to take what you have earned, somebody at the gate of the university tells you that you are not allowed to be there because you are wearing a headscarf.
What would those who do not admit the young women wearing the headscarf at the gate of Boğaziçi University feel if their daughters were turned down at the university gates because of their attire? Wouldn’t they rebel? Wouldn’t they ask for actions or measures to be taken against this invalidation of their intensive labor and efforts?
Imagine the families of these students with headscarves. They have spent money for years to make sure that their daughters will get a good education; they put forth effort; they are proud of their kids. Then, a rector appears in front of the university gate to tell them they are not allowed on the university premises in particular attire.
From where do you get this right to seize the people’s rights and labors? Where is justice and equality? Where is conscience?
27.09.2008

Political actors needed to solve Kurdish question

Foreign observers following Turkish politics naturally may have an image of Turkey as a country where political parties face constant threats of closure by the Constitutional Court. They are, in fact, not mistaken. The ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) has just escaped being closed down by the court.

Now it is the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) that the Constitutional Court is about to issue its judgment on, in a case for closure brought by the chief public prosecutor. So far 24 political parties have been closed down by the court. As for the parties of the DTP line, the number is already four. It will, therefore, be no surprise if the same thing happens to the DTP.

We know for certain that the decisions of the Constitutional Court on party closure cases are not strictly legal but also political. The judges sitting on the court use political reasoning. It is time for them to give serious thought to the function of a political party such as the DTP, and more importantly on how to resolve the Kurdish issue without political actors. Turkey needs political parties like the DTP and the AK Party that represent the Kurdish constituency to first integrate the Kurds into central politics and to address their demands and grievances.

The DTP should therefore not be closed down. Though it is not the sole representative of the Kurdish constituency as it used to be, it nevertheless reflects the views and positions of a significant segment of the Kurdish population. The DTP's presence in Parliament is valuable in itself, as is the representation of the DTP grassroots in central political institutions of Turkey. It is the DTP again where radical Kurdish politics engages in an internal debate on the ways to put their demands forward. The ability of radical Kurdish politics to transform into a legitimate political agent will, therefore, be seen in the internal debate of the DTP. And all of these processes require non-closure of the party. Only if the party is kept open will the DTP evolve over time into a genuine political party, distancing itself from the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and having a life, program, and constituency of its own.

Closure, on the other hand, would only serve to avoid questioning the party's conventional line. The radicals in the party will think that they are vindicated as they continue to argue that political struggle has its limits, and thus they should keep the violence option open.

It is clear that the DTP has not yet completely distanced itself from violence. It could have established its own political entity but instead, its leaders have chosen or were obliged to choose, to remain under the shadow of the PKK. As such they have not only disappointed many in Turkey but also foreign observers in the West. The legitimacy of a political party that does not denounce violence would be questioned in any liberal democracy.

Moreover, as Kurdish people have increasingly been questioning the wisdom of using violence as a method of political struggle, it should have been time for the DTP to emerge as solely a political agent. But it has hesitated in sending messages to the PKK and its extensions in the region. But this seems suicidal for the DTP. They should keep in mind that the DTP now has a rival in representing Kurdish politics, the AK Party. It is a challenge for the DTP to reconsider their conventional approach to politics and the Kurdish issue. I would remind them that the AK Party has succeeded in eliminating the conventional center-right political parties in Turkish politics - such as the Motherland Party (ANAVATAN) and the True Path Party (DYP) -- and replaced them, as such parties failed to renew themselves and change political, social and economic circumstances. The same might happen to the DTP in the region if it does not respond to challenges brought by the AK Party. The July 22 elections presented a clear warning to the DTP that the provision of services to the people in the region matters as much as identity politics. Given the poor performance of the DTP in local administrations and the growing weariness of people with violence, the DTP might face a serious blow in the upcoming local elections of 2009.

To conclude, first, the Constitutional Court should let the DTP evolve. Closing the party would mean siding with the radicals within the party. Second, closing the party would be another embarrassment for democracy in this country. The court should save us from such an embarrassment.
22.09.2008

Why the DTP should not be shut down

We are approaching the end of the legal case being heard in the Constitutional Court regarding whether or not the Democratic Society Party (DTP) is to be forced to close. But there is a strange silence that abounds as we relive this process, one which the ruling party experienced only two months ago and from which it very nearly did not emerge. This time around, the same national and international factions, which made a real effort to voice their views on the possible closure of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party), even going so far as to exert pressures on this front, are not saying much.

The DTP needs to spend more time thinking about this particular situation, one which cannot be explained away simply by a "lack of principles." It is both what the DTP has done as much as what it has not done that takes partial credit for this silence. The DTP ought not to be closed. As it stands, it looks impossible for even the Venice Criteria to save the DTP at this point. After all, it is impossible for the universal legal criteria that exist in the world to protect a political party that only does not condemn violence but which sees violence as a legitimate vehicle for political intervention. Still, given even this, the correct political path does not lie through the closure of the DTP.

Closing the DTP would mean shutting down one of the four political parties with parliamentary groups. And even more important, it would mean completely discounting the will of voters from the Southeast of the country. If the forced closure of the AK Party were to have struck a blow to the national will, how could the forced closure of the DTP mean anything different? The forced closure -- no matter what the conditions -- of any political party which picked up nearly half of all votes from residents of the Southeast means complete disrespect to the will of the people of that region.
The DTP ought not to be closed. We ought to be able to show even those who do not clearly condemn violence that the political road in Turkey is open to all. If our real problem is with violence and bringing an end to this violence, it would be helpful for everyone to see that every political opportunity possible was used in the attempt to stop this violence. The forced closure of the DTP will only, in the end, weaken those who embrace legitimate political methods and punish those who have some faith in politics.

The presence of the DTP in Parliament, the first such party in the legislature in 16 years, even though turbulent, is ultimately a contribution to the normalization of political life in Turkey. At the very least, factions represented by the DTP have finally transcended the basic problem of representation in Parliament. The meeting between central politics and the DTP under the roof of Parliament and the subsequent influence of central politics on the DTP need to continue. Not forcing the DTP to close will show that a chance has been given to peaceful politics and to the representation in Ankara of varied identities. In exchange for the DTP's political performance, it should be allowed to play a role in politics. The local elections are fast approaching, and the DTP is neither alone nor all that comfortable on its usual bedrock: It is facing off against the AK Party there. So there are two parties, one which depends solely on the politics of identity, against one which alleges it has no problem with the Kurdish identity and which proposes various "services" to the region in order to help transcend Kurdish problems. Such competition ought to be allowed an opportunity to play itself out.

The people of the region ought to be allowed to make their choices. So these upcoming local elections are important for different reasons to the DTP and the AK Party: The former needs to see and understand the limitations of identity-based politics, and the latter needs to be allowed to test just how much it will be able to substitute "services" for its previously hesitant approach to Kurdish identity matters.

In the meantime, people are noticing the silence emanating from the ranks of the AK Party on this all. A political party which itself has just narrowly escaped being forced to close down would normally be expected to come out "categorically" in opposition to all forced party closures. In principle, as the DTP's regional competitor for votes, they should be saying, "We want to beat the DTP at the ballot box." In fact, looked at from a completely pragmatic stance, this is how they should be thinking, for, after all, the forced closure of the DTP would only, in the end, strengthen the DTP throughout the Southeast, much as the AK Party itself would have emerged from forced closure all the stronger.

What the radical factions within the DTP really want is forced closure of their party. They know that this would give them an easier way to explain to voters just how "limited" political methods really are and why it is that "violence" always needs to be maintained as a possible measure. The forced closure of the DTP would offer party radicals a powerful tool with which to reckon with the "defenders of political means" within DTP party ranks. To borrow an expression from Bejan Matur, forced closure of the DTP would mean the "elimination of moderates." If the apparatus we call the "state," including of course the Constitutional Court, wants to see not DTP moderates but DTP hawks, then they can go ahead and force this party to close in good conscience. And if this happens, a new party will be founded along more radical lines, the hawks will take over power and the people of the region, in reaction, will keep on casting their votes for this party. And thus no opportunity will have been given to the people of the region to truly analyze the political performance of the DTP in both local and general political leadership. In the end, the decision rendered by the Constitutional Court will really reveal whether or not the "state" wishes to see a solution to the Kurdish problem.
20.09.2008

Will the Turkish military abandon NATO?

Turkey's membership in NATO and its overall security cooperation with the West has been a topic of debate recently, particularly within the country's nationalist/Kemalist circles, including the military.
For them, Turkey's presence in the Western defense structure is not an asset for Turkey's security and territorial integrity, but a liability. The occupation of Iraq and the American support for Kurdish groups in northern Iraq have certainly contributed to this view. But even before 2003, the Turkish military had come to see Turkish-American cooperation in northern Iraq, in the form of "Operation Poised Hammer," as a covert effort to create a Kurdish state with devastating effects on Turkey's territorial integrity.

From a Kemalist/nationalist point of view, not just Turkey's territorial integrity, but also its secular "regime" is threatened by the US. A city legend among the Kemalist/nationalists is that the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) was brought to power by the US in 2002 as part of the American project of promoting "moderate Islam" and implementing its "Greater Middle East Initiative." These two phrases, moderate Islam and the Greater Middle East Initiative have frequently appeared in the speeches of high ranking Kemalists/nationalists, including some retired generals, and former President Ahmet Necdet Sezer and in the indictment of the public prosecutor who opened the case in the Constitutional Court to close down the ruling AK Party.

Thus when the Kemalist/nationalist block, including elements of the civilian-military bureaucracy, have tried to get rid of the AK Party by all means available to them, they justified this on the ground that theirs was a "national" project. To fight against the AK Party, for them, is the way to resist America's designs on Turkey.

The EU, with its call for greater democracy and human rights, is also viewed as a threat. The EU's membership criteria of democracy, human rights, the rule of law, minority rights and civilian supremacy over the military are all believed to have been designed to weaken the Turkish state. But even before 1999, there had been a widespread belief in the security sector that European "allies" of Turkey were trying to revive the Sevres Treaty of 1920 that divided up Turkey. In the memoirs and statements of many retired generals, it is a common view that the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) was created and supported by those European allies of Turkey.

Even beyond political and security-related issues, Turkey's integration with the global economy is seen as a dangerous path for the country, in that privatization is a cover-up for Western companies to take over Turkey's national assets. In their recent speeches, Chief of General Staff Gen. İlker Başbuğ and his eventual successor, Gen. Işık Koşaner, expressed their opposition to globalization, global forces, and trends that were described as "determined to finish off the Turkish nation-state." In his speech Gen. Koşaner explained how "colored revolutions" attempted to destroy nation-states like Turkey. By this Gen. Koşaner was referring to pro-democracy changes in Ukraine and Georgia. From this perspective, democratization and greater integration into the global economy may lead to the end of the nation-state. What they really mean by the "global system" is the US and the EU, which are Turkey's Western allies. The structural integration of Turkey into the West in terms of EU membership, continued security cooperation and inflow of global capital seems unwelcome.
The nationalist/Kemalist block believes that they are waging a "new national struggle" against the West and its allies, including not only the AK Party, but also those liberals who advocate EU membership, globalization, a market economy, and democracy.

No one can deny the fact that the Turkish military has become deeply anti-Western and anti-American in recent years. We remember some high-ranking retired generals who called for abandoning NATO, which they described as a tool of American imperialism. We also recall some others who advocated the establishment of an axis with Russia, Iran, and China against the US and the EU.

Having observed this, I believe that if Turkey had not already been a member of NATO, the Turkish military would be opposed to NATO membership as it is to EU accession. Thank God, the Democrat Party (DP), the leader of which was hanged by the military after the 1960 military coup, brought Turkey into NATO in 1952.
15.09.2008

Why the secularists dislike the EU

Kalypso Nicolaïdis and Hakan Altınay argue really hard to explain "why the European Union strengthens secularism in Turkey." I really hope they convince the secularists of the wisdom of the EU membership for the sustainability of secularism in Turkey.

But I am afraid they will not succeed. The reason is simple: For the Turkish secularists, the question is not just a matter of secularism. For them, secularism is a "discursive tool" to empower one socio-political/economic group while excluding conservative/peripheral social actors and their interests and identities from the power center. Unless one rightly identifies the underlying causes of the secularists' outcry, it is impossible to address the issue.

Secularists would be appeased only if they are offered the continuation of the privileged status they once enjoyed -- this time by the EU, which may decide specifically to protect the interests of the secularists. The point is whether such a position would fit into the European ideal of equality and non-discrimination.

A democratic politics based on the rights of individuals as outlined in the European Convention of Human Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU would provide protection for all citizens. Special protection for a particular group, the secularists, would rightly be called privilege.
The secularists in Turkey should first come to terms with democracy and human rights. The top secularists, high-ranking commanders, declared last week how "democracy threatens the regime and human rights divide Turkey into pieces." This reflects the prevailing mindset of the secularists. How can we go along with such an idea while negotiating membership with the EU?

It is crystal clear that secularists have abandoned the ideal of democracy. They at large view democracy as a system that brought conservative (for them Islamist) political parties into power. One should not think that this is a perception of recent years. Before the existence of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and even before the emergence of the Welfare Party (RP) in the 1990s, the secularists viewed democracy as a game always won by counter-revolutionaries. The whole story started with the victory of the Democrat Party (DP) in 1950, the first free and fair elections in Turkey. Since then they have looked for anti-democratic means (direct military coup or judicial interventions) to stop the "counter-revolutionaries" who were in fact politicians representing identities and interests of "ordinary citizens" outside the Kemalist-secularist power block. For that, the secularists welcomed the 1960 military coup and the trial of DP leaders by a military-appointed special tribunal that executed Prime Minister Adnan Menders and two of his ministers.
The secularists continued to oppose Süleyman Demirel in the 1960s and Turgut Özal in the 1980s as both were representing the social periphery against the hegemony of the bureaucratic/secularist center -- and neither of them was Islamists.

So if the EU wishes to appease the secularists, it should forget about democratization in Turkey.
Isn't it interesting to note that the secularists today are the staunchest opponents of the EU? They used to support the EU membership, assuming that it would strengthen their position vis-à-vis the "ignorant, uneducated, rural people of the periphery." But realizing that the EU membership in the late 1990s means full democracy, respect for human rights for all and that the rule of law meant giving up all the privileges they had accumulated for years, the Kemalist secularists gave up on the EU objective.

Yes, they were once supporters of Westernization. Posing as Westernizers was useful to underline the cultural/social "superiority" of the ruling elite over the masses. Being a Westernizer was instrumental in acquiring the right to rule by alienating themselves from the masses, which were unfamiliar with Western culture. Thus Westernization was instrumental in establishing and justifying the power monopoly of Kemalist secularists.

This monopoly is challenged by the EU membership as Westernization now means emancipation for the masses since it requires greater democratization, empowering people vis-à-vis the bureaucratic/Kemalist/secularist center. This is why the EU is now detested by the secularist elite and loved by the masses.

The secularists should come to terms with democracy and a peaceful notion of secularism. They should give up instrumentalizing secularism to exclude conservatives from power and benefits. We need a "democratic secularism" as called for by European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso. The issue at stake is not secularism per se but the exclusion of the conservative and peripheral social/political/economic forces in the name of secularism, which cannot be overlooked by the EU.

Turkey can become a member of the EU without the blessing of the secularists, who would oppose anyway, or at least try to slow down, Turkey's European integration unless the EU sides with them to sustain their power privileges in Turkey. No one expects the EU to align itself with such anachronistic secularists, who are not only anti-democratic but also anti-Western. Remember the republican rallies of last year at which they enthusiastically chanted "Neither the US nor the EU."
08.09.2008

Why Turkish generals oppose globalization

Political debate and cleavages in Turkey today are between those who hold favorable views of globalization and thus work toward greater integration in the global system, and those who perceive globalization as the "number-one threat," who thus employ all possible means to stop pro-globalization groups.

Last week two top Turkish military commanders gave important speeches outlining their views on Turkish politics as well as global developments. The statements of Chief of General Staff Gen. İlker Başbuğ and Land Forces Commander Gen. Işık Koşaner revealed that the top military brass opposes globalization, global actors and global values.

Well, they may have a point. Though globalization does not have a particular problem with Kemalism, it shakes the fundamentals of all ideological states. An ideological state controlled by a vanguard elite including the military, in the name of Kemalism in the Turkish case, is not sustainable in a globalized world.

With globalization also come transparency, competition, and interconnectedness, all problems for an ideological state and its vanguards. It is impossible to govern a society that is integrated into a globalized world through commands from the top. People, economy and politics will be under the influence of diverse networks, ideas, and interests. Such a society will no longer rely on "official truths" imposed on them and the welfare/ liberties gifted to them by the state elite. Instead, a society integrated with the world is empowered to seek its truth, its welfare, and its liberties. Obviously, such features of globalization make it very difficult to control the state and society. Thus the military naturally prefers a closed society with controllable social, political and economic agents.

For the last six years, the average annual foreign direct investment (FDI) increased considerably, reaching $20 billion in the last couple of years, more than 20 times higher in comparison to earlier periods. Moreover, billions of dollars are traded in the stock exchange and in the banking system. All these make the "management" of the economy difficult from a "nationalist" point of view that prefers a centralized national economy that is not "vulnerable" to global trends. Would a military hostile to global trends and actors be happy with the current inflow and activities of foreign capital? Who is inviting foreign capital and "selling out" Turkey's national assets to them? These are key questions to understanding the underlying reasons for the power struggle in recent years.

To Turkish generals, international organizations, transnational civil society organizations and multinational corporations all pose threats to Turkey, Turkish security and Turkey's political regime. What they really mean is that globalization threatens the Kemalist regime that provides them with discursive justification for the military's power and privileges in the system.

In the generals' speeches a deep-seated hostility towards transnational actors, ideas and movements are clearly visible. Turkish civil society is targeted as being designed by "transnational actors." Democracy and human rights are evaluated as a disguise to divide the country and change the regime. How come these ideas willingly support Turkey's democratization process? "Too much democracy threatens secularism," they argue. So we should conclude that "Western democracies went too far and turned into theocracies." Fear of not only globalization but also of democracy prevails throughout the speeches of the top two military commanders. In fact, globalization is feared because it encourages democratization.

The generals speak of a "global system" that wants to take over Turkey. But thanks to the "Atatürkist thought system," Turkey has not surrendered to the hegemony of the global system. I really wonder if Turkey is an ally of Chaves' Venezuela or the West. These are old-fashioned Third Worldist generalizations with no correspondence to the reality on the ground.

The problem is that the Turkish military used to be the forerunner of modernization in this country. It is also the military of a country that has been a member of the Western alliance for over 50 years. As such, it is supposed to be an institution that is integrated into an international security community, NATO, with close links and cooperative international arrangements. Unfortunately, it turns out now that a reformist and pro-modernization military with international experience and supposedly culture has turned into a pro-status quo institution resisting change.

Yet the reasons are understandable: The "power monopoly" of the bureaucracy, including the military, is being eroded by globalization. This is the bottom line for their fear of globalization and resistance to democratization.
01.09.2008

Call for the army!

What is the army's mission? Being prepared to defend the country, protecting the country against attacks by enemy armies, possessing the necessary equipment, human resources, preparedness and the power of deterrence to do this.

Our army still delivers the "domestic politics" message. If the country is surrounded by enemies, if there are important developments going on in the Caucasus; if Iraq is still a threat; if there is serious tension between Iran and Syria and the West; if terror is still influential, then what needs to be done is not to criticize "postmodernism." Let the academics and writers do this.

It is our right to expect a speech from Land Forces Commander Gen. Işık Koşaner in the handover ceremony that would reference the country's preparedness, readiness, capacity, ability, and strength vis-à-vis the threats and dangers emerging in Turkey's near surroundings and deter enemies, instead of a speech on postmodernism and globalization. The army needs to go back to its actual mission right away, especially at this time when the security problems surrounding us have become more imminent.

Gen. Koşaner spoke as if he was a political leader -- and not a military commander. Let us review the thesis: "Nation-states are subjected to dissolution in the name of democracy and human rights." He suggests that democracy destroys nation-states while human rights divide them. The reality is just the opposite of this argument. Both democracy and human rights fortify the state. Nation-states that fail to embrace democracy and protect human rights are disappearing because when these noble values are absent, the legitimacy of the state becomes questionable; even the most repressive administrations have to submit to the demands for freedoms and rights.

Another argument is that the EU harmonization laws made the security forces' job in their combat against terrorism harder. Let us ask this question: When were the EU laws adopted at Parliament? In February 2002. If the harmonization laws made the security forces ineffective, why did the army fail to eliminate the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) terror in the absence of these laws before 2002? It is necessary to think about this question and avoid blaming the "liberties" for this failure.

The commander's description of the reforms introduced for EU membership as "impositions" and his attempt to present the EU criteria as "pressure and threat" shows that there are serious problems. Most importantly, this implies that the army is outside the institutional and social consensus on EU membership.

Civil society activities cannot be described as "security issues with destructive impact" by the army in a democratic country. The image of a civil society whose international affiliation is seen as dangerous is the extension of a vision of a Turkey that has closed its doors to the outside world. All individuals and institutions with connections abroad are seen as dangerous. This approach -- held by a commander of a country that has been a NATO member for over five decades -- to globalization and "the outside world" should be considered a reflection of the army's nationalist reflex since the end of the Cold War. We have frequently heard the statement, "The army is the pioneer of modernization in Turkey." But the army as described by the mentality in that speech seems to have embraced an anti-modernist stance.

Gen. Koşaner holds that the media, academics, capital circles, and civil society organizations, as "a postmodern layer" that has been "designed by the global forces," work tirelessly to "undermine and dissolve national unity, national value and security parameters" relying on their "web of propaganda and influence." What would those who hold such grave misunderstandings do? They would keep records on media, academia, capital holders and civil society actors and stage a psychological war against them.

The speech by Gen. Koşaner is a political manifesto that opposes the EU, democracy, human rights, market economy, and globalization, and it has nothing to do with the army. Those who are eager to be involved in politics should take the uniform off, take part in political activities or grab a pen to participate in the discussions. Nobody should ever promote their political agenda on behalf of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK).
31.08.2008

Foreign policy challenges

After months of uncertainty about the future of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and its leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkish politics seem pretty calm now.

The picture is as follows: The ruling party continues to enjoy substantial popular support, while the opposition parties are still unable to present a viable alternative, and the military and the judiciary are adopting a relatively low-profile opposition to the government. Despite this "stable" domestic political scene, Turkey's foreign affairs are going through challenging times.

The war in the Caucasus is the number-one challenge. The conflict involves two indispensable partners for Turkey. Georgia is the only land corridor linking Turkey with the Caspian region and Central Asia, the center of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline. Maintaining cooperation with Georgia is therefore crucial for Turkey's strategic width, reaching out the Caspian and Central Asia. Russia, in recent years, has become an important economic partner for Turkey. The early political tension in the aftermath of the cold war was overcome with a strategy of cooperation in the economic and political arenas. But this was based on a non-assertive policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia on the part of both Turkey and Russia. With the invasion of Georgia, it seems that Russia has now moved to an assertive policy in the region, claiming a zone of influence. Instead of confronting Russia bilaterally, the Turkish response has been to propose multilateral diplomacy by suggesting a Caucasia Stability and Cooperation Platform. The idea of the Caucasia Stability and Cooperation Platform sounds timely and functional, but maybe unrealistic given the global and regional dynamics. The key is the attitude of Russia, which seems rather unenthusiastic about the idea. Instead, the Russians prefer to manage the situation within the Commonwealth of Independent States if multilateral diplomacy is needed. Moreover, bringing Armenia and Azerbaijan and, of course, Turkey together within such a platform is not easy. If the Turkish government is really serious about this idea, it should begin developing its relations with Armenia without delay. What about the role of Iran? Such a platform cannot be established by excluding Iran, which has always had a great interest in Caucasian affairs.

Given all these complications and also the reluctance of the West especially the US the initiative may not result in a concrete organization institutionalizing stability and cooperation in the region but lose yet high-level diplomatic contacts. The crisis in the Caucasus has also raised other problems for Turkey in the region and in its relations with the West. It will be difficult for Turkey to engage with both Iran and Syria as these countries move closer to Russia in response to recent developments. If Russia is willing to intensify tensions with the West, Iran and Syria may see this as an opportunity for leverage, putting Turkey in an awkward position. But recent developments in the Caucasus vindicate Turkey's attempts to diversify its energy resources and reduce its dependence on Russian gas. The same is true for Europe, as well. The crisis may, therefore, be an opportunity for Europe to engage with Iran, instead of Russia, as a country linking Caspian and Central Asian energy resources to Europe. The Iraq issue remains a challenge for Turkey, as well. The possible withdrawal of American troops next year may complicate the matter even more if post-occupation Iraq proves incapable of holding itself together. Anyhow, establishing a working relationship with the Kurdish administration in northern Iraq is the key to managing the domestic Kurdish problem and the fight against the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK). Yet a self-sufficient Kurdish administration in northern Iraq may prove to be more difficult to deal with in the absence of American troops in Iraq persuading the Kurds to cooperate with the Turkish government.

Another challenge for Turkish foreign policy is an old one: Cyprus. The upcoming negotiations between presidents Mehmet Ali Talat and Dimitris Christofias have raised hopes about the possibility of a final settlement. Such an outcome will certainly accelerate Turkey's EU integration, an objective recently reasserted by the government as a priority. But it will not be easy to sell any settlement in Cyprus to the Turkish public, which is likely to start a new wave of heated debate provoked by Turkish nationalism. Knowing that foreign policy is never merely a matter of an "externally oriented" set of decisions, but a realm greatly influenced by domestic political developments, we can conclude that the stability of Turkish politics depends on establishing a peaceful regional setting.
25.08.2008

Lessons for government and opposition

The verdict of the court not to close the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) is certainly a relief, not only for the AK Party but for Turkish democracy as well. It may herald the beginning of a new era that rules out closing a political party that does not use or encourage violence. Thus democrats and AK Party supporters may hail the decision of the court as opening the path for democratic competition among political parties alone, no longer inviting the judiciary to meddle in political affairs. It may be inferred from the decision of the court that political quarrels should be settled by political means, not by the interference of the judiciary or the military.

But the court also ruled that the AK Party has become a "focal point of anti-secular activities," a point tacitly criticized by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who in his initial reaction to the court ruling asserted that "the AK Party has never been and will never be a focal point of anti-secular activities."

Thus secularism may remain the central issue of political debate in the future. Constrained by the verdict, the AK Party may speed up its evolution into a center-right political identity by pushing for more democratization and EU accession. In the new period, the AK Party may, therefore, try to expand its democratic credentials by seeking reformist policies reminiscent of its first three years in power. The court verdict would also have some ramifications on opposition politics. In a way, the court provided new ammunition to opponents of the AK Party who base their opposition on secularism. Yet this may not bring about any fresh argument against the AK Party. If the opposition continues to focus on secularism in order to push the AK Party into a corner, this would only serve to reinforce the current political division, a division that favors the AK Party. People who are concerned with secularism being used to limit the power of the people, the national will and democracy will continue to rally behind the AK Party.

Therefore, the decision of the court may also be interpreted as the end of secularism being the focal point of Turkish politics. The opposition block may be satisfied with the fact that the court declared the AK Party as anti-secularist and move on to challenge the ruling party on more concrete social and economic issues. This is the strategy that would normalize Turkish politics. It is also more likely to beat the AK Party in coming elections on such a down-to-earth opposition instead of a single issue of secularism, which has proven ineffective in bringing down the AK Party government in the last election.

In this line of reasoning, there is a possibility that the court verdict may lead to a process of "rethinking" secularism by the radical secularist block that may embrace a "moderate secularism" in an attempt to address the concerns of Turkey's religious people, a kind of rediscovering of the late Bülent Ecevit's notion of "secularism that is respectful of religion."

This may be wishful thinking given the inflexibility of the secularist-Kemalist block, but they have to try something new. Why not attempt to understand sensitivities and concerns of religious/conservative social segments? It is now a common saying that the ruling AK Party should address the concerns of secularists and win over their trust. Why do we not expect the same prudence and wisdom from the secularist/Kemalist bloc? If there is to be a reconciliation in Turkey, the secularist/Kemalist block has responsibilities as well. To start with, they should understand the need to lift the headscarf ban at universities and take the initiative to overcome this problem. Remember, around 70 percent of people want this ban lifted. If we are to seek compromise, reconciliation, and consensus, let us start removing the headscarf ban, a very effective way to win the sympathy of conservative/religious people.
04.08.2008

The roots of anti-Westernism in Turkish military (II)

During the Cold War, the West -- for the Turkish military -- meant a security umbrella against Soviet pressures that gave it a free hand to dwell in Turkish domestic politics to institutionalize its autonomy and even its dominance. Moreover, the Western alliance also provided the military with modern weaponry that enhanced its political role even further as a modern military power. The end of the Cold War was, therefore, not welcomed by the Turkish military establishment. If cooperation with the West had basically remained grounded in security, the military's central role and power not just in foreign policy and security matters, but also in domestic political issues, would not have been questioned.

The prioritization of security in the Cold War logic had perfectly matched the dominant role that the military wanted to play in Turkish politics after 1960. The "communist threat" served the securitization of Turkish domestic politics, justifying the military's gradual occupation of political and economic domains as the only reliable barrier against communism. The communist threat also justified maintaining a "disciplined" society and democracy under the tutelage of the righteous military. Therefore, the end of the Cold War was worrisome for the military establishment, since the period had been used to promote Turkish exceptionalism among Western allies and to justify a limited democracy under the control of the military on the domestic front. The end of the Cold War thus meant the end of security-centered cooperation with the West, naturally pushing the military to the sidelines of the decision-making processes. As the nature of Turkey's relations with the West started to change, the military realized that it would lose the central place it used to occupy in Turkish politics, in addition to its former power and privileges.

Following the end of the Cold War security cooperation with the West has surely continued. But it has ceased to be the central theme of the relationship. The Turkish security establishment used to sell its geostrategic location to the West during the Cold War in return for a limited democracy. That is to say that the West did not want to take the risk of pushing for full democracy in such a strategically important country during the Cold War. Strategic perspectives overrode a democratic vision.

But the end of the Cold War placed Turkey in a different context. Turkey's partners in the West were no longer interested in buying Turkey's strategic assets with support for authoritarian elements within the military. For instance, when Turkey applied for full membership in the EU in 1987, it still tried to bargain on its contribution to Western defense vis-à-vis the Soviets. In those last years of the Cold War and in its aftermath, it was not easy to cash in "strategic assets."

Soon the EU defined a set of criteria for the accession of countries that did not privilege Cold War comrades. On the contrary, the EU's enlargement now included former members of the Eastern Bloc, and membership conditions included a democratic form of civil-military relations. The Turkish military establishment never understood how these former Soviet allies could be invited to the EU, while Turkey, a country that had defended the West against these very counties, was left out. This incomprehension reflects the inability of the security establishment to understand the changing nature of global politics. As the EU made membership conditional on full democracy, including proper civil-military relations, Turkish top brass saw the EU as deliberately aiming at weakening the military.
The EU pressures in the accession process for democracy, human rights and the rule of law meant a wave of desecuritization of Turkish politics that would diminish the power and privileges that the military had gathered over the years. The same goes for the EU's insistence on the settlement of the Cyprus question. In short, as the EU developed a democratic vision sidelining the strategic priorities of the Cold War era, the military establishment started to view the EU as an adversary plotting against Turkey.

All that the EU has asked from Turkey in the post-1999 period has meant the end of the military's political and economic power. Anti-EU sentiments in the Turkish military are just a natural instinct for protecting its power and privileges. It is for this reason that they did not refrain from forging alliances with ultra-nationalist anti-EU forces.

You may ask: Where are the concerns about the future of secularism in all this? Secularism is no more than a convenient disguise for a naked political struggle for the military and the rest. Were the earlier military interventions driven by the military's concern about secularism?

In short, the anti-Westernism of the military is due to the fact that in the post-Cold War era Western powers and institutions have preferred to work with civilian, democratic forces in Turkey and encouraged democratization instead of recognizing the military as a political actor with a "right to rule."
28.07.2008

The roots of anti-Westernism in Turkish military (I)

A retired general, Nejat Eslen, gave an interview last week to Nuriye Akman of the Zaman daily. The interview reveals a particular mindset that seems to be influential in military circles. Eslen explains why Turkey should abandon the Western alliance and embrace Russia, meanwhile forgetting about democracy, which he views as a platform of "counterrevolution" against the Kemalist regime. Eslen's position provides a vivid example of the assertion I explained last week, that "anti-democratic forces in Turkey are also the most anti-Western ones."The fate of democracy in Turkey is closely linked to its relations with the West. This has always been the case. The single-party rule came to an end in 1945 in response to the victory of democracies in World War II. To be a founding member of the United Nations and win the support of Western democracies against the growing Soviet pressure on Turkey, the autocrats of the 1940s decided to adopt multi-party politics. They allowed the establishment of rival political parties and went for an early election in 1946 before opposition parties could get organized. The election of 1946 was not fair and free. It was held under the supervision of the gendarmerie and in many places, votes were dictated in a system of "public voting and secret counting" instead of secret voting and open counting. While allowing opposing political parties, the ruling Republican People's Party (CHP) was expecting to continue its rule by using the state apparatus that it controlled.

But the will of people to elect their own representative was infectious; once uttered, it was impossible to forget. Moreover, Turkey's growing engagement in the Western institutions provided significant leverage against the authoritarian tendencies of the CHP leadership. Adnan Menderes' speeches in Parliament before the 1950 elections frequently referenced Turkey's membership in the UN and its charter as requiring multi-party democracy. The beginning of Turkey's security cooperation and being part of the Marshall Plan in the immediate post-war period encouraged democratic forces.
To cement Turkey's linkages with the West, the Democrat Party (DP) government under Menderes, who won the first free and fair elections in 1950, brought Turkey to NATO membership in 1954 and applied for membership in the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1959.

But Turkey's engagement in the West did not stop the internal power struggle between the democratically elected representatives of the nation and the civilian-military bureaucracy representing the state. The paradox of the DP rule was that the modernization that it had initiated strengthened the power of its rivals as well. The military, for example, as a result of cooperation with the US bilaterally and within NATO, received new equipment and developed better training. This military, better trained, better equipped and better connected with the West, was disturbed by the transfer of power from bureaucracy to people via democracy.

They responded via a military coup against the Menderes government in 1960. In the first communiqué issued, the junta expressed its commitment to NATO, in a move to neutralize Turkey's Western allies. They were indeed successful. The West could not risk losing the generals in such a strategically important NATO ally where the generals declared their loyalty to NATO. Shelving off democracy and even hanging the democratically elected prime minister of the 1950s who brought Turkey into the NATO was tolerated by the West on the grounds that they needed Turkey in the Cold War competition with the Soviets.

This logic worked again in the 1971 military memorandum and in the military coup of 1980. In each occasion of these military interventions, the generals were quick to declare their commitment to the West and NATO.

So the military managed to trade off abolishing democracy with the continuation of Turkey's Western alliance. 1960, 1971 and 1980 military coups proved to the military that Turkey's Western allies were complacent as regards a limited tutelage democracy. So long as the West-tolerated military's central role in Turkish politics remained, the military cadets did not question the West as political orientation or military ally. But with the end of the Cold War, parameters have changed. The West, relieved by the collapse of communism, put an end to its policy of "Turkish exceptionalism," questioning the role of the military in Turkish politics and the quality of its democracy. This is where the disappointment of the Turkish military cadets with the West has started to emerge.

If the West does not accept the military's right to rule, then what is the point of sticking to the Western alliance? The search for an alternative has started, which is justified by the military circles as "Turkey's changing strategic vision."
21.07.2008

Why do they hate the West?

Anti-Westernism used to be a distinguishing feature of the Islamic political identity. Now it is the mark of the Kemalist-secularist stance. The renewed demand of the West, particularly the EU, for democracy and the rule of law has highlighted sharp differences between the vision of a Turkey Europeanized as a natural outcome of the EU integration process and the Turkey visualized by Kemalist-secularist circles. They seem irreconcilable. The challenge of the West for the Kemalists is clear: In the EU integration process, it is impossible to preserve the old order. The West and the continuing Westernization that comes with the EU accession process, therefore, pose an existential threat to the Jacobin bureaucratic-civilian elite, which adheres to a notion of a homogenized nation and the practices of an authoritarian state.

But it was the Kemalists who used to be fans of the West and Westernization. At least we know it as such. Yet what the Kemalists understood by Westernization was merely a cultural adoption of the Western lifestyle for a certain purpose. That is, this new lifestyle differentiated them from the masses, who were traditional and Eastern/Islamic looking. They were the vanguard, chosen to enlighten a nation that was in darkness. Theirs was a kind of "white man's burden." Cultural Westernization was an act of exclusion of the traditional by which a boundary was erected between the state elite and the masses, who were poor, culturally backward and religious. Out of this symbolic oppression, the elite's right to rule was constructed, justified and reproduced over the years.

The West and the process of Westernization, however, gained new dimensions in time, especially after 1999, when Turkey declared itself a candidate country for the EU. They were no longer a means to dictate the rule of the Kemalist-secularists and control the masses.

The result thus was a struggle between the democratic periphery who wanted to end its bondage and the authoritarian center, which was determined to defend its privileges. As the former "utilized" the EU process, the latter resisted it on the grounds that the EU process was a plot to divide Turkey in the name of minority rights and undo secularism in the name of democracy.

This meant, for the Kemalist-secularist elite, abandoning Westernization, a process they had initiated. It was wise for them to do so, given the fact that the process of Westernization after 1999 continued on a different path. It involved more political and economic transformation than cultural change. That is to say that Westernization in the EU context meant the transfer of power from the state elite to the people. Thus, the public at large and the peripheral forces in the Turkish economy and politics moved in to extend the process of Westernization to its logical end: the formation of liberal democracy. The objectives of Westernization, for the first time in history, have begun to be pursued by social and economic forces from below.

In short, Westernization after 1999 has gone beyond its traditional function of "controlling" the social and economic demands of the periphery. It has turned into a mechanism through which the Kemalist state and its power is checked by the people at large. As such, Westernization, now defined by EU membership, has acquired a civil and democratizing content against the authoritarian tendencies of the Kemalist elite. This explains the adversarial attitude of the Kemalist-secularists to political reforms and EU accession. Thus, in the EU accession process, the elitist model of Westernization has been replaced by a democratizing Westernization.

This is how the Kemalist-secularists have come to hate the West.
12.05.2008

The Turkish military and the US

It is often said that Turkish-American relations have never been redefined according to the new circumstances that followed the end of the Cold War. It is true that the old paradigm of security cooperation based on a shared threat emanating from the Soviet Union and international communism no longer justifies the alliance. Since then the Turkish military has gone through a mental transformation in which its threat perception has changed. Now the Turkish military's central security question is highly political.

As expressed many times by the high command, including the incoming Chief of General Staff Gen. İlker Başbuğ, the main concern is the preservation of the Turkish "nation-state." They feel that the notion of a unitary nation-state is under threat. What can be done against such a threat? It is virtually impossible to identify its source. And even if this is done successfully, it is almost inconceivable to wage a war against it, since the perceived threat involves social, political and economic actors, rather than enemy militaries. Social and economic forces that act globally cannot be controlled. This is the predicament of the Turkish military's current threat perception. No one, including a superpower like the US, can address their fear about the future of the nation-state. Demands for greater human rights, democratization, pluralism, minority rights and the dynamics of globalization are all feared to weaken the nation-state. The identified source of these evils is the West. The military's unease, therefore, is not directed just at the US, but at the West at large. The West, which supports democracy that brings the "Islamists" to power, demands human rights that protect the "terrorists" and asks for minority rights that encourage "Kurdish separatism," is no longer seen as an ally, but as the adversary. The result is simple; The Turkish military's priorities, needs and threat perceptions fundamentally differ from those of the West. The negative perception of the West by the military is therefore structural, not circumstantial.

The Turkish military is also deeply disturbed by US Middle East policy, especially in relation to Iraq, where an independent Kurdish state is assumed to be in the making with the support of the US, with devastating implications for the Turkish nation-state. A former commander of the armed forces, Gen. Aytaç Yalman, argues that the US handed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Öcalan over to Turkey in 1999 not for the sake of Turkish-American relations, but in order to strengthen the position of Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani in northern Iraq (Fikret Bila, "The Commanders' Front," p. 317). The Turkish military believes that the strategic targets and priorities of the US and Turkey are irreconcilable. Addressing the security concerns of the Turkish military requires changing the entirety of US Middle East policy -- for starters. The Turkish security establishment also views Israel's engagement in northern Iraq with suspicion. This is another significant setback, given the good old days when the Turkish security establishment regarded Israel as a partner against the PKK. But this was when Öcalan was based in Syria. It was then convenient for the Israelis to squeeze the Syrians together with Turkey. Once Öcalan was kicked out of Syria and a new force in northern Iraq, namely the Kurds, emerged vis-à-vis Iran and Sunni Iraq and Syria, the Israeli policy is argued to have been changed in favor of forging an alliance with the Kurds along with the US instead of cooperating with Turkey against the PKK.

The Turkish high command today consists of officers who served in the Southeast against the PKK. This experience has shaped their threat perception and views of the US and the West. As reflected in their memoirs and public statements, the experience of war against the PKK has made the commanders think that the PKK is not acting on its own. If the PKK were on its own, the Turkish military, the second-largest force in NATO, would already have erased them. The fact that the PKK still exists is due to the fact that it enjoys substantial foreign support, support that mainly comes from the West. Such perceptions prevail among the officers who serve in the Southeast.

Moreover, those with experience against the PKK are the ones most likely to be promoted within the military. Officers with skill and experience in fighting the PKK are naturally promoted. As a result, the high command is made up of officers with the most negative view of the West and the US.
This line and logic of promotion contrast with past practices in which those who were likely to be promoted used to be the ones who had served in NATO posts. This change has left its mark on the Turkish military's composition and security culture. The result is that the Turkish military is speedily getting out of the NATO culture of solidarity and alliance.
05.05.2008