It has become increasingly clear that the Kurdish question can neither be solved through the use of force by the Turkish state nor by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). This has been understood by all sides.
The current state of affairs does not benefit anyone. The only way out of this “lose-lose” situation is a solution that is a joint settlement by the fighting sides, the PKK and the Turkish state.
Many agree that domestic, regional and international developments are forcing the sides to contemplate new moves in addressing the question. I think the state and the PKK have exhausted all options apart from goodwill in order to achieve peace.
The PKK understands it cannot win a war with the Turkish state. There is no justification for using violence for political objectives in this age of a “global war on terror” in which no political end can justify the use of force as a strategy to get it. Besides, the domestic and international ground on which the PKK took root has changed. Turkey is not the country in which a guerrilla war was waged in 1985 when the Kurdish identity and even ethnicity were denied and speaking Kurdish in public was forbidden. Back then, the Southeast was under martial law, the State Security Court (DGM) was active, sentencing anyone who mentioned the existence of Kurds, and prisons were notorious.
It is still not completely satisfactory, but Turkey's official approach to the question is dramatically different now. The Kurdish ethnicity is recognized as a reality even by the chief of general staff, let alone the prime minister and the president. A pro-Kurdish party with very close links to the PKK is represented in Parliament. Political reforms introduced since 1999 have changed the way in which the Kurdish question is seen. The expression and representation of the Kurdish identity have never been this possible in Turkey. The state established a TV station broadcasting in Kurdish, a development that would have been regarded as inconceivable only some five years ago. Even killings committed by the “deep state” in southeastern Turkey in the 1990s are being investigated as part of the Ergenekon investigation.
Under these circumstances, it is impossible to justify the use of force in the name of “Kurdish rights.” I think this is the sense shared by most Kurds in the region. Political means developed so far are capable of bringing about a peaceful solution. The rise of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) in the region and among Kurds in general also indicates that the Kurds demand not only a recognition of their identity but also welfare and peace. People are tired of the downward spiral of violence.
Moreover, international circumstances force Kurdish politics and the PKK to search for accommodation. The PKK has been listed as a terrorist organization by the European Union and the US, making its political and economic activities in these areas very difficult. Furthermore, these two powerful blocks are increasingly rediscovering Turkey's importance in the region as an ally. Without Turkey, it is hard to make and maintain peace in the Middle East and the Caucasus. Turkey's role as a democratic and secular state is extremely valuable for the West in efforts to avoid a clash of civilizations. Securing energy transfer from Eurasia to Europe in a diversified way requires Turkey's cooperation. Above all, the EU is conducting full membership negotiations with Turkey. Thus it looks for a stabilized Turkey that can develop peaceful relations with neighboring countries to the west, the east and the south.
The US also attributes great value to Turkish cooperation in light of its experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq. As Turkey's political weight increases, as has been the case in recent years, Turkey's ability to use it as leverage over the PKK increases as well. Thus Turkey's Western allies are evermore inclined to buy Turkey's arguments, which are accompanied by a series of reforms on the domestic front toward the Kurds.
What is also important is the attitude of the Iraqi Kurds. After establishing their position in northern Iraq, they began viewing the PKK as an irritant for the consolidation of their power there. The presence of PKK camps in northern Iraq turns this region into a target for Turkey. But Turkey's goodwill is necessary for the economic and political viability of the regional authority. The Kurds in Iraq also see the PKK as a source of tension for their working relationship with the US, without which they cannot survive in the region.
Take all these together, and it becomes clear that the use of violence is neither justifiable nor sustainable. These are thus the best days to find a solution. President Abdullah Gül, in coordination with some state institutions, is taking bold steps. They should be reciprocated before it becomes too late, as some have already moved to weaken President Gül's political power and legitimacy by opening up a legal way for his trial.
25 May 2009, Monday
The current state of affairs does not benefit anyone. The only way out of this “lose-lose” situation is a solution that is a joint settlement by the fighting sides, the PKK and the Turkish state.
Many agree that domestic, regional and international developments are forcing the sides to contemplate new moves in addressing the question. I think the state and the PKK have exhausted all options apart from goodwill in order to achieve peace.
The PKK understands it cannot win a war with the Turkish state. There is no justification for using violence for political objectives in this age of a “global war on terror” in which no political end can justify the use of force as a strategy to get it. Besides, the domestic and international ground on which the PKK took root has changed. Turkey is not the country in which a guerrilla war was waged in 1985 when the Kurdish identity and even ethnicity were denied and speaking Kurdish in public was forbidden. Back then, the Southeast was under martial law, the State Security Court (DGM) was active, sentencing anyone who mentioned the existence of Kurds, and prisons were notorious.
It is still not completely satisfactory, but Turkey's official approach to the question is dramatically different now. The Kurdish ethnicity is recognized as a reality even by the chief of general staff, let alone the prime minister and the president. A pro-Kurdish party with very close links to the PKK is represented in Parliament. Political reforms introduced since 1999 have changed the way in which the Kurdish question is seen. The expression and representation of the Kurdish identity have never been this possible in Turkey. The state established a TV station broadcasting in Kurdish, a development that would have been regarded as inconceivable only some five years ago. Even killings committed by the “deep state” in southeastern Turkey in the 1990s are being investigated as part of the Ergenekon investigation.
Under these circumstances, it is impossible to justify the use of force in the name of “Kurdish rights.” I think this is the sense shared by most Kurds in the region. Political means developed so far are capable of bringing about a peaceful solution. The rise of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) in the region and among Kurds in general also indicates that the Kurds demand not only a recognition of their identity but also welfare and peace. People are tired of the downward spiral of violence.
Moreover, international circumstances force Kurdish politics and the PKK to search for accommodation. The PKK has been listed as a terrorist organization by the European Union and the US, making its political and economic activities in these areas very difficult. Furthermore, these two powerful blocks are increasingly rediscovering Turkey's importance in the region as an ally. Without Turkey, it is hard to make and maintain peace in the Middle East and the Caucasus. Turkey's role as a democratic and secular state is extremely valuable for the West in efforts to avoid a clash of civilizations. Securing energy transfer from Eurasia to Europe in a diversified way requires Turkey's cooperation. Above all, the EU is conducting full membership negotiations with Turkey. Thus it looks for a stabilized Turkey that can develop peaceful relations with neighboring countries to the west, the east and the south.
The US also attributes great value to Turkish cooperation in light of its experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq. As Turkey's political weight increases, as has been the case in recent years, Turkey's ability to use it as leverage over the PKK increases as well. Thus Turkey's Western allies are evermore inclined to buy Turkey's arguments, which are accompanied by a series of reforms on the domestic front toward the Kurds.
What is also important is the attitude of the Iraqi Kurds. After establishing their position in northern Iraq, they began viewing the PKK as an irritant for the consolidation of their power there. The presence of PKK camps in northern Iraq turns this region into a target for Turkey. But Turkey's goodwill is necessary for the economic and political viability of the regional authority. The Kurds in Iraq also see the PKK as a source of tension for their working relationship with the US, without which they cannot survive in the region.
Take all these together, and it becomes clear that the use of violence is neither justifiable nor sustainable. These are thus the best days to find a solution. President Abdullah Gül, in coordination with some state institutions, is taking bold steps. They should be reciprocated before it becomes too late, as some have already moved to weaken President Gül's political power and legitimacy by opening up a legal way for his trial.
25 May 2009, Monday
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