An Ankara-based think tank, the Eurasian Strategic Research Center (ASAM), is being shut down after its main sponsor, Ülker Holding, declared it would cut its roughly $2 million annual contribution.
Thus the apparent reason for the closure is ASAM's inability to diversify its resources as it has continued to rely on a single entity for its income.
But the problem is much deeper: ASAM could not survive because it modeled itself according to Cold War conditions and logic despite the fact that it was established well after the end of the Cold War in 1999. The founders did not have any formal education in international relations and were incapable of accurately comprehending the developments taking place in the world. Their notion of international politics was narrow-minded and outdated, sticking merely to the old notion of power politics, in which "hard power" is treated as the sole element of global politics.
Sponsored by a private company, but standing tightly by the state, particularly the General Staff, ASAM did not mind being seen as an extension of the state. On the contrary, its representatives were proud to claim they were speaking on behalf of the state even when this was not the case. It was an organization exaggerating its connection with the state, expecting to generate power and prestige out of this connection. It was not an independent and neutral institution and was never taken as such.
Led by ultranationalists, the institution was blinded to the realities of the globalized world. Serving as a gathering place for ultranationalist ex-officers and academics, ASAM never hid its advocacy for aggressive, and in the case of northern Iraq, expansionist foreign policy. It was also a "fan club for retired officers," as put forward by a senior diplomat.
ASAM was used as an institution for "psychological operations" in both domestic and foreign affairs. Its ultimate function was to securitize issues related to Turkish domestic and foreign policy areas. As such, it justified and reproduced militarism in Turkey with an authoritarian outlook in domestic politics and a militant foreign policy.
Its first chairman, Ümit Özdağ, turned out to be a contender for the leadership of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). He repeatedly called on nationalist youth to take to the streets in a stand against Kurdish demands and the American policies in the region. He was the person whom the "deep state" wanted to see as the leader of the MHP since its current leader opposed the usage of nationalist youth in the street struggle as had occurred in the 1970s.
Another chairman of ASAM was the late Gündüz Aktan, who was the ideologue of a form of neo-nationalism known as Ulusalcılık. He even wrote that mass deportation of the Kurds, which is nearly ethnic cleansing, may be carried out if the need emerges. He was eventually elected to Parliament as an MHP deputy.
ASAM certainly set an example for the think tank community in Turkey, a bad example. It not only polluted strategic thinking in Turkey but also presented its poverty. Think tanks that try to imitate ASAM will share the same fate: being shut down.
Yes, it had resources, thanks to Ülker Holding, which provided them with millions of dollars that were used to hire researchers and monitor and report foreign developments. But all these resulted in an "information dustbin" instead of deep analytical knowledge. This was because the top executives were looking not for informed analysis but for ideologically inspired prescriptions laying the groundwork for aggressive foreign policies.
Just to display how the logic of ASAM worked over the years, it is sufficient to recall the latest prescription of its founding chairman, Özdağ, who said: "[Iraqi Kurdish leader] Massoud Barzani must be made a friend of Turkey even if it requires using force!" This is the logic, vision, wisdom and the analytical creativity on which ASAM's "reports" are mostly based.
ASAM not only polluted strategic thinking in Turkey but also presented its poverty.
They will be remembered for their so-called experts who, appearing on TV screens just before the occupation of Iraq by US forces, predicted that it would take a long time to defeat the Iraqi military and that Saddam's elite troops would put up long-term resistance. The strategists of ASAM were a joke!
08 December 2008
Thus the apparent reason for the closure is ASAM's inability to diversify its resources as it has continued to rely on a single entity for its income.
But the problem is much deeper: ASAM could not survive because it modeled itself according to Cold War conditions and logic despite the fact that it was established well after the end of the Cold War in 1999. The founders did not have any formal education in international relations and were incapable of accurately comprehending the developments taking place in the world. Their notion of international politics was narrow-minded and outdated, sticking merely to the old notion of power politics, in which "hard power" is treated as the sole element of global politics.
Sponsored by a private company, but standing tightly by the state, particularly the General Staff, ASAM did not mind being seen as an extension of the state. On the contrary, its representatives were proud to claim they were speaking on behalf of the state even when this was not the case. It was an organization exaggerating its connection with the state, expecting to generate power and prestige out of this connection. It was not an independent and neutral institution and was never taken as such.
Led by ultranationalists, the institution was blinded to the realities of the globalized world. Serving as a gathering place for ultranationalist ex-officers and academics, ASAM never hid its advocacy for aggressive, and in the case of northern Iraq, expansionist foreign policy. It was also a "fan club for retired officers," as put forward by a senior diplomat.
ASAM was used as an institution for "psychological operations" in both domestic and foreign affairs. Its ultimate function was to securitize issues related to Turkish domestic and foreign policy areas. As such, it justified and reproduced militarism in Turkey with an authoritarian outlook in domestic politics and a militant foreign policy.
Its first chairman, Ümit Özdağ, turned out to be a contender for the leadership of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). He repeatedly called on nationalist youth to take to the streets in a stand against Kurdish demands and the American policies in the region. He was the person whom the "deep state" wanted to see as the leader of the MHP since its current leader opposed the usage of nationalist youth in the street struggle as had occurred in the 1970s.
Another chairman of ASAM was the late Gündüz Aktan, who was the ideologue of a form of neo-nationalism known as Ulusalcılık. He even wrote that mass deportation of the Kurds, which is nearly ethnic cleansing, may be carried out if the need emerges. He was eventually elected to Parliament as an MHP deputy.
ASAM certainly set an example for the think tank community in Turkey, a bad example. It not only polluted strategic thinking in Turkey but also presented its poverty. Think tanks that try to imitate ASAM will share the same fate: being shut down.
Yes, it had resources, thanks to Ülker Holding, which provided them with millions of dollars that were used to hire researchers and monitor and report foreign developments. But all these resulted in an "information dustbin" instead of deep analytical knowledge. This was because the top executives were looking not for informed analysis but for ideologically inspired prescriptions laying the groundwork for aggressive foreign policies.
Just to display how the logic of ASAM worked over the years, it is sufficient to recall the latest prescription of its founding chairman, Özdağ, who said: "[Iraqi Kurdish leader] Massoud Barzani must be made a friend of Turkey even if it requires using force!" This is the logic, vision, wisdom and the analytical creativity on which ASAM's "reports" are mostly based.
ASAM not only polluted strategic thinking in Turkey but also presented its poverty.
They will be remembered for their so-called experts who, appearing on TV screens just before the occupation of Iraq by US forces, predicted that it would take a long time to defeat the Iraqi military and that Saddam's elite troops would put up long-term resistance. The strategists of ASAM were a joke!
08 December 2008
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