“Being strategically important will not make Turkey an EU member-country.” This was the warning from a friend of Turkey, Joost Lagendijk, the co-president of the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Commission, published in a commentary by the Taraf daily last week.
This is a valuable comment to keep in mind. While there have always been strong advocates of the geopolitical argument on the Turkish side, it seems that there are some in Europe who are increasingly emphasizing Turkey’s strategic importance. What should be underlined is that those advocates of the geopolitical argument, both in Turkey and in Europe, are not really enthusiastic about Turkey’s accession to the EU. They are more than prepared to settle with a “special partnership” for Turkey.
The strategic thinking that works on the Turkish side maintains that if the EU really wants, it should take Turkey in without questioning the nature of its political regime. What those who ask for such an offer do not know is that the EU is not a strategic alliance but a union of values.
Even an alliance like NATO has in the post-Cold War era developed a set of political values as the basis of the alliance, thus going beyond strategic cooperation. If Turkey asked for NATO membership today, I doubt very much that it would be qualified to be a member.
The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is an important aspect of the EU’s institutional and political cooperation. Yet, since the Maastricht Treaty, signed in 1992 between members of the European Community, one of the objectives of the CFSP has been to promote and consolidate democracy, human rights and the rule of law worldwide.
For some in Turkey, EU membership is acceptable only if it does not require a restructuring of the state, improving democracy, enhancing human rights and the rule of law. That is to say, some want to get the benefits of the EU without paying the price in return for Turkey’s strategic contribution to the EU. The interesting thing is that the price that these circles, particularly the military, do not want to pay is democratization, human rights and the rule of law.
For sure, some regional and global developments have encouraged advocates of the strategic perspective. Turkey may serve as a transit route for the transportation of energy resources from the East to Europe. It may thus help Europe diversify its energy resources. The Iraq war and the instabilities in the Caucasus seem to have added to the strategic value of Turkey as well.
Do these developments, which underline Turkey’s geopolitical location, make Turkey an indispensable part of Europe or its strategic partner? My answer is that they only convince the Europeans that Turkey should be kept at the periphery with a strategic perspective.
Yet the “strategic thinking” seems to be reviving as Turkey loses momentum in doing what is necessary to do, and Europe still seems hesitant on the overall added value of a democratic and prosperous Turkey to Europe.
What has revived is the old trick; that is, to sell Turkey’s strategic value to the Western allies. It seems that some old guards in Turkey never abandoned this old-fashioned game of seduction. It is a great mistake to think that a strategic location is an asset on its own.
Moreover, putting emphasis on the “strategic perspective” in EU-Turkey relations is a trap for the genuine supporters of Turkey’s EU accession. As Lagendijk rightly warns, the “strategic perspective” is bound to end up with an offer from the EU for a “special partnership” instead of full-fledged membership.
10 November 2008
This is a valuable comment to keep in mind. While there have always been strong advocates of the geopolitical argument on the Turkish side, it seems that there are some in Europe who are increasingly emphasizing Turkey’s strategic importance. What should be underlined is that those advocates of the geopolitical argument, both in Turkey and in Europe, are not really enthusiastic about Turkey’s accession to the EU. They are more than prepared to settle with a “special partnership” for Turkey.
The strategic thinking that works on the Turkish side maintains that if the EU really wants, it should take Turkey in without questioning the nature of its political regime. What those who ask for such an offer do not know is that the EU is not a strategic alliance but a union of values.
Even an alliance like NATO has in the post-Cold War era developed a set of political values as the basis of the alliance, thus going beyond strategic cooperation. If Turkey asked for NATO membership today, I doubt very much that it would be qualified to be a member.
The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is an important aspect of the EU’s institutional and political cooperation. Yet, since the Maastricht Treaty, signed in 1992 between members of the European Community, one of the objectives of the CFSP has been to promote and consolidate democracy, human rights and the rule of law worldwide.
For some in Turkey, EU membership is acceptable only if it does not require a restructuring of the state, improving democracy, enhancing human rights and the rule of law. That is to say, some want to get the benefits of the EU without paying the price in return for Turkey’s strategic contribution to the EU. The interesting thing is that the price that these circles, particularly the military, do not want to pay is democratization, human rights and the rule of law.
For sure, some regional and global developments have encouraged advocates of the strategic perspective. Turkey may serve as a transit route for the transportation of energy resources from the East to Europe. It may thus help Europe diversify its energy resources. The Iraq war and the instabilities in the Caucasus seem to have added to the strategic value of Turkey as well.
Do these developments, which underline Turkey’s geopolitical location, make Turkey an indispensable part of Europe or its strategic partner? My answer is that they only convince the Europeans that Turkey should be kept at the periphery with a strategic perspective.
Yet the “strategic thinking” seems to be reviving as Turkey loses momentum in doing what is necessary to do, and Europe still seems hesitant on the overall added value of a democratic and prosperous Turkey to Europe.
What has revived is the old trick; that is, to sell Turkey’s strategic value to the Western allies. It seems that some old guards in Turkey never abandoned this old-fashioned game of seduction. It is a great mistake to think that a strategic location is an asset on its own.
Moreover, putting emphasis on the “strategic perspective” in EU-Turkey relations is a trap for the genuine supporters of Turkey’s EU accession. As Lagendijk rightly warns, the “strategic perspective” is bound to end up with an offer from the EU for a “special partnership” instead of full-fledged membership.
10 November 2008
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