Emergence of the ‘new AK Party'

The Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government enjoys the advantage of being without an alternative. That is certainly a luxury, in a country where the average life of a government in the democratic era before the emergence of the AK Party did not exceed two years.

The ruling party is now in its 10th year in government and still does not have any significant challenger. It is very likely that Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will be elected as president in 2014 if things continue as they are, and that his party will win another round of general elections in 2015.

Such predictions of continued success naturally boost the confidence of the party and its leadership. It is extremely difficult to tell a political party that sustains the support of more than half the population that it is doing something wrong.

Even if you tell them they will not listen to you. What counts in a competitive democracy is the number of votes. As long as a political party garners the support of enough people to bring it to power, the very objective of its political activity will be fulfilled. There can be no stronger incitement to change than a drop in the number of the votes, which does not seem to be on the cards with regard to the AK Party.

As a result, the government, instead of deepening democratic reforms, resolving the Kurdish question and making a new constitution, opts for populist conservatism, with economic and social policies designed to satisfy its supporters. This strategy manifests clearly: While the demands of conservative members of society are met with symbolic gestures, such as reintroducing the religious schools, building a gigantic mosque in Istanbul and debating the banning of abortion, funds are deftly spent on social projects for the creation of a loyal conservative bourgeoisie.

The result is perfectly satisfactory both for the party and the people at large, despite expressions of disappointment from some liberal and democrat circles claiming that the AK Party has abandoned its original reformist, democratizing and pluralistic political characteristics.

It is no surprise, of course, to see that this transformative agent of Turkey over the last decade, the AK Party, has also transformed itself. It would be a grave mistake to confuse the current AK Party with the one that emerged in 2002, which was regarded as an anomaly by the establishment, or with the one that was threatened by a coup attempt in 2007 over the election of the president, or the one that faced a closure case in 2008. All have passed, and by passing have transformed the AK Party.

Now the party has established itself within the system and become capable of utilizing the available instruments, including the military, the ideological educational structure and the centralized religious institution, the Directorate of Religious Affairs. By coercive means and through the ideological instruments of the state, the “new AK Party” is now capable of perpetuating its political power, social legitimacy, and economic strength.

Thus the AK Party today occupies all social and political space, leaving almost nothing outside its reach. This is further justified by the discourse that the AK Party is the party of the whole nation and that every person should find a place for himself or herself within the party. This “invitation” to all is understandable. But it also implies that the party sees itself as the embodiment of the nation, the same way the Republican People's Party (CHP) viewed itself in the 1930s.

We should not forget that to claim to represent all different ideas, identities, and interests within a single party is a homogenizing attitude that does not leave a free social and political space for autonomous self-expression of difference. If the agency is monopolized by a single actor that sees itself as the embodiment of the state, there will be no room for democracy and pluralism.