The foreign policy of a country is not singularly
directed abroad, it may also be a tool for domestic political purposes. Even if
it is not instrumental in formulating domestic politics its repercussion on
domestic politics is inevitable.
Foreign policy perceptions, choices, and orientations
may strengthen a particular “order of things” at home. For decades, Turkish
foreign policy not only reflected but also reinforced a “siege mentality” that
portrayed its neighbors as enemies with territorial ambitions on Turkey. This
created a tense relationship with neighbors with whom not only the state but the
people of Turkey developed a deep distrust.
Such a portrayal of the outside world made sense, especially in the cold war years. Constant threats coming from the region
justified the authoritarian power structure inside. Thus people at home had to
be united against immediate threats in the region and be even aware of their
internal extensions. Under such a continuous existential treat the idea of a fully
functioning liberal democracy, human rights, and pluralism were regarded as a
luxury and even risky. The politics of survival laid the ground for an
authoritarian politics supervised by the military, denial of the existence of
the Kurds and Kurdish identity, delays in democratization and widespread-cross
ideological nationalism. Survival and the security of the state were used as
justification for authoritarian state formation. In short, the threat perception
that was exemplified through practical foreign policy issues served to tie down
social demands, political actors and intellectual debates in Turkish politics.
This mechanism started to change after 1999 when Turkey was declared as a
candidate country for EU membership. As democratization, economic development
and good neighborly relations were required to be a full member in the EU the
Turkish governments, as well as social forces, pushed hard to change this
mechanism of foreign policy that served to the securitization of Turkish political
and social spaces. As a result of what I call the “liberal turn in Turkish
foreign policy” foreign policy ceased to be a ground for the securitization of
Turkish politics.
A paradigm shift occurred from pure power politics to
a liberal foreign policy agenda seeing the countries of the region not as
adversaries, but as partners prioritizing cooperation over conflict and soft
power over military might and bullying. This opened the avenues of mutual
understanding, trust, and cooperation in the region elevating Turkey as a country
of mediation, engagement, and multilateralism. Out of this new paradigm of
cooperation, Turkish companies, civil societal organizations, think tanks,
individuals entered into a deep interaction in the neighborhood. Later these
social and economic actors acted as driving forces for continued political
dialogue and good relationships in the region.
When the Arab revolutions occurred many expected
Turkey’s cooperation and dialogue-based soft power approach would continue. But
the resistance of the Syrian regime to change last year and Turkey’s inability
to persuade Syrian President Bashir al-Assad to introduce reforms has displayed
the limits of Turkey’s soft power to influence change in Syria on which the
Turkish leaders believed to have great leverage. Realizing that their very
image in the “neighborhood” as a capable country is at stake the Turkish
leaders have moved from persuasion to coercion against Syria.
Meanwhile after the total withdrawal of the US in
Iraq, the central government under Nouri al-Maliki backed by Iran and driven by
the Syrian crisis confronted Turkey. While Turkish business in Baghdad suffers
from this change of wave in the bilateral relations the government in Ankara
realizes again the limits of its soft power to persuade Maliki to mend the
damage. The same goes for Iran which regards Turkey as a regional rival.
The Arab spring and the ensuing debate about “Turkey
as a model” has added to the overconfidence of Turkish political actors. The
Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs started to talk about “constructing a new
order” and “a new Middle East” under the leadership of Turkey. This new
language goes obviously beyond the liberal premises of the AK Party’s earlier
stand of cooperation, engagement, and dialogue. Questions are increasingly
raised as to whether Turkey has abandoned the “zero problem policy” and “soft
power” approach, and embraced a policy of regional hegemony even domination.
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