Turkish foreign policy: Time for a re-evaluation

The foreign policy of a country is not singularly directed abroad, it may also be a tool for domestic political purposes. Even if it is not instrumental in formulating domestic politics its repercussion on domestic politics is inevitable.

Foreign policy perceptions, choices, and orientations may strengthen a particular “order of things” at home. For decades, Turkish foreign policy not only reflected but also reinforced a “siege mentality” that portrayed its neighbors as enemies with territorial ambitions on Turkey. This created a tense relationship with neighbors with whom not only the state but the people of Turkey developed a deep distrust.

Such a portrayal of the outside world made sense, especially in the cold war years. Constant threats coming from the region justified the authoritarian power structure inside. Thus people at home had to be united against immediate threats in the region and be even aware of their internal extensions. Under such a continuous existential treat the idea of a fully functioning liberal democracy, human rights, and pluralism were regarded as a luxury and even risky. The politics of survival laid the ground for an authoritarian politics supervised by the military, denial of the existence of the Kurds and Kurdish identity, delays in democratization and widespread-cross ideological nationalism. Survival and the security of the state were used as justification for authoritarian state formation. In short, the threat perception that was exemplified through practical foreign policy issues served to tie down social demands, political actors and intellectual debates in Turkish politics. This mechanism started to change after 1999 when Turkey was declared as a candidate country for EU membership. As democratization, economic development and good neighborly relations were required to be a full member in the EU the Turkish governments, as well as social forces, pushed hard to change this mechanism of foreign policy that served to the securitization of Turkish political and social spaces. As a result of what I call the “liberal turn in Turkish foreign policy” foreign policy ceased to be a ground for the securitization of Turkish politics.

A paradigm shift occurred from pure power politics to a liberal foreign policy agenda seeing the countries of the region not as adversaries, but as partners prioritizing cooperation over conflict and soft power over military might and bullying. This opened the avenues of mutual understanding, trust, and cooperation in the region elevating Turkey as a country of mediation, engagement, and multilateralism. Out of this new paradigm of cooperation, Turkish companies, civil societal organizations, think tanks, individuals entered into a deep interaction in the neighborhood. Later these social and economic actors acted as driving forces for continued political dialogue and good relationships in the region.

When the Arab revolutions occurred many expected Turkey’s cooperation and dialogue-based soft power approach would continue. But the resistance of the Syrian regime to change last year and Turkey’s inability to persuade Syrian President Bashir al-Assad to introduce reforms has displayed the limits of Turkey’s soft power to influence change in Syria on which the Turkish leaders believed to have great leverage. Realizing that their very image in the “neighborhood” as a capable country is at stake the Turkish leaders have moved from persuasion to coercion against Syria.

Meanwhile after the total withdrawal of the US in Iraq, the central government under Nouri al-Maliki backed by Iran and driven by the Syrian crisis confronted Turkey. While Turkish business in Baghdad suffers from this change of wave in the bilateral relations the government in Ankara realizes again the limits of its soft power to persuade Maliki to mend the damage. The same goes for Iran which regards Turkey as a regional rival.

The Arab spring and the ensuing debate about “Turkey as a model” has added to the overconfidence of Turkish political actors. The Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs started to talk about “constructing a new order” and “a new Middle East” under the leadership of Turkey. This new language goes obviously beyond the liberal premises of the AK Party’s earlier stand of cooperation, engagement, and dialogue. Questions are increasingly raised as to whether Turkey has abandoned the “zero problem policy” and “soft power” approach, and embraced a policy of regional hegemony even domination.

My concern is that these indicators of yet another paradigm shift in Turkish foreign policy might be due to internal political developments like whether Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will run as the presidential candidate in 2014 and who will replace him in the ruling party. An internal power struggle may radicalize Turkish foreign policy in the near future.

Changing positions in Turkish politics

Instead of a structural change, Turkish politics brings a change to a tradition of the elite serving in old structures. It is, in fact, a matter of the loyalty of the elite -- whether loyalty is directed towards Kemalism and its institutional representatives or towards the agencies of the “new Turkey” under the Justice and Development Party’s (AK Party) rule.

Allegiance is certainly important; public authorities should have allegiances towards democratically elected rulers of the country, not towards an ideology and its vanguard within the state. Yet the change that Turkey needs should transcend a simple shift in loyalty. Interestingly for some, including the government, this seems satisfactory enough.

The changing attitude towards the military is the case in point. Only one or two years ago the military used to be regarded by the government and its allies as an obstacle to full democracy. Its personnel and activities were thus constantly scrutinized and transparency and accountability were demanded. Now thinking that it is in full control of the appointments within the military and thus breaking the autonomy of the military, the government is in defense of the military, its operations, and secrecy.

The Uludere incident in which 34 Kurdish civilians were massacred by Turkish jets by “mistake” is an example. Even after it became clear that Turkish jets made an incredible mistake and bombed innocent civilians, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan congratulated the military and the chief of General Staff. To this day the Uludere controversy continues and Prime Minister Erdoğan has not moved from his position of defending the military. It is still unknown what happened on that particular day, who gave the order to bomb and why. What we hear instead from the government and its allies in the media is that “we should trust our military and not weaken its spirit in the fight against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party [PKK].”

Surprisingly though, the main opposition party has become very critical of the military. Its leader, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, questioned the stance on the Uludere incident the other day asking, “Who is governing the country, the government or the military?” This displays the changing positions of the actors towards the military depending on the shifting loyalties on the part of institutions.

Another most recent case is a column written by journalist Bekir Coşkun, a strong Kemalist and an old ally of the military, who wrote a fable about a dog called Paşa. The column undoubtedly criticized the new form of relationship between the generals and the AK Party government. The military issued a strongly worded statement, just like the old days when such statements were issued against the conservatives and liberal writers and newspapers. It was the herald of the new relationship between the government and the military in which the Turkish military issued a statement condemning a Kemalist journalist. This time, while the conservative media remained silent against the statement, the Kemalist writers and newspapers reacted. Over this issue, Prime Minister Erdoğan called on all generals to sue Coşkun for insulting all paşas, including Kemal Atatürk. Indeed, the General Staff headquarters eventually filed a complaint against Coşkun, the most famous Kemalist writer and journalist.

All these events tell us that once loyalty of institutions and their administrators have shifted, the stances change as well: Old-time pro-military Kemalists turn against the military while the conservatives, once the victims of the military, come around and defend the generals. Another case in point is the Higher Education Board (YÖK). Last month an academic who is also a columnist in a conservative daily wrote, “Apart from its name, nothing is left to change in YÖK.” This reflects the attitude towards the old institutions inherited from the Kemalist era: So long as they are staffed by “our men,” there is no need for structural change.

Everyone knows that YÖK is one of the key institutions established by the military regime in 1982. The liberals, democrats, socialists, and conservatives have criticized it for its centralized, commanding and ideologically driven administration. Instead of regulating higher education, it tried to turn it into an ideological instrument of the state. As a result, throughout Turkey students were suppressed for wearing headscarves, or using Kurdish in their activities, and academics were intimidated.

These days are over but the structure remains unchanged. However, trusting in the new rulers at the top, can we say, “Nothing is left to change?” This is the greatest challenge for the “new Turkey” if we are interested in building democracy instead of simply replacing the old Kemalist tutelage.

Post-Kemalist tutelage

Kemalism is dead. No longer does it command the Turkish state. The bureaucratic elite that traditionally acted as the spokesperson of Kemalism has lost its status within the state apparatus, while the business elite have queued up to collect the benefits distributed by the state run now by a non-Kemalist political elite. The military and the judiciary, the two strongholds of Kemalism, have bowed to their new master.

Ideologically speaking, too, Kemalism is dead. The two faces of Kemalism, namely radical secularism and ethnic nationalism, desperately need facelifts. Secularism as a mechanism to exclude and oppress the conservatives cannot be sustained. It should be included in a democratic content that enables all faith groups to exercise full freedom for their activities. An imagined “single nation of the Turks” is not convincing, even for nationalist Turks. Recognition of the Kurdish ethnicity and identity is a must to build social peace and political order.

All of these would be good for the practice of democracy in Turkey if only the “new elite” were immune to the bad habits of the old elite. We see continuities in the usage of the state apparatus to construct a “particular type of person”. It seems that “state-made citizens” is the constant objective of governments in Turkey, be them Kemalist or conservative. The end results they seek may be different in form and in terms of values, but the means used and objectives sought have not changed.

What I am trying to say is that social engineering at the hands of the state is somehow continuing with the Justice and Development (AK Party) government. This has become visible in the field of education and cultural policies. It seems that Primer Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's stated objective “to raise religious generations” is shaping the government's educational and cultural policies. The use of state power to “form” the minds, habits, and lifestyles of citizens obviously cannot be reconciled with liberal values. For the AK Party, such a policy would be defended as part and parcel of its conservative identity.

But the problem is that once the AK Party uses the state apparatus to construct “conservative citizens,” by, for instance, reorganizing the educational system “to raise religious generations,” it appears to be following the path of Kemalism, which for years sought to create “secular and nationalist Turkish citizens.”

Such a path is not only unethical but is also impractical. One should also not forget the tension and conflict generated by cultural policies to create uniform citizens by state intervention.

It is futile to construct “identities” through state institutions and policies. If a particular identity is imposed by the state, it will either fail or succeed. If such a project were to fail, it would mean the resources used to this end would have been wasted. Additionally, there would be the cost of the conflict likely to erupt between the society subjected to identity transformation and the state imposing its own values.

If such a policy succeeds, you end up with a society subservient to and dependent on the state that has lost its dynamism, creativity, and plurality.

This has been the case in Turkey since the formation of the republic, when the Kemalist state imposed its own secular and ethnic values on the masses and the people resisted these state-imposed identities.

So, it is futile to try again, with the state this time imposing conservatives values that are “nationalized” by the state.

Besides, such a state would not only be dictating conservative values to “secular” people, it would also be imposing a particular set of conservative values on the conservatives who may be denied their own choice of conservatism. The teaching religion in all schools, as envisaged by the recent change in the education system, will empower the state over society and grant it greater presence in religious affairs, which is supposed to belong to the realm of society.

A state that teaches the people their religion steps into the realm of society, which is where religion belongs. Out of this, a hierarchical relationship will be built between the state and society, in favor of the former.

In short, using the same Kemalist means and methods “to create a conservative society” will result in a post-Kemalist tutelage, not a post-Kemalist democracy. Conservative social forces will not be better off under such a regime because the state will occupy all social space, eliminating independent social forces, including the conservative ones.