A weak opposition unable to present itself as an alternative to the ruling party continues to be an important problem in Turkish politics. The lack of a viable alternative to the government boosts the ruling party’s self-righteous confidence and alienates dissident groups who have lost their hope in change through democratic competition resulting from engagement in politics.
The main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) is still in a state of internal strife. Its members are busy opposing their own party administration instead of their opponent, the Justice and Development Party (AK Party). Last week, the CHP held two party congresses at which changing the party’s internal code of conduct was discussed. But everyone knew that it was an occasion to question the leadership of Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu. Though the dissidents of the party lost the battle against the leadership, whose power was consolidated, the damage was also inflicted upon the party itself.
The CHP’s old guard seems concerned that Kılıçdaroğlu might change the party, breaking with the Kemalist tradition and ideological outlook. To me, this is a groundless fear. Even if Kılıçdaroğlu keeps the party under full control, he is unlikely and unwilling to embark on such a transformation.
There is of course pressure for the CHP to become more social democrat and less Kemalist, but the tutelage of the latter on the former within the party is almost impossible to break with. The party grassroots are overwhelmingly Kemalist and nationalist, and they view a social democrat and humanist/universalist political stance as unpatriotic. Moreover, within the party elite is a strong group of old Kemalist cadets who are ready to label proponents of change heretics and revisionists. And most important of all, Kılıçdaroğlu fears that without the support of the Kemalists, the CHP will not even get 26 percent of the vote in elections.
Anyhow, the CHP leadership should answer these questions: Does the CHP really want to win an election and rule the country? The answer is presumably yes. How, then, will this be achieved? Is the vote of the Kemalists enough to win an election? If not, whose votes will the CHP add to its own votes to win in an election?
In the last three elections, the CHP has been stuck around 20 percent of the vote. If it claims to be an alternative to replace the AK Party, it has to at least double its votes. Even if the CHP gets all of the votes of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) it cannot defeat the AK Party, which stands at around 50 percent of popular support. Thus the key to toppling the AK Party is not only for the CHP to double its votes but also to get votes that go to the AK Party. In other words, without attracting AK Party voters and persuading them to vote for the CHP, it is not possible to defeat the AK Party in elections.
This is why I keep saying that unless the CHP abandons Kemalism it cannot open up to new voters. When the CHP won 42 percent of the vote in the 1977 election it was a social democrat, populist and anti-militarist party under Bülent Ecevit. This was also the time when the CHP was the least Kemalist in its entire history. The leadership at the time was talking about change, social justice, and solidarity, not lifestyles, republican values, and secularism. As such, the CHP of the 1970s got closer to the people as departed from Kemalism.
Defeats at the hands of the AK Party led the CHP to go backward and to uphold Kemalism as the identity and ideology of the party as well as its social base. Meanwhile, the CHP also embraced its past, including the legacy of the period of one-party rule between 1925 and 1945 as the “founder of the state.” Yet this “historical legacy” that led to the birth of a particular “image” of the CHP forms barriers for the CHP when it tries to reach out to various social groups. The “victims” of this particular past of Kemalism – among them Kurds, Muslims, non-Muslims, and liberals -- were thus distanced from the CHP, the old and the new.
The CHP’s opponent, the ruling AK Party, was very happy to see the CHP going in this direction. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan constantly identified the current CHP with the historical one that ruled during the single-party period, reminding the country of practices that included the Dersim massacre, the Independence Tribunals, the mistreatment of Muslims and non-Muslims, etc. Erdoğan knew that such a historical memory works to the advantage of the AK Party and unites all victims and opponents of the CHP behind the AK Party.
If the CHP really wishes to compete with the AK Party, it should reach out to the victims of Kemalism -- namely, the Kurds, the conservative Muslims and the liberals who overwhelmingly vote for the AK Party. And this cannot be done without denouncing the past and abandoning Kemalism.
The main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) is still in a state of internal strife. Its members are busy opposing their own party administration instead of their opponent, the Justice and Development Party (AK Party). Last week, the CHP held two party congresses at which changing the party’s internal code of conduct was discussed. But everyone knew that it was an occasion to question the leadership of Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu. Though the dissidents of the party lost the battle against the leadership, whose power was consolidated, the damage was also inflicted upon the party itself.
The CHP’s old guard seems concerned that Kılıçdaroğlu might change the party, breaking with the Kemalist tradition and ideological outlook. To me, this is a groundless fear. Even if Kılıçdaroğlu keeps the party under full control, he is unlikely and unwilling to embark on such a transformation.
There is of course pressure for the CHP to become more social democrat and less Kemalist, but the tutelage of the latter on the former within the party is almost impossible to break with. The party grassroots are overwhelmingly Kemalist and nationalist, and they view a social democrat and humanist/universalist political stance as unpatriotic. Moreover, within the party elite is a strong group of old Kemalist cadets who are ready to label proponents of change heretics and revisionists. And most important of all, Kılıçdaroğlu fears that without the support of the Kemalists, the CHP will not even get 26 percent of the vote in elections.
Anyhow, the CHP leadership should answer these questions: Does the CHP really want to win an election and rule the country? The answer is presumably yes. How, then, will this be achieved? Is the vote of the Kemalists enough to win an election? If not, whose votes will the CHP add to its own votes to win in an election?
In the last three elections, the CHP has been stuck around 20 percent of the vote. If it claims to be an alternative to replace the AK Party, it has to at least double its votes. Even if the CHP gets all of the votes of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) it cannot defeat the AK Party, which stands at around 50 percent of popular support. Thus the key to toppling the AK Party is not only for the CHP to double its votes but also to get votes that go to the AK Party. In other words, without attracting AK Party voters and persuading them to vote for the CHP, it is not possible to defeat the AK Party in elections.
This is why I keep saying that unless the CHP abandons Kemalism it cannot open up to new voters. When the CHP won 42 percent of the vote in the 1977 election it was a social democrat, populist and anti-militarist party under Bülent Ecevit. This was also the time when the CHP was the least Kemalist in its entire history. The leadership at the time was talking about change, social justice, and solidarity, not lifestyles, republican values, and secularism. As such, the CHP of the 1970s got closer to the people as departed from Kemalism.
Defeats at the hands of the AK Party led the CHP to go backward and to uphold Kemalism as the identity and ideology of the party as well as its social base. Meanwhile, the CHP also embraced its past, including the legacy of the period of one-party rule between 1925 and 1945 as the “founder of the state.” Yet this “historical legacy” that led to the birth of a particular “image” of the CHP forms barriers for the CHP when it tries to reach out to various social groups. The “victims” of this particular past of Kemalism – among them Kurds, Muslims, non-Muslims, and liberals -- were thus distanced from the CHP, the old and the new.
The CHP’s opponent, the ruling AK Party, was very happy to see the CHP going in this direction. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan constantly identified the current CHP with the historical one that ruled during the single-party period, reminding the country of practices that included the Dersim massacre, the Independence Tribunals, the mistreatment of Muslims and non-Muslims, etc. Erdoğan knew that such a historical memory works to the advantage of the AK Party and unites all victims and opponents of the CHP behind the AK Party.
If the CHP really wishes to compete with the AK Party, it should reach out to the victims of Kemalism -- namely, the Kurds, the conservative Muslims and the liberals who overwhelmingly vote for the AK Party. And this cannot be done without denouncing the past and abandoning Kemalism.
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