A difficult period for the AK Party

In June of last year, the ruling party won the elections with 50 percent of the vote after almost 10 years in power.

Since then, public opinion polls have shown that its votes are not unstable but continue to rise, though slowly, while support for other political parties is either stagnant or falling.

Given such a political scene, how can one talk of “a difficult period” for the Justice and Development Party (AK Party)? This is certainly a legitimate question, and I will explain why.

When the AK Party came to power in 2002 it represented people power vis-à-vis the state power. It was the state power that had oppressed the conservative masses and their political, social and economic agents during the Feb. 28 process in the late 1990s on the one hand and looted banks during the crisis and redistributed their resources to İstanbul and the “white Turks,” the supporters of the state elite.

After winning the elections in 2002, the AK Party was very careful not to lose its support and so tried hard to isolate its opponents and fortify a wide front against them. To do so, it pursued a policy of building alliances both at home and abroad with pro-reform democrat groups as a “defense line” against the secularist/militarist elements within the state. The agenda of democratization, which included curbing the military's power, spreading welfare to the masses and seeking EU membership, was thus linked to the AK Party's search for security vis-à-vis the state that was controlled by Kemalist-secularist institutions and actors that regarded the AK Party as an anomaly.

The struggle within the state and society continued between the AK Party based on conservative social support and aligned with pro-reform democrats, and the secularists/Kemalists that held significant institutional power and enjoyed widespread media backing.

Out of this struggle, it appeared that while the AK Party was in power holding the majority in Parliament it acted as if it were an opposition party trying to overcome the resistance put up by the Kemalist state elite to democratization. This relationship constantly rejuvenated the AK Party's democratic credentials within the system in comparison to other political currencies and institutional traditions. It thus emerged as the most progressive and reformist party.

But, it continued to face bureaucratic resistance. The military as an institution directly called on the government to step down and refrain from electing a president in April 2007 -- the 27 memorandum of the military. Holding almost two-thirds of the majority in Parliament, the AK Party was obstructed from electing a president due to the military's unacceptable interference and an unlawful decision made by the Constitutional Court. Even after the AK Party's victory in the 2007 elections the state power continued to intimidate the ruling party. It was almost shut down by the Constitutional Court in 2008.

In short, the AK Party was in government but not in control of the military, judiciary and high bureaucracy, largely regarded as the “state.” This historical binary between the state and the government worked to the advantage of the AK Party and made the ruling party almost immune from criticism. The priority of the AK Party was to take the state under the control of the democratically elected government. This, to a very large extent, was achieved by a constitutional referendum on Sept. 12, 2010, which changed the balance of power within the state in favor of the elected government.

Now the AK Party seems to hold the state power while at the same time representing people power. And here comes the predicament for the ruling party: No longer can it hide behind the excuse that it cannot control the “reactionary forces within the state.” Thus, the AK Party government is accountable for whatever the “state” does, including bombing to death 35 civilians in Sirnak.

The intelligence mistakes that the National Intelligence Organization (MİT) makes, whose president is the appointee of the government, are the mistakes of the AK Party government. It is no longer possible to escape criticism by pointing to the state. Such a defense is no longer possible. The state is the AK Party.

The operational mistakes of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK), whose commanders are appointed by the government, are the mistakes of the AK Party. So when the Taraf daily runs a headline like “The state bombs its own people,” it is a state that includes the AK Party. Knowing this, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan comes out and says, “The state does not bomb its own people.” But it was him who apologized only a week ago for the massacre of the people in Dersim by the state, which bombed the entire area back in 1937-1938. A government in control of the “state” is accountable to the people for whatever the state does.

Any judicial mistakes made by the courts, whose central institutions -- including the High Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) -- are determined by the government, will be the mistakes of the AK Party. So, for all the detentions, long prosecution periods, miscarriages of justice, etc., it is the government that is accountable and responsible.

The AK Party cannot hide behind the excuse that it cannot control certain “reactionary” institutions within the state. It is now in a position -- and proud to be -- where it can determine all these institutions. Yet by “defending” the state, the AK Party risks becoming a pro-status quo power and diminishing its democratic credentials.