Participatory politics are hard to control for those at the height of political echelons, even if this is a regime like Iran's, which over the years has developed mechanisms of social and political engineering. Once people are asked to choose, this is it. There is no way to turn back. Participatory politics develop their own dynamics and culture.
Iran has experienced some degree of participatory politics since 1979, and no doubt, its Islamic regime has enjoyed a high level of legitimacy incomparable to many Arab regimes in the region.
But now that the top leadership, as opposition forces in Iran claim, is not respecting the outcome of people's votes, trouble has started for the regime, which cannot generate legitimacy without popular participation.
Yes, the post-revolutionary regime in Iran has enjoyed high legitimacy. But the legitimacy that was enjoyed by the regime in Iran had two pillars: First was the ideological component of the revolution, and second, was the popular base of the revolution.
As for the ideological pillar, the opposition does not seem to be challenging the “founding” principles of Iran's Islamic regime. They do not question Khomeini's theory of Velayat-i Faqih or the ideological elements in the Iranian constitution. However, the opposition argues that an Islamic republic does not mean a dictatorship of the jurists or of the Revolutionary Guards. It is a republic that respects people's choices. This means that the opposition directed at Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, who won the disputed presidential election, is one coming from within.
Mir Hossein Moussavi's revolutionary credentials cannot be questioned: He served for years as prime minister when Khomeini was the supreme leader. His point is clear and sharp: an Islamic republic should conduct free, fair and competitive elections, as happened many times in the past. His is therefore not a radical departure, denying past practices and principles. On the contrary, Moussavi and his supporters claim to fight against those who have deviated, by rigging the election, from the true spirit of the revolution.
This is a strong position that protects the opposition leader from charges of being a “counter-revolutionary,” giving him some space for maneuvering. By resisting the outright authoritarian tendencies of the current power elite, the opposition is attempting to keep very important breathing space for the ordinary people: the right to vote and choose (even among those who are selected beforehand by the Guardian Council).
The defense of the right of the masses to participate in electing their country's political leaders can indeed be justified via references to the revolution and its true spirit.
As I mentioned above, the second pillar of the revolution was its popular support. The revolution was essentially the making of the people. The 1979 upheaval was a mass movement. It was the power of the people that overthrew the Shah's regime. Thus the revolutionary leaders knew from the onset that the very legitimacy of the revolution was derived from the people's power. Out of the recognition of the power of the people, post-revolutionary leaders institutionalized popular participation in public decisions making progress that has turned out to be a self-defeating process as the power elite in Tehran now tries to limit it.
Thus the revolutionary leaders allowed participatory politics within an ideological framework, which together constituted the dual bases of legitimacy for the Islamic republic.
Yet what we are witnessing currently is the dynamics of participatory politics, which was brought into the system by the revolution itself, pushing the limits of ideological premises and radical revolutionary actors.
Without a fair participatory mechanism, Iran will turn into an utterly totalitarian regime that can survive only by sheer oppression. But for how long?
22 June 2009, Monday
Iran has experienced some degree of participatory politics since 1979, and no doubt, its Islamic regime has enjoyed a high level of legitimacy incomparable to many Arab regimes in the region.
But now that the top leadership, as opposition forces in Iran claim, is not respecting the outcome of people's votes, trouble has started for the regime, which cannot generate legitimacy without popular participation.
Yes, the post-revolutionary regime in Iran has enjoyed high legitimacy. But the legitimacy that was enjoyed by the regime in Iran had two pillars: First was the ideological component of the revolution, and second, was the popular base of the revolution.
As for the ideological pillar, the opposition does not seem to be challenging the “founding” principles of Iran's Islamic regime. They do not question Khomeini's theory of Velayat-i Faqih or the ideological elements in the Iranian constitution. However, the opposition argues that an Islamic republic does not mean a dictatorship of the jurists or of the Revolutionary Guards. It is a republic that respects people's choices. This means that the opposition directed at Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, who won the disputed presidential election, is one coming from within.
Mir Hossein Moussavi's revolutionary credentials cannot be questioned: He served for years as prime minister when Khomeini was the supreme leader. His point is clear and sharp: an Islamic republic should conduct free, fair and competitive elections, as happened many times in the past. His is therefore not a radical departure, denying past practices and principles. On the contrary, Moussavi and his supporters claim to fight against those who have deviated, by rigging the election, from the true spirit of the revolution.
This is a strong position that protects the opposition leader from charges of being a “counter-revolutionary,” giving him some space for maneuvering. By resisting the outright authoritarian tendencies of the current power elite, the opposition is attempting to keep very important breathing space for the ordinary people: the right to vote and choose (even among those who are selected beforehand by the Guardian Council).
The defense of the right of the masses to participate in electing their country's political leaders can indeed be justified via references to the revolution and its true spirit.
As I mentioned above, the second pillar of the revolution was its popular support. The revolution was essentially the making of the people. The 1979 upheaval was a mass movement. It was the power of the people that overthrew the Shah's regime. Thus the revolutionary leaders knew from the onset that the very legitimacy of the revolution was derived from the people's power. Out of the recognition of the power of the people, post-revolutionary leaders institutionalized popular participation in public decisions making progress that has turned out to be a self-defeating process as the power elite in Tehran now tries to limit it.
Thus the revolutionary leaders allowed participatory politics within an ideological framework, which together constituted the dual bases of legitimacy for the Islamic republic.
Yet what we are witnessing currently is the dynamics of participatory politics, which was brought into the system by the revolution itself, pushing the limits of ideological premises and radical revolutionary actors.
Without a fair participatory mechanism, Iran will turn into an utterly totalitarian regime that can survive only by sheer oppression. But for how long?
22 June 2009, Monday
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