Why do they hate the West?

Anti-Westernism used to be a distinguishing feature of the Islamic political identity. Now it is the mark of the Kemalist-secularist stance. The renewed demand of the West, particularly the EU, for democracy and the rule of law has highlighted sharp differences between the vision of a Turkey Europeanized as a natural outcome of the EU integration process and the Turkey visualized by Kemalist-secularist circles. They seem irreconcilable. The challenge of the West for the Kemalists is clear: In the EU integration process, it is impossible to preserve the old order. The West and the continuing Westernization that comes with the EU accession process, therefore, pose an existential threat to the Jacobin bureaucratic-civilian elite, which adheres to a notion of a homogenized nation and the practices of an authoritarian state.

But it was the Kemalists who used to be fans of the West and Westernization. At least we know it as such. Yet what the Kemalists understood by Westernization was merely a cultural adoption of the Western lifestyle for a certain purpose. That is, this new lifestyle differentiated them from the masses, who were traditional and Eastern/Islamic looking. They were the vanguard, chosen to enlighten a nation that was in darkness. Theirs was a kind of "white man's burden." Cultural Westernization was an act of exclusion of the traditional by which a boundary was erected between the state elite and the masses, who were poor, culturally backward and religious. Out of this symbolic oppression, the elite's right to rule was constructed, justified and reproduced over the years.

The West and the process of Westernization, however, gained new dimensions in time, especially after 1999, when Turkey declared itself a candidate country for the EU. They were no longer a means to dictate the rule of the Kemalist-secularists and control the masses.

The result thus was a struggle between the democratic periphery who wanted to end its bondage and the authoritarian center, which was determined to defend its privileges. As the former "utilized" the EU process, the latter resisted it on the grounds that the EU process was a plot to divide Turkey in the name of minority rights and undo secularism in the name of democracy.

This meant, for the Kemalist-secularist elite, abandoning Westernization, a process they had initiated. It was wise for them to do so, given the fact that the process of Westernization after 1999 continued on a different path. It involved more political and economic transformation than cultural change. That is to say that Westernization in the EU context meant the transfer of power from the state elite to the people. Thus, the public at large and the peripheral forces in the Turkish economy and politics moved in to extend the process of Westernization to its logical end: the formation of liberal democracy. The objectives of Westernization, for the first time in history, have begun to be pursued by social and economic forces from below.

In short, Westernization after 1999 has gone beyond its traditional function of "controlling" the social and economic demands of the periphery. It has turned into a mechanism through which the Kemalist state and its power is checked by the people at large. As such, Westernization, now defined by EU membership, has acquired a civil and democratizing content against the authoritarian tendencies of the Kemalist elite. This explains the adversarial attitude of the Kemalist-secularists to political reforms and EU accession. Thus, in the EU accession process, the elitist model of Westernization has been replaced by a democratizing Westernization.

This is how the Kemalist-secularists have come to hate the West.
12.05.2008

The Turkish military and the US

It is often said that Turkish-American relations have never been redefined according to the new circumstances that followed the end of the Cold War. It is true that the old paradigm of security cooperation based on a shared threat emanating from the Soviet Union and international communism no longer justifies the alliance. Since then the Turkish military has gone through a mental transformation in which its threat perception has changed. Now the Turkish military's central security question is highly political.

As expressed many times by the high command, including the incoming Chief of General Staff Gen. İlker Başbuğ, the main concern is the preservation of the Turkish "nation-state." They feel that the notion of a unitary nation-state is under threat. What can be done against such a threat? It is virtually impossible to identify its source. And even if this is done successfully, it is almost inconceivable to wage a war against it, since the perceived threat involves social, political and economic actors, rather than enemy militaries. Social and economic forces that act globally cannot be controlled. This is the predicament of the Turkish military's current threat perception. No one, including a superpower like the US, can address their fear about the future of the nation-state. Demands for greater human rights, democratization, pluralism, minority rights and the dynamics of globalization are all feared to weaken the nation-state. The identified source of these evils is the West. The military's unease, therefore, is not directed just at the US, but at the West at large. The West, which supports democracy that brings the "Islamists" to power, demands human rights that protect the "terrorists" and asks for minority rights that encourage "Kurdish separatism," is no longer seen as an ally, but as the adversary. The result is simple; The Turkish military's priorities, needs and threat perceptions fundamentally differ from those of the West. The negative perception of the West by the military is therefore structural, not circumstantial.

The Turkish military is also deeply disturbed by US Middle East policy, especially in relation to Iraq, where an independent Kurdish state is assumed to be in the making with the support of the US, with devastating implications for the Turkish nation-state. A former commander of the armed forces, Gen. Aytaç Yalman, argues that the US handed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Öcalan over to Turkey in 1999 not for the sake of Turkish-American relations, but in order to strengthen the position of Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani in northern Iraq (Fikret Bila, "The Commanders' Front," p. 317). The Turkish military believes that the strategic targets and priorities of the US and Turkey are irreconcilable. Addressing the security concerns of the Turkish military requires changing the entirety of US Middle East policy -- for starters. The Turkish security establishment also views Israel's engagement in northern Iraq with suspicion. This is another significant setback, given the good old days when the Turkish security establishment regarded Israel as a partner against the PKK. But this was when Öcalan was based in Syria. It was then convenient for the Israelis to squeeze the Syrians together with Turkey. Once Öcalan was kicked out of Syria and a new force in northern Iraq, namely the Kurds, emerged vis-à-vis Iran and Sunni Iraq and Syria, the Israeli policy is argued to have been changed in favor of forging an alliance with the Kurds along with the US instead of cooperating with Turkey against the PKK.

The Turkish high command today consists of officers who served in the Southeast against the PKK. This experience has shaped their threat perception and views of the US and the West. As reflected in their memoirs and public statements, the experience of war against the PKK has made the commanders think that the PKK is not acting on its own. If the PKK were on its own, the Turkish military, the second-largest force in NATO, would already have erased them. The fact that the PKK still exists is due to the fact that it enjoys substantial foreign support, support that mainly comes from the West. Such perceptions prevail among the officers who serve in the Southeast.

Moreover, those with experience against the PKK are the ones most likely to be promoted within the military. Officers with skill and experience in fighting the PKK are naturally promoted. As a result, the high command is made up of officers with the most negative view of the West and the US.
This line and logic of promotion contrast with past practices in which those who were likely to be promoted used to be the ones who had served in NATO posts. This change has left its mark on the Turkish military's composition and security culture. The result is that the Turkish military is speedily getting out of the NATO culture of solidarity and alliance.
05.05.2008

Turkish military’s US perception

A highly critical public attitude toward the United States that emerged after 2003 has certainly damaged Turkish-American relations. This state of mind toward the US, however, is not confined to the public at large but apparently influences some critical sectors and institutions too, including the Turkish military. The institution closest to the US as a natural result of the military alliance between the two countries is not expected to hold an "adversarial" opinion toward an ally. It is obviously hard to measure the exact scope of the negative opinion and attitude within the Turkish military toward the US, but we have some clues. One of these is a book prepared by Fikret Bila, a veteran journalist who is well acquainted with the men in uniform, "Komutanlar Cephesi" (The Commanders' Front.) The book is a collection of interviews conducted with various high-level generals who were involved with the fight against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).

While talking about the fight against the PKK, comments made by retired Turkish generals about the US are striking. Common knowledge that the US and Turkey are allies does not hold entirely true in the eyes of the commanders. It seems that the "comrades in arms" notion from the Cold War years is a thing of the past, even a distant past. What we see instead is deep distrust. Turkish generals expect the worst from the Americans, including an outright occupation of Turkey. There is only one exception, Gen. Hilmi Özkök; the rest speak of the US just as they did of the USSR two decades earlier.

What went wrong?

The most common view is that the US helps the PKK. Gen. Doğan Güreş, then the chief of general staff, said he gave an order to shoot down American helicopters during an operation in northern Iraq in 1992, citing as his reason that "the helicopters were dropping logistical support to the PKK groups" (p.72-73). Güreş does not only speak of the early 1990s. Referring to maps used by American soldiers that show Turkey divided and a statement by US Vice President Dick Cheney saying "the Kurds are America's only friends," Güreş is convinced that Americans help the PKK (Bila, 79-80). He concludes, "Turkey should be very careful." Another general, Necati Özgen, goes even further, claiming that "if the March 1 resolution had passed, the American troops would have been stationed throughout Turkey." He implies that Turkey would have lost its control in the Southeast as a result of events in the region prompted by the presence of American troops. In response to a question on the objective of the US in Turkey, Özgen is clear: "stationing in Turkey and almost occupying [the region]" (Bila, 100-101).

Özgen is prepared to go to war against the US over northern Iraq. Responding to the question of how Turkey can fight against the only superpower, Özgen responds: "It is just an image that the US is a superpower, nothing else. … Let the Americans oppose us. Even if they resist we'll fight and do whatever is necessary" (Bila, 102). Ismail Hakkı Karadayi, another general who served as the chief of general staff, is also convinced that the US is behind the PKK (Bila, 113). He speaks of how they captured the US-made weapons from the PKK, a proof of American support for the terror organization.

Gen. Hasan Kundakçı brings up a document guiding the American plot against Turkey: "The US is following a [congressional] decision made in 1896, a decision more or less like the Treaty of Sèvres," which divided up the Ottoman Empire at the end of the World War I (Bila, 131-132). Kundakci continues; "whenever the US entered Iraq helped the PKK and harmed us" (Bila, 153). Gen. Altay Tokat asserts that "after the [rejection] of the March 1 resolution by the Parliament, the US increased its support to the PKK." Weapons were sent to the Kandil Mountains where the PKK camps were based, according to Tokat (Bila, 181-182).

Are these views representative of the military high command, or their personal opinions? I do not know. But from this and other information in Bila's book, it is clear that some high-ranking generals are "reconsidering" the vision and wisdom of Turkey's alliance with the US. There exists an apparent discrepancy between the perception of the Turkish generals and the continuing cooperation on the ground between the two sides. I wonder how security cooperation can be continued with such a mindset. If our commanders think the US is the enemy, how can Turkey continue to cooperate with this country in a collective defense scheme and continue to buy weapon systems, share information and even cooperate in the NATO command structure?
28.04.2008

US and Turkey: cooperating or not?

The way in which the land operation in northern Iraq was terminated and the debate that ensued are perfect examples of mismanagement of an otherwise successful political and military endeavor.
The emerging picture of misunderstandings between American and Turkish statesmen goes against the cooperation between the two countries seen post-Nov. 5, which was expected to repair the damage in the strategic alliance over the Iraq war. A new era of understanding had developed after the November meeting in which President Bush declared the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) as the enemy of the US. Built on this understanding the US apparently shared intelligence with the Turkish authorities on the PKK and cleared airspace in northern Iraq to enable Turkish jets to conduct an air operation in the region. Even further the Turks and Americans continued to cooperate during the land operation of Turkish troops in northern Iraq between Feb. 21 and Feb. 29 against the PKK through intelligence sharing and the opening of airspace.

As everyone spoke of a return to a strategic partnership between the two countries, something happened toward the end of the Turkish land operation. Understandably the US side, acknowledging Turkey's right to fight against terrorism and endorsing the Turkish incursion into northern Iraq, asked Turkish troops to leave northern Iraq soon, as Secretary of Defense Robert Gates put it, "within weeks." On Feb. 28 President Bush wanted the withdrawal to take place "as soon as possible." The Turkish side responded by insisting that the troops will stay as long as it takes to eliminate the PKK's presence in the region. Chief of General Staff Gen. Yaşar Büyükanıt said "one day or one year." Anyhow, the "quick withdrawal" demanded by the Americans did not mean within hours. But within hours after Gates left Ankara Turkish troops were back to their bases in Turkey. The chief of General Staff declared that the decision to withdraw on Feb. 29 had been made even before Gates' arrival in Ankara.

Does this story explain why Turkey appears to have withdrawn its troops from northern Iraq under pressure from the American administration? Or who is responsible for the appearance that Turkey submitted to the demands of the US? Was such a diplomatic and political disaster not avoidable?
I think the day of Gates' visit to Ankara should be explained in detail. On the same day, two top-level warnings were shot from the American side. Why? Did the Americans not get any signal that the Turks were preparing to withdraw? If the two sides were cooperating in the operation, it would not look strange to exchange information on the withdrawal process. Did the Turkish side not hint at a quick withdrawal so that Gates and Bush would not go public in their call for a "quick withdrawal"?
Some in Ankara, including Speaker of Parliament Köksal Toptan, believe that the Americans deliberately announced their demand to make the Turkish appear as having acted under American pressure. This was assumed to serve American strength in the region and de-emphasize Turkish capabilities, military and political, to engage in unilateral action in its region.

In any case, a new element of misunderstanding has emerged between the two sides as many expected a new period of cooperation between Turkey and the US.

The whole affair has been reduced to the question of whether Turkey received an "order" from the US or not. I can understand two allies making decisions together, but to present Turkey as submitting to the will of the US will have serious implications on Turkish politics as well as on Turkey-US relations. It will only contribute to the growth of anti-Americanism in Turkey and be used by radical nationalists to discredit not only the government this time but also the command chain of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK).
10.03.2008

Dialogue with Kurds

Iraqi President Jalal Talabani is currently visiting Ankara. It is an important meeting, though a bit delayed. Establishing a dialogue with Kurdish groups in Iraq just after Turkey's cross-border military operation against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) may usher in new developments. To frequently declare that Iraq's integrity is a major concern for Turkey while avoiding meeting with its head of state has never been a consistent policy.

By the way, some groups and even some institutions in Turkey should quit labeling Iraqi Kurds a community that consists of clans. To prevent the PKK from using northern Iraq as a launchpad for its attacks in Turkey, Iraqi forces must establish their authority in this region. It is obvious that the Kurdish government in the region is the primary candidate to do this. Consequently, it is inevitable that Turkey will establish sound dialogue and cooperation with the regional administration as well as with the central government. And this can only be done by avoiding the disparaging and humiliating language that suggests, "Turkey does not address clan leaders."

No doubt such cooperation will prove beneficial to Iraqi Kurds as well. If the Iraqi Kurds claim to be a legitimate player in the region, they should not allow any "alien" or terrorist groups in their territory. An administration that cannot be dominant over its own territory will have to give consent to external interventions. Thus, the expulsion of the PKK from the region should be considered a step toward the institutionalization of the regional government. Otherwise, the authority of the regional government will be automatically ignored by the PKK and the PKK's existence will legitimately pave the way for Turkish military incursions into the region. In both cases, northern Iraq will not be treated as "sovereign territory." For this reason, the preservation and maintenance of the Iraqi Kurds' gains will be dependent on the dialogue they establish with Turkey both in economic and political terms. To this end, they must cooperate with Turkey in the removal of the PKK from the region. History has examples of such cooperation: Just a decade ago, Massoud Barzani and Talabani sided with Turkey in the fight against the PKK and, in return, Turkey from time to time acted as a mediator in the conflicts between groups led by Barzani and those led by Talabani. This cooperation is easier today than in the past. Furthermore, Iraqi Kurds should remember that they must act responsibly to protect their gains. Internationally, cooperation in counterterrorism is a central theme and those who give support or condone the terrorist organization will have no legitimacy.

The stability and development of northern Iraq are dependent on cooperation against the PKK. Turkey should be a partner to the Iraqi Kurds, not their enemy. One can see that there has been a change of will in this direction in Ankara. Talabani's visit may serve as a turning point for cooperation and stability in the region, which will bring benefits to both parties.

A dialogue with the Iraqi Kurds through President Talabani will arouse feelings of sympathy among Turkish Kurds, who are content with the recent gains of the Iraqi Kurds. We should confess that we have not truly understood the feelings of our Kurds, who were extremely happy when Iraqi Kurds were saved from the persecution and mass executions of Saddam Hussein's regime. We have regarded the developments in northern Iraq as dangerous and, as a reflex of a "traditional" state, tried to block the process. What we have failed to understand was that when our Kurds were watching the developments in northern Iraq with interest and enthusiasm, this did not mean that they wanted to become a part of those developments. Their interest can be seen as a natural result of kinship and solidarity.

In the final analysis, Turkey's dialogue with the government in northern Iraq through Talabani's official visit to Ankara can also be regarded as a new attempt at normalization with Turkish Kurds. Any dialogue with Iraqi Kurds may serve to expand possibilities for dialogue within the country. Having normalized its relations with northern Iraq, Turkey may find more latitude in its economic and political initiatives toward its own Kurds.
08.03.2008

Constitutional change with consensus

The Turkish Parliament passed changes to two articles of the Constitution last week. The amended constitutional articles underline equality before the law and the right to education and are meant to remove a headscarf ban currently enforced on university campuses. It, however, sparked a heated debate not only about secularism but also about the way in which constitutional amendments are carried out. One criticism was that the amendments are not carried out by "consensus." Insistence on consensus reminded me of another constitutional amendment some 70 years ago.

In 1937 the six principles of the Republican People's Party (CHP) were imported into the constitution. The party principles of nationalism, republicanism, statism, secularism, populism and revolutionism became the state's principles. It was the final step for the marriage between the state and the party. By this constitutional change, a simple single-party rule had turned into a model very much reminiscent of European fascism of the time. Along with the integration of the party's principles into the constitutional order the secretary-general of the party was appointed the interior minister, the provincial party leaders became the governors.

The "consensus" in the parliamentary session on the amendment proposed by Prime Minister İsmet İnönü was 100 percent. Members of Parliament taking part in the vote in 1937 numbered 333 and those who endorsed the amendment totaled 333. This is I think what some people today call "consensus." What they do not know is that it was not "democratic consensus" but "consensus by force" under the authoritarian control of Parliament by the party. In any event, it was not a Parliament freely elected directly by the people but rather one appointed by the party. Many of those "parliamentarians" later said that they had in fact never been to cities that they were supposed to represent.

The proposal underlined that a constitution should define the features of the republic and suggested inserting the six arrows of the party into the constitution to define the state.
During the proceedings the first speech was delivered by Şükrü Kaya, interior minister, who argued that the "history of humanity started with the Turks, if there were no Turks there would be no history and no civilization" (to applauses and bravos from Parliament). Framed with such absurd arguments the party principles turned into state principles in February 1937.

Speaking during the "debate" in Parliament, Şemsettin Günaltay, the head of the Constitutional Committee and later prime minister, drew the limits of opposing views. In response to questions on whether opposing views to those principles could be expressed, Günaltay said: "Once these principles are enacted as the constitutional principles, it will be questioned whether counter-views could be expressed. For example, would a liberal defend the principles of liberalism or a communist advocate communism? No, they will and could not defend opposing views. As any act contrary to the constitution is a crime, opposition to these principles will also be considered a crime" (to applause and bravos).

Recep Peker, former secretary-general of the party and an architect of the state-party merger, stated that "all citizens shall believe in these principles, they shall all love and obey these principles, creating national harmony."

This example displays the mindset of Jacobin republicans in the 1930s. There was no room for different political views in their minds. The difficulty for Turkish democracy is this "founding Jacobin mindset" that did not allow democratic plurality. When the Democrat Party (DP) was formed in January 1946 under new circumstances following the end of World War II, it had to declare its loyalty to the constitution, including Article 2, which was, in fact, the principles of the opposing CHP. This was not only ironic but also reflective of mental and constitutional obstacles to developing a real democracy in the years ahead. Imagine a political party that formed the state and the nation according to its own principles from the top down then with a transition to multi-party politics after 1950 forced to seek the consent and approval of the people. It has always been difficult for those who think they founded the state as they believe the people should appreciate them instead of questioning the founders' right to rule.
18.02.2008

Democracy without democratic opposition

The main problem in Turkish politics is the absence of a democratic and reformist opposition that would push the governing Justice and Development Party (AK Party) to be more assertive in its reform agenda. Such a democratic opposition would have tested the AK Party's commitment to democratization, the EU process and overall human rights reforms. Unfortunately, the main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP), failing to draw any lesson from the July elections, continues to be nationalist, reactionary and pro status-quo, choosing not to rely on the people's support but on the approval of the "ideological instruments of the state."

The governing AK Party is constantly being questioned by some circles about its "Islamic" roots as a barrier to its commitment to democracy, despite the reforms it has enacted in the last five years that have strengthened Turkish democracy and brought Turkey ever closer to the European Union. But the CHP seems somehow immune from criticism about its commitment to democracy. We cannot consolidate Turkish democracy if the main opposition party does not believe in democracy.
Can anyone think of a democratic opposition party that reserves constitution-making for coup plotters? CHP leader Deniz Baykal said the other day: "Can a new constitution not be drafted? Of course, yes. … You can stage a coup, risk being hanged. And after that, the entire Constitution can be changed." This statement belongs to a leader whose party is still a member of Socialist International (SI). People are denied the right to change the Constitution by a politician who sought the people's mandate in elections. I think this tells us why the CHP has not won a single election in its entire history. Winning an election without believing in democracy and people power is not possible.
It is totally understandable to see the CHP and its leader provoke undemocratic processes, as they have already lost any hope of winning an election in democratic competition. It is enough for Baykal to be the banner of secularism, not of democracy. So long as secularism is viewed as under threat by his party's supporters, he knows very well that his leadership will not be questioned. We remember how his leadership was questioned after the July elections. Even some of his close friends left the party administration and are now campaigning for its leadership.

In order to understand why Baykal is aggressive about the latest constitutional amendments, we should remember that in March the CHP will have an extraordinary party congress in which Baykal's leadership will be challenged. The more Turkey is plunged into the secularism debate, the stronger Baykal's position will be within his own party. Baykal is pleased that with the headscarf debate the CHP's electoral performance under his leadership will fall on deaf ears.

The AK Party is being criticized by some on the ground of benefiting from the unsolved headscarf problem, which enables the party to manipulate the issue and attract popular support. This might be true to some degree, but the benefits the AK Party derived from the unresolved headscarf issue cannot be compared to those of the CHP. The AK Party's popular support has been growing ever since the 2002 elections. It started out with 34 percent in 2002, reached 42 percent in 2004 local elections and went up 47 percent in the elections held in 2007.

The main opposition party, with a stagnant 20 percent rate of support in the last three elections, is a single-issue party -- and that is "secularism." "Defense of secularism" is the only asset the CHP has. Imagine if a political party had a single argument concerning Turkish politics. Would it like for that issue to be resolved? The CHP's position is simple: sticking to its single issue, exaggerating, using and manipulating it in order to maintain even its 20 percent support -- even at the expense of democracy.
11.02.2008