It is often said that Turkish-American relations have never been redefined according to the new circumstances that followed the end of the Cold War. It is true that the old paradigm of security cooperation based on a shared threat emanating from the Soviet Union and international communism no longer justifies the alliance. Since then the Turkish military has gone through a mental transformation in which its threat perception has changed. Now the Turkish military's central security question is highly political.
As expressed many times by the high command, including the incoming Chief of General Staff Gen. İlker Başbuğ, the main concern is the preservation of the Turkish "nation-state." They feel that the notion of a unitary nation-state is under threat. What can be done against such a threat? It is virtually impossible to identify its source. And even if this is done successfully, it is almost inconceivable to wage a war against it, since the perceived threat involves social, political and economic actors, rather than enemy militaries. Social and economic forces that act globally cannot be controlled. This is the predicament of the Turkish military's current threat perception. No one, including a superpower like the US, can address their fear about the future of the nation-state. Demands for greater human rights, democratization, pluralism, minority rights and the dynamics of globalization are all feared to weaken the nation-state. The identified source of these evils is the West. The military's unease, therefore, is not directed just at the US, but at the West at large. The West, which supports democracy that brings the "Islamists" to power, demands human rights that protect the "terrorists" and asks for minority rights that encourage "Kurdish separatism," is no longer seen as an ally, but as the adversary. The result is simple; The Turkish military's priorities, needs and threat perceptions fundamentally differ from those of the West. The negative perception of the West by the military is therefore structural, not circumstantial.
The Turkish military is also deeply disturbed by US Middle East policy, especially in relation to Iraq, where an independent Kurdish state is assumed to be in the making with the support of the US, with devastating implications for the Turkish nation-state. A former commander of the armed forces, Gen. Aytaç Yalman, argues that the US handed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Öcalan over to Turkey in 1999 not for the sake of Turkish-American relations, but in order to strengthen the position of Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani in northern Iraq (Fikret Bila, "The Commanders' Front," p. 317). The Turkish military believes that the strategic targets and priorities of the US and Turkey are irreconcilable. Addressing the security concerns of the Turkish military requires changing the entirety of US Middle East policy -- for starters. The Turkish security establishment also views Israel's engagement in northern Iraq with suspicion. This is another significant setback, given the good old days when the Turkish security establishment regarded Israel as a partner against the PKK. But this was when Öcalan was based in Syria. It was then convenient for the Israelis to squeeze the Syrians together with Turkey. Once Öcalan was kicked out of Syria and a new force in northern Iraq, namely the Kurds, emerged vis-à-vis Iran and Sunni Iraq and Syria, the Israeli policy is argued to have been changed in favor of forging an alliance with the Kurds along with the US instead of cooperating with Turkey against the PKK.
The Turkish high command today consists of officers who served in the Southeast against the PKK. This experience has shaped their threat perception and views of the US and the West. As reflected in their memoirs and public statements, the experience of war against the PKK has made the commanders think that the PKK is not acting on its own. If the PKK were on its own, the Turkish military, the second-largest force in NATO, would already have erased them. The fact that the PKK still exists is due to the fact that it enjoys substantial foreign support, support that mainly comes from the West. Such perceptions prevail among the officers who serve in the Southeast.
Moreover, those with experience against the PKK are the ones most likely to be promoted within the military. Officers with skill and experience in fighting the PKK are naturally promoted. As a result, the high command is made up of officers with the most negative view of the West and the US.
This line and logic of promotion contrast with past practices in which those who were likely to be promoted used to be the ones who had served in NATO posts. This change has left its mark on the Turkish military's composition and security culture. The result is that the Turkish military is speedily getting out of the NATO culture of solidarity and alliance.
05.05.2008
As expressed many times by the high command, including the incoming Chief of General Staff Gen. İlker Başbuğ, the main concern is the preservation of the Turkish "nation-state." They feel that the notion of a unitary nation-state is under threat. What can be done against such a threat? It is virtually impossible to identify its source. And even if this is done successfully, it is almost inconceivable to wage a war against it, since the perceived threat involves social, political and economic actors, rather than enemy militaries. Social and economic forces that act globally cannot be controlled. This is the predicament of the Turkish military's current threat perception. No one, including a superpower like the US, can address their fear about the future of the nation-state. Demands for greater human rights, democratization, pluralism, minority rights and the dynamics of globalization are all feared to weaken the nation-state. The identified source of these evils is the West. The military's unease, therefore, is not directed just at the US, but at the West at large. The West, which supports democracy that brings the "Islamists" to power, demands human rights that protect the "terrorists" and asks for minority rights that encourage "Kurdish separatism," is no longer seen as an ally, but as the adversary. The result is simple; The Turkish military's priorities, needs and threat perceptions fundamentally differ from those of the West. The negative perception of the West by the military is therefore structural, not circumstantial.
The Turkish military is also deeply disturbed by US Middle East policy, especially in relation to Iraq, where an independent Kurdish state is assumed to be in the making with the support of the US, with devastating implications for the Turkish nation-state. A former commander of the armed forces, Gen. Aytaç Yalman, argues that the US handed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Öcalan over to Turkey in 1999 not for the sake of Turkish-American relations, but in order to strengthen the position of Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani in northern Iraq (Fikret Bila, "The Commanders' Front," p. 317). The Turkish military believes that the strategic targets and priorities of the US and Turkey are irreconcilable. Addressing the security concerns of the Turkish military requires changing the entirety of US Middle East policy -- for starters. The Turkish security establishment also views Israel's engagement in northern Iraq with suspicion. This is another significant setback, given the good old days when the Turkish security establishment regarded Israel as a partner against the PKK. But this was when Öcalan was based in Syria. It was then convenient for the Israelis to squeeze the Syrians together with Turkey. Once Öcalan was kicked out of Syria and a new force in northern Iraq, namely the Kurds, emerged vis-à-vis Iran and Sunni Iraq and Syria, the Israeli policy is argued to have been changed in favor of forging an alliance with the Kurds along with the US instead of cooperating with Turkey against the PKK.
The Turkish high command today consists of officers who served in the Southeast against the PKK. This experience has shaped their threat perception and views of the US and the West. As reflected in their memoirs and public statements, the experience of war against the PKK has made the commanders think that the PKK is not acting on its own. If the PKK were on its own, the Turkish military, the second-largest force in NATO, would already have erased them. The fact that the PKK still exists is due to the fact that it enjoys substantial foreign support, support that mainly comes from the West. Such perceptions prevail among the officers who serve in the Southeast.
Moreover, those with experience against the PKK are the ones most likely to be promoted within the military. Officers with skill and experience in fighting the PKK are naturally promoted. As a result, the high command is made up of officers with the most negative view of the West and the US.
This line and logic of promotion contrast with past practices in which those who were likely to be promoted used to be the ones who had served in NATO posts. This change has left its mark on the Turkish military's composition and security culture. The result is that the Turkish military is speedily getting out of the NATO culture of solidarity and alliance.
05.05.2008
No comments:
Post a Comment