Anti-Westernism used to be a distinguishing feature of the Islamic political identity. Now it is the mark of the Kemalist-secularist stance. The renewed demand of the West, particularly the EU, for democracy and the rule of law has highlighted sharp differences between the vision of a Turkey Europeanized as a natural outcome of the EU integration process and the Turkey visualized by Kemalist-secularist circles. They seem irreconcilable. The challenge of the West for the Kemalists is clear: In the EU integration process, it is impossible to preserve the old order. The West and the continuing Westernization that comes with the EU accession process, therefore, pose an existential threat to the Jacobin bureaucratic-civilian elite, which adheres to a notion of a homogenized nation and the practices of an authoritarian state.
But it was the Kemalists who used to be fans of the West and Westernization. At least we know it as such. Yet what the Kemalists understood by Westernization was merely a cultural adoption of the Western lifestyle for a certain purpose. That is, this new lifestyle differentiated them from the masses, who were traditional and Eastern/Islamic looking. They were the vanguard, chosen to enlighten a nation that was in darkness. Theirs was a kind of "white man's burden." Cultural Westernization was an act of exclusion of the traditional by which a boundary was erected between the state elite and the masses, who were poor, culturally backward and religious. Out of this symbolic oppression, the elite's right to rule was constructed, justified and reproduced over the years.
The West and the process of Westernization, however, gained new dimensions in time, especially after 1999, when Turkey declared itself a candidate country for the EU. They were no longer a means to dictate the rule of the Kemalist-secularists and control the masses.
The result thus was a struggle between the democratic periphery who wanted to end its bondage and the authoritarian center, which was determined to defend its privileges. As the former "utilized" the EU process, the latter resisted it on the grounds that the EU process was a plot to divide Turkey in the name of minority rights and undo secularism in the name of democracy.
This meant, for the Kemalist-secularist elite, abandoning Westernization, a process they had initiated. It was wise for them to do so, given the fact that the process of Westernization after 1999 continued on a different path. It involved more political and economic transformation than cultural change. That is to say that Westernization in the EU context meant the transfer of power from the state elite to the people. Thus, the public at large and the peripheral forces in the Turkish economy and politics moved in to extend the process of Westernization to its logical end: the formation of liberal democracy. The objectives of Westernization, for the first time in history, have begun to be pursued by social and economic forces from below.
In short, Westernization after 1999 has gone beyond its traditional function of "controlling" the social and economic demands of the periphery. It has turned into a mechanism through which the Kemalist state and its power is checked by the people at large. As such, Westernization, now defined by EU membership, has acquired a civil and democratizing content against the authoritarian tendencies of the Kemalist elite. This explains the adversarial attitude of the Kemalist-secularists to political reforms and EU accession. Thus, in the EU accession process, the elitist model of Westernization has been replaced by a democratizing Westernization.
This is how the Kemalist-secularists have come to hate the West.
12.05.2008
But it was the Kemalists who used to be fans of the West and Westernization. At least we know it as such. Yet what the Kemalists understood by Westernization was merely a cultural adoption of the Western lifestyle for a certain purpose. That is, this new lifestyle differentiated them from the masses, who were traditional and Eastern/Islamic looking. They were the vanguard, chosen to enlighten a nation that was in darkness. Theirs was a kind of "white man's burden." Cultural Westernization was an act of exclusion of the traditional by which a boundary was erected between the state elite and the masses, who were poor, culturally backward and religious. Out of this symbolic oppression, the elite's right to rule was constructed, justified and reproduced over the years.
The West and the process of Westernization, however, gained new dimensions in time, especially after 1999, when Turkey declared itself a candidate country for the EU. They were no longer a means to dictate the rule of the Kemalist-secularists and control the masses.
The result thus was a struggle between the democratic periphery who wanted to end its bondage and the authoritarian center, which was determined to defend its privileges. As the former "utilized" the EU process, the latter resisted it on the grounds that the EU process was a plot to divide Turkey in the name of minority rights and undo secularism in the name of democracy.
This meant, for the Kemalist-secularist elite, abandoning Westernization, a process they had initiated. It was wise for them to do so, given the fact that the process of Westernization after 1999 continued on a different path. It involved more political and economic transformation than cultural change. That is to say that Westernization in the EU context meant the transfer of power from the state elite to the people. Thus, the public at large and the peripheral forces in the Turkish economy and politics moved in to extend the process of Westernization to its logical end: the formation of liberal democracy. The objectives of Westernization, for the first time in history, have begun to be pursued by social and economic forces from below.
In short, Westernization after 1999 has gone beyond its traditional function of "controlling" the social and economic demands of the periphery. It has turned into a mechanism through which the Kemalist state and its power is checked by the people at large. As such, Westernization, now defined by EU membership, has acquired a civil and democratizing content against the authoritarian tendencies of the Kemalist elite. This explains the adversarial attitude of the Kemalist-secularists to political reforms and EU accession. Thus, in the EU accession process, the elitist model of Westernization has been replaced by a democratizing Westernization.
This is how the Kemalist-secularists have come to hate the West.
12.05.2008
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