A retired general, Nejat Eslen, gave an interview last week to Nuriye Akman of the Zaman daily. The interview reveals a particular mindset that seems to be influential in military circles. Eslen explains why Turkey should abandon the Western alliance and embrace Russia, meanwhile forgetting about democracy, which he views as a platform of "counterrevolution" against the Kemalist regime. Eslen's position provides a vivid example of the assertion I explained last week, that "anti-democratic forces in Turkey are also the most anti-Western ones."The fate of democracy in Turkey is closely linked to its relations with the West. This has always been the case. The single-party rule came to an end in 1945 in response to the victory of democracies in World War II. To be a founding member of the United Nations and win the support of Western democracies against the growing Soviet pressure on Turkey, the autocrats of the 1940s decided to adopt multi-party politics. They allowed the establishment of rival political parties and went for an early election in 1946 before opposition parties could get organized. The election of 1946 was not fair and free. It was held under the supervision of the gendarmerie and in many places, votes were dictated in a system of "public voting and secret counting" instead of secret voting and open counting. While allowing opposing political parties, the ruling Republican People's Party (CHP) was expecting to continue its rule by using the state apparatus that it controlled.
But the will of people to elect their own representative was infectious; once uttered, it was impossible to forget. Moreover, Turkey's growing engagement in the Western institutions provided significant leverage against the authoritarian tendencies of the CHP leadership. Adnan Menderes' speeches in Parliament before the 1950 elections frequently referenced Turkey's membership in the UN and its charter as requiring multi-party democracy. The beginning of Turkey's security cooperation and being part of the Marshall Plan in the immediate post-war period encouraged democratic forces.
To cement Turkey's linkages with the West, the Democrat Party (DP) government under Menderes, who won the first free and fair elections in 1950, brought Turkey to NATO membership in 1954 and applied for membership in the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1959.
But Turkey's engagement in the West did not stop the internal power struggle between the democratically elected representatives of the nation and the civilian-military bureaucracy representing the state. The paradox of the DP rule was that the modernization that it had initiated strengthened the power of its rivals as well. The military, for example, as a result of cooperation with the US bilaterally and within NATO, received new equipment and developed better training. This military, better trained, better equipped and better connected with the West, was disturbed by the transfer of power from bureaucracy to people via democracy.
They responded via a military coup against the Menderes government in 1960. In the first communiqué issued, the junta expressed its commitment to NATO, in a move to neutralize Turkey's Western allies. They were indeed successful. The West could not risk losing the generals in such a strategically important NATO ally where the generals declared their loyalty to NATO. Shelving off democracy and even hanging the democratically elected prime minister of the 1950s who brought Turkey into the NATO was tolerated by the West on the grounds that they needed Turkey in the Cold War competition with the Soviets.
This logic worked again in the 1971 military memorandum and in the military coup of 1980. In each occasion of these military interventions, the generals were quick to declare their commitment to the West and NATO.
So the military managed to trade off abolishing democracy with the continuation of Turkey's Western alliance. 1960, 1971 and 1980 military coups proved to the military that Turkey's Western allies were complacent as regards a limited tutelage democracy. So long as the West-tolerated military's central role in Turkish politics remained, the military cadets did not question the West as political orientation or military ally. But with the end of the Cold War, parameters have changed. The West, relieved by the collapse of communism, put an end to its policy of "Turkish exceptionalism," questioning the role of the military in Turkish politics and the quality of its democracy. This is where the disappointment of the Turkish military cadets with the West has started to emerge.
If the West does not accept the military's right to rule, then what is the point of sticking to the Western alliance? The search for an alternative has started, which is justified by the military circles as "Turkey's changing strategic vision."
21.07.2008
But the will of people to elect their own representative was infectious; once uttered, it was impossible to forget. Moreover, Turkey's growing engagement in the Western institutions provided significant leverage against the authoritarian tendencies of the CHP leadership. Adnan Menderes' speeches in Parliament before the 1950 elections frequently referenced Turkey's membership in the UN and its charter as requiring multi-party democracy. The beginning of Turkey's security cooperation and being part of the Marshall Plan in the immediate post-war period encouraged democratic forces.
To cement Turkey's linkages with the West, the Democrat Party (DP) government under Menderes, who won the first free and fair elections in 1950, brought Turkey to NATO membership in 1954 and applied for membership in the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1959.
But Turkey's engagement in the West did not stop the internal power struggle between the democratically elected representatives of the nation and the civilian-military bureaucracy representing the state. The paradox of the DP rule was that the modernization that it had initiated strengthened the power of its rivals as well. The military, for example, as a result of cooperation with the US bilaterally and within NATO, received new equipment and developed better training. This military, better trained, better equipped and better connected with the West, was disturbed by the transfer of power from bureaucracy to people via democracy.
They responded via a military coup against the Menderes government in 1960. In the first communiqué issued, the junta expressed its commitment to NATO, in a move to neutralize Turkey's Western allies. They were indeed successful. The West could not risk losing the generals in such a strategically important NATO ally where the generals declared their loyalty to NATO. Shelving off democracy and even hanging the democratically elected prime minister of the 1950s who brought Turkey into the NATO was tolerated by the West on the grounds that they needed Turkey in the Cold War competition with the Soviets.
This logic worked again in the 1971 military memorandum and in the military coup of 1980. In each occasion of these military interventions, the generals were quick to declare their commitment to the West and NATO.
So the military managed to trade off abolishing democracy with the continuation of Turkey's Western alliance. 1960, 1971 and 1980 military coups proved to the military that Turkey's Western allies were complacent as regards a limited tutelage democracy. So long as the West-tolerated military's central role in Turkish politics remained, the military cadets did not question the West as political orientation or military ally. But with the end of the Cold War, parameters have changed. The West, relieved by the collapse of communism, put an end to its policy of "Turkish exceptionalism," questioning the role of the military in Turkish politics and the quality of its democracy. This is where the disappointment of the Turkish military cadets with the West has started to emerge.
If the West does not accept the military's right to rule, then what is the point of sticking to the Western alliance? The search for an alternative has started, which is justified by the military circles as "Turkey's changing strategic vision."
21.07.2008
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