During the Cold War, the West -- for the Turkish military -- meant a security umbrella against Soviet pressures that gave it a free hand to dwell in Turkish domestic politics to institutionalize its autonomy and even its dominance. Moreover, the Western alliance also provided the military with modern weaponry that enhanced its political role even further as a modern military power. The end of the Cold War was, therefore, not welcomed by the Turkish military establishment. If cooperation with the West had basically remained grounded in security, the military's central role and power not just in foreign policy and security matters, but also in domestic political issues, would not have been questioned.
The prioritization of security in the Cold War logic had perfectly matched the dominant role that the military wanted to play in Turkish politics after 1960. The "communist threat" served the securitization of Turkish domestic politics, justifying the military's gradual occupation of political and economic domains as the only reliable barrier against communism. The communist threat also justified maintaining a "disciplined" society and democracy under the tutelage of the righteous military. Therefore, the end of the Cold War was worrisome for the military establishment, since the period had been used to promote Turkish exceptionalism among Western allies and to justify a limited democracy under the control of the military on the domestic front. The end of the Cold War thus meant the end of security-centered cooperation with the West, naturally pushing the military to the sidelines of the decision-making processes. As the nature of Turkey's relations with the West started to change, the military realized that it would lose the central place it used to occupy in Turkish politics, in addition to its former power and privileges.
Following the end of the Cold War security cooperation with the West has surely continued. But it has ceased to be the central theme of the relationship. The Turkish security establishment used to sell its geostrategic location to the West during the Cold War in return for a limited democracy. That is to say that the West did not want to take the risk of pushing for full democracy in such a strategically important country during the Cold War. Strategic perspectives overrode a democratic vision.
But the end of the Cold War placed Turkey in a different context. Turkey's partners in the West were no longer interested in buying Turkey's strategic assets with support for authoritarian elements within the military. For instance, when Turkey applied for full membership in the EU in 1987, it still tried to bargain on its contribution to Western defense vis-à-vis the Soviets. In those last years of the Cold War and in its aftermath, it was not easy to cash in "strategic assets."
Soon the EU defined a set of criteria for the accession of countries that did not privilege Cold War comrades. On the contrary, the EU's enlargement now included former members of the Eastern Bloc, and membership conditions included a democratic form of civil-military relations. The Turkish military establishment never understood how these former Soviet allies could be invited to the EU, while Turkey, a country that had defended the West against these very counties, was left out. This incomprehension reflects the inability of the security establishment to understand the changing nature of global politics. As the EU made membership conditional on full democracy, including proper civil-military relations, Turkish top brass saw the EU as deliberately aiming at weakening the military.
The EU pressures in the accession process for democracy, human rights and the rule of law meant a wave of desecuritization of Turkish politics that would diminish the power and privileges that the military had gathered over the years. The same goes for the EU's insistence on the settlement of the Cyprus question. In short, as the EU developed a democratic vision sidelining the strategic priorities of the Cold War era, the military establishment started to view the EU as an adversary plotting against Turkey.
All that the EU has asked from Turkey in the post-1999 period has meant the end of the military's political and economic power. Anti-EU sentiments in the Turkish military are just a natural instinct for protecting its power and privileges. It is for this reason that they did not refrain from forging alliances with ultra-nationalist anti-EU forces.
You may ask: Where are the concerns about the future of secularism in all this? Secularism is no more than a convenient disguise for a naked political struggle for the military and the rest. Were the earlier military interventions driven by the military's concern about secularism?
In short, the anti-Westernism of the military is due to the fact that in the post-Cold War era Western powers and institutions have preferred to work with civilian, democratic forces in Turkey and encouraged democratization instead of recognizing the military as a political actor with a "right to rule."
28.07.2008
The prioritization of security in the Cold War logic had perfectly matched the dominant role that the military wanted to play in Turkish politics after 1960. The "communist threat" served the securitization of Turkish domestic politics, justifying the military's gradual occupation of political and economic domains as the only reliable barrier against communism. The communist threat also justified maintaining a "disciplined" society and democracy under the tutelage of the righteous military. Therefore, the end of the Cold War was worrisome for the military establishment, since the period had been used to promote Turkish exceptionalism among Western allies and to justify a limited democracy under the control of the military on the domestic front. The end of the Cold War thus meant the end of security-centered cooperation with the West, naturally pushing the military to the sidelines of the decision-making processes. As the nature of Turkey's relations with the West started to change, the military realized that it would lose the central place it used to occupy in Turkish politics, in addition to its former power and privileges.
Following the end of the Cold War security cooperation with the West has surely continued. But it has ceased to be the central theme of the relationship. The Turkish security establishment used to sell its geostrategic location to the West during the Cold War in return for a limited democracy. That is to say that the West did not want to take the risk of pushing for full democracy in such a strategically important country during the Cold War. Strategic perspectives overrode a democratic vision.
But the end of the Cold War placed Turkey in a different context. Turkey's partners in the West were no longer interested in buying Turkey's strategic assets with support for authoritarian elements within the military. For instance, when Turkey applied for full membership in the EU in 1987, it still tried to bargain on its contribution to Western defense vis-à-vis the Soviets. In those last years of the Cold War and in its aftermath, it was not easy to cash in "strategic assets."
Soon the EU defined a set of criteria for the accession of countries that did not privilege Cold War comrades. On the contrary, the EU's enlargement now included former members of the Eastern Bloc, and membership conditions included a democratic form of civil-military relations. The Turkish military establishment never understood how these former Soviet allies could be invited to the EU, while Turkey, a country that had defended the West against these very counties, was left out. This incomprehension reflects the inability of the security establishment to understand the changing nature of global politics. As the EU made membership conditional on full democracy, including proper civil-military relations, Turkish top brass saw the EU as deliberately aiming at weakening the military.
The EU pressures in the accession process for democracy, human rights and the rule of law meant a wave of desecuritization of Turkish politics that would diminish the power and privileges that the military had gathered over the years. The same goes for the EU's insistence on the settlement of the Cyprus question. In short, as the EU developed a democratic vision sidelining the strategic priorities of the Cold War era, the military establishment started to view the EU as an adversary plotting against Turkey.
All that the EU has asked from Turkey in the post-1999 period has meant the end of the military's political and economic power. Anti-EU sentiments in the Turkish military are just a natural instinct for protecting its power and privileges. It is for this reason that they did not refrain from forging alliances with ultra-nationalist anti-EU forces.
You may ask: Where are the concerns about the future of secularism in all this? Secularism is no more than a convenient disguise for a naked political struggle for the military and the rest. Were the earlier military interventions driven by the military's concern about secularism?
In short, the anti-Westernism of the military is due to the fact that in the post-Cold War era Western powers and institutions have preferred to work with civilian, democratic forces in Turkey and encouraged democratization instead of recognizing the military as a political actor with a "right to rule."
28.07.2008
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