A new state policy on the Kurdish question?

There are signs that the "state policy" toward the Kurdish question may be entering a process of change. Some retired generals, including the leader of the 1980 military coup, Gen. Kenan Evren, have admitted that they made some mistakes in the past. The ban on speaking Kurdish in public was clearly described as a mistake by Evren who, nevertheless, did not mention the treatment of the inmates under the military junta in the notorious Diyarbakir Military Prison which served, thanks to the junta's violent policies, for years as a recruitment center for the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).

But even such an admission is progress and maybe a sign of changing policy. Another sign in this direction is the proposal of Republican People's Party (CHP) leader Deniz Baykal for a cooperative relationship with the Iraqi Kurds.

CHP leader Baykal surprised many by his latest maneuvering on the issue of northern Iraq. It is really hard to understand the U-turn Baykal made last week given the fact that he had called for an immediate military operation into the region that would target the Iraqi regional government too. What has happened to prompt Baykal to come up with a list of social and political measures that go against his original idea of crushing the regional government in northern Iraq?
Some argue that he is trying to win the support of the party branches in southeastern Turkey for the CHP's upcoming party congress. Well, I do not really think so. A party and leadership so closely linked to the state elite would not move independently on such a crucial issue. Baykal's new stand might be part of a changing state policy on the Kurdish question.

Offering educational opportunities for the Iraqi Kurds, increasing the volume of trade, opening a new border post and sharing water resources evenly and cooperatively are elements of a liberal solution to the issue of how to engage with the Kurds in northern Iraq. Many other measures can be added to this, but these are geared to increase economic and social cooperation, leading to an unbreakable interdependence between the two sides.

The shift from a confrontational perspective to one of cooperation and interdependence should be welcome. But some of his critics within the party and Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) spokespersons have already started questioning Baykal's loyalty to the notion of a unitary nation-state. This reminds us why we should avoid using extreme terms like treason when discussing politics. Baykal used that a lot. Now it is being used against him. Just a few weeks ago he was accusing Prime Minister Erdoğan of being Barzani's man; now he is the one whose discourse Barzani sympathizes with.

For the last 80 years neither the denial of Kurdish ethnic identity nor torture in the Diyarbakir Military Prison and the ban on speaking Kurdish in public has solved the problem.
If there is a new approach developing to address the Kurdish question it cannot help but tackle a broader issue. The century-old objective, which turned into a state tradition, of creating a homogenous nation by using the coercive apparatus of the state should be abandoned.
The republican regime should give up its tradition of fighting against the social currents through state power, a tradition that destroys pluralism, democracy and the rule of law. This is the basis of the problem. We had better understand that a Jacobin approach is no way a solution to social problems. Without questioning the Jacobin tradition of imposing the state's views and preferences on the people, be it the Kurds, the liberals, the Alevis or Muslims with headscarves, we cannot proceed with establishing social peace in this country. Repressive state policies are the main obstacle to peace, harmony and social integration. Let the people be, whatever or whoever they are. The state has no right to "define" and "impose" social, religious or ethnic identities on its people. Since we Turks have a majority in this country we cannot deny the right of the Kurds to be different and remain so. Respect for minority rights, be it ethnic, religious, political or sexual, is not only the basis of legitimacy for any polity but also of social peace.
12.11.2007

Mistakes the Americans made

We could never have imagined -- even after the end of the Cold War -- that the Turkish people and the state elite would have come to view the US as an enemy threatening Turkey’s security and integrity. Even five years ago we could never imagine that Turkish-American relations would have ended up with such poisonous mistrust and misunderstanding on both sides. But it happened. Lately, there has been a growing perception that the US supports the PKK and prefers the Iraqi Kurds to its old ally, Turkey. In short, it seems to the public and the state elite that the US is not only abandoning Turkey as an ally and friend but is also confronting it as an adversary. If you look at the way we are debating the issues of the PKK and northern Iraq, it seems as if we are on the verge of a war against the US, which has been our ally for the last 60 years.

This breakdown in relations between the two countries will have domestic, regional and global implications. The position of anti-Western circles in Turkey who call for an end to NATO membership, oppose EU membership and fight against globalization will be vindicated and strengthened. Will the US’ strategic interests be better served if Turkey comes under the influence of these forces? What are the great strategic outcomes of such an adventurist political agenda for the region or for the US?

The US needs to seriously change the attitude it has adopted towards Turkey, which is pushing Turkey to look for a strategic partnership in the East. In 2002, when such a prospect was voiced by Gen. Tuncer Kılınç, then the secretary-general of the National Security Council, it regarded as a laughing matter, a careless and visionless statement. Some five years have passed and now we see increasing numbers of people, including security elite and analysts, talking of an Eurasian union as a viable policy option.

To me, the idea of Turkey forging a strategic alliance with Russia, Iran, and China is still a fantasy -- and a dangerous one, at that. But the increasing popularity of this fantasy is a sign, among others, of Turkey’s growing disillusionment with the US over the last four years.

The US administration made mistakes, serious ones. It never bothered to take into account the security risks for its ally, Turkey, posed by its occupation of Iraq. It refrained from addressing the concerns of Turkey and it refused to work cooperatively. This attitude resulted in the exclusion of Turkey from the developments that took place close to its border with Iraq. As was predicted, this allowed the development of a serious threat to Turkey’s national security. Turkey’s cooperation with the US was reduced in March 2003 with the decision of Parliament to not allow American troops to pass through Turkish territory. Following this decision, Turkish institutions, including the government, the military, and even the main opposition party, came under harsh criticism from high-ranking American officials. Meanwhile, an understanding developed in Turkey that the US was “punishing Turkey” for Parliament’s decision.

What was worse was that the US administration meddled in Turkish politics at the expense of its image as an ally, which requires remaining above the squabbles of day-to-day politics. The US’s actions may be calculated to capitalize on and exploit domestic divisions between the ruling party and the opposition parties and also between the military and the government. But this pulled the US into domestic political struggles, eventually alienating all sides involved. At one stage the Americans seemed to side with the government against the military, which was criticized for not supporting the March resolution. Such incidents naturally increased sympathy for the US in AK Party circles. But the time also came when the AK Party seemed to be abandoned in the face of the military’s growing threats of intervention against the government.

We can all remember how long it took for the US administration to come out against the so-called e-memorandum threatening a direct military coup on April 27. The US was also accused of plotting against the republican regime by supporting the “moderate Islam” represented by the AK Party, which was seen as furthering the “Greater Middle East Project” of the US.

In short, by meddling in Turkish domestic politics the US has ended up alienating almost all groups.

Furthermore, Hamas’ visit to Ankara was exaggerated and turned into yet another excuse to punish Turkey by some radical elements of the Jewish lobby, which alienated not only the government but also the vast majority of people who sympathize with the Palestinians. The energy deal with Iran was also subject to overreaction, indicating that the US was not prepared to understand Turkey’s need to diversify its energy resources for its growing economy and population.

Is the US administration aware of these and other mistakes they have made? Given all these considerations and the current issue with the PKK, it is time for the Americans to rethink their stance on Turkey.
08.11.2007

Rights and wrongs in the fight against the PKK

We can live with terror, like many other nations in the world fighting against it and bearing its pains. But the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) terror is different. It poses an existential threat to Turkey because it is part of a broader Kurdish question. Fighting against the PKK is not simply a fight against a terrorist organization. It requires a broader approach than security measures. The extent to which this broader Kurdish issue is addressed helps to eliminate the PKK in the medium to long term.
But once again we seem to have reduced the issue to hit the PKK presence in northern Iraq as if it will resolve the problem for good. Preoccupation with security measures makes us lose our perspective. The securitization that we are increasingly witnessing nowadays is not the solution but the problem. Since 1925, following the Sheikh Said rebellion, Turkey has chosen "securitization" to deal with the Kurdish issue. What is the outcome? The unresolved Kurdish problem has obstructed the development of Turkish democracy.

It is good to mobilize public support against terror. But what would be the target of those angry masses? They are likely to get out of hand, increasing the possibility of provocations in various parts of Turkey. We should not forget that Turkey experienced the dreadful event of Sept. 6-7, 1955, in Istanbul and Izmir, where an angry mob attacked non-Muslim citizens. Years later, it was admitted that the Sept. 6-7 event was the doing of a "special war unit" within the Turkish security forces and it was described by one of its former commanders as a "successful psychological war operation."
The public mood is ready for similar raids against "Kurdish targets" in big cities with sizeable Kurdish populations. Prevention of such a provocation should be the number-one priority for the government, much more important than a cross-border operation.

In the struggle against the PKK, the key to success is to isolate it. An isolated terror organization with its social and political bases cut off cannot survive for long. Even if it maintains some of its cells it will cease to pose an existential threat to Turkey. And we can deal with such a terror organization.
The thing to do to isolate the PKK as a terror organization and cut off its links with the Kurdish community is to eliminate the ground on which it grows -- and that is to solve the Kurdish question. For the last six to seven years Turkey has taken significant steps in improving the state of the Kurds in the cultural, political and economic domains. However limited, these should be carried on.
In this context, the continuation of the Justice and Development Party's (AK Party) link with the Kurdish people is essential to enable the representation of those people in the center of Turkish politics. Without forgetting the nationalist credentials of the AK Party, I would argue that the AK Party also represents the Kurdish identity and interest, as reflected in the latest election and referendum results. The capability of the AK Party to reach out to the Kurdish people should be maintained. We should not push the AK Party into the fire over the northern Iraq issue and break up its rapprochement with the Kurds in this country.

The PKK leaders should be very happy about the last couple of weeks. Their terror acts have reached their objective of elevating the PKK to the place of a relevant entity in both Turkish and regional politics. We have caused the entire world to talk of the PKK. Our anger and reaction provided the PKK with a perfect propaganda outlet. This is not the way to fight terrorism. Gen. İlker Başbuğ complained the other week that Turkey had failed in preventing new PKK recruits. But this attitude of exaggerating the power of the PKK paves the way for new requirements to the terror organization. The power of the PKK is in no way comparable to that of the early 1990s when it was even poised to take control of some cities in the region.

I think Turkey should not exaggerate the PKK -- on the contrary, it should ignore it altogether. There are understandable reasons for the recent outrage against PKK violence. Yet we should be able to play it down and reduce the tension among the people. We may even direct this anger and resentment into a positive direction, like a national campaign for an embracing between Turks and Kurds.
Public sympathy and support for the PKK are waning. People in the region want peace, prosperity and cultural/ethnic recognition, all of which have been increasingly provided in recent years. As I explained earlier, this is the reason for an increase in the terrorist activities of the PKK -- it is out of the realization that it has become irrelevant to the solution to the Kurdish problem.

Instead of abandoning it, the Turkish government should launch an aggressive reform package demonstrating its will to manage its own agenda. Continuing reform with even surprising speed will put the PKK into a more irrelevant position over the Kurdish issue.

Turkey should not give the opportunity to the anti-reformist camp by abandoning the reform process. What has happened to the new constitution? The PKK and the hawks in Turkey should not be allowed to hijack Turkey's reform agenda. Cutting the PKK's social base requires continuing with the reform process.

More democratization, not securitization, is the way out of this crisis. We should not lose our perspective.
01.11.2007

What does the US really want?

IHSAN DAGI
i.dagi@todayszaman.com

What does the US really want?

I wonder if the US administration is aware that the prevailing negative public perception of the US is destroying the social and psychological basis of a working relationship in the long run between the US and Turkey. Even if a rapprochement is made today on the government level, it will be very difficult to carry it out in an atmosphere of common distrust and disappointment among the Turks. In an ever-democratizing Turkey, no government can remain indifferent to the demands and opinions of the masses. At the moment both sides seem to be losing their ability to make a new start in the future. Anti-Americanism has become part of "popular culture" with novels, movies, and TV series. While I sense some sort of an orchestrated effort to impact the negative American image in public, some actions and inactions of the US administration are paving the way towards this end.

Let's be honest, the US is not viewed as an ally, a strategic partner or a friend today. The image of the US is that of an adversary, which is largely due to its inaction when it comes to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and its policy toward northern Iraq. Like it or not, many in this country have come to see the US as a national security threat and not as an ally.

The widespread belief is that the US wants Turkey to divide up along ethnic lines to create a Kurdish state. An independent Kurdish state is believed to be a reliable, long-term ally in the region for the US, whose friends are low in number both in the region and in the rest of the world. Here reliability, in fact, means "dependence" on the US. Being surrounded by enemy states and nations -- Turkey in the north, Iran in the east, Syria in the west and the Sunni Arabs in the south -- an imaginary Kurdish state will be nothing but dependent on the US for its survival. And this is the basis of a perfect ally for the US. Along with Israel, such a Kurdish state in northern Iraq under the protection of the US is believed to be the objective of the US. An independent Kurdish state is expected to be a permanent ally for the US.

Strengthening its Kurdish ally or poking their nose into trouble and thus needing US help, it is also believed that the US is encouraging the Kurds of Turkey to be part of a greater Kurdish state. Many argue that the US support is not confined to Iraqi Kurds; the PKK is armed with American weapons. There is even talk of the US sharing intelligence on the Turkish military with the PKK.
It would be a mistake to think that all these are the views of the "public." These have indeed also become the views of many policy-makers who are in the security establishment and political institutions.

I think it is getting too late for the US to convince the Turkish people and authorities of alliance and friendship. Unless it moves quickly and disproves current public perceptions, Turkish-American relations will be permanently and structurally damaged.

I still believe that the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and its leader, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, are capable of controlling the nationalist outcry. But they should be provided with some sort of gains in the fight against the PKK. Otherwise, the nationalist fever will hijack Turkish politics and crash all, including those who assist them in their politics, the military and the media, creating waves of tension and clashes both in Turkey and in its neighbors.

The US administration should realize before it's too late that the PKK is sabotaging the Turkish-US alliance -- does the US have any interest in maintaining it? The PKK is also sabotaging stability and security in Iraq and the region as a whole -- does the US have any interest in securing it? I would even argue that the PKK is sabotaging a possible Kurdish independent state in northern Iraq -- does the US have any interest in having it? Moreover, the PKK is also sabotaging the friendship and understanding between the US and the Iraqi Kurds -- does the US have any interest in keeping it?
I wonder if the Americans do not see that they are being fooled by the PKK.

Anyhow, I still think that the US administration will not sacrifice its relationship with Turkey to the PKK and will avoid going down in history as the administration that lost Turkey.
29.10.2007

Is Kemalism compatible with democracy?

I know this question is straightforward, but it is one that we have to ask and answer if we are really interested in identifying and removing the obstacles before the democratization process. Any ideology may claim to be “good” and “right,” but if an ideology claims to have a monopoly over the “truth” and secures a constitutional superiority over other sets of ideas and ideologies, it turns out to be incompatible with democracy. Democracy requires pluralism of views that compete with one another. If the founding principles of a state are reduced to a single ideology, neither democracy nor rule of law can flourish, simply because constitutional order would not protect the pluralities of ideas and ideologies, but the one on which it is based.

The notion of state ideology is incompatible with the notion of democracy. Democracy does not only welcome plurality of views, programs, and ideologies, but requires them. These contending “views” on society should be in free competition to attract the support of the people.

As a set of ideas, Kemalism certainly deserves a place among the others and is entitled to protection from the state and law, just like other views, ideas, and ideologies. But it cannot ask for a monopoly or even a privilege. It is time for the Kemalists to understand for the sake of Turkish democracy that Kemalism is one among others that compete for adherence and acceptance by the people. The state protection and privileges for Kemalism only lead to distancing it further from society, people losing faith in democracy and producing more radicalism. In the free market of ideas, the Kemalists, too, will moderate themselves in order to appeal to a greater number of people.

We certainly need “moderate Kemalism” that accepts pluralism and democracy. But this requires abandoning the claim to be the sole provider of truth for society and the state, which is a totalitarian inclination anyway. Construction of a new and homogenized society by using the coercive means of the state is unacceptable from a liberal democratic point of view. In order not to be described as the new reactionaries of Turkey in the 21st century, the Kemalists had better come to terms with democracy and pluralism. It is the engagement in the path of democracy and the free market of ideas that may make the Kemalists feel the need for moderation.

When we look at the neo-Kemalists today, they seem to have a deep fear of the values and institutions of political modernity, namely democracy, human rights and the rule of law. The modern state cannot impose a particular ideology on its citizens. This is against the very nature of the state and its raison d’etre, which is to protect individual rights against the Leviathan, not vice versa.

However, some Kemalists still imagine Turkey as an ideological state, unaware of the fact that Turkish social, economic and political realities do not allow the imposition of a state ideology.
But some think that it is possible and they try. By doing so they opt out of the rules, norms, and principles of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. To make people uniformly believe in a state ideology, the neo-Kemalists seem prepared to resort to authoritarian means. That is how neo-Kemalism has become an authoritarian political and social project. Their problem is viewing citizens as subservient to the state and its ideology, instead of recognizing them as autonomous moral and political entities capable of making individual and public choices.

The Kemalists also seem far from curing their strong anti-Western sentiments and position, which leads them to misinterpret the events in Turkey and abroad. Once the Islamists in Turkey thought of the West in this way, but now it is the Kemalists who think the West is the mother of all evil.

Kemalism as a state ideology above the law and principles of democracy goes against the notion of “contemporary civilization.”

Not only Kemalism but all ideologies that intend to use the state apparatus to silence and suppress other ideologies are incompatible with the principles of democracy.
04.10.2007

The future of Kemalism and the İstanbul Biennial

Does Kemalism allow academic freedoms and freedom of thought and expression? Well, if it left to “contemporary” Kemalists they would criminalize any act of criticism leveled at Kemalism of their understanding. The latest incidence of intolerance in the name of Kemalism involved Hou Hanru, the curator of the Istanbul Biennial, who made an opening speech and forwarded the Biennial catalog in which he “analyzed” Kemalism from a slightly critical perspective. He says:
“Turkey, as one of the first non-western modern republics and a key player in the modernization of the developing world has proved to be one of the most radical, spectacular and influential cases in this direction. But, a fundamentally crucial problem is that the modernization model promoted by the Kemalist project was still a top-down imposition with some unsolvable contradictions and dilemmas inherent within the system: the quasi-military imposition of reforms, while necessary as a revolutionary tool, betrayed the principle of democracy; the nationalist ideology ran counter to its embracing of the universality of humanism, and the elite-led economic development generated social division. Populist political and religious forces have managed to recuperate and manipulate the claims from the ‘bottom’ of the society and have used them to their own advantage.”

A group of academics headed by the dean of the Faculty of Fine Arts at the Marmara University issued a declaration condemning Hou Hanru for having thought of Kemalism in this way. The statement points to “delicate times Turkey passing through” and calls on the curator to be “more sensitive”.

Well, we are really passing through delicate times: the neo-Kemalists think they are waging a new war of independence against their own people who vote for anti-Kemalist (?) political parties and globalist forces. They want a new top-down revolution to redesign people, think that democracy has gone too far and they have lost control over the state, society, and economy.
In short, they react Hou Hanru not because he criticized the founding myths of Kemalism but because he implicitly disclosed what the neo-Kemalists today think and are trying to do.

Otherwise, what are wrongs with such arguments? It is a generally agreed view that the republican project of building a “nation-state” and making a “new nation” out of the remains of the Ottoman Empire was an example of top-down modernization. It is a historical fact that these were not carried out in a “democratic” regime but by a single-party government and through “revolutionary” means. Democracy with its elementary mechanisms and institutions began with 1950, which is described by many Kemalists as the beginning of “counter-revolution”. Even today we know that neo-Kemalists are extremely skeptical of democracy; they ask for the continuation of the top-down revolutionary command to control and shape the country.

Instead of condemning Hanru, the neo-Kemalists can take his criticisms and, in fact, advises as a starting point for the revival of Kemalism in the new circumstances. Hanru basically underlines the reasons why Kemalism was unable to reach out to the “bottom of the society”. The contemporary Kemalists should think of new ways and languages by which they can reach society. Hanru points them out for the Kemalists: do not betray the principle of democracy, devise a more humane notion of nationalism and be sensitive to social problems. These are good pieces of advice if the neo-Kemalists are interested in reproducing Kemalism in a democratic milieu.

But they seem disinterested. In order to get acceptance from the people, the neo-Kemalists ask for favoritism. They want their notion of Kemalism to be protected and even imposed by the state and by the law. They should realize that Kemalism is one among many other “ideologies” that should compete for adherence in the free market of ideas and ideologies.

The neo-Kemalists are in fact trying to preserve their power and status within the system by hiding behind an anachronistic ideology that has nothing to do with the legacy of Ataturk himself which is alive and well respected in society at large. They are neither republican, nor democrat and modern, and as such should be disassociated from Kemal Ataturk as a historical personality who laid down the basis of modern Turkey.

Unless they do not link up Kemalism with contemporary ideas of democracy, human rights, rule of law as well as a civic notion of nationalism that is in peace with the world at large the neo-Kemalist ideology cannot survive. Anyhow neither Islamism nor Kemalism as ideologies cannot be imposed on societies through state apparatus in an open society, market economy, and globalized world.
01.10.2007

Is the Turkish state secular anyway?

“Defending secularism” has become a façade to hide the struggle to maintain the status quo. One hundred years ago it was the reactionary Islamic scholars who fought against change in the name of Islam; now it is reactionary positivist scholars who resist change in the name of secularism.

 Secularism has been used as a proper tool to control social and political opposition directed to the beneficiaries of the status quo. The rising peripheral forces with their liberal, conservative and democratic credentials are intimidated by a language of “secularism under threat.”

To demonstrate that the fight is not about secularism per se but a power struggle between the elite and peripheral forces, it is necessary to look at the practice of secularism in Turkey and see if the Turkish practice is really “secular.”

A secular state refers to a particular form of relationship between the state and religion. This relationship includes two fundamental components: first, separation of the state from religion and second, the neutrality of the state towards all religions and beliefs.

Is the current practice of secularism in Turkey in line with secularism defined in terms of the separation of the state and religion? Absolutely not. The Religious Affairs Directorate is part of the state organization with thousands of staff and hundreds of local branches. That is to say that the state is organized to serve a particular religion or maybe to keep religion under the surveillance and supervision of the state. Either way, it goes against the principles of a secular state. While some are concerned that religion, in our case Islam, is influencing state affairs, what we see in practice is that the state claims a total control over religious activities through its apparatus dealing with religious affairs. Religious groups, circles and dervish orders do not officially exist. By this, the state does not recognize a social and indeed an individual space for independent religious organizations. It is the state that interferes with religion and religious activities, and such a state cannot be called a secular one.

Is the current practice of secularism in line with secularism defined in terms of neutrality of the state towards all religions, sects, and creeds? Absolutely not. The state-organized religious affairs under the directorate impose a particular form of Islam on its citizens. As such, it is not neutral but partisan. Non-Muslim minorities are discriminated against on religious grounds by this secular state as restrictions have been imposed with regard to educational activities and properties of non-Muslim minorities. The Religious Affairs Directorate does not serve or represent non-Islamic religions which are observed by some Turkish citizens. Even more dramatic is the denial of an Islamic sect, the Alevis, by the state’s religious apparatus. The directorate teaches, preaches and practices not only Islam but a particular form of Islam: the Sunni-Hanefi version. It is not neutrality of a secular state, but the imposition of a particular form of Islam on its citizens. How can a “secular” state teach compulsory courses on a particular interpretation of Islam in elementary and high schools?

All these are serious deviations from the conception of a secular state. The state cannot and should not dominate religion and religious affairs and vice versa.

To settle the question once and for all is to build a secular state by really separating it from religion (Islam) and neutralizing it toward all religions and creeds.
20.09.2007

How to erase the legacy of the military regime: A new constitution

The debate on a new constitution requires a comprehensive questioning of the legacy of the military regime. A democratic regime cannot be thoroughly established in a constitutional order that constantly reminds us of the constituting power of the military.

In its original form, this Constitution had articles justifying a military coup, imposing unlawful bans on political party leaders beside its illiberal articles limiting freedom of expression and association. It is time for this country to prove that it is capable of making a democratic and liberal constitution both in content and the way it is made.

The 1982 constitution was drafted by a commission of the Advisory Council, the members of which were appointed by the junta named the National Security Council. The authority to finalize the draft before going for a referendum belonged to the junta. A referendum was held on Nov. 6, 1982, approving the constitution and simultaneously electing Gen. Kenan Evren, the leader of the junta as president. Other junta members maintained a “constitutional” position within the system as members of a Presidential Council. The result was a constitution carrying the junta structure and its priorities well into the era of the civilian government after 1983.

Neither the process of making the constitution nor the referendum took place in a free atmosphere. All was done under a military government when hundreds of thousands were under detention, censorship was in place and political debates were totally banned. What kind of constitution can one get in such circumstances?

Retaining the 1982 constitution demonstrates our inability to face the past as if we are destined to carry the burden of the past. We have been living with our past sins, yet pretending that we have overcome them. Not really. Not until we put an end to the legacy of the 1980 military regime.

We have not been able to confess and start with a new beginning, but our fellow Greeks have. They brought the colonels to justice and put them in prison, opening the way for the consolidation of Greek democracy and eventual membership in the EU. It took only seven years to achieve this, simply because they had the courage to face reality and change it.

What about us? We have pretended that by the end of 1983 democracy was restored without questioning the constitutional order established according to the needs and priorities of the military autocrats. The junta effectively survived until 1989. The first significant change in the constitution could only be introduced in 1995 that slightly broadened the sphere of political participation. And even then, it was not us who initiated the process with an understanding to eliminate at least some remaining elements of the military regime but rather, it was the EU. The European Parliament declared it would not approve the customs union with Turkey without some constitutional reform.

Thus it is due to the EU that a new process to amend the constitution was started. And since then almost half of the articles in the constitution were changed -- all motivated or required by the EU process. Where has been our will to establish real democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights? Even many reformists did not have the guts to call for democracy and human rights for its own sake but instead tried to justify their wish by referring to the EU membership requirement.

Now the emerging will and consensus for a new constitution is a rare opportunity to show that the “constituting” will in this country belong to people and not to the military.
17.09.2007

September 12 military regime: A reminder

Some seem to have forgotten what it was like to be under a military regime. Sept. 12 was marked by lawlessness and arbitrary rule. It was an assault on democracy and a catastrophe for civil and political rights.

Let’s take a look back. The generals dissolved Parliament and government and banned all political activities with their first “communiqué.” The leaders of four major political parties -- Süleyman Demirel, Bülent Ecevit, Necmettin Erbakan and Alpaslan Türkes -- were arrested. Martial law was declared over the whole country, and the martial law authorities were empowered to censor the press and appoint or dismiss civil servants. Two trade unions, the Confederation of Revolutionary Workers’ Unions (DİSK) and Confederation of Nationalist Workers’ Unions (MİSK) were closed down, and their leaders were arrested. The National Security Council (MGK), composed of five members of the junta, became the sole rule-making body with no authority or law above it.

All mayors and members of city councils were removed from their offices. The first two executions since 1972 were carried out immediately after the coup in October. By the end of the military regime, the number of executions reached 49. Right after the military takeover, a big hunt was launched for suspects and political activists -- 600,000 were detained; some 230,000 were tried, out of which 517 were sentenced to death and 50 were executed. The detention period without trial was officially extended to 90 days, but thousands were not brought to trial after exceeding that period. Around 400,000 people were denied passports, 14,000 were stripped of citizenship, hundreds died from torture and thousands were fired from public jobs, including from universities.

All lock-outs and strikes were declared illegal and freedom of the press was violated with many newspapers being banned indefinitely and journalists imprisoned. Mass trials were held to prosecute trade unionists, political party members, and others, with a shocking 7,000 decisions for the death penalty.

After being held in detention for a month, Ecevit and Demirel, the leaders of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Justice Party (AP), respectively, were released on the condition that they would refrain from political activities and statements. The other political leaders Erbakan and Türkes were charged with actions against the Constitution, the very Constitution that was wrecked by the military itself. Erbakan spent around a year in prison while Türkes spent five years.

To silence any political opposition, the junta issued a decree in June 1981 banning the release or publication of any political statement from former politicians and making any criticism of the ruling military regime illegal. So it was effectively forbidden to speak about politics or public affairs. Towards the end of 1981, the military formally closed down all political parties including the one established by Atatürk, the CHP. Former premier and then leader of the CHP Ecevit was given a prison sentence of four months for his political comments, contravening the MGK decree of June in his newly established weekly Arayış, which was shut down in March 1982. Ecevit was also tried and sentenced to three months for interviews he gave to the foreign press.

Are all of these actions acceptable, tolerable, desirable or bearable today? Only torturers and executioners would want another military regime in this country. A democratic regime is the key to having a decent and honorable life, so it is necessary that we nurture democracy and work hard to strengthen it. Yet in a country in which the leader of the main opposition party -- which also claims to be a social democrat one -- declares that democracy is threatening the republic, we still have a long way to go.
13.09.2007

From isolationism to nationalism and then to authoritarianism?

The latest Transatlantic Trends, a global public opinion survey issued by the German Marshall Fund, reveals some alarming data that are likely to block Turkey’s quest for opening up to the world economically and politically. A question arises if the government will face an even stronger nationalist resistance from society at large in response to its integrationist policies towards the EU in particular and global economy in general as people become seemingly more skeptical about the outside world.

According to the survey, while 40 percent of Turks favor Turkey’s EU membership, only 26 percent anticipate an eventual membership. A majority of Turkish people -- 56 percent -- see the leadership of the EU in world affairs as being undesirable. Only 35 percent view Turkey’s NATO membership as being essential for its security. The overall Turkish attitude towards world nations is rather “cool” and distanced. On a scale starting from 100, Palestinians score the highest with 42, followed by Iran (30), China (28), the EU (26), Russia (21) and the US (11).

These are symptoms of inward-looking, insecure and distrustful minds likely to create an asocial society in the family of nations, which is not only a disturbing factor for an international community but also a risk for an open, democratic society in this country. The distance between isolationist nationalism to an authoritarian society and state is not far.

It seems that the discourse surrounding Turkey being targeted by the outside world, particularly in the last couple of years, has been effective in winning the minds of Turks. With such a mindset we cannot go on with a policy of integration with the EU. The government should start effectively addressing issues that inflame isolationist and nationalist sentiments, which are fertile grounds for a reactionary and xenophobic nationalism. The killings of Father Andrea Santaro in Trabzon, missionaries in Malatya and Hrant Dink in İstanbul took place within such a social and political background. Fanning the flame of xenophobia disguised as nationalism should be stopped.

Firstly all political parties should abandon provoking and promoting a nationalist hysteria. We all remember how political parties’ election campaigns were shaped by an odd rivalry for nationalism. Each tried senselessly to prove that the “most nationalist” was theirs. In Turkey’s entire history we have never had an election period like the one we recently witnessed -- in which the flag of political parties was overshadowed by the national flag as a symbol of nationalism superimposed on all political parties.

Opposition parties like the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) based their election campaigns on their attempts to prove that Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the leader of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party), was soft on Turkey’s national interests. He was accused of selling Turkey out because of privatization policies and the selling of properties to the foreign nationals. The government was also accused of selling out Cyprus for its policies of supporting a settlement in Cyprus, of being subordinate to the demands of the EU and the US. Erdoğan was also accused of protecting Massoud Barzani as he refrained from invading northern Iraq.

We also recall how the opposition’s strong language forced the AK Party to respond by trying hard to prove that it too is a nationalist party. Both Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül referred to their nationalist credentials in the past to escape from the opposition’s accusations. Moreover, the AK Party hardly mentioned its EU performance during its election campaign in an attempt to avoid the accusation of having sold Turkey out to the EU. The AK Party’s İstanbul meeting, where around 1 million supporters gathered, was dominated by Turkish flags instead of party flags. The AK Party, too, was taken hostage by the nationalist upsurge.

But this cannot go on. Unless the surge in nationalism is brought under control, no political party can rule this country in a way to build a free and prosperous future. After the elections, many expect a new process of normalization which can only come through reducing the nationalist hysteria in people’s attitude and behavior.

The government is equipped to” tame” nationalism, which is a ticking bomb in its hands, too. Given the presence of nationalist elements within the AK Party and the nationalist credentials of its leader, Erdoğan, it is capable of doing so in the period ahead. Instead of conceding the nationalist fever as a constraint, the AK Party should pursue policies of “rehabilitation” for the growing nationalism in Turkey. This is an issue prone to be manipulated by the statist, elitist and anti-globalization groups in the face of attempts to introduce further economic and political reforms.

Unless we put the genie of nationalism back into the bottle, we will sink into a self-destructive isolationism or irredentism.
10.09.2007

A constitution without Kemalism

It is time to acknowledge the fact that is is impossible to have or maintain a Kemalist regime in an “open society,” with a “market economy” and through the “globalization process.” If we somehow uphold these three attributes of “contemporary civilization,” we need a post-Kemalist constitution.

Imagine a constitution that declares “no activity that contravenes Ataturk nationalism and the Ataturk principles and revolutions shall be protected.” This clearly amounts to an “official ideology” that sets limits to freedom of expression. It is futile to raise questions as to how these principles can be defined as constitutional principles and who are entitled to interpret them since there could be no satisfactory answer. Ideological dispositions, not the rules of interpreting a legal text, will shape the answers.

The fundamental problem is that references to the Ataturk principles and revolutions blur the boundaries between the “ideological” and the “legal,” which makes establishing a rule of law regime extremely difficult.

Many complain that the judiciary in Turkey is conservative and ideologically oriented, as recently displayed with the 367 decision of the Constitutional Court. The conservative ideology of the judiciary is Kemalism, as included in the Constitution. It is time to build the constitutional bases of liberal democracy by drawing a proper line between the legal and ideological and to drop protection of a particular “ideology” (Kemalism) at the expense of the others.

Ideological states, be they socialist, fascist or Kemalist, have failed to meet their promises. They have failed to produce freedom, welfare, and security for their citizens. The collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union heralded not only the end of the Cold War but also the demise of the ideological state.

To build anew or maintain an ideological state is practically impossible in the contemporary complexities of the global economy, social networks, and political interactions. It is a struggle against the current that risks confronting not only global trends but also the demands of the people at home. People want liberty, welfare, and security, which cannot be provided by an ideological state, as proven by the political history of the 20th century.

The modern state cannot impose a particular ideology on its citizens. In our age, it is not the ideological state but the “performative” state that is in use. The power and legitimacy of the state are not derived from its adherence to an ideology but from the services provided to the people.

Democracy requires a functional and performative state. If the founding principles of a state are informed by ideology, neither democracy nor the rule of law can be established, simply because constitutional order and institutions will be geared to protecting this or that ideological premise and not the citizens’ rights.

Such an ideological state provides the grounds for the arbitrariness of state authorities in the name of their raison d’état, which cannot be accepted by democratic measures. But for some in this country, their anachronistic power and privileges within the system are best served by sticking to an ideological Kemalist state.

The time of the ideological state has passed. If Turkey wants to bring itself to the level of contemporary civilization, it should abandon the notion of Kemalism as the basis of the state as outlined in the Constitution.

A constitution without Kemalism will be a prelude to a fully functioning democracy and the rule of law in Turkey.
13.08.2007

Representing the Kurds, presenting the solution

The July election brought the Democratic Society Party (DTP) into Parliament with 22 seats. Yet the DTP’s performance in the election was considerably lower than expected. The results indicate that the DTP is far from representing the Kurdish people on its own. In 12 out of 15 provinces in the East where the DTP ran with independents, the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) came first. While the AK Party doubled and, in some cases, tripled its votes in these cities, the DTP-rooted independents lost votes in all but Hakkari and Şırnak in comparison to the 2002 elections. In the metropolitan city of Diyarbakır -- where the DTP holds municipalities -- the AK Party almost tripled its votes, reaching 41 percent, while the DTP led with 45 percent of the vote, which is 10 percent lower than its 2002 vote count.

For the AK Party, these results are not surprising, since it managed to receive such a high percentage of votes across Turkey. But for the DTP there are lessons to learn from these results, which point to the limits of identity politics based on Kurdish ethnicity. Like the rest of the country, the people in the region want services, development and a decent democracy and a human rights regime. It seems that people not only questioned the DTP’s performance in municipalities but also its competence to resolve the Kurdish question. The self-marginalizing language and policies of the DTP are likely to make it irrelevant for the solution of the problem.

The Kurdish people in the region seemed to be “unionist” not “separatist,” and as such are prepared to look for representation from other political parties. The AK Party, with its reform packages, EU perspective, social services spending record and its display of restraint over the northern Iraq issue coupled with its recognition of Kurdish identity, has emerged as a strong representative of Kurdish discontent. The Kurdish interest in the AK Party also demonstrates the willingness of the Kurdish people to be part of national politics, provided that the national actors do not exclude their needs, demands, and identities. The DTP can no longer pretend to be the sole representative of the Kurdish people. As a matter of fact, the AK Party, given its electoral support in the region, is better positioned to represent the Kurdish people. This is a new phenomenon that suggests the DTP should change its strategy accordingly.

Anyhow, with the ruling AK Party and DTP deputies in Parliament, the Kurdish interest will be highly represented in Turkish national politics. The legitimacy of Kurdish representation in Parliament is beyond doubt. The integration of Kurdish demands into national politics, and their recognition by the “political center,” will reduce the separatist tendencies among the Kurds as well as distrust among the Turks toward Kurdish intentions. This may turn into a golden opportunity for a peaceful resolution of the Kurdish question, as the confidence and trust of the Turks and the Kurds in each other and in themselves grow.

I think the DTP should understand the message; that the Kurdish people see themselves not imprisoned to a politics wholly based on identity. The DTP is expected to read the post-election situation in a constructive manner that will enable it to go beyond identity politics. But it may still choose to carry on with a radical/nationalist course of action alongside the PKK, which will finish it off as an independent political actor. This will be a self-denying strategy for a political party supposedly engaging in peaceful political competition.

The DTP may also choose to be a moderating force in Turkish politics, building bridges between the Kurdish people and others. To start this, they should denounce violence as an instrument for political objectives. This is the universal principle for a party to be recognized as a legitimate counterpart engaging in constructive dialogue. Unless the DTP denounces violence and makes itself independent of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) it will be destined for the political margins, even among the Kurds.

The DTP leaders should appreciate the political choice of the people of this country for an open society, greater democracy, proper civilian-military relations, and European Union membership. Their presence in Parliament should not make the attainment of these objectives more difficult by producing excuses for the nationalist security establishment to make a comeback in this new post-July 22 period. I bet they are looking forward to being provided with some excuses, via DTP policies and statements in the new Parliament, in order to move in and constrain the political space. Will the DTP act responsibly to protect the civilian-political space vis-à-vis the excesses of the nationalists and the militarists?

The CHP and the question of the left after the elections

The loser in this election was not the left but the CHP, which ran its campaign with security-centric and nationalist jargon under the influence of some marginal neo-Kemalists. Instead of proposing a positive program to resolve real problems of the masses, the CHP chose to realign itself with the state elite, from the president to the chief of General Staff, to prompt a nationalist instinct to “save the state.” This was neither the expectation of the masses nor the social democrats. Such a realignment that became all apparent during the presidential elections crisis reinforced the CHP’s image as a party of the state and the state elite, an image doomed to be voted against in a popular democracy.

After decades of defeats at the polls the CHP is still unable to understand the rules of the game in democracy -- a party representing interests, demands and priorities of the state elite will never win in competitive elections. The CHP leaders cannot adapt themselves to the requirements of competitive democracy even years after their domination of Turkish politics under a single-party government ceased.

My advice to the CHP is that if they really want to play this game, the only game in town, they should abandon elements of authoritarianism within the party leadership, ideology and discourse. With a Recep Peker kind of world view, reincarnated in the personality of Onur Oymen, the deputy leader of the party, they will end up siding with bureaucratic despotism, not for pluralistic democracy.

It was such personalities as Oymen who stated his complete agreement with every word of the military memorandum issued on April 27. It was him again after the election last week for whom the election results lacked any logic, which is well illustrative of his and the CHP’s respect for democracy and the will of the people. With this “logic” of theirs they will neither be able to turn the party into a social democrat one nor win a general election for another 50 years.

The historical misfortune of the left in this country is that the CHP happens to represent the leftist political stance. For a party that views itself as the representative of the state interest and state ideology vis-à-vis the masses whose loyalty is constantly suspect, it is impossible to be the carrier of social democracy. The party was designed to protect the state from the people, not vice versa. Furthermore the CHP took up a leftist stance without questioning Kemalism that developed as a state ideology during the single-party years, under the heavy influence of Italian fascism and Soviet Bolshevism in terms of its notions of the state, society and ideology.

Unless the social democrats in Turkey abandon the Kemalist legacy with its authoritarian political tendencies, there is no possibility of having a real social democrat party. Kemalism as a homogenizing authoritarian state ideology is not only compatible with democracy but also with social democracy. I wonder for how long we shall wait for the social democrats to understand this simple truth.

The CHP leadership and the Kemalist elite always talk of a threat to secularism. The official line of the Kemalist elite and the CHP threatens the masses who do not share their view, but in reality the masses regard Kemalist “secular fundamentalism” as threatening pluralistic democracy and the supremacy of the will of the nation. The result is the widening gap between the main blocks of Turkish society and the CHP.

The only option for the CHP is to start anew to build a social democrat party with a real agenda focusing on the problems and demands of the disadvantaged people in society and abandon their notion of an authoritarian radical secularism. Another useful starting point for the party to explain the election defeats is that there is nothing wrong with the people but with the party, its leadership, discourse and program.

This cannot be achieved easily. As everybody knows Baykal has expelled any potential opponent in the party. Thus it is in unlikely that attempts to renew the party and its world view will come from within. Social democrats who have distanced themselves from the CHP should now actively engage in transforming the party into a modern, outward-looking and peace-oriented democrat party. In this the support of the Socialist International will be crucial, too. The external pressure over the CHP as regards the principles of social democracy will be extremely effective in pushing the party to rethink its views and positions.

If this does not come through, it is time for real social democrats in Turkey to throw the CHP into the dust bin of history, get rid of the burden of Kemalism and opt for a new beginning with a brand new social democrat mass party. And let the CHP remain an anachronistic party of the Kemalist nationalists with their secular fundamentalism.

30.07.2007

The AK Party After Elections: Performance and Prospects

The election results shall be the basis on which political parties will evaluate their performance in the last five years and develop new strategies for the future after drawing necessary lessons.

The Justice and Development Party (AK Party), with a record 47 percent of the vote, won a rare second-term election victory. It emerged as the only truly national party in Turkey capable of representing almost every part of the country. The AK Party won this election because it was perceived by the masses to be the carrier of the idea of more democracy, greater liberties, respect for ethnic and religious identities and integration with the world -- especially with the EU -- as well as stability, development and social reformation.

The main challenge ahead for the AK Party is to maintain a broad coalition of the liberals, the democrats and the conservatives who united in this election under the AK Party ticket against the nationalist block posing to revive the old model of an authoritarian state and disciplinarian society after cutting Turkey off from global dynamics. The task of holding this broad coalition together, which is the key to governing Turkey for the AK Party, first of all, requires starting a new and comprehensive program for further political reforms and EU integration. In this context, rolling back radical nationalism is essential and urgent. Unless nationalism is brought under control, the new AK Party government cannot move ahead on the issues of political reforms and EU integration. They should understand the message that the people want the EU and what is necessary to achieve this objective. The AK Party leaders should keep it on their minds that despite a huge and orchestrated propaganda campaign against the EU, the support for the membership still holds at 54 percent.

Another challenge for the party is to reorganize the party administration and the government in line with the diversity of people who voted for it. The AK Party voters constitute a great heterogeneity. The party managed to appeal to people from almost all social classes, regions, ideologies and ethnic and religious groups. This diversity at the grassroots level should be reflected in the party administration and the government formation in a way to keep the interaction continuing between the top and the bottom of the party.

It seems that the AK Party will have another four or five years without a significant opposition posing as a capable “alternative.” An alternative to the AK Party can only come from the center-right, given the inability of the CHP to transform itself from a Kemalist into a social democrat party. But there is also no center-right party left except the AK Party after the self-destructive merger between the True Path Party (DYP) and the Motherland Party (ANAVATAN) before the elections and the defeat of the former on July 22. What is left is the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) in Parliament as the alternative to the AK Party from the right. But the MHP, with its peculiar history, image and set of ideas will never be able to reach out and embrace the center of society. Thus the MHP in Parliament as the only right-wing opposition to the AK Party will result in strengthening the AK Party’s centrist image and position in Turkish politics.

Understanding anti-Americanism in Turkey

Understanding anti-Americanism in Turkey

Anti-American sentiment among Turkish people seems to have made a world record in the last year with only 9 percent of the people viewing the US favorably. Growing anti-Americanism is a symptom of the mismanaging of Turkish-American relations, which have not been adapted to the changing post-Cold War situation. At the beginning of the new period, over the occupation of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein in 1990, a new rationale for an alliance was formulated by the efforts of Turgut Ozal. In time, however, allies Turkey and the US, first “providing comfort” to the Kurds in the north and then “posing to strike” against Saddam Hussein’s army, came to see that they do not necessarily share a common vision for the region. As a result, a mutual distrust developed, especially among the security sectors of both sides supposedly cooperating in safeguarding and supervising northern Iraq. Given membership in NATO and Turkey’s frontline position in the East-West rivalry, Turkish officers used to have a highly positive view of the US. During the Cold War years, the army cadets in Turkey were educated with a sense of alliance solidarity. The brightest of them were sent to US military schools and those serving in NATO posts were the most likely to get promoted. Yet for quite some time this sense of Cold War solidarity has gone. No longer do the militaries of both nations view each other as comrades in arms. In this, the Iraq question played a significant role. Turning the term “alliance” into mere rhetoric was the occupation of Iraq by American forces with the support of the Kurdish elements in 2003 as Turkey remained non-cooperative, not allowing passage of American troops. From then on the US was accused of plotting to establish an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq at the expense of Turkey’s national interests. Incidents like the one in Sulaimaniya, where several Turkish officers were held and interrogated by American troops, magnified the distrust of the US among Turks in general as well as the Turkish military. Novels were published while TV serials and movies were produced telling stories of American invasions of Turkey and vice versa. The public mood moved by a nationalist defensiveness was deeply penetrated by these cultural activities that normalized hostility, an inconceivable phenomenon of the past, between the two countries. Eventually, we ended up with a public opinion suggesting that 31 percent of the population believed in the possibility of a US invasion of Turkey. Anti-Western and anti-American sentiments have become more visible not only among people at large but in the Turkish military as well. In the context of Turkey’s bid to join the EU and the hard-to-swallow political reforms and fearful of losing their privileged position within the system, a Third-Worldist, anti-Western, anti-imperialistic and anti-globalization ideological currency with a fixation on full independence has gained ground in the military circles. Apart from this, anti-Americanism has ideological roots in Turkey. The Turkish left has a tradition of anti-American sentiment dating back to the 1960s. The new leftist movements of the late 1960s distinguished themselves with a strong anti-American and anti-NATO position. This was symbolized by an incident at the Middle East Technical University (METU) campus in 1969 when the car of the US ambassador was set on fire, a leftist legend. In the 1970s, when the CHP under the leadership of Bulent Ecevit had a brief period in government, Turkish-American relations were marked by a degree of tension, first over the issue of opium and then the Cyprus intervention. Ecevit always had some bitterness towards the US, certainly inspired by his ideological outlook. This leftist tradition, blended with a newly discovered nationalism, has been revived in recent years, particularly as part of the opposition to globalization, the war in Iraq and general American policy towards the Middle East. Islamism too breeds a high degree of anti-Americanism since such an ideological position is to a large extent constructed by its opposition to the west, including the US. In their anti-American stand, issues like the US policy towards Islam and Islamic countries after 9/11, intervention in Afghanistan and occupation of Iraq play a central role. The view that the fight against terrorism was deliberately directed against Islam finds supporters among many Muslims who are not Islamists at all. American support of Israel and perceived Jewish influence over the policies of the US are also important ingredients of Islamist discourse fueling and justifying their anti-American stand. The neo-Kemalists, suspicious of anything “foreign” and preoccupied with conspiracy theories against Turkey, think the US and the West, in general, are plotting to revive the Treaty of Sèvres. A Kurdish entity in northern Iraq under the protection of the US is seen as a prelude to dividing Turkey into ethnic pieces. The liberals with favorable views towards the US have also become disappointed with the American attitude after 9/11 that seemed to be ready to sacrifice liberties for security, encouraging and vindicating the anti-reform groups in Turkey. While struggling to overcome resistance to the EU-motivated reforms, the liberals are concerned that the US has emerged as a bad example justifying sacrifices in the fields of liberties, human rights, and democratization. The key to open a new period in Turkish-American relations requires addressing the northern Iraq and Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) issue on the part of the Americans and dealing with the provoked nationalism on the part of the Turkish government; each will ease the other.

02.07.2007

The CHP and MHP: A joint nationalist foreign policy front

The Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) used to be in violent opposition to one another, with each representing distinctly different social and ideological poles.

But today as part of the post-elections scenarios, a coalition of these two is being promoted, which is quite unlikely according to public opinion surveys in which the CHP seems to earn 20 percent of the vote while the MHP is just over 10 percent, in contrast to the 40 percent that supports the Justice and Development Party (AK Party).

Anyhow it is worth looking at the details of the positions, policies, and visions of these two that serve as the ground on which a projected coalition government is being contemplated.

The MHP election manifesto starts with an assertion that the Turkish state is on the verge of total collapse under the assault of globalization forces aligned with some domestic actors. This is an alarmist political stance shared and repeated many times by the president and the chief of General Staff. Advocating for an aggressive foreign policy, the MHP visualizes Turkey like an iron fist in regional and global politics. It is clear that the MHP is sick and tired of the EU as it calls for a break in negotiations. Along with the claim that Turkish national interests were surrendered to the EU, the MHP describes EU-Turkey relations with terms like bullying, imposition, and blackmailing.
On Iraq the MHP is of the view that there is an imminent threat to Turkey emanating from northern Iraq and thus conditions for “self-defense,” as allowed by the UN charter, have arisen. The MHP regards an intervention in northern Iraq as both necessary and legitimate and does not seem to have any respect for Iraq’s sovereignty or territorial integrity. Iraq, and particularly its north, are viewed as the backyard of Turkey. We know that these are views that are not alien to the views and wishes of the high-level state bureaucracy.

The CHP’s views on foreign policy as displayed in its election manifesto overlap in perspective and proposal with those of the MHP. The CHP supports EU membership in principle but criticizes the recent form of the relationship, which resulted in meeting the political Copenhagen criteria and the beginning of accession negotiations, characterized as “submission” to and political bullying by the EU. The CHP also declares its dissatisfaction with the negotiation framework document, the terms on which accession negotiations are conducted, terming it unacceptable. On the EU therefore, the CHP seems to be close to the MHP in its calls for a “break” in the negotiation process.

The government is criticized by the CHP for “not having the guts to intervene in northern Iraq.” It is strange that the main opposition party that claims power in upcoming elections resorts to such an approach rather than a rational, sensible and responsible one. In its election manifesto, the CHP declares its intention to invade a sovereign country if it comes to power in the government. I think this is a unique election promise by a so-called social democrat party, and that the Socialist International should take note of it. On the northern Iraq policy, the CHP follows the leader of the MHP who called on the military to be ready to intervene in northern Iraq after the elections since the MHP is coming to power.

On Cyprus, the CHP shocks many by arguing that the Annan plan was accepted in 2004 by the people of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (KKTC) because of pressure and bullying. It is worrisome that a free and democratic referendum is described as an occasion when people were forced to vote for approval. Moreover, a free and democratic presidential election in which people voted with 56 percent for the current pro-solution president, Mehmet Ali Talat, is portrayed as a plot to sacrifice Rauf Denktaş. All these alarm me about the commitment of the CHP to the idea, process, and institution of democracy. I am worried that CHP leader Deniz Baykal may declare the result of the upcoming elections unacceptable, simply because he will not be voted into the government.

From the CHP’s election manifesto it is sure that the party wants to keep Turkish-American relations at a critical suspension. Fanning nationalist sentiments, the CHP challenges the US on its Iraq policy and threatens it with “non-cooperation” in the future unless its Iraq policy is changed. It seems that under a CHP government Turkish-American relations would deteriorate further.

A general illiberal attitude toward “foreigners” is also discernible in the CHP’s manifesto. The CHP asserts that property sales to foreigners will be re-regulated so as not to threaten national security -- assuming that such a practice is a threat to national security. This reflects security centrism, protectionism and even an element of xenophobia.

A joint nationalist foreign policy stand of the CHP and the MHP illustrates that the main dividing line in Turkish politics is between those who advocate globalization, EU membership, open society and market economy and those who are skeptical of all these. Otherwise, how can we explain the applause of Ilhan Selcuk, a national socialist editor of the daily Cumhuriyet and a frequent visitor of the sitting President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, for the MHP?
28.06.2007

A clash of foreign policy perspectives

A clash of foreign policy perspectives

Political parties have declared their election manifestos. Though limited, foreign policy issues have also been touched upon. From the Iraq issue to EU-Turkey and US-Turkey relations, the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) have proposed a tougher stand, justified by claims the current Turkish foreign policy under the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government has been characterized by submission and subordination to the Western powers, namely the EU and the US. Both the CHP and the MHP share an old-fashion dictum in the realm of foreign policy: “an honorable foreign policy,” formulated by Mümtaz Soysal, once a CHP foreign minister in the late 1990s and now a leader of a national socialist political party of which no one knows the name (including me). But this loon seems to have left the CHP the inheritance of his strange foreign policy concept. Once this concept is translated into Turkish, it means non-cooperation as the basic principle of international relations, non-negotiation over Cyprus, no enthusiasm for EU membership and no cost-benefit analysis in the pursuit of foreign policy objectives. On the other hand, the AK Party seems to have built its performance in government so far on pro-globalization and a pro-EU stand, supported by a zero problem with neighbors' policy. It is anyhow good to see mainstream political parties with diverse foreign policy perspectives. In the past, almost all political parties had uniform views on foreign policy matters. An underlining reason was the realm of foreign policy being unquestionably left to the state bureaucracy. Formulation of basic policies in foreign affairs was too important to be left to political actors who, accepting such a limited role, were portrayed as incapable of understanding the state’s raison d’être. It took quite some time for some political leaders to understand that the realm of foreign policy as monopolized by the state elite is, in fact, the power reservoir of the authoritarian elements within the state. Thus many have recently realized that foreign policy does not only concern relations with “distant” countries but is also an integral part of economic and social perspectives and projects that various political and non-political actors wish to achieve domestically. It is crystal clear today that a “particular” vision of Turkey is constructed, maintained and legitimated through foreign policy. For many years an authoritarian political formation and its corollary, militaristic social/political culture, was constructed, sustained and socialized with a discourse of enmity towards the external world. Turkey was constantly described as the target of enemy forces in the country domestically, in the globe and the region, with no friend and ally and in a state of war against all, to be saved only by an uncompromising “national unity.” Such a picture of Turkey resulted in viewing social and political heterogeneity as a threat directed at the very survival of the nation and the state, thus paving the way for the prevalence of an authoritarian/militaristic culture throughout society. This was reversed after 1999. The pro-reform groups started to use the EU integration, with its cultural and historical legitimization, as leverage to change the state-society relationship and to restructure the state, weakening the authoritarian elements. The recent “project nationalism” aims to eliminate the EU leverage and preserve the power relationship in Turkey. Some retired army generals have recently been proposing a fundamental shift in Turkish foreign policy from West to East, establishing a new strategic alliance with Russia and China, a view that has sympathetic supporters in the CHP and the MHP. The main objective behind this proposal is to remove the “West” as an element encouraging a reconstruction of Turkish politics along democratic lines. The expectation is that once Turkey is distanced from the West, and the EU in particular, “defending the cultural and institutional bases of authoritarian power centers” within Turkey will be much easier. For this, they even contemplate going into a full-fledged war in Iraq, seen as an opportunity to break away from the West. Anyhow Turkey’s foreign policy direction has significant ramifications on the shape of domestic politics, the characteristics of the regime and the power struggle within. It is, therefore, better to see the clash of perspectives in Turkish foreign policy as an extension of domestic power struggle between the pro-reform groups and the pro-status quo nationalists, the result of which will shape the form of Turkish domestic politics and the direction of Turkish foreign policy, the process of which will be influenced by Turkey’s foreign partners too, among others.

25.06.2007

The new nationalist front

The new nationalist front

As the July 22 elections approach, many see an informal “alliance” between the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) transforming into formal cooperation involving a post-election coalition government if the composition of the new Parliament permits. This is also the wish of some non-political circles who have been upset with the market economy, democratization, the EU integration process, and globalization. These non-political actors expect that the new nationalist alliance of the CHP and the MHP will put all of these dynamics of change back under control. If these two political parties come to power, they would not disappoint those who bet on them. In its election manifesto, the MHP has called for a suspension of EU negotiations. The position of the CHP on the EU has been quite similar. Let’s recall that the CHP opposed the UN (Annan) plan for a settlement of the Cyprus problem, rejected the negotiation framework document and objected to removing Article 301 of the penal code. In fact, the main reason for their objection to the EU is more ideological. As the bearer of the Kemalist state ideology, the CHP knows that it is impossible to maintain a Kemalist state after the EU integration process. The CHP, as the vanguard of the Kemalists, will not stand for the cultural, political and social pluralities that are bound to emerge out of this process. On the other hand, the MHP, free of the Kemalist concerns, shares the fear that a plural and open society will end forever the possibility of any form of authoritarian political power. The leaders of the CHP and MHP with their advisors are in favor of a hawkish foreign policy. Deniz Baykal of the CHP regards the restrain, rationality and caution in Turkey’s policy towards northern Iraq as “talking like Barzani.” The other day during a political rally, Devlet Bahceli of the MHP called on the military to “be ready for an invasion of northern Iraq.” Not only adventurism but also irredentism too seem to be the characteristics of this new alliance. Within the CHP and the MHP we should also note the growing influence of “radical nationalist diplomats” who are the architects of the recent rapprochement. It is worth studying the phenomena that a Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, possessing a Western outlook since the early 19th century, has produced such anti-Western ideologues for the CHP and the MHP. The age of the “diplomats as ‘Westernizers’” it seems has long gone to be replaced by diplomats calling for an end to the EU integration process, the US-Turkey alliance and the EU-inspired democratization reforms. Out of fear of globalization and Turkey’s opening up to the world, the nationalists from the left and right have united in the name of “full independence.” As such, the proponents of this “holy alliance” are disturbed by the amount of foreign capital coming into Turkey. Apparently attracting foreign capital is not the success that we thought, but selling out Turkey to them. They do not value the accession negotiations with the EU, instead of viewing it as a bargaining process for the division of Turkey. The nationalists also think that missionary activities have gotten out of control and are threatening the social base of the Turkish community. Note that the issue was inflamed two years ago by Rahsan Ecevit, the wife of late Bulent Ecevit, honorary leader of the Democrat Left Party (DSP) that is now in electoral cooperation with the CHP. This “warning” was designed to alarm conservative Muslims and lead them to the nationalist alliance in the name of preserving the state.  The nationalists also claim that Turkish land is bought up piece by piece by foreigners -- in the West by the Westerners and in the Southeast by the Jews who did the same in Palestine to establish a future “greater Israel.” In sum, the social, ideological and institutional framework of such a “reactionary nationalist front” has long been operational. What they want now is to turn these networks mobilized by fear and a deep sense of insecurity into votes supporting the nationalist block. A new “nationalist front government” similar to the model Turkey experienced in the 1970s that led to the 1980 military coup will be a disaster for the Turkish economy, social peace, and relations with Turkey’s friends and allies abroad.

18.06.2007

Is the military in favor of EU accession?

19.04.2007

Officially speaking, yes; the military leadership has declared many times that Turkey’s EU membership was a strategic target for Turkey and as such they support accession. Yet, the mindset of the higher command as revealed through their public speeches throws significant doubt on the “official stance.” The latest example of this can be seen in what the chief of general staff said in a press conference last week.

To hold a “press conference” to express the military’s view on political issues is obviously not a democratic practice. So the military’s conduct of its public affairs does not help Turkey’s EU endeavor but underlines the fact that the form of civil-military relations in Turkey is not compatible with EU standards. Beyond this, the views expressed in press conferences or other speeches constitute more substantial obstacles for Turkey-EU relations. In the latest press conference, Gen. Büyükanıt talked about how Kemalism was not properly taught at universities, what qualities the president to be elected should have and who is behind Massoud Barzani. Not only domestic politics but also foreign policy issues were comfortably commented upon. The US, Turkey’s ally in NATO for more than 50 years, was behind Barzani’s claims over Diyarbakır and the EU was plotting against Turkish territorial integrity, according to Gen. Büyükanıt. A sense of insecurity and distrust with allies and friends in the West is also displayed by the frequently repeated discourse that throughout its entire republican history the Turkish state has never before encountered such a threat as the one it is facing today.

Under the influence of this mindset that views almost every actor in international relations as an adversary plotting against the very existence of the Turkish state, it is extremely hard to expect to understand the logic of cooperation that marks European integration. An exaggerated notion of threat obscures a proper understanding of the contemporary dynamics of international relations as well as Turkey’s bilateral and multilateral relations with the outside world.

Remember Gen. Büyükanıt’s speech at the War Academies in October 2006 in which a TESEV report on “security sector reform” and the European Commission’s Ankara representative were strongly criticized. Commenting on the TESEV report, Gen. Büyükanıt pointed to activities that aim to weaken the military “under the façade of the EU.” This discourse of “façade” is often used by state elites who are disturbed by the content, process, and outcome of either the EU process or democratization. President Sezer just the other day said that democracy was a façade manipulated by anti-regime forces.

In this attitude, we see frustration from the plurality of views and social forces brought about by the EU process and democratization. They are rightly and hopelessly aware of the fact that due to these two dynamics, social and political actors and processes have left the control of the state and state ideology, Kemalism. The Turkish military, the stronghold of Kemalism, is naturally aware that the EU process, coupled with the democratization of politics and the liberalization of the economy, is eroding Kemalism as a state ideology. How then can we expect the military to support this process which also stands poised to eliminate their power within the system wholeheartedly?

In his October speech responding to the comments of the Ankara representative of the European Commission on religious education, cultural rights and universities, Gen. Büyükanıt asks why the EU is disturbed by the social influence of the military in Turkey. Gen. Büyükanıt hints that he knows the answer by raising another question: “Is it because the military upsets the secret agenda of those who make these comments?” It seems clear that in his October speech Gen. Büyükanit accused the EU or at least the EU representative of having a “secret agenda” on Turkey.

Gen. Büyükanıt’s speech last week reveals at least one element of the EU’s “secret agenda,” which is “creating minorities in Turkey.” Believing that creating minorities is part of the EU acquis, Gen. Büyükanıt was certain: “This (adapting the EU acquis) will divide Turkey into pieces.” How can we expect the military to support a project and process (the EU) that is thought with certainty to divide the country? Regardless, whether the military is in favor of the EU or not is rather irrelevant since it is the political authority that makes the decisions and conducts the negotiations. The best we can ask from the military is what Diogenes wanted from Alexander the Great: “Stand out of my sunlight.”

A pro-Russian Turkish general?

31.05.2007

A retired general and former head of the National Security Council (MGK) Tuncer Kılınç, speaking at a meeting in London organized by the Kemalist Thought Association (ADD), declared that Turkey should leave NATO. He said, “to emancipate us from Western hegemony and colonization Turkey should put an end to its NATO membership.” The retired general also added that the US is not Turkey’s friend or strategic ally. His speech received huge applause from the ADD crowd at the meeting.

Such a call by a Turkish general who has served at the top post of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK), an armed force that has been deeply integrated into NATO structures for the last 50 years, maybe shocking to many. But it would be a mistake to assume that the military’s commitment to the Western alliance is as solid as it used to be.

Co-speaker at the conference in which Kılınç made this remark was another retired general, ADD President Şener Eruygur. We remember Gen. Eruygur from the allegations that he was planning a coup against the government in 2004 when he was the commander of the gendarmerie.

An increasing number of critical statements have been coming from the security establishment against the West.

This is certainly an important trend that is becoming increasingly visible. Given the fact that the ADD -- an NGO very popular among the retired army officers -- is now headed by a retired general, I wonder if Gen. Kılınç’s call for abandoning NATO reflects the view of a significant portion of the Turkish military. Does this call have anything to do with the claims of the Washington-based journalist Yasemin Çongar, who argued the other week that there are pro-Putin generals in the military? It is hard to believe this, but she points to the unusual practice of broadcasting the Russian President Vladimir Putin’s Munich speech challenging the US in global politics on the TSK Web site. Now Kılınç’s call to leave NATO confirms that there could be such a formation in the TSK. Let’s remember when Kılınc first put forward his thought that Turkey should seek an alternative alliance to the EU in the East, pointing to Russia, China, and Iran. It was in early 2002. If Kılınç, as an influential figure at the top of the National Security Council (MGK), was not just toying with an extreme idea, but also organizing a formation within the security establishment with the aim of reorienting Turkish foreign and security policy away from the West, by now they must have secured some important positions within the military. Is the April 27 military statement -- the “e-memorandum” -- a product of this group? We do not know. Regardless, a Eurasianist anti-NATO move within the security establishment would be alarming for at least one reason, in that it signals a possible division between the conventional pro-NATO elements and the Eurasianists with pro-Russian inclinations. I think it is time to reassert that Turkey’s Western orientation is vital to its defense, its economic development, and its modernization and democracy. An adventurist course of action would be deadly for Turkey. An alliance with Russia against the West will be more devastating than the alliance of the Unionists with Germany in 1914. I am afraid the hawks see a confrontation with the US over northern Iraq as an opportunity to break away from NATO and the West at large. I really wonder about the role of the Russians. Do the Russians want to sell weapons worth billions of dollars to replace the NATO equipment of the Turkish military? Well, a bankrupt Turkey, following an all-out confrontation with the West, could not afford to pay for the Russian military equipment. Instead of cash the Russians, in return, may settle for something else. Who knows?

31.05.2007

What does the security establishment really want?

The recent crisis over northern Iraq has highlighted an old practice in Turkey: the use of foreign policy issues by the security establishment to define Turkish politics, shape political culture and set limits for political actors.

Keeping the political and the social under control is not the only concern; the security establishment also uses foreign policy crises as an opportunity to “establish, consolidate and justify its hegemony” over the system.

This has been the case for decades. Even when we thought that foreign policy issues were being managed by the state institutions, we were, in fact, being subjected to a process of securitization that provoked our fears from the world and the region. The process, institutions, and language of securitization served as the basis of the military’s autonomy and even hegemony over the political system, and elevated militarism as a socially and politically acceptable state of affairs.

We cannot establish full democracy in this country unless we stop the manipulation of foreign policy and security issues by the security establishment. Whatever steps we take for broadening democratization, introducing human rights reforms and strengthening the rule of law will not produce the desired end if foreign these issues remain under the monopoly of the security establishment. Even if we throw the authoritarian elements out the front door they will manage to come in through the back door to dictate their will, world view, political preferences, and interests.

This relationship is being played out at the moment over the northern Iraq crisis. A well-calculated crisis is brought to Turkey’s agenda just before the July elections to increase the weight of the security establishment in Turkish politics, in the media, and over the masses.

While the government was called on to define the “political objective” of an operation/invasion in northern Iraq, I wonder about the political objectives of those who pressure the government to invade northern Iraq. What do they really want? Do they only want to fight against the PKK and the forces of Massoud Barzani, and do something against the US elements in the region? The fight against the PKK has been going on without success for the last 20 years. The Barzani tribe has been a political force in northern Iraq for the last 50 years. The formation of a Kurdish entity in northern Iraq under the protection of the US has been going on for the last 15 years. Nothing is new that warrants such a hasty operation/invasion in northern Iraq.

So, what do they really want?