The July election brought the Democratic Society Party (DTP) into Parliament with 22 seats. Yet the DTP’s performance in the election was considerably lower than expected. The results indicate that the DTP is far from representing the Kurdish people on its own. In 12 out of 15 provinces in the East where the DTP ran with independents, the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) came first. While the AK Party doubled and, in some cases, tripled its votes in these cities, the DTP-rooted independents lost votes in all but Hakkari and Şırnak in comparison to the 2002 elections. In the metropolitan city of Diyarbakır -- where the DTP holds municipalities -- the AK Party almost tripled its votes, reaching 41 percent, while the DTP led with 45 percent of the vote, which is 10 percent lower than its 2002 vote count.
For the AK Party, these results are not surprising, since it managed to receive such a high percentage of votes across Turkey. But for the DTP there are lessons to learn from these results, which point to the limits of identity politics based on Kurdish ethnicity. Like the rest of the country, the people in the region want services, development and a decent democracy and a human rights regime. It seems that people not only questioned the DTP’s performance in municipalities but also its competence to resolve the Kurdish question. The self-marginalizing language and policies of the DTP are likely to make it irrelevant for the solution of the problem.
The Kurdish people in the region seemed to be “unionist” not “separatist,” and as such are prepared to look for representation from other political parties. The AK Party, with its reform packages, EU perspective, social services spending record and its display of restraint over the northern Iraq issue coupled with its recognition of Kurdish identity, has emerged as a strong representative of Kurdish discontent. The Kurdish interest in the AK Party also demonstrates the willingness of the Kurdish people to be part of national politics, provided that the national actors do not exclude their needs, demands, and identities. The DTP can no longer pretend to be the sole representative of the Kurdish people. As a matter of fact, the AK Party, given its electoral support in the region, is better positioned to represent the Kurdish people. This is a new phenomenon that suggests the DTP should change its strategy accordingly.
Anyhow, with the ruling AK Party and DTP deputies in Parliament, the Kurdish interest will be highly represented in Turkish national politics. The legitimacy of Kurdish representation in Parliament is beyond doubt. The integration of Kurdish demands into national politics, and their recognition by the “political center,” will reduce the separatist tendencies among the Kurds as well as distrust among the Turks toward Kurdish intentions. This may turn into a golden opportunity for a peaceful resolution of the Kurdish question, as the confidence and trust of the Turks and the Kurds in each other and in themselves grow.
I think the DTP should understand the message; that the Kurdish people see themselves not imprisoned to a politics wholly based on identity. The DTP is expected to read the post-election situation in a constructive manner that will enable it to go beyond identity politics. But it may still choose to carry on with a radical/nationalist course of action alongside the PKK, which will finish it off as an independent political actor. This will be a self-denying strategy for a political party supposedly engaging in peaceful political competition.
The DTP may also choose to be a moderating force in Turkish politics, building bridges between the Kurdish people and others. To start this, they should denounce violence as an instrument for political objectives. This is the universal principle for a party to be recognized as a legitimate counterpart engaging in constructive dialogue. Unless the DTP denounces violence and makes itself independent of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) it will be destined for the political margins, even among the Kurds.
The DTP leaders should appreciate the political choice of the people of this country for an open society, greater democracy, proper civilian-military relations, and European Union membership. Their presence in Parliament should not make the attainment of these objectives more difficult by producing excuses for the nationalist security establishment to make a comeback in this new post-July 22 period. I bet they are looking forward to being provided with some excuses, via DTP policies and statements in the new Parliament, in order to move in and constrain the political space. Will the DTP act responsibly to protect the civilian-political space vis-à-vis the excesses of the nationalists and the militarists?
For the AK Party, these results are not surprising, since it managed to receive such a high percentage of votes across Turkey. But for the DTP there are lessons to learn from these results, which point to the limits of identity politics based on Kurdish ethnicity. Like the rest of the country, the people in the region want services, development and a decent democracy and a human rights regime. It seems that people not only questioned the DTP’s performance in municipalities but also its competence to resolve the Kurdish question. The self-marginalizing language and policies of the DTP are likely to make it irrelevant for the solution of the problem.
The Kurdish people in the region seemed to be “unionist” not “separatist,” and as such are prepared to look for representation from other political parties. The AK Party, with its reform packages, EU perspective, social services spending record and its display of restraint over the northern Iraq issue coupled with its recognition of Kurdish identity, has emerged as a strong representative of Kurdish discontent. The Kurdish interest in the AK Party also demonstrates the willingness of the Kurdish people to be part of national politics, provided that the national actors do not exclude their needs, demands, and identities. The DTP can no longer pretend to be the sole representative of the Kurdish people. As a matter of fact, the AK Party, given its electoral support in the region, is better positioned to represent the Kurdish people. This is a new phenomenon that suggests the DTP should change its strategy accordingly.
Anyhow, with the ruling AK Party and DTP deputies in Parliament, the Kurdish interest will be highly represented in Turkish national politics. The legitimacy of Kurdish representation in Parliament is beyond doubt. The integration of Kurdish demands into national politics, and their recognition by the “political center,” will reduce the separatist tendencies among the Kurds as well as distrust among the Turks toward Kurdish intentions. This may turn into a golden opportunity for a peaceful resolution of the Kurdish question, as the confidence and trust of the Turks and the Kurds in each other and in themselves grow.
I think the DTP should understand the message; that the Kurdish people see themselves not imprisoned to a politics wholly based on identity. The DTP is expected to read the post-election situation in a constructive manner that will enable it to go beyond identity politics. But it may still choose to carry on with a radical/nationalist course of action alongside the PKK, which will finish it off as an independent political actor. This will be a self-denying strategy for a political party supposedly engaging in peaceful political competition.
The DTP may also choose to be a moderating force in Turkish politics, building bridges between the Kurdish people and others. To start this, they should denounce violence as an instrument for political objectives. This is the universal principle for a party to be recognized as a legitimate counterpart engaging in constructive dialogue. Unless the DTP denounces violence and makes itself independent of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) it will be destined for the political margins, even among the Kurds.
The DTP leaders should appreciate the political choice of the people of this country for an open society, greater democracy, proper civilian-military relations, and European Union membership. Their presence in Parliament should not make the attainment of these objectives more difficult by producing excuses for the nationalist security establishment to make a comeback in this new post-July 22 period. I bet they are looking forward to being provided with some excuses, via DTP policies and statements in the new Parliament, in order to move in and constrain the political space. Will the DTP act responsibly to protect the civilian-political space vis-à-vis the excesses of the nationalists and the militarists?
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