A clash of foreign policy perspectives

A clash of foreign policy perspectives

Political parties have declared their election manifestos. Though limited, foreign policy issues have also been touched upon. From the Iraq issue to EU-Turkey and US-Turkey relations, the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) have proposed a tougher stand, justified by claims the current Turkish foreign policy under the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government has been characterized by submission and subordination to the Western powers, namely the EU and the US. Both the CHP and the MHP share an old-fashion dictum in the realm of foreign policy: “an honorable foreign policy,” formulated by Mümtaz Soysal, once a CHP foreign minister in the late 1990s and now a leader of a national socialist political party of which no one knows the name (including me). But this loon seems to have left the CHP the inheritance of his strange foreign policy concept. Once this concept is translated into Turkish, it means non-cooperation as the basic principle of international relations, non-negotiation over Cyprus, no enthusiasm for EU membership and no cost-benefit analysis in the pursuit of foreign policy objectives. On the other hand, the AK Party seems to have built its performance in government so far on pro-globalization and a pro-EU stand, supported by a zero problem with neighbors' policy. It is anyhow good to see mainstream political parties with diverse foreign policy perspectives. In the past, almost all political parties had uniform views on foreign policy matters. An underlining reason was the realm of foreign policy being unquestionably left to the state bureaucracy. Formulation of basic policies in foreign affairs was too important to be left to political actors who, accepting such a limited role, were portrayed as incapable of understanding the state’s raison d’être. It took quite some time for some political leaders to understand that the realm of foreign policy as monopolized by the state elite is, in fact, the power reservoir of the authoritarian elements within the state. Thus many have recently realized that foreign policy does not only concern relations with “distant” countries but is also an integral part of economic and social perspectives and projects that various political and non-political actors wish to achieve domestically. It is crystal clear today that a “particular” vision of Turkey is constructed, maintained and legitimated through foreign policy. For many years an authoritarian political formation and its corollary, militaristic social/political culture, was constructed, sustained and socialized with a discourse of enmity towards the external world. Turkey was constantly described as the target of enemy forces in the country domestically, in the globe and the region, with no friend and ally and in a state of war against all, to be saved only by an uncompromising “national unity.” Such a picture of Turkey resulted in viewing social and political heterogeneity as a threat directed at the very survival of the nation and the state, thus paving the way for the prevalence of an authoritarian/militaristic culture throughout society. This was reversed after 1999. The pro-reform groups started to use the EU integration, with its cultural and historical legitimization, as leverage to change the state-society relationship and to restructure the state, weakening the authoritarian elements. The recent “project nationalism” aims to eliminate the EU leverage and preserve the power relationship in Turkey. Some retired army generals have recently been proposing a fundamental shift in Turkish foreign policy from West to East, establishing a new strategic alliance with Russia and China, a view that has sympathetic supporters in the CHP and the MHP. The main objective behind this proposal is to remove the “West” as an element encouraging a reconstruction of Turkish politics along democratic lines. The expectation is that once Turkey is distanced from the West, and the EU in particular, “defending the cultural and institutional bases of authoritarian power centers” within Turkey will be much easier. For this, they even contemplate going into a full-fledged war in Iraq, seen as an opportunity to break away from the West. Anyhow Turkey’s foreign policy direction has significant ramifications on the shape of domestic politics, the characteristics of the regime and the power struggle within. It is, therefore, better to see the clash of perspectives in Turkish foreign policy as an extension of domestic power struggle between the pro-reform groups and the pro-status quo nationalists, the result of which will shape the form of Turkish domestic politics and the direction of Turkish foreign policy, the process of which will be influenced by Turkey’s foreign partners too, among others.

25.06.2007