The AK Party After Elections: Performance and Prospects

The election results shall be the basis on which political parties will evaluate their performance in the last five years and develop new strategies for the future after drawing necessary lessons.

The Justice and Development Party (AK Party), with a record 47 percent of the vote, won a rare second-term election victory. It emerged as the only truly national party in Turkey capable of representing almost every part of the country. The AK Party won this election because it was perceived by the masses to be the carrier of the idea of more democracy, greater liberties, respect for ethnic and religious identities and integration with the world -- especially with the EU -- as well as stability, development and social reformation.

The main challenge ahead for the AK Party is to maintain a broad coalition of the liberals, the democrats and the conservatives who united in this election under the AK Party ticket against the nationalist block posing to revive the old model of an authoritarian state and disciplinarian society after cutting Turkey off from global dynamics. The task of holding this broad coalition together, which is the key to governing Turkey for the AK Party, first of all, requires starting a new and comprehensive program for further political reforms and EU integration. In this context, rolling back radical nationalism is essential and urgent. Unless nationalism is brought under control, the new AK Party government cannot move ahead on the issues of political reforms and EU integration. They should understand the message that the people want the EU and what is necessary to achieve this objective. The AK Party leaders should keep it on their minds that despite a huge and orchestrated propaganda campaign against the EU, the support for the membership still holds at 54 percent.

Another challenge for the party is to reorganize the party administration and the government in line with the diversity of people who voted for it. The AK Party voters constitute a great heterogeneity. The party managed to appeal to people from almost all social classes, regions, ideologies and ethnic and religious groups. This diversity at the grassroots level should be reflected in the party administration and the government formation in a way to keep the interaction continuing between the top and the bottom of the party.

It seems that the AK Party will have another four or five years without a significant opposition posing as a capable “alternative.” An alternative to the AK Party can only come from the center-right, given the inability of the CHP to transform itself from a Kemalist into a social democrat party. But there is also no center-right party left except the AK Party after the self-destructive merger between the True Path Party (DYP) and the Motherland Party (ANAVATAN) before the elections and the defeat of the former on July 22. What is left is the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) in Parliament as the alternative to the AK Party from the right. But the MHP, with its peculiar history, image and set of ideas will never be able to reach out and embrace the center of society. Thus the MHP in Parliament as the only right-wing opposition to the AK Party will result in strengthening the AK Party’s centrist image and position in Turkish politics.

Understanding anti-Americanism in Turkey

Understanding anti-Americanism in Turkey

Anti-American sentiment among Turkish people seems to have made a world record in the last year with only 9 percent of the people viewing the US favorably. Growing anti-Americanism is a symptom of the mismanaging of Turkish-American relations, which have not been adapted to the changing post-Cold War situation. At the beginning of the new period, over the occupation of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein in 1990, a new rationale for an alliance was formulated by the efforts of Turgut Ozal. In time, however, allies Turkey and the US, first “providing comfort” to the Kurds in the north and then “posing to strike” against Saddam Hussein’s army, came to see that they do not necessarily share a common vision for the region. As a result, a mutual distrust developed, especially among the security sectors of both sides supposedly cooperating in safeguarding and supervising northern Iraq. Given membership in NATO and Turkey’s frontline position in the East-West rivalry, Turkish officers used to have a highly positive view of the US. During the Cold War years, the army cadets in Turkey were educated with a sense of alliance solidarity. The brightest of them were sent to US military schools and those serving in NATO posts were the most likely to get promoted. Yet for quite some time this sense of Cold War solidarity has gone. No longer do the militaries of both nations view each other as comrades in arms. In this, the Iraq question played a significant role. Turning the term “alliance” into mere rhetoric was the occupation of Iraq by American forces with the support of the Kurdish elements in 2003 as Turkey remained non-cooperative, not allowing passage of American troops. From then on the US was accused of plotting to establish an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq at the expense of Turkey’s national interests. Incidents like the one in Sulaimaniya, where several Turkish officers were held and interrogated by American troops, magnified the distrust of the US among Turks in general as well as the Turkish military. Novels were published while TV serials and movies were produced telling stories of American invasions of Turkey and vice versa. The public mood moved by a nationalist defensiveness was deeply penetrated by these cultural activities that normalized hostility, an inconceivable phenomenon of the past, between the two countries. Eventually, we ended up with a public opinion suggesting that 31 percent of the population believed in the possibility of a US invasion of Turkey. Anti-Western and anti-American sentiments have become more visible not only among people at large but in the Turkish military as well. In the context of Turkey’s bid to join the EU and the hard-to-swallow political reforms and fearful of losing their privileged position within the system, a Third-Worldist, anti-Western, anti-imperialistic and anti-globalization ideological currency with a fixation on full independence has gained ground in the military circles. Apart from this, anti-Americanism has ideological roots in Turkey. The Turkish left has a tradition of anti-American sentiment dating back to the 1960s. The new leftist movements of the late 1960s distinguished themselves with a strong anti-American and anti-NATO position. This was symbolized by an incident at the Middle East Technical University (METU) campus in 1969 when the car of the US ambassador was set on fire, a leftist legend. In the 1970s, when the CHP under the leadership of Bulent Ecevit had a brief period in government, Turkish-American relations were marked by a degree of tension, first over the issue of opium and then the Cyprus intervention. Ecevit always had some bitterness towards the US, certainly inspired by his ideological outlook. This leftist tradition, blended with a newly discovered nationalism, has been revived in recent years, particularly as part of the opposition to globalization, the war in Iraq and general American policy towards the Middle East. Islamism too breeds a high degree of anti-Americanism since such an ideological position is to a large extent constructed by its opposition to the west, including the US. In their anti-American stand, issues like the US policy towards Islam and Islamic countries after 9/11, intervention in Afghanistan and occupation of Iraq play a central role. The view that the fight against terrorism was deliberately directed against Islam finds supporters among many Muslims who are not Islamists at all. American support of Israel and perceived Jewish influence over the policies of the US are also important ingredients of Islamist discourse fueling and justifying their anti-American stand. The neo-Kemalists, suspicious of anything “foreign” and preoccupied with conspiracy theories against Turkey, think the US and the West, in general, are plotting to revive the Treaty of Sèvres. A Kurdish entity in northern Iraq under the protection of the US is seen as a prelude to dividing Turkey into ethnic pieces. The liberals with favorable views towards the US have also become disappointed with the American attitude after 9/11 that seemed to be ready to sacrifice liberties for security, encouraging and vindicating the anti-reform groups in Turkey. While struggling to overcome resistance to the EU-motivated reforms, the liberals are concerned that the US has emerged as a bad example justifying sacrifices in the fields of liberties, human rights, and democratization. The key to open a new period in Turkish-American relations requires addressing the northern Iraq and Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) issue on the part of the Americans and dealing with the provoked nationalism on the part of the Turkish government; each will ease the other.

02.07.2007

The CHP and MHP: A joint nationalist foreign policy front

The Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) used to be in violent opposition to one another, with each representing distinctly different social and ideological poles.

But today as part of the post-elections scenarios, a coalition of these two is being promoted, which is quite unlikely according to public opinion surveys in which the CHP seems to earn 20 percent of the vote while the MHP is just over 10 percent, in contrast to the 40 percent that supports the Justice and Development Party (AK Party).

Anyhow it is worth looking at the details of the positions, policies, and visions of these two that serve as the ground on which a projected coalition government is being contemplated.

The MHP election manifesto starts with an assertion that the Turkish state is on the verge of total collapse under the assault of globalization forces aligned with some domestic actors. This is an alarmist political stance shared and repeated many times by the president and the chief of General Staff. Advocating for an aggressive foreign policy, the MHP visualizes Turkey like an iron fist in regional and global politics. It is clear that the MHP is sick and tired of the EU as it calls for a break in negotiations. Along with the claim that Turkish national interests were surrendered to the EU, the MHP describes EU-Turkey relations with terms like bullying, imposition, and blackmailing.
On Iraq the MHP is of the view that there is an imminent threat to Turkey emanating from northern Iraq and thus conditions for “self-defense,” as allowed by the UN charter, have arisen. The MHP regards an intervention in northern Iraq as both necessary and legitimate and does not seem to have any respect for Iraq’s sovereignty or territorial integrity. Iraq, and particularly its north, are viewed as the backyard of Turkey. We know that these are views that are not alien to the views and wishes of the high-level state bureaucracy.

The CHP’s views on foreign policy as displayed in its election manifesto overlap in perspective and proposal with those of the MHP. The CHP supports EU membership in principle but criticizes the recent form of the relationship, which resulted in meeting the political Copenhagen criteria and the beginning of accession negotiations, characterized as “submission” to and political bullying by the EU. The CHP also declares its dissatisfaction with the negotiation framework document, the terms on which accession negotiations are conducted, terming it unacceptable. On the EU therefore, the CHP seems to be close to the MHP in its calls for a “break” in the negotiation process.

The government is criticized by the CHP for “not having the guts to intervene in northern Iraq.” It is strange that the main opposition party that claims power in upcoming elections resorts to such an approach rather than a rational, sensible and responsible one. In its election manifesto, the CHP declares its intention to invade a sovereign country if it comes to power in the government. I think this is a unique election promise by a so-called social democrat party, and that the Socialist International should take note of it. On the northern Iraq policy, the CHP follows the leader of the MHP who called on the military to be ready to intervene in northern Iraq after the elections since the MHP is coming to power.

On Cyprus, the CHP shocks many by arguing that the Annan plan was accepted in 2004 by the people of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (KKTC) because of pressure and bullying. It is worrisome that a free and democratic referendum is described as an occasion when people were forced to vote for approval. Moreover, a free and democratic presidential election in which people voted with 56 percent for the current pro-solution president, Mehmet Ali Talat, is portrayed as a plot to sacrifice Rauf Denktaş. All these alarm me about the commitment of the CHP to the idea, process, and institution of democracy. I am worried that CHP leader Deniz Baykal may declare the result of the upcoming elections unacceptable, simply because he will not be voted into the government.

From the CHP’s election manifesto it is sure that the party wants to keep Turkish-American relations at a critical suspension. Fanning nationalist sentiments, the CHP challenges the US on its Iraq policy and threatens it with “non-cooperation” in the future unless its Iraq policy is changed. It seems that under a CHP government Turkish-American relations would deteriorate further.

A general illiberal attitude toward “foreigners” is also discernible in the CHP’s manifesto. The CHP asserts that property sales to foreigners will be re-regulated so as not to threaten national security -- assuming that such a practice is a threat to national security. This reflects security centrism, protectionism and even an element of xenophobia.

A joint nationalist foreign policy stand of the CHP and the MHP illustrates that the main dividing line in Turkish politics is between those who advocate globalization, EU membership, open society and market economy and those who are skeptical of all these. Otherwise, how can we explain the applause of Ilhan Selcuk, a national socialist editor of the daily Cumhuriyet and a frequent visitor of the sitting President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, for the MHP?
28.06.2007

A clash of foreign policy perspectives

A clash of foreign policy perspectives

Political parties have declared their election manifestos. Though limited, foreign policy issues have also been touched upon. From the Iraq issue to EU-Turkey and US-Turkey relations, the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) have proposed a tougher stand, justified by claims the current Turkish foreign policy under the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government has been characterized by submission and subordination to the Western powers, namely the EU and the US. Both the CHP and the MHP share an old-fashion dictum in the realm of foreign policy: “an honorable foreign policy,” formulated by Mümtaz Soysal, once a CHP foreign minister in the late 1990s and now a leader of a national socialist political party of which no one knows the name (including me). But this loon seems to have left the CHP the inheritance of his strange foreign policy concept. Once this concept is translated into Turkish, it means non-cooperation as the basic principle of international relations, non-negotiation over Cyprus, no enthusiasm for EU membership and no cost-benefit analysis in the pursuit of foreign policy objectives. On the other hand, the AK Party seems to have built its performance in government so far on pro-globalization and a pro-EU stand, supported by a zero problem with neighbors' policy. It is anyhow good to see mainstream political parties with diverse foreign policy perspectives. In the past, almost all political parties had uniform views on foreign policy matters. An underlining reason was the realm of foreign policy being unquestionably left to the state bureaucracy. Formulation of basic policies in foreign affairs was too important to be left to political actors who, accepting such a limited role, were portrayed as incapable of understanding the state’s raison d’être. It took quite some time for some political leaders to understand that the realm of foreign policy as monopolized by the state elite is, in fact, the power reservoir of the authoritarian elements within the state. Thus many have recently realized that foreign policy does not only concern relations with “distant” countries but is also an integral part of economic and social perspectives and projects that various political and non-political actors wish to achieve domestically. It is crystal clear today that a “particular” vision of Turkey is constructed, maintained and legitimated through foreign policy. For many years an authoritarian political formation and its corollary, militaristic social/political culture, was constructed, sustained and socialized with a discourse of enmity towards the external world. Turkey was constantly described as the target of enemy forces in the country domestically, in the globe and the region, with no friend and ally and in a state of war against all, to be saved only by an uncompromising “national unity.” Such a picture of Turkey resulted in viewing social and political heterogeneity as a threat directed at the very survival of the nation and the state, thus paving the way for the prevalence of an authoritarian/militaristic culture throughout society. This was reversed after 1999. The pro-reform groups started to use the EU integration, with its cultural and historical legitimization, as leverage to change the state-society relationship and to restructure the state, weakening the authoritarian elements. The recent “project nationalism” aims to eliminate the EU leverage and preserve the power relationship in Turkey. Some retired army generals have recently been proposing a fundamental shift in Turkish foreign policy from West to East, establishing a new strategic alliance with Russia and China, a view that has sympathetic supporters in the CHP and the MHP. The main objective behind this proposal is to remove the “West” as an element encouraging a reconstruction of Turkish politics along democratic lines. The expectation is that once Turkey is distanced from the West, and the EU in particular, “defending the cultural and institutional bases of authoritarian power centers” within Turkey will be much easier. For this, they even contemplate going into a full-fledged war in Iraq, seen as an opportunity to break away from the West. Anyhow Turkey’s foreign policy direction has significant ramifications on the shape of domestic politics, the characteristics of the regime and the power struggle within. It is, therefore, better to see the clash of perspectives in Turkish foreign policy as an extension of domestic power struggle between the pro-reform groups and the pro-status quo nationalists, the result of which will shape the form of Turkish domestic politics and the direction of Turkish foreign policy, the process of which will be influenced by Turkey’s foreign partners too, among others.

25.06.2007

The new nationalist front

The new nationalist front

As the July 22 elections approach, many see an informal “alliance” between the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) transforming into formal cooperation involving a post-election coalition government if the composition of the new Parliament permits. This is also the wish of some non-political circles who have been upset with the market economy, democratization, the EU integration process, and globalization. These non-political actors expect that the new nationalist alliance of the CHP and the MHP will put all of these dynamics of change back under control. If these two political parties come to power, they would not disappoint those who bet on them. In its election manifesto, the MHP has called for a suspension of EU negotiations. The position of the CHP on the EU has been quite similar. Let’s recall that the CHP opposed the UN (Annan) plan for a settlement of the Cyprus problem, rejected the negotiation framework document and objected to removing Article 301 of the penal code. In fact, the main reason for their objection to the EU is more ideological. As the bearer of the Kemalist state ideology, the CHP knows that it is impossible to maintain a Kemalist state after the EU integration process. The CHP, as the vanguard of the Kemalists, will not stand for the cultural, political and social pluralities that are bound to emerge out of this process. On the other hand, the MHP, free of the Kemalist concerns, shares the fear that a plural and open society will end forever the possibility of any form of authoritarian political power. The leaders of the CHP and MHP with their advisors are in favor of a hawkish foreign policy. Deniz Baykal of the CHP regards the restrain, rationality and caution in Turkey’s policy towards northern Iraq as “talking like Barzani.” The other day during a political rally, Devlet Bahceli of the MHP called on the military to “be ready for an invasion of northern Iraq.” Not only adventurism but also irredentism too seem to be the characteristics of this new alliance. Within the CHP and the MHP we should also note the growing influence of “radical nationalist diplomats” who are the architects of the recent rapprochement. It is worth studying the phenomena that a Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, possessing a Western outlook since the early 19th century, has produced such anti-Western ideologues for the CHP and the MHP. The age of the “diplomats as ‘Westernizers’” it seems has long gone to be replaced by diplomats calling for an end to the EU integration process, the US-Turkey alliance and the EU-inspired democratization reforms. Out of fear of globalization and Turkey’s opening up to the world, the nationalists from the left and right have united in the name of “full independence.” As such, the proponents of this “holy alliance” are disturbed by the amount of foreign capital coming into Turkey. Apparently attracting foreign capital is not the success that we thought, but selling out Turkey to them. They do not value the accession negotiations with the EU, instead of viewing it as a bargaining process for the division of Turkey. The nationalists also think that missionary activities have gotten out of control and are threatening the social base of the Turkish community. Note that the issue was inflamed two years ago by Rahsan Ecevit, the wife of late Bulent Ecevit, honorary leader of the Democrat Left Party (DSP) that is now in electoral cooperation with the CHP. This “warning” was designed to alarm conservative Muslims and lead them to the nationalist alliance in the name of preserving the state.  The nationalists also claim that Turkish land is bought up piece by piece by foreigners -- in the West by the Westerners and in the Southeast by the Jews who did the same in Palestine to establish a future “greater Israel.” In sum, the social, ideological and institutional framework of such a “reactionary nationalist front” has long been operational. What they want now is to turn these networks mobilized by fear and a deep sense of insecurity into votes supporting the nationalist block. A new “nationalist front government” similar to the model Turkey experienced in the 1970s that led to the 1980 military coup will be a disaster for the Turkish economy, social peace, and relations with Turkey’s friends and allies abroad.

18.06.2007

Is the military in favor of EU accession?

19.04.2007

Officially speaking, yes; the military leadership has declared many times that Turkey’s EU membership was a strategic target for Turkey and as such they support accession. Yet, the mindset of the higher command as revealed through their public speeches throws significant doubt on the “official stance.” The latest example of this can be seen in what the chief of general staff said in a press conference last week.

To hold a “press conference” to express the military’s view on political issues is obviously not a democratic practice. So the military’s conduct of its public affairs does not help Turkey’s EU endeavor but underlines the fact that the form of civil-military relations in Turkey is not compatible with EU standards. Beyond this, the views expressed in press conferences or other speeches constitute more substantial obstacles for Turkey-EU relations. In the latest press conference, Gen. Büyükanıt talked about how Kemalism was not properly taught at universities, what qualities the president to be elected should have and who is behind Massoud Barzani. Not only domestic politics but also foreign policy issues were comfortably commented upon. The US, Turkey’s ally in NATO for more than 50 years, was behind Barzani’s claims over Diyarbakır and the EU was plotting against Turkish territorial integrity, according to Gen. Büyükanıt. A sense of insecurity and distrust with allies and friends in the West is also displayed by the frequently repeated discourse that throughout its entire republican history the Turkish state has never before encountered such a threat as the one it is facing today.

Under the influence of this mindset that views almost every actor in international relations as an adversary plotting against the very existence of the Turkish state, it is extremely hard to expect to understand the logic of cooperation that marks European integration. An exaggerated notion of threat obscures a proper understanding of the contemporary dynamics of international relations as well as Turkey’s bilateral and multilateral relations with the outside world.

Remember Gen. Büyükanıt’s speech at the War Academies in October 2006 in which a TESEV report on “security sector reform” and the European Commission’s Ankara representative were strongly criticized. Commenting on the TESEV report, Gen. Büyükanıt pointed to activities that aim to weaken the military “under the façade of the EU.” This discourse of “façade” is often used by state elites who are disturbed by the content, process, and outcome of either the EU process or democratization. President Sezer just the other day said that democracy was a façade manipulated by anti-regime forces.

In this attitude, we see frustration from the plurality of views and social forces brought about by the EU process and democratization. They are rightly and hopelessly aware of the fact that due to these two dynamics, social and political actors and processes have left the control of the state and state ideology, Kemalism. The Turkish military, the stronghold of Kemalism, is naturally aware that the EU process, coupled with the democratization of politics and the liberalization of the economy, is eroding Kemalism as a state ideology. How then can we expect the military to support this process which also stands poised to eliminate their power within the system wholeheartedly?

In his October speech responding to the comments of the Ankara representative of the European Commission on religious education, cultural rights and universities, Gen. Büyükanıt asks why the EU is disturbed by the social influence of the military in Turkey. Gen. Büyükanıt hints that he knows the answer by raising another question: “Is it because the military upsets the secret agenda of those who make these comments?” It seems clear that in his October speech Gen. Büyükanit accused the EU or at least the EU representative of having a “secret agenda” on Turkey.

Gen. Büyükanıt’s speech last week reveals at least one element of the EU’s “secret agenda,” which is “creating minorities in Turkey.” Believing that creating minorities is part of the EU acquis, Gen. Büyükanıt was certain: “This (adapting the EU acquis) will divide Turkey into pieces.” How can we expect the military to support a project and process (the EU) that is thought with certainty to divide the country? Regardless, whether the military is in favor of the EU or not is rather irrelevant since it is the political authority that makes the decisions and conducts the negotiations. The best we can ask from the military is what Diogenes wanted from Alexander the Great: “Stand out of my sunlight.”

A pro-Russian Turkish general?

31.05.2007

A retired general and former head of the National Security Council (MGK) Tuncer Kılınç, speaking at a meeting in London organized by the Kemalist Thought Association (ADD), declared that Turkey should leave NATO. He said, “to emancipate us from Western hegemony and colonization Turkey should put an end to its NATO membership.” The retired general also added that the US is not Turkey’s friend or strategic ally. His speech received huge applause from the ADD crowd at the meeting.

Such a call by a Turkish general who has served at the top post of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK), an armed force that has been deeply integrated into NATO structures for the last 50 years, maybe shocking to many. But it would be a mistake to assume that the military’s commitment to the Western alliance is as solid as it used to be.

Co-speaker at the conference in which Kılınç made this remark was another retired general, ADD President Şener Eruygur. We remember Gen. Eruygur from the allegations that he was planning a coup against the government in 2004 when he was the commander of the gendarmerie.

An increasing number of critical statements have been coming from the security establishment against the West.

This is certainly an important trend that is becoming increasingly visible. Given the fact that the ADD -- an NGO very popular among the retired army officers -- is now headed by a retired general, I wonder if Gen. Kılınç’s call for abandoning NATO reflects the view of a significant portion of the Turkish military. Does this call have anything to do with the claims of the Washington-based journalist Yasemin Çongar, who argued the other week that there are pro-Putin generals in the military? It is hard to believe this, but she points to the unusual practice of broadcasting the Russian President Vladimir Putin’s Munich speech challenging the US in global politics on the TSK Web site. Now Kılınç’s call to leave NATO confirms that there could be such a formation in the TSK. Let’s remember when Kılınc first put forward his thought that Turkey should seek an alternative alliance to the EU in the East, pointing to Russia, China, and Iran. It was in early 2002. If Kılınç, as an influential figure at the top of the National Security Council (MGK), was not just toying with an extreme idea, but also organizing a formation within the security establishment with the aim of reorienting Turkish foreign and security policy away from the West, by now they must have secured some important positions within the military. Is the April 27 military statement -- the “e-memorandum” -- a product of this group? We do not know. Regardless, a Eurasianist anti-NATO move within the security establishment would be alarming for at least one reason, in that it signals a possible division between the conventional pro-NATO elements and the Eurasianists with pro-Russian inclinations. I think it is time to reassert that Turkey’s Western orientation is vital to its defense, its economic development, and its modernization and democracy. An adventurist course of action would be deadly for Turkey. An alliance with Russia against the West will be more devastating than the alliance of the Unionists with Germany in 1914. I am afraid the hawks see a confrontation with the US over northern Iraq as an opportunity to break away from NATO and the West at large. I really wonder about the role of the Russians. Do the Russians want to sell weapons worth billions of dollars to replace the NATO equipment of the Turkish military? Well, a bankrupt Turkey, following an all-out confrontation with the West, could not afford to pay for the Russian military equipment. Instead of cash the Russians, in return, may settle for something else. Who knows?

31.05.2007