People power in the Middle East and the West

Calls for change have been shaking the Arab Middle East from Tunisia to Egypt and Yemen. Are people becoming “agents of change” in this part of the world? Is what we see an emergence of people power in the Middle East?

In the meantime, however, the people of these countries should not be deprived of international support for democratization. For a change, the West should not side with dictators in the Middle East but with the people.

For decades now the West has been trapped by analysts who advocated supporting despotic regimes in the Middle East to stop the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, even if this meant oppression, violence, and poverty. This was, in fact, not the correct strategy. The ensuing accusations of Western double standards were then not unwarranted. It was obvious that after the end of the Cold War the Middle East was exempt from the wave of democratization.

The Algerian case is exemplary in this context. A democratic electoral process was stopped by the military in 1991 when it became clear that the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was to form a majority in parliament. Implicit and explicit support of the West for the military intervention that resulted in chaos and the death of tens of thousands of people in Algeria is still well remembered.

Such an attitude adopted by the West constituted one of the grounds for the widespread anti-Western sentiment. While democracy was applauded in every part of the world, it has been denied to the people of the Middle East. This fueled anger towards Western governments that supported suppressive regimes in the Middle East. The excuse for this unprincipled support was to stop the rise of radical political Islam.

Have Western policymakers and analysts not yet understood that suppressive and corrupt governments in the Middle East use the “threat of Islamism” as a convenient tool to secure the support of the West? With the “threat of Islamists” having become a fruitful “strategic asset” in the hands of repressive governments, it became impossible to expect from these governments that they would finish off the “threat.” The paradox for the West is evident. Oppressive and corrupt regimes in the Middle East used the “Islamist threat.” Thus, even if there was no such threat, they created one or kept such existing “threats” in order to “sell” themselves to the West.

In the wake of uprisings in the Middle East, Western governments and media should do away with this vicious circle. It is time to realize that suppression through authoritarian governments is not the way to deal with Islamic radicalism.

Second, important rethinking relates to the process and outcomes of democratization. It is not a process that merely benefits radical Islamists. The process also does not necessarily bring radical Islamists to power. It is fundamentally misleading to equate democratization with Islamization in the Middle East. What people want is a representative and accountable government. A democratic mechanism may bring the Islamists to power, but it also has the built-in mechanisms to oust them from power. It is Orientalist reductionism to assume that Muslims will blindly vote for an Islamist party, disregarding their program and performance once in power. The inclusion of Islamists in the political process is absolutely necessary to establish representative and accountable governments in the Middle East.

I think the people of Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and others in the Middle East are capable of electing their representatives and holding them responsible for what they do and what they do not do while in government.

Whenever we talk of Middle Eastern politics, one concept is key: legitimacy or, to be more precise, the lack of legitimacy of the regimes in the Middle East. Some buy it through a rentier economy, some cover it up through ideological or nationalist sentiment and some silence the masses with oppressive apparatuses and measures. But I think it is becoming ever more difficult to sustain such regimes. Legitimacy generated through democratic participation is an absolute must.

Discontent can no longer be contained. There is a moment when the cost of oppression outweighs the cost of tolerating democratic change. The Middle East is at such a crossroads. And the international community should decide with the people of the region on what they prefer. Will they stand for the durable stability of democracies or the fragile and shaky stability of dictators?

Turkey’s ‘number one’ enemy?

Once Turks thought that Turkey was located in a very hostile environment and was surrounded by enemy nations. Now things seem different; they think that the threat to their country comes mainly from afar, the United States.

A recent public opinion survey conducted by MetroPOLL on the threat perception of the people of Turkey rings alarm bells. As a person who was part of the research team, I was shocked when I learned the answer to a question we asked about “the greatest threat to Turkey.” People point to two countries, the US and Israel, both of which are supposed to be Turkey’s allies and neither of which Turkey has ever been involved in a hot conflict. According to the poll, 43 percent of people feel threatened by the US and 24 percent by Israel, while only 3 percent regard Iran as a threat and 2 percent Greece.

It is good to see threat perception is down so much for regional countries, some of which are considered Turkey’s historical enemies, but bad that the perceived threat of the US and Israel is so high. To conduct a strategic relationship with such public opinion is not possible in the long run, especially in a democratic country.

I keep repeating in this column that democratization at home is having serious foreign policy implications. In a globalized world, as it is today, people are better informed about developments abroad and the effects on their lives. In an open society and with the means of communication these issues are widely debated. Thus people are increasingly empowered by democratization and globalization to influence decision-making bodies. In a democratic government, no one can remain indifferent to what people perceive and believe.

Without winning the hearts and minds of the people, a lofty discourse of friendship and alliance cannot be sustained. Therefore, people’s threat perceptions should be addressed. This cannot be done only by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party), though it should really strive to tell the people what they believe in when they talk of alliance and cooperation with the US in particular. In fact, there is no significant difference of opinion among the voters for the AK Party and the rest as revealed by the MetroPOLL research. As always, foreign policy issues cut across domestic political fragmentation.

While Turkey preaches peace, stability, cooperation, interdependence, and mediation abroad, it is unacceptable to plague ourselves with an unreasonable, unfounded threat perception that would restrain Turkish foreign policy.

To point to the underlying reasons for the perceived threat from the US The Wall Street Journal used the news about the research with a subtitle, “Ask Uncle Sam.” It is indeed true that this perception has a lot to do with US foreign policy. The occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan, the Armenian issue regularly surfacing in the US congress, pressures over the Iran issue and the unconditional support extended to Israel are the main policy issues that raise eyebrows about the US. One should also add the perceived support of the US for the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) or lack of support to fight against it, which is taken as a proof of the support anyway.

This is what the new US ambassador, Francis J. Ricciardone, to Ankara is going to find in Turkey: a very skeptical public. As the Obama factor could not be a remedy for the deteriorating image of the US in Turkey, he should pray that no shocking document comes out of WikiLeaks while he is serving in Ankara.

The number two threat to Turkey as perceived by the people is Israel, according to the MetroPOLL survey. Given the recent tension between the two countries, this may not be surprising. But if there are going to be future Turkish-Israeli relations, such a perception is poisonous. Yet Israel cannot expect better if it continues its policy of using violence to settle the problems that it encounters in the region. I am not only talking about the flotilla aggression but also refer to its dealings with the Palestinians both in Gaza and the West Bank as well as Lebanon, Syria, and Iran. The Israelis should understand that the future of Turkish-Israeli relations depends on the relationships it develops in the region. No Turkish government can develop normal cooperative relations with Israel while a huge majority of people in Turkey are deeply annoyed by Israel’s aggressive regional policy.

It may really take time to repair the damaged image of Israel among the people. Israel should care what “people think.” It would be wrong if Israelis think it is all about the “Islamist AK Party” government, and that when it is gone everything will be normal. Not really: When we look at it in detail, it is clear it is not only the AK Party. For instance on the question whether Turkey should freeze its relations with Israel or develop them, 71 percent of Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) voters, 73 percent of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) voters, 60 percent of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) voters and 63 percent of the AK Party voters say they should be “frozen.”

In short, what people think and perceive matters, especially in a developing democracy like Turkey.

Will the new strategy of opposition work?

The most important event in Turkish politics last year was the Republican People’s Party’s (CHP) change in leadership. It is a culmination of past events that indicates a fundamental change in their strategy to oppose the ruling party. With the leadership change, the opponents of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) decided to try a new strategy to bring down the ruling party, using democratic means with populist policies.

Their adoption of this new strategy came out of a process where undemocratic alternatives failed to bring about desired objectives. In the absence of strong political opposition to the ruling party, some had looked to the military and the judiciary as the center of the anti-AK Party block. These two institutions played just such a role, which they legitimized as protecting secularism.

For its part, the military tried to influence the presidential elections by issuing an e-memorandum against the ruling party in April 2007 in an attempt to prevent the AK Party majority in Parliament electing a new president. But it backfired. The military’s intervention created waves among the people, resulting in a landslide electoral victory for the AK Party, followed by the election of Abdullah Gül as president.

Discouraged by the military’s apparent ineffectiveness, the opposition looked to the judiciary to block the AK Party’s way. The filing of a closure case against the AK Party by the chief prosecutor in March 2008 was therefore welcomed. The court’s earlier decisions on party closures and the AK Party’s legislative activities encouraged the opposition groups who wished to see the end of the AK Party at the hands of the court.

The Constitutional Court had emerged as an institution capable of blocking the legislative activities of the AK Party government but it could not make the decision to close down such a popular party. Thus the non-closure verdict highlighted the limits of the Constitutional Court to be a focal point of opposition against the AK Party.

Invitations of these non-political forces into the political arena, however, did not bring the expected results, so what was left was to pursue opposition to the AK Party by political means. Having lost all hope that the AK Party could be toppled by the court or by pressure from the military, the CHP was forced to develop more creative policies against the AK Party within the political sphere. There was increased pressure on the CHP to transform itself into a viable political alternative to the ruling party. The party’s performance under Deniz Baykal was tested for the last time during the March 2009 elections. It was a failure again as the CHP finished far behind the AK Party in votes. It was proven once more that the CHP under Baykal’s leadership was unable to present a viable alternative to the AK Party.

It was not just about leadership. They revised the themes and discourse that they used to mobilize themselves against the ruling party. Focusing on secularism had proven fruitless. Because relying on that single issue was ineffective in bringing down the AK Party government, the opponents decided to challenge the AK Party on more concrete social and economic issues.

What they do is good for Turkey’s democracy because an alternative to the AK Party should be sought through democratic means and among political actors. The new strategy with its leadership and discourse-policy components developed in 2010 will be tested in 2011 with the June elections.

We will see if the new leadership and new political discourse will bring down the AK Party government. If the AK Party’s opponents fail again will they go back to their old strategy? Well, it is difficult; undemocratic means of opposition are hard to revive. The only exit is going forward through democracy.

Government’s embarrassing silence

Last Friday a statement made by the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) on the Kurdish language debate went almost unnoticed. This silence may have something to do with the decreasing weight of the military on political issues. No one may have cared what the generals were thinking and saying about the Kurdish question.

Whatever the reason, that silence was not good for the consolidation of democracy in this country. The military should have been reminded forcefully that it was none of their business to make a remark on the Kurdish language. But all political actors, with the exception of the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), remained silent. Neither the prime minister nor any other political figure in the government went public, opposing the position of the military revealed through a statement placed on the TSK’s website.

On the contrary, politicians, including the parliament speaker, heavily criticized the BDP for bringing up the issue of bilingual social space in southeast Turkey. The latter even called on public prosecutors to make a case on the BDP’s stance on bilingual social space, which is a disgrace to the democratic credentials of the parliament speaker.

The ruling party did not pass the test on this case at the detriment of its own legitimacy and democratic credentials. Is it the military that decides how to address the Kurdish question? If they are in charge of defining the problem and drawing a line for resolving the question, what then is the role of the government and Parliament?

The government should see clearly that such statements from the military are attempts to hijack the role of the government. It then becomes impossible to erode the image that the government is soft, unreliable and ready to sell the country out, and thus it is the military that the people must turn to and rely on.

It is really hard to swallow a statement by the military in which it asserts that the debate on bilingualism, the usage of Turkish and Kurdish in southeast Turkey “goes against the founding philosophy of the Turkish Republic.” What does the military know about the “founding principles”? And how were they informed about their content? And, above all, what does it have to do with the military’s profession, which is to defend the country against external aggression?

Consider the mindset of the Turkish military revealed with this latest statement. It is as if they are not men in uniform trained in combat, but wise experts on history, language, and political science. They proclaim: “Language, culture, and ideals of unity are the indispensable aspects of being a nation. The result of a lack of linguistic unity has been portrayed by many painful examples in history.” Really? I think they seem to know about everything but their own profession because they pay the least attention to it.

This is not all. “The TSK has and always will continue to stand for and side with the protection of … the nation-state, the unitary state, and the secular state,” the statement claimed.

No democratic government can swallow a military that positions itself to tell political actors the “true way of conducting politics.” This cannot be the business of the military. One likes or dislikes the argument for the bilingual use of Turkish and Kurdish. Politicians and the public should debate it. But if politicians treat the military as the final “arbiter” in this debate, then we cannot claim to have achieved democracy and the end of military tutelage.

A government that remains silent on an intrusion meant to limit political debates behind a façade of the “founding principles of the republic” cannot oppose further intrusions conducted in the name of secularism or any other pretext. Once the military is allowed to draw the boundaries of the political debate, as we know very well in this country, there will be no limit to their political ambitions.

Human rights as a prerequisite for peace and security

Last week Human Rights Day was celebrated around the world as well as in Turkey. Over the years slow but positive developments have continued on the codification of human rights in international law. It is certainly an impressive progress that we are talking about.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 was merely a declaration without any legal power, stating the goodwill and moral commitment of the world’s nations. But now the international community has a series of conventions and protocols that legally bind the signatory countries concerning human rights. The establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) is the most striking accomplishment of this process.

Human rights are generally based on moral values and philosophical preferences. As such they tend to be understood as abstract intellectual endeavors. Yet it is undeniable that respect for human rights has a more day-to-day outcome that includes security at the individual and national as well as global level. First, demands for human rights in its essence reflect the search for the physical and moral integrity of individuals. The idea of the inviolability of basic rights and freedoms aims at “securing” the individual as an independent and moral agent. Second, a working human rights regime constitutes one of the prerequisites for providing national security, that is, domestic peace based on a wide-ranging social consensus concerning the legitimacy of a political regime. Thus the maintenance of national security depends on the realization of individual security built on the respect for human rights. Third, individual and national security built through a human rights regime domestically is an indispensable part of global security. As such human rights are not only grounded on moral or philosophical arguments but also on a practical and pragmatic base.

The old notion of security was based on a concept giving priority to the protection of the state against external threats. Security was defined through penetration by outsiders. Now, crises that do not involve warfare and do not come from outside yet threaten the very wellbeing of nations are catching the attention of both policymakers and the public at large.

The revival of nationalism and micro-nationalism in the post-Cold War era has reinforced the need for international protection of human, and particularly minority, rights. What the rise of ethnic clashes has also shown was the interaction and interdependencies between domestic peace and regional/international security: Both secessionism and suppression of ethnic identities proved to be insecurity-generating policies for the international system.

Post Cold War developments have shown that human rights should be conceived as a necessity for strengthening national and international security and thus they are an asset, not a liability. As a result, the place of human rights in international politics has also been legitimized by an increasing understanding that the international protection and promotion of human rights contributes to national and international peace. Thus the debate now seems to be set in a way that human rights and national/international security are complementary concerns and objectives. One does not necessarily exclude the other; instead, both can be secured at the same time.

There is wide agreement today that human rights have become a global issue within which there has emerged a multiplicity of linkages and interconnections that involve but also transcend nation-states. As a result, violations of human rights in one country may create unprecedented consequences for other countries, peoples, and individuals. While territorial boundaries are becoming more penetrable, transnational implications of human rights violations turn out to be unavoidable. This adds to the source of tension among states. The most striking case that illustrates how human rights violations have transnational impacts and how they create security threats for other states is the massive flow of refugees. The cases of Bosnia, Rwanda, Haiti, Iraq and recently Kosovo clearly illustrate that violations of human rights cannot be contained within national boundaries and that they have transnational implications which in the end provoke and necessitate regional or international interventions, further complicating a basically domestic problem.

While the respect for human rights enhances national security, states that are involved in systematic violations of human rights endanger not only national but also international peace and security.

This leads to an understanding that the search for global peace and security starts with improving human rights conditions at a domestic level since there exists a clear-cut linkage between national and international security. Human rights considerations thus give birth to a notion of global security. The link between individual, national and global security justifies concern about the fate of individuals everywhere as part of a search for global security.

Fifty years after the Universal Declaration it has become even clearer that peace requires respect for human rights at national and global levels.

NATO’s common enemy or common values?

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has been suffering from the absence of a common enemy to justify and cement the alliance. In response, the presence and coherence of the organization is tried to be justified by references to “common values,” as reflected in its revised “strategic concepts.”

The Lisbon summit approved the third such “concept” since 1991, searching for a rationale for the alliance in the absence of a common enemy. NATO is attempting to go beyond a “defense organization” and to evolve into a political entity. In an era with no “common enemy,” NATO has embraced “common values” that were spelled out long ago in the Washington Treaty. Since its foundation, NATO has always claimed to defend the common values of its member states as well as their territories. The confrontation with the Warsaw Pact countries during the Cold War was often justified by reference to defending the “free world” and liberties cherished by it. However, defending liberties and promoting values and institutions of the “free world” was taken up as an essential mission of NATO in the post-Cold War era. The question is, to what extent has NATO succeeded in living up to its claim?

In the aftermath of the Cold War and the demise of a Soviet threat, NATO moved to be a “community of values” more concerned about threats to its core values. The “maintenance of democratic order” was often cited as a rationale for NATO’s assertiveness in the definition of non-Article 5 tasks. It appeared that NATO was moving from a collective defense organization to a Euro-Atlantic politico-military power. Thus it was perceived that repression, economic failure, and human rights abuses leading to massive flows of refugees and environmental degradation could, though indirectly, affect the security and stability of NATO members. In the post-Cold War era, the “new NATO” claimed to have become an institution that intervenes to protect certain principles and values, a power for peacemaking and post-conflict peacekeeping, and a model for developing democratic national security structures. In response to the post-Cold War politico-security environment, the 1991 strategic concept developed a “broader” concept of security threats for NATO that includes instabilities and insecurities prompted by human rights violations. It was then declared that “security and stability do not lie solely in the military dimension” and NATO’s leaders decided to enhance the “political component” of the alliance.

After eight years of experimentation with the 1991 document, the 1999 Strategic Concept observed that “the last 10 years have seen … the appearance of complex new risks to Euro-Atlantic peace and stability, including oppression, ethnic conflict, economic distress, [and] the collapse of political order.” Here the alliance declared that issues of “software security” threaten peace and stability in the NATO area. Among the “purpose and tasks of the alliance,” the 1999 strategic concept committed NATO to “contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations.” Here NATO clearly defined a role that went beyond its conventional task definition that required a constant interest in the state of politics in peripheral states. The strategic concept also talked of “fostering democracy” as a means of reaching the objective of peace and stability. Among the possibilities, the document mentions are uncertainty and instability generated by “ethnic and religious rivalries,” “the abuse of human rights” and “the uncontrolled movement of large numbers of people.” It was understood that security and stability of NATO required an interest in the wider environment, focusing also on software security threats.

Thus, the non-Article 5 tasks of crisis management and crisis response have become some of the fundamental security tasks of the new NATO. In this context, NATO peacekeeping in the Balkans and other parts of the world seem to be long-term commitments. This is reiterated in the new strategic concept approved by NATO leaders in the Lisbon summit. The alliance commits itself to prevent crises, managing conflicts and stabilizing post-conflict situations around the globe. This is obviously not the NATO we knew in the Cold War years. To justify a political role in the absence of a common enemy, the Lisbon concept emphases “common values” among member countries. It is reaffirmed that the “alliance is based on common values of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law.” NATO’s essential mission is described in a similar manner: to ensure that the alliance remains an unparalleled community of freedom, peace, security and shared values.

It is true that a coherent alliance identity requires common values. These, however, cannot be achieved by stating them but by practicing them. Old habits of looking for an enemy (be it Iran or Russia) contradict the claims of the new NATO as a “community of values.”

Will European liberal values survive: the Austrian case

Did you hear about the statements made by Turkey’s ambassador to Vienna, Kadri Ecvet Tezcan, on mistakes being made in the process of integration of Turks into Austrian society? And do you know about the reaction by the Austrian government to the ambassador’s criticisms?

It is time to remind you all: Everyone is watching everyone else. There is no way to hide behind national boundaries when it comes to human rights, basic freedoms and the threat of racism. It seems that a number of European countries need a good lecturing on human rights.

For decades now Turkish intellectuals, NGO activists and journalists have joined Europeans in criticizing Turkey’s human rights record and pressed for improvements in this field. We know that at the beginning the Turkish side was rather reluctant, frequently accusing foreigners of meddling in Turkey’s domestic affairs.

In this latest incident, I cannot see that level of understanding from the Austrian government. While Turkey has been improving itself, getting to know the trends in international law, global politics, and international social movements on human rights, it is a pity that a country in the center of Europe fails to understand any of these.

You have criticized Turkey for decades but feel offended when concerns about right-wing movements are expressed by the Turkish ambassador. You freely and rightly point to the question of the integration of Alevis and Kurds in Turkey, but you think you are exempt from criticism about the way in which immigrants are treated in Austria, or for that matter, in any other European country. You tell us every day what to do in our domestic matters but get upset when we tell you how to handle the problem of racism and integration.

Please, no one should embrace this old notion of “non-interference in domestic affairs.” This is the habit of authoritarian governments, you may remember, all over the world. It is an embarrassment for Europe to have governments that try to defend their wrongdoings in domestic affairs by hiding behind the non-interference principle.

Sorry guys, as you watch us we watch you too. We all have to be sincere and open to criticism.

Just look at the way the Austrian government has responded to the Turkish ambassador’s remarks: Tezcan was summoned to Austria’s foreign ministry and the Austrian foreign minister telephoned his Turkish counterpart to complain. A spokesman from the Austrian foreign ministry claimed that Tezcan “crossed many red lines.”

Well, I really loved this typical reactionary response by the Austrian side! Do they really think that they live in an age of absolute sovereignty in which they can do whatever they wish to people living in their national boundaries, and still expect the world to remain silent? This is totally anachronistic. When it comes to human rights and fundamental freedoms this Westphalian principle has long since been abandoned in international law. Just remember the human rights conventions that the Austrian government is also a signatory to.

The spokesman argued that the Turkish ambassador does not represent all Turks in Austria because half of them are Austrian citizens. Well, it is even more embarrassing, isn’t it?

Instead of blatantly rejecting the criticism, the Austrian government should take the problem of immigrants, whether they are their own citizens or not, very seriously. We all know that this is a serious problem. Do not get me wrong: It is serious not only for those migrants trying to make ends meet in Europe but also for what Europe stands for. The way foreigners are treated in Europe may slowly ruin the values of Europe such as equality, freedom and human rights -- including the right to be different.

Increasingly some EU member countries need “progress reports” on the way in which they treat their own citizens with migrant backgrounds as well as new migrants. It is not ethical at all to talk about human rights abroad while not facing your problems at home.

I think Europe should take warning signs and criticisms very seriously, if not for the sake of immigrants then for the survival of European liberal values.