The most important event in Turkish politics last year was the Republican People’s Party’s (CHP) change in leadership. It is a culmination of past events that indicates a fundamental change in their strategy to oppose the ruling party. With the leadership change, the opponents of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) decided to try a new strategy to bring down the ruling party, using democratic means with populist policies.
Their adoption of this new strategy came out of a process where undemocratic alternatives failed to bring about desired objectives. In the absence of strong political opposition to the ruling party, some had looked to the military and the judiciary as the center of the anti-AK Party block. These two institutions played just such a role, which they legitimized as protecting secularism.
For its part, the military tried to influence the presidential elections by issuing an e-memorandum against the ruling party in April 2007 in an attempt to prevent the AK Party majority in Parliament electing a new president. But it backfired. The military’s intervention created waves among the people, resulting in a landslide electoral victory for the AK Party, followed by the election of Abdullah Gül as president.
Discouraged by the military’s apparent ineffectiveness, the opposition looked to the judiciary to block the AK Party’s way. The filing of a closure case against the AK Party by the chief prosecutor in March 2008 was therefore welcomed. The court’s earlier decisions on party closures and the AK Party’s legislative activities encouraged the opposition groups who wished to see the end of the AK Party at the hands of the court.
The Constitutional Court had emerged as an institution capable of blocking the legislative activities of the AK Party government but it could not make the decision to close down such a popular party. Thus the non-closure verdict highlighted the limits of the Constitutional Court to be a focal point of opposition against the AK Party.
Invitations of these non-political forces into the political arena, however, did not bring the expected results, so what was left was to pursue opposition to the AK Party by political means. Having lost all hope that the AK Party could be toppled by the court or by pressure from the military, the CHP was forced to develop more creative policies against the AK Party within the political sphere. There was increased pressure on the CHP to transform itself into a viable political alternative to the ruling party. The party’s performance under Deniz Baykal was tested for the last time during the March 2009 elections. It was a failure again as the CHP finished far behind the AK Party in votes. It was proven once more that the CHP under Baykal’s leadership was unable to present a viable alternative to the AK Party.
It was not just about leadership. They revised the themes and discourse that they used to mobilize themselves against the ruling party. Focusing on secularism had proven fruitless. Because relying on that single issue was ineffective in bringing down the AK Party government, the opponents decided to challenge the AK Party on more concrete social and economic issues.
What they do is good for Turkey’s democracy because an alternative to the AK Party should be sought through democratic means and among political actors. The new strategy with its leadership and discourse-policy components developed in 2010 will be tested in 2011 with the June elections.
We will see if the new leadership and new political discourse will bring down the AK Party government. If the AK Party’s opponents fail again will they go back to their old strategy? Well, it is difficult; undemocratic means of opposition are hard to revive. The only exit is going forward through democracy.
Their adoption of this new strategy came out of a process where undemocratic alternatives failed to bring about desired objectives. In the absence of strong political opposition to the ruling party, some had looked to the military and the judiciary as the center of the anti-AK Party block. These two institutions played just such a role, which they legitimized as protecting secularism.
For its part, the military tried to influence the presidential elections by issuing an e-memorandum against the ruling party in April 2007 in an attempt to prevent the AK Party majority in Parliament electing a new president. But it backfired. The military’s intervention created waves among the people, resulting in a landslide electoral victory for the AK Party, followed by the election of Abdullah Gül as president.
Discouraged by the military’s apparent ineffectiveness, the opposition looked to the judiciary to block the AK Party’s way. The filing of a closure case against the AK Party by the chief prosecutor in March 2008 was therefore welcomed. The court’s earlier decisions on party closures and the AK Party’s legislative activities encouraged the opposition groups who wished to see the end of the AK Party at the hands of the court.
The Constitutional Court had emerged as an institution capable of blocking the legislative activities of the AK Party government but it could not make the decision to close down such a popular party. Thus the non-closure verdict highlighted the limits of the Constitutional Court to be a focal point of opposition against the AK Party.
Invitations of these non-political forces into the political arena, however, did not bring the expected results, so what was left was to pursue opposition to the AK Party by political means. Having lost all hope that the AK Party could be toppled by the court or by pressure from the military, the CHP was forced to develop more creative policies against the AK Party within the political sphere. There was increased pressure on the CHP to transform itself into a viable political alternative to the ruling party. The party’s performance under Deniz Baykal was tested for the last time during the March 2009 elections. It was a failure again as the CHP finished far behind the AK Party in votes. It was proven once more that the CHP under Baykal’s leadership was unable to present a viable alternative to the AK Party.
It was not just about leadership. They revised the themes and discourse that they used to mobilize themselves against the ruling party. Focusing on secularism had proven fruitless. Because relying on that single issue was ineffective in bringing down the AK Party government, the opponents decided to challenge the AK Party on more concrete social and economic issues.
What they do is good for Turkey’s democracy because an alternative to the AK Party should be sought through democratic means and among political actors. The new strategy with its leadership and discourse-policy components developed in 2010 will be tested in 2011 with the June elections.
We will see if the new leadership and new political discourse will bring down the AK Party government. If the AK Party’s opponents fail again will they go back to their old strategy? Well, it is difficult; undemocratic means of opposition are hard to revive. The only exit is going forward through democracy.
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