Why the DTP should not be shut down

We are approaching the end of the legal case being heard in the Constitutional Court regarding whether or not the Democratic Society Party (DTP) is to be forced to close. But there is a strange silence that abounds as we relive this process, one which the ruling party experienced only two months ago and from which it very nearly did not emerge. This time around, the same national and international factions, which made a real effort to voice their views on the possible closure of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party), even going so far as to exert pressures on this front, are not saying much.

The DTP needs to spend more time thinking about this particular situation, one which cannot be explained away simply by a "lack of principles." It is both what the DTP has done as much as what it has not done that takes partial credit for this silence. The DTP ought not to be closed. As it stands, it looks impossible for even the Venice Criteria to save the DTP at this point. After all, it is impossible for the universal legal criteria that exist in the world to protect a political party that only does not condemn violence but which sees violence as a legitimate vehicle for political intervention. Still, given even this, the correct political path does not lie through the closure of the DTP.

Closing the DTP would mean shutting down one of the four political parties with parliamentary groups. And even more important, it would mean completely discounting the will of voters from the Southeast of the country. If the forced closure of the AK Party were to have struck a blow to the national will, how could the forced closure of the DTP mean anything different? The forced closure -- no matter what the conditions -- of any political party which picked up nearly half of all votes from residents of the Southeast means complete disrespect to the will of the people of that region.
The DTP ought not to be closed. We ought to be able to show even those who do not clearly condemn violence that the political road in Turkey is open to all. If our real problem is with violence and bringing an end to this violence, it would be helpful for everyone to see that every political opportunity possible was used in the attempt to stop this violence. The forced closure of the DTP will only, in the end, weaken those who embrace legitimate political methods and punish those who have some faith in politics.

The presence of the DTP in Parliament, the first such party in the legislature in 16 years, even though turbulent, is ultimately a contribution to the normalization of political life in Turkey. At the very least, factions represented by the DTP have finally transcended the basic problem of representation in Parliament. The meeting between central politics and the DTP under the roof of Parliament and the subsequent influence of central politics on the DTP need to continue. Not forcing the DTP to close will show that a chance has been given to peaceful politics and to the representation in Ankara of varied identities. In exchange for the DTP's political performance, it should be allowed to play a role in politics. The local elections are fast approaching, and the DTP is neither alone nor all that comfortable on its usual bedrock: It is facing off against the AK Party there. So there are two parties, one which depends solely on the politics of identity, against one which alleges it has no problem with the Kurdish identity and which proposes various "services" to the region in order to help transcend Kurdish problems. Such competition ought to be allowed an opportunity to play itself out.

The people of the region ought to be allowed to make their choices. So these upcoming local elections are important for different reasons to the DTP and the AK Party: The former needs to see and understand the limitations of identity-based politics, and the latter needs to be allowed to test just how much it will be able to substitute "services" for its previously hesitant approach to Kurdish identity matters.

In the meantime, people are noticing the silence emanating from the ranks of the AK Party on this all. A political party which itself has just narrowly escaped being forced to close down would normally be expected to come out "categorically" in opposition to all forced party closures. In principle, as the DTP's regional competitor for votes, they should be saying, "We want to beat the DTP at the ballot box." In fact, looked at from a completely pragmatic stance, this is how they should be thinking, for, after all, the forced closure of the DTP would only, in the end, strengthen the DTP throughout the Southeast, much as the AK Party itself would have emerged from forced closure all the stronger.

What the radical factions within the DTP really want is forced closure of their party. They know that this would give them an easier way to explain to voters just how "limited" political methods really are and why it is that "violence" always needs to be maintained as a possible measure. The forced closure of the DTP would offer party radicals a powerful tool with which to reckon with the "defenders of political means" within DTP party ranks. To borrow an expression from Bejan Matur, forced closure of the DTP would mean the "elimination of moderates." If the apparatus we call the "state," including of course the Constitutional Court, wants to see not DTP moderates but DTP hawks, then they can go ahead and force this party to close in good conscience. And if this happens, a new party will be founded along more radical lines, the hawks will take over power and the people of the region, in reaction, will keep on casting their votes for this party. And thus no opportunity will have been given to the people of the region to truly analyze the political performance of the DTP in both local and general political leadership. In the end, the decision rendered by the Constitutional Court will really reveal whether or not the "state" wishes to see a solution to the Kurdish problem.
20.09.2008

Will the Turkish military abandon NATO?

Turkey's membership in NATO and its overall security cooperation with the West has been a topic of debate recently, particularly within the country's nationalist/Kemalist circles, including the military.
For them, Turkey's presence in the Western defense structure is not an asset for Turkey's security and territorial integrity, but a liability. The occupation of Iraq and the American support for Kurdish groups in northern Iraq have certainly contributed to this view. But even before 2003, the Turkish military had come to see Turkish-American cooperation in northern Iraq, in the form of "Operation Poised Hammer," as a covert effort to create a Kurdish state with devastating effects on Turkey's territorial integrity.

From a Kemalist/nationalist point of view, not just Turkey's territorial integrity, but also its secular "regime" is threatened by the US. A city legend among the Kemalist/nationalists is that the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) was brought to power by the US in 2002 as part of the American project of promoting "moderate Islam" and implementing its "Greater Middle East Initiative." These two phrases, moderate Islam and the Greater Middle East Initiative have frequently appeared in the speeches of high ranking Kemalists/nationalists, including some retired generals, and former President Ahmet Necdet Sezer and in the indictment of the public prosecutor who opened the case in the Constitutional Court to close down the ruling AK Party.

Thus when the Kemalist/nationalist block, including elements of the civilian-military bureaucracy, have tried to get rid of the AK Party by all means available to them, they justified this on the ground that theirs was a "national" project. To fight against the AK Party, for them, is the way to resist America's designs on Turkey.

The EU, with its call for greater democracy and human rights, is also viewed as a threat. The EU's membership criteria of democracy, human rights, the rule of law, minority rights and civilian supremacy over the military are all believed to have been designed to weaken the Turkish state. But even before 1999, there had been a widespread belief in the security sector that European "allies" of Turkey were trying to revive the Sevres Treaty of 1920 that divided up Turkey. In the memoirs and statements of many retired generals, it is a common view that the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) was created and supported by those European allies of Turkey.

Even beyond political and security-related issues, Turkey's integration with the global economy is seen as a dangerous path for the country, in that privatization is a cover-up for Western companies to take over Turkey's national assets. In their recent speeches, Chief of General Staff Gen. İlker Başbuğ and his eventual successor, Gen. Işık Koşaner, expressed their opposition to globalization, global forces, and trends that were described as "determined to finish off the Turkish nation-state." In his speech Gen. Koşaner explained how "colored revolutions" attempted to destroy nation-states like Turkey. By this Gen. Koşaner was referring to pro-democracy changes in Ukraine and Georgia. From this perspective, democratization and greater integration into the global economy may lead to the end of the nation-state. What they really mean by the "global system" is the US and the EU, which are Turkey's Western allies. The structural integration of Turkey into the West in terms of EU membership, continued security cooperation and inflow of global capital seems unwelcome.
The nationalist/Kemalist block believes that they are waging a "new national struggle" against the West and its allies, including not only the AK Party, but also those liberals who advocate EU membership, globalization, a market economy, and democracy.

No one can deny the fact that the Turkish military has become deeply anti-Western and anti-American in recent years. We remember some high-ranking retired generals who called for abandoning NATO, which they described as a tool of American imperialism. We also recall some others who advocated the establishment of an axis with Russia, Iran, and China against the US and the EU.

Having observed this, I believe that if Turkey had not already been a member of NATO, the Turkish military would be opposed to NATO membership as it is to EU accession. Thank God, the Democrat Party (DP), the leader of which was hanged by the military after the 1960 military coup, brought Turkey into NATO in 1952.
15.09.2008

Why the secularists dislike the EU

Kalypso Nicolaïdis and Hakan Altınay argue really hard to explain "why the European Union strengthens secularism in Turkey." I really hope they convince the secularists of the wisdom of the EU membership for the sustainability of secularism in Turkey.

But I am afraid they will not succeed. The reason is simple: For the Turkish secularists, the question is not just a matter of secularism. For them, secularism is a "discursive tool" to empower one socio-political/economic group while excluding conservative/peripheral social actors and their interests and identities from the power center. Unless one rightly identifies the underlying causes of the secularists' outcry, it is impossible to address the issue.

Secularists would be appeased only if they are offered the continuation of the privileged status they once enjoyed -- this time by the EU, which may decide specifically to protect the interests of the secularists. The point is whether such a position would fit into the European ideal of equality and non-discrimination.

A democratic politics based on the rights of individuals as outlined in the European Convention of Human Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU would provide protection for all citizens. Special protection for a particular group, the secularists, would rightly be called privilege.
The secularists in Turkey should first come to terms with democracy and human rights. The top secularists, high-ranking commanders, declared last week how "democracy threatens the regime and human rights divide Turkey into pieces." This reflects the prevailing mindset of the secularists. How can we go along with such an idea while negotiating membership with the EU?

It is crystal clear that secularists have abandoned the ideal of democracy. They at large view democracy as a system that brought conservative (for them Islamist) political parties into power. One should not think that this is a perception of recent years. Before the existence of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and even before the emergence of the Welfare Party (RP) in the 1990s, the secularists viewed democracy as a game always won by counter-revolutionaries. The whole story started with the victory of the Democrat Party (DP) in 1950, the first free and fair elections in Turkey. Since then they have looked for anti-democratic means (direct military coup or judicial interventions) to stop the "counter-revolutionaries" who were in fact politicians representing identities and interests of "ordinary citizens" outside the Kemalist-secularist power block. For that, the secularists welcomed the 1960 military coup and the trial of DP leaders by a military-appointed special tribunal that executed Prime Minister Adnan Menders and two of his ministers.
The secularists continued to oppose Süleyman Demirel in the 1960s and Turgut Özal in the 1980s as both were representing the social periphery against the hegemony of the bureaucratic/secularist center -- and neither of them was Islamists.

So if the EU wishes to appease the secularists, it should forget about democratization in Turkey.
Isn't it interesting to note that the secularists today are the staunchest opponents of the EU? They used to support the EU membership, assuming that it would strengthen their position vis-à-vis the "ignorant, uneducated, rural people of the periphery." But realizing that the EU membership in the late 1990s means full democracy, respect for human rights for all and that the rule of law meant giving up all the privileges they had accumulated for years, the Kemalist secularists gave up on the EU objective.

Yes, they were once supporters of Westernization. Posing as Westernizers was useful to underline the cultural/social "superiority" of the ruling elite over the masses. Being a Westernizer was instrumental in acquiring the right to rule by alienating themselves from the masses, which were unfamiliar with Western culture. Thus Westernization was instrumental in establishing and justifying the power monopoly of Kemalist secularists.

This monopoly is challenged by the EU membership as Westernization now means emancipation for the masses since it requires greater democratization, empowering people vis-à-vis the bureaucratic/Kemalist/secularist center. This is why the EU is now detested by the secularist elite and loved by the masses.

The secularists should come to terms with democracy and a peaceful notion of secularism. They should give up instrumentalizing secularism to exclude conservatives from power and benefits. We need a "democratic secularism" as called for by European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso. The issue at stake is not secularism per se but the exclusion of the conservative and peripheral social/political/economic forces in the name of secularism, which cannot be overlooked by the EU.

Turkey can become a member of the EU without the blessing of the secularists, who would oppose anyway, or at least try to slow down, Turkey's European integration unless the EU sides with them to sustain their power privileges in Turkey. No one expects the EU to align itself with such anachronistic secularists, who are not only anti-democratic but also anti-Western. Remember the republican rallies of last year at which they enthusiastically chanted "Neither the US nor the EU."
08.09.2008

Why Turkish generals oppose globalization

Political debate and cleavages in Turkey today are between those who hold favorable views of globalization and thus work toward greater integration in the global system, and those who perceive globalization as the "number-one threat," who thus employ all possible means to stop pro-globalization groups.

Last week two top Turkish military commanders gave important speeches outlining their views on Turkish politics as well as global developments. The statements of Chief of General Staff Gen. İlker Başbuğ and Land Forces Commander Gen. Işık Koşaner revealed that the top military brass opposes globalization, global actors and global values.

Well, they may have a point. Though globalization does not have a particular problem with Kemalism, it shakes the fundamentals of all ideological states. An ideological state controlled by a vanguard elite including the military, in the name of Kemalism in the Turkish case, is not sustainable in a globalized world.

With globalization also come transparency, competition, and interconnectedness, all problems for an ideological state and its vanguards. It is impossible to govern a society that is integrated into a globalized world through commands from the top. People, economy and politics will be under the influence of diverse networks, ideas, and interests. Such a society will no longer rely on "official truths" imposed on them and the welfare/ liberties gifted to them by the state elite. Instead, a society integrated with the world is empowered to seek its truth, its welfare, and its liberties. Obviously, such features of globalization make it very difficult to control the state and society. Thus the military naturally prefers a closed society with controllable social, political and economic agents.

For the last six years, the average annual foreign direct investment (FDI) increased considerably, reaching $20 billion in the last couple of years, more than 20 times higher in comparison to earlier periods. Moreover, billions of dollars are traded in the stock exchange and in the banking system. All these make the "management" of the economy difficult from a "nationalist" point of view that prefers a centralized national economy that is not "vulnerable" to global trends. Would a military hostile to global trends and actors be happy with the current inflow and activities of foreign capital? Who is inviting foreign capital and "selling out" Turkey's national assets to them? These are key questions to understanding the underlying reasons for the power struggle in recent years.

To Turkish generals, international organizations, transnational civil society organizations and multinational corporations all pose threats to Turkey, Turkish security and Turkey's political regime. What they really mean is that globalization threatens the Kemalist regime that provides them with discursive justification for the military's power and privileges in the system.

In the generals' speeches a deep-seated hostility towards transnational actors, ideas and movements are clearly visible. Turkish civil society is targeted as being designed by "transnational actors." Democracy and human rights are evaluated as a disguise to divide the country and change the regime. How come these ideas willingly support Turkey's democratization process? "Too much democracy threatens secularism," they argue. So we should conclude that "Western democracies went too far and turned into theocracies." Fear of not only globalization but also of democracy prevails throughout the speeches of the top two military commanders. In fact, globalization is feared because it encourages democratization.

The generals speak of a "global system" that wants to take over Turkey. But thanks to the "Atatürkist thought system," Turkey has not surrendered to the hegemony of the global system. I really wonder if Turkey is an ally of Chaves' Venezuela or the West. These are old-fashioned Third Worldist generalizations with no correspondence to the reality on the ground.

The problem is that the Turkish military used to be the forerunner of modernization in this country. It is also the military of a country that has been a member of the Western alliance for over 50 years. As such, it is supposed to be an institution that is integrated into an international security community, NATO, with close links and cooperative international arrangements. Unfortunately, it turns out now that a reformist and pro-modernization military with international experience and supposedly culture has turned into a pro-status quo institution resisting change.

Yet the reasons are understandable: The "power monopoly" of the bureaucracy, including the military, is being eroded by globalization. This is the bottom line for their fear of globalization and resistance to democratization.
01.09.2008

Call for the army!

What is the army's mission? Being prepared to defend the country, protecting the country against attacks by enemy armies, possessing the necessary equipment, human resources, preparedness and the power of deterrence to do this.

Our army still delivers the "domestic politics" message. If the country is surrounded by enemies, if there are important developments going on in the Caucasus; if Iraq is still a threat; if there is serious tension between Iran and Syria and the West; if terror is still influential, then what needs to be done is not to criticize "postmodernism." Let the academics and writers do this.

It is our right to expect a speech from Land Forces Commander Gen. Işık Koşaner in the handover ceremony that would reference the country's preparedness, readiness, capacity, ability, and strength vis-à-vis the threats and dangers emerging in Turkey's near surroundings and deter enemies, instead of a speech on postmodernism and globalization. The army needs to go back to its actual mission right away, especially at this time when the security problems surrounding us have become more imminent.

Gen. Koşaner spoke as if he was a political leader -- and not a military commander. Let us review the thesis: "Nation-states are subjected to dissolution in the name of democracy and human rights." He suggests that democracy destroys nation-states while human rights divide them. The reality is just the opposite of this argument. Both democracy and human rights fortify the state. Nation-states that fail to embrace democracy and protect human rights are disappearing because when these noble values are absent, the legitimacy of the state becomes questionable; even the most repressive administrations have to submit to the demands for freedoms and rights.

Another argument is that the EU harmonization laws made the security forces' job in their combat against terrorism harder. Let us ask this question: When were the EU laws adopted at Parliament? In February 2002. If the harmonization laws made the security forces ineffective, why did the army fail to eliminate the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) terror in the absence of these laws before 2002? It is necessary to think about this question and avoid blaming the "liberties" for this failure.

The commander's description of the reforms introduced for EU membership as "impositions" and his attempt to present the EU criteria as "pressure and threat" shows that there are serious problems. Most importantly, this implies that the army is outside the institutional and social consensus on EU membership.

Civil society activities cannot be described as "security issues with destructive impact" by the army in a democratic country. The image of a civil society whose international affiliation is seen as dangerous is the extension of a vision of a Turkey that has closed its doors to the outside world. All individuals and institutions with connections abroad are seen as dangerous. This approach -- held by a commander of a country that has been a NATO member for over five decades -- to globalization and "the outside world" should be considered a reflection of the army's nationalist reflex since the end of the Cold War. We have frequently heard the statement, "The army is the pioneer of modernization in Turkey." But the army as described by the mentality in that speech seems to have embraced an anti-modernist stance.

Gen. Koşaner holds that the media, academics, capital circles, and civil society organizations, as "a postmodern layer" that has been "designed by the global forces," work tirelessly to "undermine and dissolve national unity, national value and security parameters" relying on their "web of propaganda and influence." What would those who hold such grave misunderstandings do? They would keep records on media, academia, capital holders and civil society actors and stage a psychological war against them.

The speech by Gen. Koşaner is a political manifesto that opposes the EU, democracy, human rights, market economy, and globalization, and it has nothing to do with the army. Those who are eager to be involved in politics should take the uniform off, take part in political activities or grab a pen to participate in the discussions. Nobody should ever promote their political agenda on behalf of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK).
31.08.2008

Foreign policy challenges

After months of uncertainty about the future of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and its leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkish politics seem pretty calm now.

The picture is as follows: The ruling party continues to enjoy substantial popular support, while the opposition parties are still unable to present a viable alternative, and the military and the judiciary are adopting a relatively low-profile opposition to the government. Despite this "stable" domestic political scene, Turkey's foreign affairs are going through challenging times.

The war in the Caucasus is the number-one challenge. The conflict involves two indispensable partners for Turkey. Georgia is the only land corridor linking Turkey with the Caspian region and Central Asia, the center of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline. Maintaining cooperation with Georgia is therefore crucial for Turkey's strategic width, reaching out the Caspian and Central Asia. Russia, in recent years, has become an important economic partner for Turkey. The early political tension in the aftermath of the cold war was overcome with a strategy of cooperation in the economic and political arenas. But this was based on a non-assertive policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia on the part of both Turkey and Russia. With the invasion of Georgia, it seems that Russia has now moved to an assertive policy in the region, claiming a zone of influence. Instead of confronting Russia bilaterally, the Turkish response has been to propose multilateral diplomacy by suggesting a Caucasia Stability and Cooperation Platform. The idea of the Caucasia Stability and Cooperation Platform sounds timely and functional, but maybe unrealistic given the global and regional dynamics. The key is the attitude of Russia, which seems rather unenthusiastic about the idea. Instead, the Russians prefer to manage the situation within the Commonwealth of Independent States if multilateral diplomacy is needed. Moreover, bringing Armenia and Azerbaijan and, of course, Turkey together within such a platform is not easy. If the Turkish government is really serious about this idea, it should begin developing its relations with Armenia without delay. What about the role of Iran? Such a platform cannot be established by excluding Iran, which has always had a great interest in Caucasian affairs.

Given all these complications and also the reluctance of the West especially the US the initiative may not result in a concrete organization institutionalizing stability and cooperation in the region but lose yet high-level diplomatic contacts. The crisis in the Caucasus has also raised other problems for Turkey in the region and in its relations with the West. It will be difficult for Turkey to engage with both Iran and Syria as these countries move closer to Russia in response to recent developments. If Russia is willing to intensify tensions with the West, Iran and Syria may see this as an opportunity for leverage, putting Turkey in an awkward position. But recent developments in the Caucasus vindicate Turkey's attempts to diversify its energy resources and reduce its dependence on Russian gas. The same is true for Europe, as well. The crisis may, therefore, be an opportunity for Europe to engage with Iran, instead of Russia, as a country linking Caspian and Central Asian energy resources to Europe. The Iraq issue remains a challenge for Turkey, as well. The possible withdrawal of American troops next year may complicate the matter even more if post-occupation Iraq proves incapable of holding itself together. Anyhow, establishing a working relationship with the Kurdish administration in northern Iraq is the key to managing the domestic Kurdish problem and the fight against the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK). Yet a self-sufficient Kurdish administration in northern Iraq may prove to be more difficult to deal with in the absence of American troops in Iraq persuading the Kurds to cooperate with the Turkish government.

Another challenge for Turkish foreign policy is an old one: Cyprus. The upcoming negotiations between presidents Mehmet Ali Talat and Dimitris Christofias have raised hopes about the possibility of a final settlement. Such an outcome will certainly accelerate Turkey's EU integration, an objective recently reasserted by the government as a priority. But it will not be easy to sell any settlement in Cyprus to the Turkish public, which is likely to start a new wave of heated debate provoked by Turkish nationalism. Knowing that foreign policy is never merely a matter of an "externally oriented" set of decisions, but a realm greatly influenced by domestic political developments, we can conclude that the stability of Turkish politics depends on establishing a peaceful regional setting.
25.08.2008

Lessons for government and opposition

The verdict of the court not to close the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) is certainly a relief, not only for the AK Party but for Turkish democracy as well. It may herald the beginning of a new era that rules out closing a political party that does not use or encourage violence. Thus democrats and AK Party supporters may hail the decision of the court as opening the path for democratic competition among political parties alone, no longer inviting the judiciary to meddle in political affairs. It may be inferred from the decision of the court that political quarrels should be settled by political means, not by the interference of the judiciary or the military.

But the court also ruled that the AK Party has become a "focal point of anti-secular activities," a point tacitly criticized by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who in his initial reaction to the court ruling asserted that "the AK Party has never been and will never be a focal point of anti-secular activities."

Thus secularism may remain the central issue of political debate in the future. Constrained by the verdict, the AK Party may speed up its evolution into a center-right political identity by pushing for more democratization and EU accession. In the new period, the AK Party may, therefore, try to expand its democratic credentials by seeking reformist policies reminiscent of its first three years in power. The court verdict would also have some ramifications on opposition politics. In a way, the court provided new ammunition to opponents of the AK Party who base their opposition on secularism. Yet this may not bring about any fresh argument against the AK Party. If the opposition continues to focus on secularism in order to push the AK Party into a corner, this would only serve to reinforce the current political division, a division that favors the AK Party. People who are concerned with secularism being used to limit the power of the people, the national will and democracy will continue to rally behind the AK Party.

Therefore, the decision of the court may also be interpreted as the end of secularism being the focal point of Turkish politics. The opposition block may be satisfied with the fact that the court declared the AK Party as anti-secularist and move on to challenge the ruling party on more concrete social and economic issues. This is the strategy that would normalize Turkish politics. It is also more likely to beat the AK Party in coming elections on such a down-to-earth opposition instead of a single issue of secularism, which has proven ineffective in bringing down the AK Party government in the last election.

In this line of reasoning, there is a possibility that the court verdict may lead to a process of "rethinking" secularism by the radical secularist block that may embrace a "moderate secularism" in an attempt to address the concerns of Turkey's religious people, a kind of rediscovering of the late Bülent Ecevit's notion of "secularism that is respectful of religion."

This may be wishful thinking given the inflexibility of the secularist-Kemalist block, but they have to try something new. Why not attempt to understand sensitivities and concerns of religious/conservative social segments? It is now a common saying that the ruling AK Party should address the concerns of secularists and win over their trust. Why do we not expect the same prudence and wisdom from the secularist/Kemalist bloc? If there is to be a reconciliation in Turkey, the secularist/Kemalist block has responsibilities as well. To start with, they should understand the need to lift the headscarf ban at universities and take the initiative to overcome this problem. Remember, around 70 percent of people want this ban lifted. If we are to seek compromise, reconciliation, and consensus, let us start removing the headscarf ban, a very effective way to win the sympathy of conservative/religious people.
04.08.2008