We are approaching the end of the legal case being heard in the Constitutional Court regarding whether or not the Democratic Society Party (DTP) is to be forced to close. But there is a strange silence that abounds as we relive this process, one which the ruling party experienced only two months ago and from which it very nearly did not emerge. This time around, the same national and international factions, which made a real effort to voice their views on the possible closure of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party), even going so far as to exert pressures on this front, are not saying much.
The DTP needs to spend more time thinking about this particular situation, one which cannot be explained away simply by a "lack of principles." It is both what the DTP has done as much as what it has not done that takes partial credit for this silence. The DTP ought not to be closed. As it stands, it looks impossible for even the Venice Criteria to save the DTP at this point. After all, it is impossible for the universal legal criteria that exist in the world to protect a political party that only does not condemn violence but which sees violence as a legitimate vehicle for political intervention. Still, given even this, the correct political path does not lie through the closure of the DTP.
Closing the DTP would mean shutting down one of the four political parties with parliamentary groups. And even more important, it would mean completely discounting the will of voters from the Southeast of the country. If the forced closure of the AK Party were to have struck a blow to the national will, how could the forced closure of the DTP mean anything different? The forced closure -- no matter what the conditions -- of any political party which picked up nearly half of all votes from residents of the Southeast means complete disrespect to the will of the people of that region.
The DTP ought not to be closed. We ought to be able to show even those who do not clearly condemn violence that the political road in Turkey is open to all. If our real problem is with violence and bringing an end to this violence, it would be helpful for everyone to see that every political opportunity possible was used in the attempt to stop this violence. The forced closure of the DTP will only, in the end, weaken those who embrace legitimate political methods and punish those who have some faith in politics.
The presence of the DTP in Parliament, the first such party in the legislature in 16 years, even though turbulent, is ultimately a contribution to the normalization of political life in Turkey. At the very least, factions represented by the DTP have finally transcended the basic problem of representation in Parliament. The meeting between central politics and the DTP under the roof of Parliament and the subsequent influence of central politics on the DTP need to continue. Not forcing the DTP to close will show that a chance has been given to peaceful politics and to the representation in Ankara of varied identities. In exchange for the DTP's political performance, it should be allowed to play a role in politics. The local elections are fast approaching, and the DTP is neither alone nor all that comfortable on its usual bedrock: It is facing off against the AK Party there. So there are two parties, one which depends solely on the politics of identity, against one which alleges it has no problem with the Kurdish identity and which proposes various "services" to the region in order to help transcend Kurdish problems. Such competition ought to be allowed an opportunity to play itself out.
The people of the region ought to be allowed to make their choices. So these upcoming local elections are important for different reasons to the DTP and the AK Party: The former needs to see and understand the limitations of identity-based politics, and the latter needs to be allowed to test just how much it will be able to substitute "services" for its previously hesitant approach to Kurdish identity matters.
In the meantime, people are noticing the silence emanating from the ranks of the AK Party on this all. A political party which itself has just narrowly escaped being forced to close down would normally be expected to come out "categorically" in opposition to all forced party closures. In principle, as the DTP's regional competitor for votes, they should be saying, "We want to beat the DTP at the ballot box." In fact, looked at from a completely pragmatic stance, this is how they should be thinking, for, after all, the forced closure of the DTP would only, in the end, strengthen the DTP throughout the Southeast, much as the AK Party itself would have emerged from forced closure all the stronger.
What the radical factions within the DTP really want is forced closure of their party. They know that this would give them an easier way to explain to voters just how "limited" political methods really are and why it is that "violence" always needs to be maintained as a possible measure. The forced closure of the DTP would offer party radicals a powerful tool with which to reckon with the "defenders of political means" within DTP party ranks. To borrow an expression from Bejan Matur, forced closure of the DTP would mean the "elimination of moderates." If the apparatus we call the "state," including of course the Constitutional Court, wants to see not DTP moderates but DTP hawks, then they can go ahead and force this party to close in good conscience. And if this happens, a new party will be founded along more radical lines, the hawks will take over power and the people of the region, in reaction, will keep on casting their votes for this party. And thus no opportunity will have been given to the people of the region to truly analyze the political performance of the DTP in both local and general political leadership. In the end, the decision rendered by the Constitutional Court will really reveal whether or not the "state" wishes to see a solution to the Kurdish problem.
20.09.2008
The DTP needs to spend more time thinking about this particular situation, one which cannot be explained away simply by a "lack of principles." It is both what the DTP has done as much as what it has not done that takes partial credit for this silence. The DTP ought not to be closed. As it stands, it looks impossible for even the Venice Criteria to save the DTP at this point. After all, it is impossible for the universal legal criteria that exist in the world to protect a political party that only does not condemn violence but which sees violence as a legitimate vehicle for political intervention. Still, given even this, the correct political path does not lie through the closure of the DTP.
Closing the DTP would mean shutting down one of the four political parties with parliamentary groups. And even more important, it would mean completely discounting the will of voters from the Southeast of the country. If the forced closure of the AK Party were to have struck a blow to the national will, how could the forced closure of the DTP mean anything different? The forced closure -- no matter what the conditions -- of any political party which picked up nearly half of all votes from residents of the Southeast means complete disrespect to the will of the people of that region.
The DTP ought not to be closed. We ought to be able to show even those who do not clearly condemn violence that the political road in Turkey is open to all. If our real problem is with violence and bringing an end to this violence, it would be helpful for everyone to see that every political opportunity possible was used in the attempt to stop this violence. The forced closure of the DTP will only, in the end, weaken those who embrace legitimate political methods and punish those who have some faith in politics.
The presence of the DTP in Parliament, the first such party in the legislature in 16 years, even though turbulent, is ultimately a contribution to the normalization of political life in Turkey. At the very least, factions represented by the DTP have finally transcended the basic problem of representation in Parliament. The meeting between central politics and the DTP under the roof of Parliament and the subsequent influence of central politics on the DTP need to continue. Not forcing the DTP to close will show that a chance has been given to peaceful politics and to the representation in Ankara of varied identities. In exchange for the DTP's political performance, it should be allowed to play a role in politics. The local elections are fast approaching, and the DTP is neither alone nor all that comfortable on its usual bedrock: It is facing off against the AK Party there. So there are two parties, one which depends solely on the politics of identity, against one which alleges it has no problem with the Kurdish identity and which proposes various "services" to the region in order to help transcend Kurdish problems. Such competition ought to be allowed an opportunity to play itself out.
The people of the region ought to be allowed to make their choices. So these upcoming local elections are important for different reasons to the DTP and the AK Party: The former needs to see and understand the limitations of identity-based politics, and the latter needs to be allowed to test just how much it will be able to substitute "services" for its previously hesitant approach to Kurdish identity matters.
In the meantime, people are noticing the silence emanating from the ranks of the AK Party on this all. A political party which itself has just narrowly escaped being forced to close down would normally be expected to come out "categorically" in opposition to all forced party closures. In principle, as the DTP's regional competitor for votes, they should be saying, "We want to beat the DTP at the ballot box." In fact, looked at from a completely pragmatic stance, this is how they should be thinking, for, after all, the forced closure of the DTP would only, in the end, strengthen the DTP throughout the Southeast, much as the AK Party itself would have emerged from forced closure all the stronger.
What the radical factions within the DTP really want is forced closure of their party. They know that this would give them an easier way to explain to voters just how "limited" political methods really are and why it is that "violence" always needs to be maintained as a possible measure. The forced closure of the DTP would offer party radicals a powerful tool with which to reckon with the "defenders of political means" within DTP party ranks. To borrow an expression from Bejan Matur, forced closure of the DTP would mean the "elimination of moderates." If the apparatus we call the "state," including of course the Constitutional Court, wants to see not DTP moderates but DTP hawks, then they can go ahead and force this party to close in good conscience. And if this happens, a new party will be founded along more radical lines, the hawks will take over power and the people of the region, in reaction, will keep on casting their votes for this party. And thus no opportunity will have been given to the people of the region to truly analyze the political performance of the DTP in both local and general political leadership. In the end, the decision rendered by the Constitutional Court will really reveal whether or not the "state" wishes to see a solution to the Kurdish problem.
20.09.2008
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