People power in the Middle East and the West

Calls for change have been shaking the Arab Middle East from Tunisia to Egypt and Yemen. Are people becoming “agents of change” in this part of the world? Is what we see an emergence of people power in the Middle East?

In the meantime, however, the people of these countries should not be deprived of international support for democratization. For a change, the West should not side with dictators in the Middle East but with the people.

For decades now the West has been trapped by analysts who advocated supporting despotic regimes in the Middle East to stop the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, even if this meant oppression, violence, and poverty. This was, in fact, not the correct strategy. The ensuing accusations of Western double standards were then not unwarranted. It was obvious that after the end of the Cold War the Middle East was exempt from the wave of democratization.

The Algerian case is exemplary in this context. A democratic electoral process was stopped by the military in 1991 when it became clear that the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was to form a majority in parliament. Implicit and explicit support of the West for the military intervention that resulted in chaos and the death of tens of thousands of people in Algeria is still well remembered.

Such an attitude adopted by the West constituted one of the grounds for the widespread anti-Western sentiment. While democracy was applauded in every part of the world, it has been denied to the people of the Middle East. This fueled anger towards Western governments that supported suppressive regimes in the Middle East. The excuse for this unprincipled support was to stop the rise of radical political Islam.

Have Western policymakers and analysts not yet understood that suppressive and corrupt governments in the Middle East use the “threat of Islamism” as a convenient tool to secure the support of the West? With the “threat of Islamists” having become a fruitful “strategic asset” in the hands of repressive governments, it became impossible to expect from these governments that they would finish off the “threat.” The paradox for the West is evident. Oppressive and corrupt regimes in the Middle East used the “Islamist threat.” Thus, even if there was no such threat, they created one or kept such existing “threats” in order to “sell” themselves to the West.

In the wake of uprisings in the Middle East, Western governments and media should do away with this vicious circle. It is time to realize that suppression through authoritarian governments is not the way to deal with Islamic radicalism.

Second, important rethinking relates to the process and outcomes of democratization. It is not a process that merely benefits radical Islamists. The process also does not necessarily bring radical Islamists to power. It is fundamentally misleading to equate democratization with Islamization in the Middle East. What people want is a representative and accountable government. A democratic mechanism may bring the Islamists to power, but it also has the built-in mechanisms to oust them from power. It is Orientalist reductionism to assume that Muslims will blindly vote for an Islamist party, disregarding their program and performance once in power. The inclusion of Islamists in the political process is absolutely necessary to establish representative and accountable governments in the Middle East.

I think the people of Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and others in the Middle East are capable of electing their representatives and holding them responsible for what they do and what they do not do while in government.

Whenever we talk of Middle Eastern politics, one concept is key: legitimacy or, to be more precise, the lack of legitimacy of the regimes in the Middle East. Some buy it through a rentier economy, some cover it up through ideological or nationalist sentiment and some silence the masses with oppressive apparatuses and measures. But I think it is becoming ever more difficult to sustain such regimes. Legitimacy generated through democratic participation is an absolute must.

Discontent can no longer be contained. There is a moment when the cost of oppression outweighs the cost of tolerating democratic change. The Middle East is at such a crossroads. And the international community should decide with the people of the region on what they prefer. Will they stand for the durable stability of democracies or the fragile and shaky stability of dictators?

Turkey’s ‘number one’ enemy?

Once Turks thought that Turkey was located in a very hostile environment and was surrounded by enemy nations. Now things seem different; they think that the threat to their country comes mainly from afar, the United States.

A recent public opinion survey conducted by MetroPOLL on the threat perception of the people of Turkey rings alarm bells. As a person who was part of the research team, I was shocked when I learned the answer to a question we asked about “the greatest threat to Turkey.” People point to two countries, the US and Israel, both of which are supposed to be Turkey’s allies and neither of which Turkey has ever been involved in a hot conflict. According to the poll, 43 percent of people feel threatened by the US and 24 percent by Israel, while only 3 percent regard Iran as a threat and 2 percent Greece.

It is good to see threat perception is down so much for regional countries, some of which are considered Turkey’s historical enemies, but bad that the perceived threat of the US and Israel is so high. To conduct a strategic relationship with such public opinion is not possible in the long run, especially in a democratic country.

I keep repeating in this column that democratization at home is having serious foreign policy implications. In a globalized world, as it is today, people are better informed about developments abroad and the effects on their lives. In an open society and with the means of communication these issues are widely debated. Thus people are increasingly empowered by democratization and globalization to influence decision-making bodies. In a democratic government, no one can remain indifferent to what people perceive and believe.

Without winning the hearts and minds of the people, a lofty discourse of friendship and alliance cannot be sustained. Therefore, people’s threat perceptions should be addressed. This cannot be done only by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party), though it should really strive to tell the people what they believe in when they talk of alliance and cooperation with the US in particular. In fact, there is no significant difference of opinion among the voters for the AK Party and the rest as revealed by the MetroPOLL research. As always, foreign policy issues cut across domestic political fragmentation.

While Turkey preaches peace, stability, cooperation, interdependence, and mediation abroad, it is unacceptable to plague ourselves with an unreasonable, unfounded threat perception that would restrain Turkish foreign policy.

To point to the underlying reasons for the perceived threat from the US The Wall Street Journal used the news about the research with a subtitle, “Ask Uncle Sam.” It is indeed true that this perception has a lot to do with US foreign policy. The occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan, the Armenian issue regularly surfacing in the US congress, pressures over the Iran issue and the unconditional support extended to Israel are the main policy issues that raise eyebrows about the US. One should also add the perceived support of the US for the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) or lack of support to fight against it, which is taken as a proof of the support anyway.

This is what the new US ambassador, Francis J. Ricciardone, to Ankara is going to find in Turkey: a very skeptical public. As the Obama factor could not be a remedy for the deteriorating image of the US in Turkey, he should pray that no shocking document comes out of WikiLeaks while he is serving in Ankara.

The number two threat to Turkey as perceived by the people is Israel, according to the MetroPOLL survey. Given the recent tension between the two countries, this may not be surprising. But if there are going to be future Turkish-Israeli relations, such a perception is poisonous. Yet Israel cannot expect better if it continues its policy of using violence to settle the problems that it encounters in the region. I am not only talking about the flotilla aggression but also refer to its dealings with the Palestinians both in Gaza and the West Bank as well as Lebanon, Syria, and Iran. The Israelis should understand that the future of Turkish-Israeli relations depends on the relationships it develops in the region. No Turkish government can develop normal cooperative relations with Israel while a huge majority of people in Turkey are deeply annoyed by Israel’s aggressive regional policy.

It may really take time to repair the damaged image of Israel among the people. Israel should care what “people think.” It would be wrong if Israelis think it is all about the “Islamist AK Party” government, and that when it is gone everything will be normal. Not really: When we look at it in detail, it is clear it is not only the AK Party. For instance on the question whether Turkey should freeze its relations with Israel or develop them, 71 percent of Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) voters, 73 percent of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) voters, 60 percent of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) voters and 63 percent of the AK Party voters say they should be “frozen.”

In short, what people think and perceive matters, especially in a developing democracy like Turkey.

Will the new strategy of opposition work?

The most important event in Turkish politics last year was the Republican People’s Party’s (CHP) change in leadership. It is a culmination of past events that indicates a fundamental change in their strategy to oppose the ruling party. With the leadership change, the opponents of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) decided to try a new strategy to bring down the ruling party, using democratic means with populist policies.

Their adoption of this new strategy came out of a process where undemocratic alternatives failed to bring about desired objectives. In the absence of strong political opposition to the ruling party, some had looked to the military and the judiciary as the center of the anti-AK Party block. These two institutions played just such a role, which they legitimized as protecting secularism.

For its part, the military tried to influence the presidential elections by issuing an e-memorandum against the ruling party in April 2007 in an attempt to prevent the AK Party majority in Parliament electing a new president. But it backfired. The military’s intervention created waves among the people, resulting in a landslide electoral victory for the AK Party, followed by the election of Abdullah Gül as president.

Discouraged by the military’s apparent ineffectiveness, the opposition looked to the judiciary to block the AK Party’s way. The filing of a closure case against the AK Party by the chief prosecutor in March 2008 was therefore welcomed. The court’s earlier decisions on party closures and the AK Party’s legislative activities encouraged the opposition groups who wished to see the end of the AK Party at the hands of the court.

The Constitutional Court had emerged as an institution capable of blocking the legislative activities of the AK Party government but it could not make the decision to close down such a popular party. Thus the non-closure verdict highlighted the limits of the Constitutional Court to be a focal point of opposition against the AK Party.

Invitations of these non-political forces into the political arena, however, did not bring the expected results, so what was left was to pursue opposition to the AK Party by political means. Having lost all hope that the AK Party could be toppled by the court or by pressure from the military, the CHP was forced to develop more creative policies against the AK Party within the political sphere. There was increased pressure on the CHP to transform itself into a viable political alternative to the ruling party. The party’s performance under Deniz Baykal was tested for the last time during the March 2009 elections. It was a failure again as the CHP finished far behind the AK Party in votes. It was proven once more that the CHP under Baykal’s leadership was unable to present a viable alternative to the AK Party.

It was not just about leadership. They revised the themes and discourse that they used to mobilize themselves against the ruling party. Focusing on secularism had proven fruitless. Because relying on that single issue was ineffective in bringing down the AK Party government, the opponents decided to challenge the AK Party on more concrete social and economic issues.

What they do is good for Turkey’s democracy because an alternative to the AK Party should be sought through democratic means and among political actors. The new strategy with its leadership and discourse-policy components developed in 2010 will be tested in 2011 with the June elections.

We will see if the new leadership and new political discourse will bring down the AK Party government. If the AK Party’s opponents fail again will they go back to their old strategy? Well, it is difficult; undemocratic means of opposition are hard to revive. The only exit is going forward through democracy.