The roots of anti-Westernism in Turkish military (II)

During the Cold War, the West -- for the Turkish military -- meant a security umbrella against Soviet pressures that gave it a free hand to dwell in Turkish domestic politics to institutionalize its autonomy and even its dominance. Moreover, the Western alliance also provided the military with modern weaponry that enhanced its political role even further as a modern military power. The end of the Cold War was, therefore, not welcomed by the Turkish military establishment. If cooperation with the West had basically remained grounded in security, the military's central role and power not just in foreign policy and security matters, but also in domestic political issues, would not have been questioned.

The prioritization of security in the Cold War logic had perfectly matched the dominant role that the military wanted to play in Turkish politics after 1960. The "communist threat" served the securitization of Turkish domestic politics, justifying the military's gradual occupation of political and economic domains as the only reliable barrier against communism. The communist threat also justified maintaining a "disciplined" society and democracy under the tutelage of the righteous military. Therefore, the end of the Cold War was worrisome for the military establishment, since the period had been used to promote Turkish exceptionalism among Western allies and to justify a limited democracy under the control of the military on the domestic front. The end of the Cold War thus meant the end of security-centered cooperation with the West, naturally pushing the military to the sidelines of the decision-making processes. As the nature of Turkey's relations with the West started to change, the military realized that it would lose the central place it used to occupy in Turkish politics, in addition to its former power and privileges.

Following the end of the Cold War security cooperation with the West has surely continued. But it has ceased to be the central theme of the relationship. The Turkish security establishment used to sell its geostrategic location to the West during the Cold War in return for a limited democracy. That is to say that the West did not want to take the risk of pushing for full democracy in such a strategically important country during the Cold War. Strategic perspectives overrode a democratic vision.

But the end of the Cold War placed Turkey in a different context. Turkey's partners in the West were no longer interested in buying Turkey's strategic assets with support for authoritarian elements within the military. For instance, when Turkey applied for full membership in the EU in 1987, it still tried to bargain on its contribution to Western defense vis-à-vis the Soviets. In those last years of the Cold War and in its aftermath, it was not easy to cash in "strategic assets."

Soon the EU defined a set of criteria for the accession of countries that did not privilege Cold War comrades. On the contrary, the EU's enlargement now included former members of the Eastern Bloc, and membership conditions included a democratic form of civil-military relations. The Turkish military establishment never understood how these former Soviet allies could be invited to the EU, while Turkey, a country that had defended the West against these very counties, was left out. This incomprehension reflects the inability of the security establishment to understand the changing nature of global politics. As the EU made membership conditional on full democracy, including proper civil-military relations, Turkish top brass saw the EU as deliberately aiming at weakening the military.
The EU pressures in the accession process for democracy, human rights and the rule of law meant a wave of desecuritization of Turkish politics that would diminish the power and privileges that the military had gathered over the years. The same goes for the EU's insistence on the settlement of the Cyprus question. In short, as the EU developed a democratic vision sidelining the strategic priorities of the Cold War era, the military establishment started to view the EU as an adversary plotting against Turkey.

All that the EU has asked from Turkey in the post-1999 period has meant the end of the military's political and economic power. Anti-EU sentiments in the Turkish military are just a natural instinct for protecting its power and privileges. It is for this reason that they did not refrain from forging alliances with ultra-nationalist anti-EU forces.

You may ask: Where are the concerns about the future of secularism in all this? Secularism is no more than a convenient disguise for a naked political struggle for the military and the rest. Were the earlier military interventions driven by the military's concern about secularism?

In short, the anti-Westernism of the military is due to the fact that in the post-Cold War era Western powers and institutions have preferred to work with civilian, democratic forces in Turkey and encouraged democratization instead of recognizing the military as a political actor with a "right to rule."
28.07.2008

The roots of anti-Westernism in Turkish military (I)

A retired general, Nejat Eslen, gave an interview last week to Nuriye Akman of the Zaman daily. The interview reveals a particular mindset that seems to be influential in military circles. Eslen explains why Turkey should abandon the Western alliance and embrace Russia, meanwhile forgetting about democracy, which he views as a platform of "counterrevolution" against the Kemalist regime. Eslen's position provides a vivid example of the assertion I explained last week, that "anti-democratic forces in Turkey are also the most anti-Western ones."The fate of democracy in Turkey is closely linked to its relations with the West. This has always been the case. The single-party rule came to an end in 1945 in response to the victory of democracies in World War II. To be a founding member of the United Nations and win the support of Western democracies against the growing Soviet pressure on Turkey, the autocrats of the 1940s decided to adopt multi-party politics. They allowed the establishment of rival political parties and went for an early election in 1946 before opposition parties could get organized. The election of 1946 was not fair and free. It was held under the supervision of the gendarmerie and in many places, votes were dictated in a system of "public voting and secret counting" instead of secret voting and open counting. While allowing opposing political parties, the ruling Republican People's Party (CHP) was expecting to continue its rule by using the state apparatus that it controlled.

But the will of people to elect their own representative was infectious; once uttered, it was impossible to forget. Moreover, Turkey's growing engagement in the Western institutions provided significant leverage against the authoritarian tendencies of the CHP leadership. Adnan Menderes' speeches in Parliament before the 1950 elections frequently referenced Turkey's membership in the UN and its charter as requiring multi-party democracy. The beginning of Turkey's security cooperation and being part of the Marshall Plan in the immediate post-war period encouraged democratic forces.
To cement Turkey's linkages with the West, the Democrat Party (DP) government under Menderes, who won the first free and fair elections in 1950, brought Turkey to NATO membership in 1954 and applied for membership in the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1959.

But Turkey's engagement in the West did not stop the internal power struggle between the democratically elected representatives of the nation and the civilian-military bureaucracy representing the state. The paradox of the DP rule was that the modernization that it had initiated strengthened the power of its rivals as well. The military, for example, as a result of cooperation with the US bilaterally and within NATO, received new equipment and developed better training. This military, better trained, better equipped and better connected with the West, was disturbed by the transfer of power from bureaucracy to people via democracy.

They responded via a military coup against the Menderes government in 1960. In the first communiqué issued, the junta expressed its commitment to NATO, in a move to neutralize Turkey's Western allies. They were indeed successful. The West could not risk losing the generals in such a strategically important NATO ally where the generals declared their loyalty to NATO. Shelving off democracy and even hanging the democratically elected prime minister of the 1950s who brought Turkey into the NATO was tolerated by the West on the grounds that they needed Turkey in the Cold War competition with the Soviets.

This logic worked again in the 1971 military memorandum and in the military coup of 1980. In each occasion of these military interventions, the generals were quick to declare their commitment to the West and NATO.

So the military managed to trade off abolishing democracy with the continuation of Turkey's Western alliance. 1960, 1971 and 1980 military coups proved to the military that Turkey's Western allies were complacent as regards a limited tutelage democracy. So long as the West-tolerated military's central role in Turkish politics remained, the military cadets did not question the West as political orientation or military ally. But with the end of the Cold War, parameters have changed. The West, relieved by the collapse of communism, put an end to its policy of "Turkish exceptionalism," questioning the role of the military in Turkish politics and the quality of its democracy. This is where the disappointment of the Turkish military cadets with the West has started to emerge.

If the West does not accept the military's right to rule, then what is the point of sticking to the Western alliance? The search for an alternative has started, which is justified by the military circles as "Turkey's changing strategic vision."
21.07.2008