Why do they hate the West?

Anti-Westernism used to be a distinguishing feature of the Islamic political identity. Now it is the mark of the Kemalist-secularist stance. The renewed demand of the West, particularly the EU, for democracy and the rule of law has highlighted sharp differences between the vision of a Turkey Europeanized as a natural outcome of the EU integration process and the Turkey visualized by Kemalist-secularist circles. They seem irreconcilable. The challenge of the West for the Kemalists is clear: In the EU integration process, it is impossible to preserve the old order. The West and the continuing Westernization that comes with the EU accession process, therefore, pose an existential threat to the Jacobin bureaucratic-civilian elite, which adheres to a notion of a homogenized nation and the practices of an authoritarian state.

But it was the Kemalists who used to be fans of the West and Westernization. At least we know it as such. Yet what the Kemalists understood by Westernization was merely a cultural adoption of the Western lifestyle for a certain purpose. That is, this new lifestyle differentiated them from the masses, who were traditional and Eastern/Islamic looking. They were the vanguard, chosen to enlighten a nation that was in darkness. Theirs was a kind of "white man's burden." Cultural Westernization was an act of exclusion of the traditional by which a boundary was erected between the state elite and the masses, who were poor, culturally backward and religious. Out of this symbolic oppression, the elite's right to rule was constructed, justified and reproduced over the years.

The West and the process of Westernization, however, gained new dimensions in time, especially after 1999, when Turkey declared itself a candidate country for the EU. They were no longer a means to dictate the rule of the Kemalist-secularists and control the masses.

The result thus was a struggle between the democratic periphery who wanted to end its bondage and the authoritarian center, which was determined to defend its privileges. As the former "utilized" the EU process, the latter resisted it on the grounds that the EU process was a plot to divide Turkey in the name of minority rights and undo secularism in the name of democracy.

This meant, for the Kemalist-secularist elite, abandoning Westernization, a process they had initiated. It was wise for them to do so, given the fact that the process of Westernization after 1999 continued on a different path. It involved more political and economic transformation than cultural change. That is to say that Westernization in the EU context meant the transfer of power from the state elite to the people. Thus, the public at large and the peripheral forces in the Turkish economy and politics moved in to extend the process of Westernization to its logical end: the formation of liberal democracy. The objectives of Westernization, for the first time in history, have begun to be pursued by social and economic forces from below.

In short, Westernization after 1999 has gone beyond its traditional function of "controlling" the social and economic demands of the periphery. It has turned into a mechanism through which the Kemalist state and its power is checked by the people at large. As such, Westernization, now defined by EU membership, has acquired a civil and democratizing content against the authoritarian tendencies of the Kemalist elite. This explains the adversarial attitude of the Kemalist-secularists to political reforms and EU accession. Thus, in the EU accession process, the elitist model of Westernization has been replaced by a democratizing Westernization.

This is how the Kemalist-secularists have come to hate the West.
12.05.2008

The Turkish military and the US

It is often said that Turkish-American relations have never been redefined according to the new circumstances that followed the end of the Cold War. It is true that the old paradigm of security cooperation based on a shared threat emanating from the Soviet Union and international communism no longer justifies the alliance. Since then the Turkish military has gone through a mental transformation in which its threat perception has changed. Now the Turkish military's central security question is highly political.

As expressed many times by the high command, including the incoming Chief of General Staff Gen. İlker Başbuğ, the main concern is the preservation of the Turkish "nation-state." They feel that the notion of a unitary nation-state is under threat. What can be done against such a threat? It is virtually impossible to identify its source. And even if this is done successfully, it is almost inconceivable to wage a war against it, since the perceived threat involves social, political and economic actors, rather than enemy militaries. Social and economic forces that act globally cannot be controlled. This is the predicament of the Turkish military's current threat perception. No one, including a superpower like the US, can address their fear about the future of the nation-state. Demands for greater human rights, democratization, pluralism, minority rights and the dynamics of globalization are all feared to weaken the nation-state. The identified source of these evils is the West. The military's unease, therefore, is not directed just at the US, but at the West at large. The West, which supports democracy that brings the "Islamists" to power, demands human rights that protect the "terrorists" and asks for minority rights that encourage "Kurdish separatism," is no longer seen as an ally, but as the adversary. The result is simple; The Turkish military's priorities, needs and threat perceptions fundamentally differ from those of the West. The negative perception of the West by the military is therefore structural, not circumstantial.

The Turkish military is also deeply disturbed by US Middle East policy, especially in relation to Iraq, where an independent Kurdish state is assumed to be in the making with the support of the US, with devastating implications for the Turkish nation-state. A former commander of the armed forces, Gen. Aytaç Yalman, argues that the US handed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Öcalan over to Turkey in 1999 not for the sake of Turkish-American relations, but in order to strengthen the position of Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani in northern Iraq (Fikret Bila, "The Commanders' Front," p. 317). The Turkish military believes that the strategic targets and priorities of the US and Turkey are irreconcilable. Addressing the security concerns of the Turkish military requires changing the entirety of US Middle East policy -- for starters. The Turkish security establishment also views Israel's engagement in northern Iraq with suspicion. This is another significant setback, given the good old days when the Turkish security establishment regarded Israel as a partner against the PKK. But this was when Öcalan was based in Syria. It was then convenient for the Israelis to squeeze the Syrians together with Turkey. Once Öcalan was kicked out of Syria and a new force in northern Iraq, namely the Kurds, emerged vis-à-vis Iran and Sunni Iraq and Syria, the Israeli policy is argued to have been changed in favor of forging an alliance with the Kurds along with the US instead of cooperating with Turkey against the PKK.

The Turkish high command today consists of officers who served in the Southeast against the PKK. This experience has shaped their threat perception and views of the US and the West. As reflected in their memoirs and public statements, the experience of war against the PKK has made the commanders think that the PKK is not acting on its own. If the PKK were on its own, the Turkish military, the second-largest force in NATO, would already have erased them. The fact that the PKK still exists is due to the fact that it enjoys substantial foreign support, support that mainly comes from the West. Such perceptions prevail among the officers who serve in the Southeast.

Moreover, those with experience against the PKK are the ones most likely to be promoted within the military. Officers with skill and experience in fighting the PKK are naturally promoted. As a result, the high command is made up of officers with the most negative view of the West and the US.
This line and logic of promotion contrast with past practices in which those who were likely to be promoted used to be the ones who had served in NATO posts. This change has left its mark on the Turkish military's composition and security culture. The result is that the Turkish military is speedily getting out of the NATO culture of solidarity and alliance.
05.05.2008