Turkish foreign policy: Time for a re-evaluation

The foreign policy of a country is not singularly directed abroad, it may also be a tool for domestic political purposes. Even if it is not instrumental in formulating domestic politics its repercussion on domestic politics is inevitable.

Foreign policy perceptions, choices, and orientations may strengthen a particular “order of things” at home. For decades, Turkish foreign policy not only reflected but also reinforced a “siege mentality” that portrayed its neighbors as enemies with territorial ambitions on Turkey. This created a tense relationship with neighbors with whom not only the state but the people of Turkey developed a deep distrust.

Such a portrayal of the outside world made sense, especially in the cold war years. Constant threats coming from the region justified the authoritarian power structure inside. Thus people at home had to be united against immediate threats in the region and be even aware of their internal extensions. Under such a continuous existential treat the idea of a fully functioning liberal democracy, human rights, and pluralism were regarded as a luxury and even risky. The politics of survival laid the ground for an authoritarian politics supervised by the military, denial of the existence of the Kurds and Kurdish identity, delays in democratization and widespread-cross ideological nationalism. Survival and the security of the state were used as justification for authoritarian state formation. In short, the threat perception that was exemplified through practical foreign policy issues served to tie down social demands, political actors and intellectual debates in Turkish politics. This mechanism started to change after 1999 when Turkey was declared as a candidate country for EU membership. As democratization, economic development and good neighborly relations were required to be a full member in the EU the Turkish governments, as well as social forces, pushed hard to change this mechanism of foreign policy that served to the securitization of Turkish political and social spaces. As a result of what I call the “liberal turn in Turkish foreign policy” foreign policy ceased to be a ground for the securitization of Turkish politics.

A paradigm shift occurred from pure power politics to a liberal foreign policy agenda seeing the countries of the region not as adversaries, but as partners prioritizing cooperation over conflict and soft power over military might and bullying. This opened the avenues of mutual understanding, trust, and cooperation in the region elevating Turkey as a country of mediation, engagement, and multilateralism. Out of this new paradigm of cooperation, Turkish companies, civil societal organizations, think tanks, individuals entered into a deep interaction in the neighborhood. Later these social and economic actors acted as driving forces for continued political dialogue and good relationships in the region.

When the Arab revolutions occurred many expected Turkey’s cooperation and dialogue-based soft power approach would continue. But the resistance of the Syrian regime to change last year and Turkey’s inability to persuade Syrian President Bashir al-Assad to introduce reforms has displayed the limits of Turkey’s soft power to influence change in Syria on which the Turkish leaders believed to have great leverage. Realizing that their very image in the “neighborhood” as a capable country is at stake the Turkish leaders have moved from persuasion to coercion against Syria.

Meanwhile after the total withdrawal of the US in Iraq, the central government under Nouri al-Maliki backed by Iran and driven by the Syrian crisis confronted Turkey. While Turkish business in Baghdad suffers from this change of wave in the bilateral relations the government in Ankara realizes again the limits of its soft power to persuade Maliki to mend the damage. The same goes for Iran which regards Turkey as a regional rival.

The Arab spring and the ensuing debate about “Turkey as a model” has added to the overconfidence of Turkish political actors. The Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs started to talk about “constructing a new order” and “a new Middle East” under the leadership of Turkey. This new language goes obviously beyond the liberal premises of the AK Party’s earlier stand of cooperation, engagement, and dialogue. Questions are increasingly raised as to whether Turkey has abandoned the “zero problem policy” and “soft power” approach, and embraced a policy of regional hegemony even domination.

My concern is that these indicators of yet another paradigm shift in Turkish foreign policy might be due to internal political developments like whether Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will run as the presidential candidate in 2014 and who will replace him in the ruling party. An internal power struggle may radicalize Turkish foreign policy in the near future.

Changing positions in Turkish politics

Instead of a structural change, Turkish politics brings a change to a tradition of the elite serving in old structures. It is, in fact, a matter of the loyalty of the elite -- whether loyalty is directed towards Kemalism and its institutional representatives or towards the agencies of the “new Turkey” under the Justice and Development Party’s (AK Party) rule.

Allegiance is certainly important; public authorities should have allegiances towards democratically elected rulers of the country, not towards an ideology and its vanguard within the state. Yet the change that Turkey needs should transcend a simple shift in loyalty. Interestingly for some, including the government, this seems satisfactory enough.

The changing attitude towards the military is the case in point. Only one or two years ago the military used to be regarded by the government and its allies as an obstacle to full democracy. Its personnel and activities were thus constantly scrutinized and transparency and accountability were demanded. Now thinking that it is in full control of the appointments within the military and thus breaking the autonomy of the military, the government is in defense of the military, its operations, and secrecy.

The Uludere incident in which 34 Kurdish civilians were massacred by Turkish jets by “mistake” is an example. Even after it became clear that Turkish jets made an incredible mistake and bombed innocent civilians, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan congratulated the military and the chief of General Staff. To this day the Uludere controversy continues and Prime Minister Erdoğan has not moved from his position of defending the military. It is still unknown what happened on that particular day, who gave the order to bomb and why. What we hear instead from the government and its allies in the media is that “we should trust our military and not weaken its spirit in the fight against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party [PKK].”

Surprisingly though, the main opposition party has become very critical of the military. Its leader, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, questioned the stance on the Uludere incident the other day asking, “Who is governing the country, the government or the military?” This displays the changing positions of the actors towards the military depending on the shifting loyalties on the part of institutions.

Another most recent case is a column written by journalist Bekir Coşkun, a strong Kemalist and an old ally of the military, who wrote a fable about a dog called Paşa. The column undoubtedly criticized the new form of relationship between the generals and the AK Party government. The military issued a strongly worded statement, just like the old days when such statements were issued against the conservatives and liberal writers and newspapers. It was the herald of the new relationship between the government and the military in which the Turkish military issued a statement condemning a Kemalist journalist. This time, while the conservative media remained silent against the statement, the Kemalist writers and newspapers reacted. Over this issue, Prime Minister Erdoğan called on all generals to sue Coşkun for insulting all paşas, including Kemal Atatürk. Indeed, the General Staff headquarters eventually filed a complaint against Coşkun, the most famous Kemalist writer and journalist.

All these events tell us that once loyalty of institutions and their administrators have shifted, the stances change as well: Old-time pro-military Kemalists turn against the military while the conservatives, once the victims of the military, come around and defend the generals. Another case in point is the Higher Education Board (YÖK). Last month an academic who is also a columnist in a conservative daily wrote, “Apart from its name, nothing is left to change in YÖK.” This reflects the attitude towards the old institutions inherited from the Kemalist era: So long as they are staffed by “our men,” there is no need for structural change.

Everyone knows that YÖK is one of the key institutions established by the military regime in 1982. The liberals, democrats, socialists, and conservatives have criticized it for its centralized, commanding and ideologically driven administration. Instead of regulating higher education, it tried to turn it into an ideological instrument of the state. As a result, throughout Turkey students were suppressed for wearing headscarves, or using Kurdish in their activities, and academics were intimidated.

These days are over but the structure remains unchanged. However, trusting in the new rulers at the top, can we say, “Nothing is left to change?” This is the greatest challenge for the “new Turkey” if we are interested in building democracy instead of simply replacing the old Kemalist tutelage.

Post-Kemalist tutelage

Kemalism is dead. No longer does it command the Turkish state. The bureaucratic elite that traditionally acted as the spokesperson of Kemalism has lost its status within the state apparatus, while the business elite have queued up to collect the benefits distributed by the state run now by a non-Kemalist political elite. The military and the judiciary, the two strongholds of Kemalism, have bowed to their new master.

Ideologically speaking, too, Kemalism is dead. The two faces of Kemalism, namely radical secularism and ethnic nationalism, desperately need facelifts. Secularism as a mechanism to exclude and oppress the conservatives cannot be sustained. It should be included in a democratic content that enables all faith groups to exercise full freedom for their activities. An imagined “single nation of the Turks” is not convincing, even for nationalist Turks. Recognition of the Kurdish ethnicity and identity is a must to build social peace and political order.

All of these would be good for the practice of democracy in Turkey if only the “new elite” were immune to the bad habits of the old elite. We see continuities in the usage of the state apparatus to construct a “particular type of person”. It seems that “state-made citizens” is the constant objective of governments in Turkey, be them Kemalist or conservative. The end results they seek may be different in form and in terms of values, but the means used and objectives sought have not changed.

What I am trying to say is that social engineering at the hands of the state is somehow continuing with the Justice and Development (AK Party) government. This has become visible in the field of education and cultural policies. It seems that Primer Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's stated objective “to raise religious generations” is shaping the government's educational and cultural policies. The use of state power to “form” the minds, habits, and lifestyles of citizens obviously cannot be reconciled with liberal values. For the AK Party, such a policy would be defended as part and parcel of its conservative identity.

But the problem is that once the AK Party uses the state apparatus to construct “conservative citizens,” by, for instance, reorganizing the educational system “to raise religious generations,” it appears to be following the path of Kemalism, which for years sought to create “secular and nationalist Turkish citizens.”

Such a path is not only unethical but is also impractical. One should also not forget the tension and conflict generated by cultural policies to create uniform citizens by state intervention.

It is futile to construct “identities” through state institutions and policies. If a particular identity is imposed by the state, it will either fail or succeed. If such a project were to fail, it would mean the resources used to this end would have been wasted. Additionally, there would be the cost of the conflict likely to erupt between the society subjected to identity transformation and the state imposing its own values.

If such a policy succeeds, you end up with a society subservient to and dependent on the state that has lost its dynamism, creativity, and plurality.

This has been the case in Turkey since the formation of the republic, when the Kemalist state imposed its own secular and ethnic values on the masses and the people resisted these state-imposed identities.

So, it is futile to try again, with the state this time imposing conservatives values that are “nationalized” by the state.

Besides, such a state would not only be dictating conservative values to “secular” people, it would also be imposing a particular set of conservative values on the conservatives who may be denied their own choice of conservatism. The teaching religion in all schools, as envisaged by the recent change in the education system, will empower the state over society and grant it greater presence in religious affairs, which is supposed to belong to the realm of society.

A state that teaches the people their religion steps into the realm of society, which is where religion belongs. Out of this, a hierarchical relationship will be built between the state and society, in favor of the former.

In short, using the same Kemalist means and methods “to create a conservative society” will result in a post-Kemalist tutelage, not a post-Kemalist democracy. Conservative social forces will not be better off under such a regime because the state will occupy all social space, eliminating independent social forces, including the conservative ones.

What do the Kurds want?

The quest for a new constitution continues despite the fact that the hope for its realization is dim. Almost every day public events are held in various cities, proposals are made and new research is conducted. All these indicate the determination of the Turkish people to make their own constitution.

It is widely acknowledged that one of the reasons why Turkey needs a new constitution is to address the Kurdish question. Issues about general rights, citizenship, the language of education and the administrative structure all have a bearing on the Kurdish question.

What about the Kurds? What do they expect from a new constitution? Recent research by the Center for Political and Social Research (SAMER), a Diyarbakır-based think tank, conducted an important survey assessing the expectations of Kurds in east and southeast Turkey.

According to SAMER’s research, 87 percent of the people in the region point to the need for a new constitution. The Kurds surveyed are also of the view that the new constitution should be made through the widest possible participation of individuals, civil society associations, trade unions, political parties, and similar groups. But the concern is expressed about the accessibility of the Constitutional Reconciliation Commission, in charge of drafting the constitution. Fifty-seven percent believe that their views have not been heard by the commission while 33 percent think that their views have been heard by the commission somewhat or to a satisfactory extent.

The top problem of Kurds in the region is cited as the Kurdish question (51 percent), followed by the economy (34 percent). This shows that two problems dominate for Kurds in the East and Southeast: identity and poverty.

On the relationship between the Kurdish question and the new constitution, people were asked: “To what extent would a democratic, civil and pluralistic constitution resolve the Kurdish question?” Responses showed hope is high. People surveyed expect that the new constitution will resolve the question. While 52 percent say the new constitution will resolve the question completely, 23 percent expect it to resolve the problem partially. We will see if these expectations can be met or not by political parties in Ankara.

Kurds of the region expect the new constitution to be based on democracy, human rights and the rule of law (95 percent), and the recognition of plurality in society (93 percent). Apart from desiring that these highly praised values be included in the new constitution, there are some values that the respondents wish to see excluded. For example, only 18 percent want the new constitution to be based on Kemalist nationalism. In short, Kurds of the East and Southeast want a democratic and pluralistic constitution and not a Kemalist one.

When it comes to the status of the Kurds in the new constitution, the respondents’ preferences are as follows: 19 percent favor independence, 41 percent favor democratic autonomy, 12 percent favor the current federal governance and 9 percent favor a decentralized system.

As for the issue of Turkey’s official language, 44 percent favor “Turkish as an official language while all other languages should be freely used,” 19 percent prefer naming Turkish and Kurdish as official languages, with others to be freely used. Similar results appear about the issue of the language of instruction in schools. Only 8 percent approve of the current model. Thirty-five percent think that education should be conducted in the mother tongue and other languages should be elective. There is also major support for education being in Turkish but Kurdish being an elective language in education (35 percent). This shows that Kurdish elective courses will address the demands of one-third of the Kurds.

Concerning ethnic references in the constitution, the Kurds are very clear: They reject the current model based on “Turkishness.” Thirty-three percent prefer no ethnic reference in the constitution while 62 percent want to see Turkish, Kurdish and other ethnicities referred to together. When asked what term should be used instead of “the Turkish nation” in the new constitution, 13 percent respond “citizens of Turkey,” 32 percent say “people of Turkey” and 42 percent favor “all citizens.”

In short, the Kurds have high expectations of the new constitution. Whether they will be met or not will determine the allegiance of these Kurds towards the Republic of Turkey. A final note: As for the demands and expectations of the Kurds, the SAMER research does not find much difference in responses between voters who support the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) and those who support the Justice and Development Party (AK Party). I think this is extremely important to take note of for the ruling party.

Can Barzani be a mediator?

No doubt Iraqi Kurdistan is the most peaceful and stable part of Iraq. As such it can be described as an island of stability in a region where conflicts among regional actors have recently been spreading.

Yet the peace and stability of Iraqi Kurdistan are fragile, too. It is vulnerable to the presence and activities of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in the north of the country.

With spring here, the PKK's cross-border operations are expected to increase, following a winter break, with assaults on targets in Turkey.

Security forces will certainly respond to any new wave of terrorist activities in Turkey. As the tension increases between Turkey and Syria, the former cannot afford to appear weak vis-à-vis the PKK. Furthermore, with the rising tension in the region, nationalist public reactions against Kurds within Turkey cannot be ruled out. All these will have destabilizing effects on the Iraqi Kurdish region.

Iraqi Kurds now have a golden opportunity to improve relations with Turkey. The only irritant between Turkey and the Iraqi Kurdish administration is the PKK. Once the PKK stops being a source of quarrels, the two sides will emerge as natural allies and partners in regional politics and further improve their economic cooperation.

This is recognized as such by the president of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), Massoud Barzani, who was on an official visit to Turkey last week. The way in which he was received is indicative of the potential for a full-fledged partnership.

To move in this direction Barzani seems willing to get rid of the PKK problem. I do not expect an open confrontation between Barzani and the PKK. This will be unacceptable to the Kurds of the region as a whole. But what I see is that Barzani has increasingly regarded the PKK as a burden for the future of Iraqi Kurds. And he is certainly right to see it this way.

The PKK concentrated its activities in camps in northern Iraq after being expelled from Syria in 1998. Exploiting the turmoil and lack of authority in the region, it turned Iraqi Kurdistan into a safe haven for its recruitment and training activities. For some time now the Kurdish administration has established itself in Iraqi Kurdistan, asserting authority and sovereignty. It is thus hard to explain the presence of a group described by the US and the EU as a terrorist organization within the territory the Kurdish administration claims controlled by the regional government in Arbil.

Stopping the activities and removing the presence of the PKK in Iraqi Kurdistan is a mission related to the statehood of the KRG in northern Iraq if it does not want its territory to be seen by its neighbors as a “no man's land” that everyone is free to intervene in.

I think it is a priority for Barzani to enhance stability and peace in the Kurdish region as this will speed up institutionalization and the legitimacy of the regional government. He will not wish to risk the achievements of the Iraqi Kurds by harboring the PKK, a terrorist network.

For this, Barzani called on the PKK during his visit to Ankara to “lay down [its] arms,” adding that they “won't get anywhere with weapons.” Another strong message Barzani gave was about the PKK presence in northern Iraq. He said, “I will not let the PKK prevail in northern Iraq.”

These messages may not persuade the PKK to lay down its arms and leave northern Iraq, but they will certainly put the PKK under strong pressure. Barzani does not control the PKK, but his influence over Kurds on both sides of the border is significant. This is not solely due to the historical struggle of the Barzani family for more than half a century in the region, but also due to Barzani's recent success in instituting semi-statehood in northern Iraq.

With this influence over Kurds and the trust of the Turkish government, Barzani can mediate a peace deal. The long-delayed Kurdish conference to be held in Arbil soon may be the beginning of a new era in which the PKK is compelled to come up with a “new thinking.”

The fall of the generals

The leader of the 1980 coup and the former “president” of Turkey, Gen. Kenan Evren, is now being tried in a court for staging a military coup.

It is really hard to believe this. Even those who voted in September 2010 for the amendment to the Constitution that lifted the protection from prosecution covering the military junta did not think that an actual trial was possible.

The idea of trying military personnel for plotting coups was inconceivable in this country. This was not only because of the lack of a legal and institutional framework for this but also because of the prevailing political culture that treated the military as untouchable. There was only one example of trying a coup plotter that took place, and this was in 1963. Then, Col. Talat Aydemir was executed after being tried in a military court for attempting a military coup. It is important to note that in this process, the government of the time and civilian powers did not play any role. The trial and execution were part and parcel of an internal power struggle within the military.

Col. Aydemir was a revolutionary who was a member of the junta that staged the coup of 1960. But at the time of the coup, he was abroad, so he did not get what he wished for in the post-coup administration. Despite this, he was appointed commander of the War Academy, an unconventionally high post for a colonel. But the colonel was not happy. All of his friends in the junta had higher offices after the coup. So he decided to stage his own coup. In 1962, he tried it by organizing the students of the War Academy. He almost succeeded. But when the air force failed to join in the operation on time, he failed in taking over the government. Despite his attempted coup, the government pardoned him as if nothing had happened. A year after, he tried and failed again. His persistent attempts annoyed the top military officers, not because he was trying to overthrow the government but because Col. Aydemir’s target was the top military brass who benefited from the 1960 coup but did not share the benefits with officers like himself. So, he was tried by the military court and executed in 1964.

In short, this affair, the first trial of a coup plotter, had nothing to do with civilian politics. Aydemir was a counter-revolutionary trying to counter the effects of the 1960 coup that excluded him from power.

So, the trial of the 1980 coup leaders that started last week is a turning point in Turkish politics. There had been a belief that a successful coup could not be brought before the courts. Once a junta succeeds in successfully staging a coup, it would escape trial forever. The trial of Gen. Evren disproves this belief that a “successful coup” cannot be tried.

It is a historic moment for Turkey. The trial will serve as the ultimate deterrent to the recurrence of similar incidents in Turkey. Thus, it is a process that will certainly enhance democracy in Turkey. But democracy will still remain incomplete unless the Constitution made by the junta in 1982 is replaced by a new one. It is not only the Constitution; the basic laws of the system are the making of the military regime. The Political Parties Law, Election Law and Higher Education Law were all introduced by the military junta. Thus, the leaders of the junta are on trial, but the junta’s laws and institutions are still intact.

If Turkey really wants to leave the period of military coups behind, it should eliminate the remaining legacy of the military regime. There is no point in trying the junta but ruling Turkey with its Constitution, laws and institutions.

Islam and the nuclear issue

Are nuclear weapons un-Islamic? Yes, according to Iranian religious leader Ayatollah Khamenei. His statement was reported by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who visited Iran and met with the country's religious leader after attending a nuclear summit in South Korea.

Khamenei, explaining that Iran is not interested in developing nuclear weapons, told the Turkish prime minister, “Islam does not allow weapons of mass destruction like nuclear ones.” So we should presumably be assured about the intentions of Iran, which is an Islamic republic and would not conduct any policy that is deemed un-Islamic.

I do not think there is anyone Muslim or non-Muslim who would believe such an explanation. Go and search for the record of human rights violations, corruption and usurpation of power in Iran. Encountering the voluminous evidence of all of these, one may wonder if such types of misconduct are allowed in Islam. The answer is of course negative. Iran is a typical example of a regime using Islam as a spiritual pretext to legitimate its worldly actions. I am sure if they develop a nuclear weapon and test it, Khamenei will quickly claim religious grounds for this.

It is all about politics and power, not religion. But “defending Islam” is a clever and popular excuse for one's actions. In this way a purely national quest for power and hegemony in the region is disguised as a policy of preserving the religion. This motive is still not admitted to by government officials. Yet on the street this logic works and appeals to common people.

The fact that a cultural outsider in the region, Israel, has nuclear weapons constitutes a perfect excuse for nuclear weapon seekers. Even Prime Minister Erdoğan, when speaking of Iran's nuclear program and its possibility of producing nuclear weapons, mentions Israel's nuclear weapons capability. It makes sense in the context of a call for a “nuclear-free region.” But it also taps into people's subconscious desire for an “Islamic bomb” to balance and deter Israel, to many the suspect aggressor in the Middle East.

Particularly when Israel bullies Iran about its nuclear program, Muslims side with Iran out of religious solidarity. Iranian leaders are very happy to see such solidarity among Muslims, even as it upsets regional Sunni governments. Israel's threats will therefore only justify Iran's quest for going nuclear in the minds of most Muslims.

If the world wants to stop Iran from going nuclear, it must first stop Israel from meddling in the process. Israel's visibility in this issue is totally counterproductive. When Israel threatens the United States by saying “you hit or I will,” it prevents the US from developing effective mechanisms to deal with the situation and to build a regional coalition to put pressure on Iran. In the upcoming negotiations taking place in İstanbul Israel should refrain from publically supporting a strike on Iran.

If Israel goes further and wages an attack on Iran, the region will descend into chaos. Such an attack will save Bashar al-Assad, stop the process of democratization in the region, put an end to the Arab Spring and destabilize the oil-rich Gulf monarchies.

An Israeli attack on Iran will have consequences that extend beyond the region. One of the first effects will be on the outcome of the presidential elections in the US. The moment Israel conducts such aggression against Iran, the chance President Barack Obama has for re-election will disappear.

The likelihood of an Israeli attack on Iran is very low, of course. It will only materialize if the Israeli government really wishes to sabotage President Obama's re-election chances.