Towards normalization of Turkish politics?

The election campaigns have started. Political parties have nominated their candidates for Parliament and announced their election manifestos.

But just when things seemed pretty normal, the Supreme Election Board (YSK) vetoed the nominations of some independent candidates supported by the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), creating a wave of political and social reaction. But it quickly took a step back and rectified the situation. However, what has remained are agitated supporters of the BDP and the increasing sensitivity of Turkish nationalists. The short-lived crisis benefited both.

Despite this short-lived crisis, so far Turkish politics certainly appears more stable and predictable when compared to the circumstances prior to the elections of 2007. Then the military was in the game of politics, determined to block the election of a president by the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) majority in Parliament. Moreover, the opposition to the ruling party was based on an Islamist-secularist divide without putting forward any policy alternative. It was a time described by opponents of the AK Party as when the republic was in “danger.”

Four years later this nonsense has been stopped. The military seems to have understood that its attempts to influence the election process often backfire. People tend to react democratically and side with those victimized by the military. So, I expect that the military will remain silent during this election process.

In addition, the main opposition party seems more sensible in its approach to political competition. With the resignation of the old leader of the party, Deniz Baykal, also went the old form of politics based on defending the state and the regime against the people. This old perspective utterly failed in creating an alternative to the AK Party. It is no surprise to me that the June elections will take place without Baykal’s leadership. The day after the 2007 general elections I wrote in this column that “Baykal has led his last election campaign as leader of the CHP.”

Since then, the CHP has changed not only its leader but also its political discourse. The 2011 election manifesto of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) presents a break from the CHP of 2007. It no longer calls on the people to defend the regime, secularism, and Kemalism but instead outlines how the CHP will protect and empower the people. In many ways, the election promises of the CHP are crude populism, but nevertheless, they indicate that the CHP is now much more interested in addressing the needs and demands of the people. This is good for both the CHP and Turkey as the party becomes less ideological and more policy-oriented.

So this election will be an election in which “visions” of political parties will compete with each other, signifying the normalization of Turkish politics.

This might be advantageous for the ruling AK Party as it has mastered developing projects and delivering services during its years in power. No doubt its strength lies in its performance over the last nine years. Management of the economy, which has generated remarkable economic growth under low inflation, is one of its greatest assets. With projects that improved services in health care, transportation, education, and social security, as well as conditions in villages and small towns, the AK Party government has managed to satisfy the needs and demands of large segments of society. Steps taken in the direction for democratization that include constitutional changes and the Kurdish initiative are also very positive.

But a problem for the AK Party is that although it has a very strong record to defend in this field of projects and services, it is not used to this kind of opposition. Because it was futile for opposition parties to organize their resistance against the AK Party on secularism and the lifestyle issues, the AK Party felt most comfortable countering this form of opposition. The CHP with a new policy style is a challenge for the AK Party. It may push the AK Party to be defensive, as turned out to be the case with the issue about the duration of compulsory military service.

Anyhow, Turkey is sailing in the realm of rational politics, not the realm of irrational fears about the future of the regime, as we witnessed four years ago.

Central bank governor and the poverty of White Turks

I keep writing that the old business elite and the White Turks are incapable of understanding the new Turkey. They are blinded by their Kemalist and secularist prejudice, coupled with their thirst for privileges.

Their opposition to the appointment of Erdem Başçı as governor of the Central Bank of Turkey in 2006 and the later smear campaign against Durmuş Yılmaz, who was eventually appointed governor, clearly illustrate how poorly they see the new dynamics and new actors in Turkey. Today some of the Kemalist White Turks are ashamed of themselves, given the outstanding performance of these two economists leading the central bank.

Başçı is now the governor of the central bank. His appointment is yet another indication of the defeat of the so-called White Turks, who the new Turkey does not need.

Başçı’s appointment was vetoed in 2006 by the then Kemalist President Ahmet Necdet Sezer. The reason for this veto was that Başçı’s wife wore a headscarf. This “simple-minded” attitude back in 2006 tells us a lot about the poverty of the myopic White Turks. They were not looking for merit but checked whether he was religious or not, and for that looked at his wife’s choice of clothing.

It is not really difficult to understand why the Kemalist White Turks have lost. For them what matters is not merit and qualification but loyalty to the Kemalist ideology and the continuation of their privileges. They are educated but ignorant, and rich but poorly connected to society and the world around them.

The fact that the international financial sector increased Turkey’s credit rating on Başçı’s appointment is, I think, a slap in the face of the arrogant but incompetent White Turks, who had blocked his appointment as governor five years ago.

This is only one side of the situation. On the other side is a shameful episode brought on by the White Turks. Back in 2006, when Başçı was vetoed, the Kemalist president had no choice but to appoint another person, Yılmaz, as governor, but the appointment was accompanied by an immediate smear campaign. Journalists poked into his private life, revealing his house and his wife, publishing big pictures of shoes left outside the door. The self-proclaimed ideologue of the White Turks, Ertuğrul Özkök, then wrote in his column in the Hürriyet daily commentary on Yılmaz, his lifestyle, his wife and his house. It was disgusting. Even as I write these sentences I find myself scowling as if I were looking at those dirty, revolting campaigns conducted by Özkök’s Hürriyet.

The campaign against Yılmaz was a reflection of hatred and jealousy, implying that while there are “presentable” White Turks ripe for this prestigious job, the government nominates those “ordinary” Turks with Islamic lifestyles. Then and now I only feel pity for them. Pity on them who have lost their privileges, turning them into “ordinary” Turks like the ones they look down on. But these “ordinary” Turks who lost their privileges are not able to compete in the free market of ideas and skills with real “ordinary Turks.”

On succession in the Turkish Central Bank, the Wall Street Journal writes: “The new governor will take over an institution whose credibility with markets has improved dramatically over the past decade. Mr. Yılmaz’s five-year tenure saw Turkey’s inflation rate fall to record lows, while the economy rebounded strongly from the impact of a global recession.”

Poor White Turks, the person they tried to belittle has succeeded in running the central bank with first-rate performance. In doing so, Yılmaz’s main aide was Başçı, whose appointment was vetoed by the Kemalist president in 2006. No doubt Yılmaz was one of the best governors in the world and, as a result, was recognized as the best central bank governor by Euromoney in 2009.

The right to stop dictators like Gaddafi

There are limits not to cross even for dictators. They think they have the right to do whatever they wish to their people. But the conscience of people and the dynamics of global politics do not allow them.

Likewise, the international community stood up and told Libya’s Gaddafi that he has no right to massacre his own people. This is a late but welcome move. Its importance goes beyond the Libyan case as it sends a clear message to all dictators of the world that they are not free to kill.

Once more we understand the moral limits to territorial sovereignty and the old principle of non-intervention. No one can hide behind these outdated terms from the 19th century to go ahead with massacres under the protective shield of sovereignty and non-intervention. No concept can serve to protect a state that engages in massive, widespread and systematic killings of its own citizens.

The borders of a state are not the walls of a prison in which the lives of its “inmates” are left to the mercy of the “guards,” that is, the dictators. The conscience of the people, as well as international humanitarian law, does not accept turning a country into a prison camp. People interfere, international organizations get involved, democratic governments take part to stop the dictators who cross moral limits. However late, limited, calculated and in some cases ineffective these may be, the dictators would know that one day they will be held accountable by their own people and the international community.

In this context humanitarian intervention is a means to force dictators to comply with international human rights laws. I know some who, based on the idea of sovereignty and order, would oppose humanitarian intervention. To them, we should issue the reminder that the “rights of states” come from the rights of individuals/citizens and therefore do not have any autonomous moral standing. The right of autonomy and thus sovereignty for states is derived from the respect on the part of the state for the right of the individual’s autonomy. If the ultimate justification for the existence of states is the protection of the natural/basic rights of citizens, then, as Fernando Teson argues in his book “Humanitarian intervention,” “a government that engages in substantial violation of human rights betrays the very purpose for which it exists.” As a result, the government loses not only domestic but also international legitimacy. Therefore, in such a case even foreign armies are morally entitled to help victims of oppression in overthrowing dictators.

The subject of international direct action should not be confined to genocide, enslavement and mass murder; serious, disrespectful, yet not genocidal oppression also justifies international military action.

Moreover, international order and peace are sustained better in an international system that consists of countries respectful to the basic rights of its citizens. This is repeatedly acknowledged by the UN Security Council (UNSC) in the post-Cold War era. Starting with Resolution 688 on Northern Iraq, the UNSC considered humanitarian crises emanating from massive human rights violations as “threats to international peace and security,” authorizing the use of force under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. Today it is crystal clear that there is a linkage between international peace and security and humanitarian crisis.

Furthermore from an international law perspective, it can be argued that the non-intervention principle is not an absolute norm in the contemporary international normative system. The UN Charter 2(7) forbids intervention in matters that are within the domestic jurisdiction of another state. But what are the “matters that are within the domestic jurisdiction”? International lawyers argue that to the extent a matter has been internationalized, the traditional prohibition against “intervention in the domestic jurisdiction of a state” is inapplicable. International undertakings have transformed the human rights violations that constitute a humanitarian crisis from domestic jurisdiction to international jurisdiction.

When and if, as Michael Walzer writes in his book “Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad,” the violation of human rights is on a scale which “shocks the moral conscience of mankind,” direct military action authorized by the UN is morally and legally justified to stop the continuation of gross violations of human dignity and rights. This applies to the Libyan case as well.

My only concern is that this humanitarian cause should not be sacrificed to the eccentricities of French President Nicolas Sarkozy and his tendencies to show off in order to secure re-election next year. This will be really, really ugly.

Gaddafi’s right to bomb his own people

Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi is exercising his “right” to bomb his own people. This is a “right” enjoyed by dictators. But the implementation of such a “right” threatens not only the nationals of Libya but regional and international security, thus the international community cannot remain indifferent to the massacres of people in Libya by Gaddafi.

The UN Security Council decided to impose sanctions and the International Criminal Court will be investigating the events in Libya to determine whether they constitute a crime against humanity. These are all welcoming measures but they still may prove ineffective to stop the massacres of the people.

Imposing an arms embargo, a travel ban and freezing the assets of Gaddafi, his family and his close associates, will not prevent the regime from committing further crimes. Besides, contrary to the claims by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, they do not harm the Libyan people. The UN Security Council sanctions can only be criticized for not being strong enough. I think more should be done.

The Libyan case forces us to rethink the link between a legitimate regime based on respect for human and citizens’ rights and international security. We should be aware of the fact that there exists a link between respect for human rights and maintaining national and international security. A working human rights regime constitutes one of the prerequisites for providing national security, which is domestic peace based on a wide-ranging social consensus concerning the legitimacy of a political regime.

Those who approach politics from a security-centric point of view should keep in mind that demands for human rights are, in fact, generated from the security concerns of individuals. Thus, human rights in their essence reflect the search for the physical and moral integrity of individuals. The idea of the inviolability of basic rights and freedoms aims at “securing” the individual as a moral agent. Thus one can ground human rights in a search for security at the individual level with undeniable links to security at a national level.

There exists, therefore, a tight link between individual security put forward as demands for human rights, and collective security at the national level. It is rather impossible to reach the objective of national security in countries where systematic and persistent human rights violations take place, let alone the massacres we have been seeing in Libya. Massive human rights violations destroy domestic peace and security by undermining the legitimacy of the political system. What is left then is not a legitimate government but a sheer mechanism of violence.

Furthermore, global peace and security are built through a legitimate government nationally that respects the basic rights of its citizens. Therefore, while the respect for human rights enhances national security, the state that is involved in systematic and massive violations of human rights endangers not only national but also international peace and security.

It is necessary and relevant to investigate the interplay between respect for human rights and international security for at least two reasons. First, the behavior of a state in the international arena cannot be separated from the way in which it treats its own citizens at home. This is to say that the kind of political regime prevalent domestically strongly influences its policy towards the outside world. Second, violations of human rights do not only harm individuals, groups or the people in the country concerned but may well endanger others, particularly in regional countries, as the repercussions of human rights violations cannot be confined within national borders. For instance, the outflow of refugees, which is one of the most tragic outcomes of human rights violations, may reach a massive scale in some cases with grave security implications for both the sending and receiving countries, damaging both regional and international security. This is clearly being seen in the Libyan case as hundreds of thousands of foreign workers are either trapped in Libya and the outpouring into neighboring countries, which is creating a humanitarian crisis.

Hence, the kind of political regime and the form of state-society relationship lay at the heart of the stability-instability problem determining, to some extent, prospects for international peace. This is to say that international security is dependent on domestic peace, which is in turn heavily influenced by the level of respect for human rights and a legitimate national government.

No ruler has the absolute right to treat its people any way he wishes. There are moral and legal limits to a sovereign’s right to kill his own people. And I think Gaddafi has passed that limit and this necessitates measures to stop him.

Why do we need a post-Kemalist republic?

Unless Turkey abandons Kemalism as a constituent element of the state and society, we cannot consolidate democracy and resolve the Kurdish question. The best a Kemalist paradigm can offer is a “tutelage democracy” under the supervision of the military.

Kemalism has left its mark on the state apparatus, the political culture, and the national psyche. In its essence, Kemalism envisages a homogenized nation and a disciplined society. Since the nation was not homogeneous but diverse ethnically and religiously, the state apparatus was used to eliminate sources of difference, or at least silence claims of difference. This resulted in assimilation efforts aimed at Kurds and the expulsion of many non-Muslims during the republican period. This positioned the state elite as a hegemonic authority vis-à-vis society that was subjected to the interferences of the state.

Moreover, the top-down modernization project as reflected in the radical reform movement in the early republican period assumed the possibility of constructing a “new society” in accordance with the ideological proposition of the state elite. Society was supposed to be “modern, secular, Turkish and loyal,” as taught to them by the Kemalist vanguard. Viewing society as subject to the interferences of the state elite to be modernized, secularized and nationalized built a “hierarchical relationship between the state and society.”

All these reflected the belief that a “new society” can be built through state intervention according to the model imagined by the Kemalist elite. It is obvious that democracy which prioritizes society over the state could not be established under such a hierarchical relationship. This Jacobin attitude that still prevails among the secularists and the Kemalists prevents them from embracing democracy and its political outcomes. It is then possible to assert that under a strict Kemalist order, which places the state and its ideological vanguards above society, democracy cannot flourish. To make the democratization process irreversible and consolidate democracy in Turkey then, a post-Kemalist republic is needed.

A related problem is the form of military-civilian relations. Since the 1960 military coup, the military established itself as autonomous from the political sphere. With the 1961 constitution, it created tutelage over politics. While it was autonomous from politics, the latter was subordinated to the priorities and preferences of the military. This was done by claiming that the military was the vanguard of the Kemalist republic. Such a self-appointed role after the 1960 military coup constituted the grounds for the constant interference of the military in political affairs.

Thus Kemalism of the formative years was reinvented in the 1960s to limit democratic politics and justify a role for the military to assert its will over the people’s will. Backing up Kemalism with the armed forces created a fatal power against democratic forces. To get out of this trap what is essential is to reform the military as a “professional” unit and not as an ideological one seeking political power, which requires total control of the military by civilians. This, however, cannot be done in a Kemalist state in which powerful institutions will always try to derive the right to rule from their ideological commitment to Kemalism. Thus, a post-Kemalist state is needed to eliminate the possibility of using ideological justifications over the national will and representative institutions.

Another reason for the need to form a post-Kemalist order concerns the Kurdish question. It is not only the continuation of the question itself but its usage by the state elite that is an obstacle to democratization. The Kurdish question has always been used as a pretext for authoritarian political formations in Turkey. This was first carried out over the Kurdish rebellion in 1925 by Sheikh Said. To suppress the rebellion, the regime in Ankara did not limit its measures to the Kurdish areas and people. But the occasion was used to suppress all opposition in Ankara and İstanbul. The new opposition party, the Progressive Republican Party, was closed down and the dissenting İstanbul press was silenced as part of the crackdown following the Sheikh Said rebellion.

Since then the pattern has not changed: “Kurdish demands” have been used by the authoritarian elements in the state to postpone full democracy, suppress human rights, ignore the rule of law and spread a militarist political culture provoked using the threat the Kurdish demands were supposed to pose to the integrity of Turkey. Therefore, to build and consolidate democracy in this country, the Kurdish question should be resolved. The Kurdish question has to be resolved, first to address the demands of the Kurdish question and second to deprive the state of an excuse to postpone meeting the requirements of full democracy.

And the Kurdish question cannot be resolved within the paradigm of Kemalism that imagines a homogeneous Turkish nation denouncing even the presence of the Kurdish people. In short, we need to have a post-Kemalist republic in order to consolidate democracy, establish civilian control over the military and resolve the long-standing Kurdish question.

Is the AK Party experience relevant for the Middle East?

Demands for reform shaking the Middle East have once again brought up the debate over the model that Turkey can offer its region. For years some thought Turkey could be a “secular-democratic model” for the Muslim Middle East. But the problem was that Turkey’s secularism was authoritarian, not leaving any autonomous space for religion and, moreover, significantly limiting freedom of conscience.

So it was not something to aspire to. Second, Turkey’s democracy was far from a model to be imported as it was under the tutelage of the military, which intervened regularly to discipline political actors and society when there was any deviation from a strict Kemalist ideology. The “old Turkey” had nothing to offer, but as Turkish secularism and democracy have been in the process of restructuring under the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) rule, “Turkey as a model” has more relevance today. But on this topic, I still think it is not Turkey per se but the experience of its ruling party, the AK Party, and its conservative constituency that can offer a model for the democracy-aspiring masses in the Middle East.

The AK Party’s story has relevance for the people of the Muslim Middle East. It demonstrates that Islamic identity is not in contradiction to democracy and that there is no inevitable clash between Islamic identity and the West, globalization and the market economy. The AK Party’s story tells Islamic movements in the Middle East that once they abandon their radical political stand and thereby manage to reach out to a broader public, they will be better equipped to deal with an authoritarian state apparatus. The AK Party experience tells them that instead of fighting against globalization, getting the system behind your cause for greater freedom and greater welfare for people will make your objective more reachable. The story of the party is the one that demonstrates what a reformed Islamic party can achieve through democracy. The party rejects describing itself as a political movement with Islamist roots or objectives. It has transformed itself from a marginal Islamist movement to a mass political party. No doubt it originated as an Islamic-oriented party, the Welfare Party (RP), which was closed down in 1998 on the grounds that it was a center for anti-secular activities. Having won two subsequent elections since 2002 and having been able to elect the new president, Abdullah Gül, from among its own ranks, the party is now poised to win for the third time in the 2011 elections. It claims to represent the “center” in Turkish politics, not a marginal Islamist or nationalist trend.

Since its establishment in 2001, the AK Party has developed a three-layered strategy. First, it adopted a language of human rights and democracy as a discursive shield. Second, it mobilized popular support as a form of democratic legitimacy. Third, it built a liberal-democratic coalition with modern/secular sectors at home and abroad that recognize the AK Party as a legitimate political actor. By gaining discursive supremacy over its opponents and building a broader social and political front, it has managed to outmaneuver its secularist/Kemalist opponents. It seems that the AK Party has overcome the central problem of its predecessor, namely legitimacy and systemic security, by speaking the language of human rights, democracy and popular will that built up its democratic credentials.

As they witnessed their political parties being closed down, their leaders banned from political activities and their associations and foundations intimidated, the old Islamists have moved to embrace the language of civil and political rights that provided them with both an effective leverage against the pressures of the state and a base on which to build up international coalitions. And they forged a unique coalition with pro-reform groups at home and abroad that bolstered the position of the Islamic polity vis-à-vis their Kemalist/secularist opponents.

Thus, the main body of the Islamic movement has adopted a new and positive stance on approaching the West, Turkey’s membership in the EU and the integration of Turkey into the global structures and process. This was a clear break from its tradition that used to be based on an outright rejection of the West, a deep suspicion of modern political discourse and an objection to the Turkish experience of Westernization. It was this transformation that paved the way for an electoral victory in 2002 for the AK Party, which has been ruling the country since then. AK Party leaders seem to be aware of the fact that to have an Islamist agenda, or to develop one, would be a self-defeating strategy for the party. The AK Party has chosen to be a party representing those conservatives and democrats on the center-right, not ideological rigidity. As a mass political movement, the AK Party carries messages and credentials that are conservative, nationalist, Islamic and democratic. Its social base is heterogeneous, too, made up of both the urban and rural, the rich and poor, as well as the highly educated and less educated.

If studied properly, I think the AK Party can offer a new way of thinking about Islam, democracy and the West in the “new” Middle East.

People power in the Middle East and the West

Calls for change have been shaking the Arab Middle East from Tunisia to Egypt and Yemen. Are people becoming “agents of change” in this part of the world? Is what we see an emergence of people power in the Middle East?

In the meantime, however, the people of these countries should not be deprived of international support for democratization. For a change, the West should not side with dictators in the Middle East but with the people.

For decades now the West has been trapped by analysts who advocated supporting despotic regimes in the Middle East to stop the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, even if this meant oppression, violence, and poverty. This was, in fact, not the correct strategy. The ensuing accusations of Western double standards were then not unwarranted. It was obvious that after the end of the Cold War the Middle East was exempt from the wave of democratization.

The Algerian case is exemplary in this context. A democratic electoral process was stopped by the military in 1991 when it became clear that the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was to form a majority in parliament. Implicit and explicit support of the West for the military intervention that resulted in chaos and the death of tens of thousands of people in Algeria is still well remembered.

Such an attitude adopted by the West constituted one of the grounds for the widespread anti-Western sentiment. While democracy was applauded in every part of the world, it has been denied to the people of the Middle East. This fueled anger towards Western governments that supported suppressive regimes in the Middle East. The excuse for this unprincipled support was to stop the rise of radical political Islam.

Have Western policymakers and analysts not yet understood that suppressive and corrupt governments in the Middle East use the “threat of Islamism” as a convenient tool to secure the support of the West? With the “threat of Islamists” having become a fruitful “strategic asset” in the hands of repressive governments, it became impossible to expect from these governments that they would finish off the “threat.” The paradox for the West is evident. Oppressive and corrupt regimes in the Middle East used the “Islamist threat.” Thus, even if there was no such threat, they created one or kept such existing “threats” in order to “sell” themselves to the West.

In the wake of uprisings in the Middle East, Western governments and media should do away with this vicious circle. It is time to realize that suppression through authoritarian governments is not the way to deal with Islamic radicalism.

Second, important rethinking relates to the process and outcomes of democratization. It is not a process that merely benefits radical Islamists. The process also does not necessarily bring radical Islamists to power. It is fundamentally misleading to equate democratization with Islamization in the Middle East. What people want is a representative and accountable government. A democratic mechanism may bring the Islamists to power, but it also has the built-in mechanisms to oust them from power. It is Orientalist reductionism to assume that Muslims will blindly vote for an Islamist party, disregarding their program and performance once in power. The inclusion of Islamists in the political process is absolutely necessary to establish representative and accountable governments in the Middle East.

I think the people of Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and others in the Middle East are capable of electing their representatives and holding them responsible for what they do and what they do not do while in government.

Whenever we talk of Middle Eastern politics, one concept is key: legitimacy or, to be more precise, the lack of legitimacy of the regimes in the Middle East. Some buy it through a rentier economy, some cover it up through ideological or nationalist sentiment and some silence the masses with oppressive apparatuses and measures. But I think it is becoming ever more difficult to sustain such regimes. Legitimacy generated through democratic participation is an absolute must.

Discontent can no longer be contained. There is a moment when the cost of oppression outweighs the cost of tolerating democratic change. The Middle East is at such a crossroads. And the international community should decide with the people of the region on what they prefer. Will they stand for the durable stability of democracies or the fragile and shaky stability of dictators?