Demands for reform shaking the Middle East have once again brought up the debate over the model that Turkey can offer its region. For years some thought Turkey could be a “secular-democratic model” for the Muslim Middle East. But the problem was that Turkey’s secularism was authoritarian, not leaving any autonomous space for religion and, moreover, significantly limiting freedom of conscience.
So it was not something to aspire to. Second, Turkey’s democracy was far from a model to be imported as it was under the tutelage of the military, which intervened regularly to discipline political actors and society when there was any deviation from a strict Kemalist ideology. The “old Turkey” had nothing to offer, but as Turkish secularism and democracy have been in the process of restructuring under the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) rule, “Turkey as a model” has more relevance today. But on this topic, I still think it is not Turkey per se but the experience of its ruling party, the AK Party, and its conservative constituency that can offer a model for the democracy-aspiring masses in the Middle East.
The AK Party’s story has relevance for the people of the Muslim Middle East. It demonstrates that Islamic identity is not in contradiction to democracy and that there is no inevitable clash between Islamic identity and the West, globalization and the market economy. The AK Party’s story tells Islamic movements in the Middle East that once they abandon their radical political stand and thereby manage to reach out to a broader public, they will be better equipped to deal with an authoritarian state apparatus. The AK Party experience tells them that instead of fighting against globalization, getting the system behind your cause for greater freedom and greater welfare for people will make your objective more reachable. The story of the party is the one that demonstrates what a reformed Islamic party can achieve through democracy. The party rejects describing itself as a political movement with Islamist roots or objectives. It has transformed itself from a marginal Islamist movement to a mass political party. No doubt it originated as an Islamic-oriented party, the Welfare Party (RP), which was closed down in 1998 on the grounds that it was a center for anti-secular activities. Having won two subsequent elections since 2002 and having been able to elect the new president, Abdullah Gül, from among its own ranks, the party is now poised to win for the third time in the 2011 elections. It claims to represent the “center” in Turkish politics, not a marginal Islamist or nationalist trend.
Since its establishment in 2001, the AK Party has developed a three-layered strategy. First, it adopted a language of human rights and democracy as a discursive shield. Second, it mobilized popular support as a form of democratic legitimacy. Third, it built a liberal-democratic coalition with modern/secular sectors at home and abroad that recognize the AK Party as a legitimate political actor. By gaining discursive supremacy over its opponents and building a broader social and political front, it has managed to outmaneuver its secularist/Kemalist opponents. It seems that the AK Party has overcome the central problem of its predecessor, namely legitimacy and systemic security, by speaking the language of human rights, democracy and popular will that built up its democratic credentials.
As they witnessed their political parties being closed down, their leaders banned from political activities and their associations and foundations intimidated, the old Islamists have moved to embrace the language of civil and political rights that provided them with both an effective leverage against the pressures of the state and a base on which to build up international coalitions. And they forged a unique coalition with pro-reform groups at home and abroad that bolstered the position of the Islamic polity vis-à-vis their Kemalist/secularist opponents.
Thus, the main body of the Islamic movement has adopted a new and positive stance on approaching the West, Turkey’s membership in the EU and the integration of Turkey into the global structures and process. This was a clear break from its tradition that used to be based on an outright rejection of the West, a deep suspicion of modern political discourse and an objection to the Turkish experience of Westernization. It was this transformation that paved the way for an electoral victory in 2002 for the AK Party, which has been ruling the country since then. AK Party leaders seem to be aware of the fact that to have an Islamist agenda, or to develop one, would be a self-defeating strategy for the party. The AK Party has chosen to be a party representing those conservatives and democrats on the center-right, not ideological rigidity. As a mass political movement, the AK Party carries messages and credentials that are conservative, nationalist, Islamic and democratic. Its social base is heterogeneous, too, made up of both the urban and rural, the rich and poor, as well as the highly educated and less educated.
If studied properly, I think the AK Party can offer a new way of thinking about Islam, democracy and the West in the “new” Middle East.
So it was not something to aspire to. Second, Turkey’s democracy was far from a model to be imported as it was under the tutelage of the military, which intervened regularly to discipline political actors and society when there was any deviation from a strict Kemalist ideology. The “old Turkey” had nothing to offer, but as Turkish secularism and democracy have been in the process of restructuring under the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) rule, “Turkey as a model” has more relevance today. But on this topic, I still think it is not Turkey per se but the experience of its ruling party, the AK Party, and its conservative constituency that can offer a model for the democracy-aspiring masses in the Middle East.
The AK Party’s story has relevance for the people of the Muslim Middle East. It demonstrates that Islamic identity is not in contradiction to democracy and that there is no inevitable clash between Islamic identity and the West, globalization and the market economy. The AK Party’s story tells Islamic movements in the Middle East that once they abandon their radical political stand and thereby manage to reach out to a broader public, they will be better equipped to deal with an authoritarian state apparatus. The AK Party experience tells them that instead of fighting against globalization, getting the system behind your cause for greater freedom and greater welfare for people will make your objective more reachable. The story of the party is the one that demonstrates what a reformed Islamic party can achieve through democracy. The party rejects describing itself as a political movement with Islamist roots or objectives. It has transformed itself from a marginal Islamist movement to a mass political party. No doubt it originated as an Islamic-oriented party, the Welfare Party (RP), which was closed down in 1998 on the grounds that it was a center for anti-secular activities. Having won two subsequent elections since 2002 and having been able to elect the new president, Abdullah Gül, from among its own ranks, the party is now poised to win for the third time in the 2011 elections. It claims to represent the “center” in Turkish politics, not a marginal Islamist or nationalist trend.
Since its establishment in 2001, the AK Party has developed a three-layered strategy. First, it adopted a language of human rights and democracy as a discursive shield. Second, it mobilized popular support as a form of democratic legitimacy. Third, it built a liberal-democratic coalition with modern/secular sectors at home and abroad that recognize the AK Party as a legitimate political actor. By gaining discursive supremacy over its opponents and building a broader social and political front, it has managed to outmaneuver its secularist/Kemalist opponents. It seems that the AK Party has overcome the central problem of its predecessor, namely legitimacy and systemic security, by speaking the language of human rights, democracy and popular will that built up its democratic credentials.
As they witnessed their political parties being closed down, their leaders banned from political activities and their associations and foundations intimidated, the old Islamists have moved to embrace the language of civil and political rights that provided them with both an effective leverage against the pressures of the state and a base on which to build up international coalitions. And they forged a unique coalition with pro-reform groups at home and abroad that bolstered the position of the Islamic polity vis-à-vis their Kemalist/secularist opponents.
Thus, the main body of the Islamic movement has adopted a new and positive stance on approaching the West, Turkey’s membership in the EU and the integration of Turkey into the global structures and process. This was a clear break from its tradition that used to be based on an outright rejection of the West, a deep suspicion of modern political discourse and an objection to the Turkish experience of Westernization. It was this transformation that paved the way for an electoral victory in 2002 for the AK Party, which has been ruling the country since then. AK Party leaders seem to be aware of the fact that to have an Islamist agenda, or to develop one, would be a self-defeating strategy for the party. The AK Party has chosen to be a party representing those conservatives and democrats on the center-right, not ideological rigidity. As a mass political movement, the AK Party carries messages and credentials that are conservative, nationalist, Islamic and democratic. Its social base is heterogeneous, too, made up of both the urban and rural, the rich and poor, as well as the highly educated and less educated.
If studied properly, I think the AK Party can offer a new way of thinking about Islam, democracy and the West in the “new” Middle East.
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