Does geopolitics bring about EU membership?

“Being strategically important will not make Turkey an EU member-country.” This was the warning from a friend of Turkey, Joost Lagendijk, the co-president of the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Commission, published in a commentary by the Taraf daily last week.

This is a valuable comment to keep in mind. While there have always been strong advocates of the geopolitical argument on the Turkish side, it seems that there are some in Europe who are increasingly emphasizing Turkey’s strategic importance. What should be underlined is that those advocates of the geopolitical argument, both in Turkey and in Europe, are not really enthusiastic about Turkey’s accession to the EU. They are more than prepared to settle with a “special partnership” for Turkey.

The strategic thinking that works on the Turkish side maintains that if the EU really wants, it should take Turkey in without questioning the nature of its political regime. What those who ask for such an offer do not know is that the EU is not a strategic alliance but a union of values.

Even an alliance like NATO has in the post-Cold War era developed a set of political values as the basis of the alliance, thus going beyond strategic cooperation. If Turkey asked for NATO membership today, I doubt very much that it would be qualified to be a member.

The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is an important aspect of the EU’s institutional and political cooperation. Yet, since the Maastricht Treaty, signed in 1992 between members of the European Community, one of the objectives of the CFSP has been to promote and consolidate democracy, human rights and the rule of law worldwide.

For some in Turkey, EU membership is acceptable only if it does not require a restructuring of the state, improving democracy, enhancing human rights and the rule of law. That is to say, some want to get the benefits of the EU without paying the price in return for Turkey’s strategic contribution to the EU. The interesting thing is that the price that these circles, particularly the military, do not want to pay is democratization, human rights and the rule of law.

For sure, some regional and global developments have encouraged advocates of the strategic perspective. Turkey may serve as a transit route for the transportation of energy resources from the East to Europe. It may thus help Europe diversify its energy resources. The Iraq war and the instabilities in the Caucasus seem to have added to the strategic value of Turkey as well.
Do these developments, which underline Turkey’s geopolitical location, make Turkey an indispensable part of Europe or its strategic partner? My answer is that they only convince the Europeans that Turkey should be kept at the periphery with a strategic perspective.
Yet the “strategic thinking” seems to be reviving as Turkey loses momentum in doing what is necessary to do, and Europe still seems hesitant on the overall added value of a democratic and prosperous Turkey to Europe.

What has revived is the old trick; that is, to sell Turkey’s strategic value to the Western allies. It seems that some old guards in Turkey never abandoned this old-fashioned game of seduction. It is a great mistake to think that a strategic location is an asset on its own.

Moreover, putting emphasis on the “strategic perspective” in EU-Turkey relations is a trap for the genuine supporters of Turkey’s EU accession. As Lagendijk rightly warns, the “strategic perspective” is bound to end up with an offer from the EU for a “special partnership” instead of full-fledged membership.

10 November 2008

Obama or McCain for Turkey?

This week the American people are electing their next president. No doubt this election carries global implications. Is it time for a change, as advocated by Obama's supporters, or is it a time to be cautious and carry on with neocon American unilateralism? We will see.

Turkey has always been interested in US elections. Every election season, Turks tune in to hear what the candidates are saying about two particular issues: Cyprus and Armenian genocide claims. It is widely believed that Greeks and Armenians are powerful enough to impose their agendas on candidates during their election campaigns. A Republican president who prioritizes "interests" over "values" is expected to be more sympathetic to the Turkish cause. The logic is simple: A power-politics perspective that is informed by geopolitical necessities in the region understands and appreciates the importance of Turkey much better than an "idealist democrat" would.

This rather old-fashioned analysis was spectacularly invalidated during the presidency of George W. Bush when Turkish-American relations experienced one of their worst periods ever and the popularity of the US and its policies declined drastically.

The Bush presidency proved that instead of being interested only in what the American president thinks of Turkey, we must watch how he runs his own country to understand what he truly means to us. The foreign policies of a statesman are not independent of his general political outlook.
Sticking to an old habit from the Cold War and imprisoning Turkish-American relations to a mere strategic alliance, a policy promoted in some circles in both Ankara and Washington does nothing to improve the relationship between the two countries. What is needed is not merely a strategic alliance but a "democratic partnership."

Thus cooperation against a terror organization is a good starting point for the improvement of relations, but it is not the end of it. The US, as a "democratic partner," should do more than declare the [outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party] PKK a terror organization and share intelligence on the group with Turkey. This is an old paradigm based on the notion of fighting together against the common enemy. What about a positive vision shared between the two countries? How about a partnership to building peace and democracy in the region? It is time for a "positive alliance," one that is not based on "against" this or that, but rather "for" a shared vision.

This requires treating Turkey as a "democratic partner." An American administration that is not sensitive to Turkey's quest to perfect its democracy will lose the faith of the Turkish public by being seen as allied with anti-democratic forces. This is in fact what has happened during the last couple of years when the US administration failed to show solidarity with democratic forces in Turkey. As a result, anti-American nationalists, as well as pro-Western liberals, have grown critical of the American attitude. The result was a "double alienation" of the American administration in Turkey.
To avoid this, America should understand that its partner in Ankara is the elected government, not a "few good men in the Turkish military." Turkish-American relations have gone beyond cooperation for security and into diverse and sophisticated issues. Even in order to continue cooperating on security, America's counterpart in Ankara is the democratically elected government, not the chief of general staff. Treating Turkey as though Cold War conditions are still prevalent would be a grave mistake on the part of an administration headed by Obama or McCain since it would mean that they fail to understand the "democratic reformation" that has taken place in Turkey in recent years, a process Americans could have contributed as much to as the EU has.

I think it is time for a change in Turkish-American relations as well. An Obama presidency in the US is more likely to add a "democratic vision" to the "strategic perspective" that still prevails in Turkish-American relations.

03 November 2008

Turkish military and the Kurdish question

At the heart of the Kurdish question lies an "imagined Turkish nation" which is assumed to be ethnically homogenous and politically equal. Such an imagined nation came out of a concern that without a unified and homogenous nation, territorial and political integrity of the new republic could not be sustained. Viewing differences as potentially disruptive to unity, the Kurds were assumed to be part of the Turkish nation, and their distinct language, culture and history were denied.
This has not occurred only to the Kurds. The republican regime has always had problems with identities, be it ethnic or religious, or even ideological. Allegiances to entities rather than the state were always viewed with great suspicion, giving the impression that the state was fearful of competing with other social and political entities for the loyalty of its citizens. This sense of insecurity, prompted by a top-down authoritarian modernization project, has resulted in a deep distrust of people who are considered potentially anti-republican or anti-Turkish nation-state. The problem was in fact not modernization, nation building or even secularization, but the exclusionary manner in which the Kemalist state elite conducted these processes. Denying representation to different ethnic and religious groups at the center with their own distinct identities only served to exclude and alienate Islamic/conservative groups and the Kurds, which in turn added to the insecurity of the Kemalist regime.
The way to break this vicious cycle is to broaden avenues of representation for these historically excluded identity groups and abandon the Kemalist policy of imposing an official identity/ideology for the people, be it Turks or Kurds. Though the Turkish military continues to imagine Turkey/Turkish nation/Turkish nation-state as homogenous, the founding myths of the Turkish nation-state have proved to be fallacious. Turkey needs to generate a new social consensus for coexistence among its diverse ethnic groups. One of the grounds for a renewed consensus is a constitution with liberal, democratic and pluralistic elements that will recognize the Kurds as being included. The second ground on which a new consensus can be built is to secure EU membership. These two areas, a new constitution and EU membership, are in fact mutually supportive objectives.
What is the position of the military on these broad objectives as the grounds to address the Kurdish question? There hasn't been a public statement by the military on the new constitution. But it is known that the military views political reforms that further democratization and improve human rights very critically. Democracy and human rights are considered fallacies, as reflected recently in the statement of Gen. [İlker] Başbuğ when he took up the job of chief of general staff. Recognition of the Kurds as an ethno-political group is strongly opposed by Başbuğ.
Concerning EU membership, we know how skeptical the top military brass are. The EU is viewed as a post-modern political project that will destroy the Turkish nation-state. Apart from supranational characteristics of the EU that threaten the Turkish nation-state, the military does not have favorable views on individual European states either. Almost all are depicted as "Turkey's so-called friends and allies," most of whom support the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).
The military wants to fight against PKK terrorism but not to address the root cause of the problem, the Kurdish question. In its public statements the military points to the need for non-military measures to overcome the PKK terror. By such discourse it implies that political leadership is not doing enough to eliminate social and political circumstances that enable the PKK to recruit new militants. Thus, in a way, responsibility for the continuation of PKK terror is placed on political leadership, which does not deal with the roots of terror. However, it is the military that blocks addressing the root cause. The military does not only reduce the problem to the fight against terror but also constantly draws "red lines" to obstruct a political solution. Pluralism is questioned, broadcasting in Kurdish is obstructed, amnesty is opposed, transfer of power to local governments is blocked, and the Democratic Society Party (DTP) is stigmatized. Within such "red lines" drawn so effectively by the military there can be no political solution to the Kurdish question.
Finally, we should keep in mind that the Kurdish question is not only a challenge for the Turkish military but also an opportunity to establish and sustain its hegemonic position in Turkish politics. Through the Kurdish question that social and political space in Turkey is secured, placing the military at the top.

20.10.2008

The PKK as a burden on Iraqi Kurds

The outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party’s (PKK) attacks from northern Iraq on Turkish targets have turned the Kurdish region in Iraq into a primary target of Turkey. It is time for the regional Kurdish administration to stop using the PKK as a bargaining chip against Turkey; it is not a time for the Kurdish people of Iraq to side with the PKK out of Kurdish sentimentality. While the former produces no advantages and incites the animosity of Turkey and pressures of the US, the latter ignores the fact that the PKK threatens to undo the gains Iraqi Kurds have made through their long struggle.
What Iraqi Kurds have today, after decades of struggle, is certainly worth preserving and consolidating, and those gains should not be risked by protecting the PKK.
The Iraqi Kurdish administration and Kurdish people need to understand what the PKK is up to. The objective of the PKK is clear: to keep the Iraqi Kurdish administration under the assault and pressure of Turkey. By doing so the PKK calculates that Iraqi Kurds will be unable to develop a polity which has full sovereignty over northern Iraq and is powerful enough to exclude the PKK from the region.
The PKK is aware that once Turkey and the northern Iraqi Kurdish administration establish mutual trust and cooperation, the PKK’s power in the region will disappear. Thus it does everything possible to block the development of understanding and cooperation between Turkey and northern Iraq. The PKK is pleased that Turkey has launched cross-border operations into northern Iraq, that it threatens the Kurdish administration and that it exerts pressure on the US to turn against the Kurds of Iraq.
Iraqi Kurds should not be naïve: the PKK does not want the Iraqi Kurdish administration to consolidate its power in the region. A powerful and consolidated Iraqi Kurdish administration would mean that the PKK would no longer have a free hand in northern Iraq, nor would it any longer be a force to be reckoned with.
Personalities should not be forgotten when analyzing the objectives of the PKK. Do the Iraqi Kurds and the regional administration really think that the PKK and its leader Abdullah Öcalan care about the fate, success and future of Iraqi Kurds? Just think of the current positions of three Kurdish leaders in the region: Jalal Talabani, Massoud Barzani and Öcalan. Talabani is the respected president of Iraq; Barzani is the recognized head of the Kurdish administration in northern Iraq. What about Öcalan? He is regarded by the world as a terrorist sitting in a Turkish jail! Do you think he could care less about the success of the Iraqi Kurds? I bet Öcalan is sitting in his jail hating Talabani and Barzani out of jealousy over being defeated while the other two leaders are enjoying success and international legitimacy.
It is crystal clear that northern Iraq will not exercise full sovereignty in the region as long as the PKK is present there. As long as northern Iraq is used as a base for the PKK’s attack on Turkey, Turkey’s cross-border operations will be legitimate. The territory of northern Iraq will treated as no-man’s land without a legitimate authority.
The PKK presence in northern Iraq means that the Iraqi Kurdish authority shares its territorial sovereignty with the PKK. In the past Iraqi Kurds and their leaders at times fought against the PKK and at times aligned with it. Now the situation is different. Iraqi Kurds who recognize the historical significance of the federal state they now control within Iraq should act accordingly and forget about the simple politicking of the past.
The PKK is their enemy of as well as Turkey’s. It is the single most important hurdle in the consolidation of their power in northern Iraq and the establishment of a peaceful relationship with Turkey, a relationship which is necessary for the consolidation of their administration.
If Iraqi Kurds want enemies in the region they should tolerate, turn a blind eye to or support the PKK on their soil. Iraqi Kurds should recognize that the PKK has become a burden for them.
It is obvious that the PKK launched an attack on Turkey just to provoke a reaction that would show disregard for the Iraqi authority. The Iraqi Kurdish administration should reflect on the situation and decide its priorities: Will it take the current historic opportunity to consolidate its power, or will it continue to see the PKK in a sympathetic light and be treated like the PKK in the region?
13.10.2008

The PKK’s raid: predictions and questions

The Kurdistan Workers' Party's (PKK) attack on Aktütün, a military post in Şemdinli near the Iraqi border, took place in the middle of two events.

The first is an ethnic clash which erupted last week between Kurds and Turks in Altınova, a holiday resort on the Aegean coast, leaving two dead. The second is a request from the government that Parliament extend the authorization for cross-border operations into northern Iraq, something which will be voted on this week.
It is clear that the PKK's attack on the Aktütün post is an open challenge to the Turkish military on the eve of the renewal of the authorization for cross-border operations on the one hand and an attempt to provoke further ethnic clashes between Kurds and Turks throughout Turkey on the other.
With the Aktütün raid, the PKK is trying to send the message that it is still strong and capable of staging high-profile operations against military targets. Given the fact that some 350 PKK militants took part in the raid and that the clash continued for seven hours in broad daylight, it would not be inaccurate to assume that the organizational and logistical infrastructure of the PKK is effective despite claims by Turkish security forces that recent cross-border operations destroyed the PKK's infrastructure in northern Iraq.
The latest attack by the PKK will put Turkey's relations with both northern Iraq and the US into question. It was revealed that the terrorists arrived from northern Iraq and hit the military post with long-range weapons from Iraqi soil. This will prompt the question of whether Iraq is a sovereign state capable of controlling its own territory. It is also certain that ability or willingness of the Kurdish authorities in the north to control the PKK's activities will be under debate in Turkey, thus poisoning the development of understanding and cooperation between Turkey and the Kurdish regional government.
The need for continued cross-border military operations in northern Iraq is confirmed by the PKK raid of Aktütün, and Parliament's extension of the authorization for cross-border operations into northern Iraq is now certain.
The US's cooperation will also be questioned. Nationalist anti-Western circles have already started to use the occasion to stir anti-American sentiment, arguing that the PKK is being supported by Turkey's Western allies including the US. Thus it is time for the US to reassert its support for Turkey in the fight against PKK terror.
The government will now face tremendous pressure. Although many, including the military, say that non-military measures are needed to address the root causes of the problem, it will be rather difficult for the government to institute such programs. Even a redirection of funds to southeastern Turkey may encounter bureaucratic resistance and slowdown in the wake of the PKK's assault. Any political scheme put forward to resolve this problem would be unthinkable for some time to come.
The attack by the PKK will certainly put the Democratic Society Party (DTP) in a difficult position, especially in its closure case before the Constitutional Court. Under the influence of growing public anger, the court may well be inclined to close down the party, which is accused of being connected with the PKK.
The Aktütün raid also raises questions in regard to the efficiency of the military's fight against the PKK and its ability to gather intelligence and mobilize its forces in the event of an attack. This time the military will not be able to escape criticism. The loss of 15 Turkish soldiers at a military post that was still vulnerable despite having been attacked five times in the past must be explained to the public. Many questions emerge: Is the Turkish military, which is so outspoken and so uncompromising on domestic political matters, capable of winning the war against the PKK, which is known to have only 5,000 militants? Is the Turkish military wasting its resources and energy on domestic political quarrels, leaving it ineffective against the PKK?
06.10.2008

Nation-state, Turkish military and the EU

Is the Turkish military in favor of Turkey's accession to the EU? Given the lack of enthusiasm on the part of the EU and the Turkish government at the moment, this question may appear rather irrelevant. But to understand the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government slowing down on the EU reforms, providing an answer to this question is important.
As EU membership is increasingly described in terms of the very survival of the Turkish nation-state it becomes very difficult for the government to push for risky political reforms. An aggressive EU integration process by the government may thus increase the tension and conflict within the state between the reformist government and those resisting bureaucracy, mainly the military and the judiciary. So the government is cautious.
Yet Chief of General Staff Gen. İlker Başbuğ declared recently that the military is not against EU membership provided that the EU doesn't target the "nation-state." So for the military preserving the "nation state" while acceding to the EU is a must.
This is exactly the point. This means that the military leaders merely pay lip service to the EU membership goal but resist reforms needed to get Turkey into the bloc, the reforms that they regard as weakening the nation-state. Everybody knows that EU membership requires a revision of the traditional notion of sovereignty and the nation-state.
Isn't it a nice public relations affair on the part of the military both in Turkey and Europe?
They know perfectly well that in the accession process political reforms have to be continued, including a more transparent military budget and a democratic civil-military relationship. Instead of saying this directly they prefer to refer to the notion of the nation-state.
This gives an image that the military wishes to see Turkey in the EU but not changed, transformed or reformed. My guess is that even if the EU decided to take Turkey in today the military would oppose it. This time the military will ask the EU to change itself before Turkey is allowed to join.
Will the Turkish military be prepared to be part of the EU where there are supranational institutions that are in no way under the control of national governments? The EU is an entity in which supranational institutions, such as the European Commission, the European Parliament, the European Court of Justice and the European Central Bank, have power over national governments. The Lisbon Treaty is meant to increase the supranational character of the EU at large. Decision making in the European Council, an intergovernmental body, will be significantly changed in a way to reduce further "national sovereignty."
So, how would the Turkish military fit Turkey into this increasingly supranational entity while keeping the Turkish nation-state intact? Is the military prepared to give up national currency (it is not a must, but very likely), accept a European Central Bank, European defense and foreign policy and jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice? How would the military defend its business interests such as OYAK Holding in an EU member Turkey?
There is no way to go on with a conventional nation-state in the EU, which is increasingly becoming a transnational entity going beyond traditional functions, organization and duties of a nation-state.
If the military really wishes to be part of the EU it must be prepared to revise the traditional notion of the nation-state. But we see quite the contrary: It puts forth maintaining the traditional nation-state as a prerequisite to membership. This means that either it does not understand what the EU is or just does not want to be part of it.
Let me conclude on why the Turkish military is against EU membership: Turkish generals want Turkey to be ruled in Ankara not in Brussels. They think so long as Turkey is ruled in Ankara they will somehow control or share power with the politicians. They know perfectly well that they will have no seat in the power-sharing mechanisms of Brussels.
29.09.2008

A matter of conscience and respect for labor

The “reactionary” move of the newly appointed rector at Boğaziçi University sparked a reaction from students and faculty members.
Those who ignore the liberal and liberalizing roles of the universities really have difficult times. Defending the bans in the strongholds of liberal thought, attempting to assume a role to monitor attire and keeping the students away from the classrooms are not things we can approve of.
Is there any “law” prohibiting the headscarf at the universities? No. Quite the contrary, the Higher Education Law states that students are free to wear any clothing or attire at institutions of higher education, as long as it does not violate the legislation in effect. So where does the ban come from? In its interpretation of this legal provision, the Constitutional Court ruled that the headscarf could not be considered proper attire under this law. The law says it is allowed whereas civil servants offer a restrictive interpretation. This is what is called “arbitrary rule.”
In an attempt to end this arbitrariness, Parliament amended the Constitution in February to eliminate discrimination between students by emphasizing the right to education and the equal opportunity principle. But this time, civil servants who are used to arbitrary rule concluded that Parliament was not allowed to amend the Constitution. The Constitutional Court had no right or authority to take such an action.
Let’s just say that it is forbidden to wear the headscarf at universities. Recently, Yasemin Çongar from the Taraf daily expounded on the matter, saying, “Just because it is banned does not necessarily mean that it is just.” The ban does not stop the headscarf from being a right that individuals can claim. The history of humanity is full of examples of rights gained after a struggle against bans. Nobody should be expected to accept the bans. This prohibition closely concerns a vast majority of the people in this country. At least 70 percent of the Turkish people support lifting this ban at the universities. That is to say, the people are asking for the ban to be lifted, whereas public officers, who are supposed to be servants of the people and make a living on the people’s taxes, resist. Can you tell me what the people should do?
Obviously, the headscarf controversy is no longer merely a legal issue. You should listen to your conscience because from now on it is also a matter of conscience. Depriving the students of their right to education at the universities should hurt people and give them sleepless nights.
Can you imagine this: You have to rank in the first 10,000 among 1.5 million examinees to be entitled to placement in a department at Boğaziçi University. To achieve this, you give up playing with your friends at an early age and instead you choose rigorous studying. You attend private courses after school instead of seeing a movie. You study hard instead of having fun with friends and family. At an early age, you feel the need and burden of having a bright future through a good education. You experience sleepless nights. Neither your body nor your mind is actually able to bear this burden. But you put forth the effort; you want to succeed -- and finally you fulfill your dream when you earn a spot at Boğaziçi University after intensive effort over at least five years. But while you are ready to take what you have earned, somebody at the gate of the university tells you that you are not allowed to be there because you are wearing a headscarf.
What would those who do not admit the young women wearing the headscarf at the gate of Boğaziçi University feel if their daughters were turned down at the university gates because of their attire? Wouldn’t they rebel? Wouldn’t they ask for actions or measures to be taken against this invalidation of their intensive labor and efforts?
Imagine the families of these students with headscarves. They have spent money for years to make sure that their daughters will get a good education; they put forth effort; they are proud of their kids. Then, a rector appears in front of the university gate to tell them they are not allowed on the university premises in particular attire.
From where do you get this right to seize the people’s rights and labors? Where is justice and equality? Where is conscience?
27.09.2008