Turkish military’s US perception

A highly critical public attitude toward the United States that emerged after 2003 has certainly damaged Turkish-American relations. This state of mind toward the US, however, is not confined to the public at large but apparently influences some critical sectors and institutions too, including the Turkish military. The institution closest to the US as a natural result of the military alliance between the two countries is not expected to hold an "adversarial" opinion toward an ally. It is obviously hard to measure the exact scope of the negative opinion and attitude within the Turkish military toward the US, but we have some clues. One of these is a book prepared by Fikret Bila, a veteran journalist who is well acquainted with the men in uniform, "Komutanlar Cephesi" (The Commanders' Front.) The book is a collection of interviews conducted with various high-level generals who were involved with the fight against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).

While talking about the fight against the PKK, comments made by retired Turkish generals about the US are striking. Common knowledge that the US and Turkey are allies does not hold entirely true in the eyes of the commanders. It seems that the "comrades in arms" notion from the Cold War years is a thing of the past, even a distant past. What we see instead is deep distrust. Turkish generals expect the worst from the Americans, including an outright occupation of Turkey. There is only one exception, Gen. Hilmi Özkök; the rest speak of the US just as they did of the USSR two decades earlier.

What went wrong?

The most common view is that the US helps the PKK. Gen. Doğan Güreş, then the chief of general staff, said he gave an order to shoot down American helicopters during an operation in northern Iraq in 1992, citing as his reason that "the helicopters were dropping logistical support to the PKK groups" (p.72-73). Güreş does not only speak of the early 1990s. Referring to maps used by American soldiers that show Turkey divided and a statement by US Vice President Dick Cheney saying "the Kurds are America's only friends," Güreş is convinced that Americans help the PKK (Bila, 79-80). He concludes, "Turkey should be very careful." Another general, Necati Özgen, goes even further, claiming that "if the March 1 resolution had passed, the American troops would have been stationed throughout Turkey." He implies that Turkey would have lost its control in the Southeast as a result of events in the region prompted by the presence of American troops. In response to a question on the objective of the US in Turkey, Özgen is clear: "stationing in Turkey and almost occupying [the region]" (Bila, 100-101).

Özgen is prepared to go to war against the US over northern Iraq. Responding to the question of how Turkey can fight against the only superpower, Özgen responds: "It is just an image that the US is a superpower, nothing else. … Let the Americans oppose us. Even if they resist we'll fight and do whatever is necessary" (Bila, 102). Ismail Hakkı Karadayi, another general who served as the chief of general staff, is also convinced that the US is behind the PKK (Bila, 113). He speaks of how they captured the US-made weapons from the PKK, a proof of American support for the terror organization.

Gen. Hasan Kundakçı brings up a document guiding the American plot against Turkey: "The US is following a [congressional] decision made in 1896, a decision more or less like the Treaty of Sèvres," which divided up the Ottoman Empire at the end of the World War I (Bila, 131-132). Kundakci continues; "whenever the US entered Iraq helped the PKK and harmed us" (Bila, 153). Gen. Altay Tokat asserts that "after the [rejection] of the March 1 resolution by the Parliament, the US increased its support to the PKK." Weapons were sent to the Kandil Mountains where the PKK camps were based, according to Tokat (Bila, 181-182).

Are these views representative of the military high command, or their personal opinions? I do not know. But from this and other information in Bila's book, it is clear that some high-ranking generals are "reconsidering" the vision and wisdom of Turkey's alliance with the US. There exists an apparent discrepancy between the perception of the Turkish generals and the continuing cooperation on the ground between the two sides. I wonder how security cooperation can be continued with such a mindset. If our commanders think the US is the enemy, how can Turkey continue to cooperate with this country in a collective defense scheme and continue to buy weapon systems, share information and even cooperate in the NATO command structure?
28.04.2008

US and Turkey: cooperating or not?

The way in which the land operation in northern Iraq was terminated and the debate that ensued are perfect examples of mismanagement of an otherwise successful political and military endeavor.
The emerging picture of misunderstandings between American and Turkish statesmen goes against the cooperation between the two countries seen post-Nov. 5, which was expected to repair the damage in the strategic alliance over the Iraq war. A new era of understanding had developed after the November meeting in which President Bush declared the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) as the enemy of the US. Built on this understanding the US apparently shared intelligence with the Turkish authorities on the PKK and cleared airspace in northern Iraq to enable Turkish jets to conduct an air operation in the region. Even further the Turks and Americans continued to cooperate during the land operation of Turkish troops in northern Iraq between Feb. 21 and Feb. 29 against the PKK through intelligence sharing and the opening of airspace.

As everyone spoke of a return to a strategic partnership between the two countries, something happened toward the end of the Turkish land operation. Understandably the US side, acknowledging Turkey's right to fight against terrorism and endorsing the Turkish incursion into northern Iraq, asked Turkish troops to leave northern Iraq soon, as Secretary of Defense Robert Gates put it, "within weeks." On Feb. 28 President Bush wanted the withdrawal to take place "as soon as possible." The Turkish side responded by insisting that the troops will stay as long as it takes to eliminate the PKK's presence in the region. Chief of General Staff Gen. Yaşar Büyükanıt said "one day or one year." Anyhow, the "quick withdrawal" demanded by the Americans did not mean within hours. But within hours after Gates left Ankara Turkish troops were back to their bases in Turkey. The chief of General Staff declared that the decision to withdraw on Feb. 29 had been made even before Gates' arrival in Ankara.

Does this story explain why Turkey appears to have withdrawn its troops from northern Iraq under pressure from the American administration? Or who is responsible for the appearance that Turkey submitted to the demands of the US? Was such a diplomatic and political disaster not avoidable?
I think the day of Gates' visit to Ankara should be explained in detail. On the same day, two top-level warnings were shot from the American side. Why? Did the Americans not get any signal that the Turks were preparing to withdraw? If the two sides were cooperating in the operation, it would not look strange to exchange information on the withdrawal process. Did the Turkish side not hint at a quick withdrawal so that Gates and Bush would not go public in their call for a "quick withdrawal"?
Some in Ankara, including Speaker of Parliament Köksal Toptan, believe that the Americans deliberately announced their demand to make the Turkish appear as having acted under American pressure. This was assumed to serve American strength in the region and de-emphasize Turkish capabilities, military and political, to engage in unilateral action in its region.

In any case, a new element of misunderstanding has emerged between the two sides as many expected a new period of cooperation between Turkey and the US.

The whole affair has been reduced to the question of whether Turkey received an "order" from the US or not. I can understand two allies making decisions together, but to present Turkey as submitting to the will of the US will have serious implications on Turkish politics as well as on Turkey-US relations. It will only contribute to the growth of anti-Americanism in Turkey and be used by radical nationalists to discredit not only the government this time but also the command chain of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK).
10.03.2008

Dialogue with Kurds

Iraqi President Jalal Talabani is currently visiting Ankara. It is an important meeting, though a bit delayed. Establishing a dialogue with Kurdish groups in Iraq just after Turkey's cross-border military operation against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) may usher in new developments. To frequently declare that Iraq's integrity is a major concern for Turkey while avoiding meeting with its head of state has never been a consistent policy.

By the way, some groups and even some institutions in Turkey should quit labeling Iraqi Kurds a community that consists of clans. To prevent the PKK from using northern Iraq as a launchpad for its attacks in Turkey, Iraqi forces must establish their authority in this region. It is obvious that the Kurdish government in the region is the primary candidate to do this. Consequently, it is inevitable that Turkey will establish sound dialogue and cooperation with the regional administration as well as with the central government. And this can only be done by avoiding the disparaging and humiliating language that suggests, "Turkey does not address clan leaders."

No doubt such cooperation will prove beneficial to Iraqi Kurds as well. If the Iraqi Kurds claim to be a legitimate player in the region, they should not allow any "alien" or terrorist groups in their territory. An administration that cannot be dominant over its own territory will have to give consent to external interventions. Thus, the expulsion of the PKK from the region should be considered a step toward the institutionalization of the regional government. Otherwise, the authority of the regional government will be automatically ignored by the PKK and the PKK's existence will legitimately pave the way for Turkish military incursions into the region. In both cases, northern Iraq will not be treated as "sovereign territory." For this reason, the preservation and maintenance of the Iraqi Kurds' gains will be dependent on the dialogue they establish with Turkey both in economic and political terms. To this end, they must cooperate with Turkey in the removal of the PKK from the region. History has examples of such cooperation: Just a decade ago, Massoud Barzani and Talabani sided with Turkey in the fight against the PKK and, in return, Turkey from time to time acted as a mediator in the conflicts between groups led by Barzani and those led by Talabani. This cooperation is easier today than in the past. Furthermore, Iraqi Kurds should remember that they must act responsibly to protect their gains. Internationally, cooperation in counterterrorism is a central theme and those who give support or condone the terrorist organization will have no legitimacy.

The stability and development of northern Iraq are dependent on cooperation against the PKK. Turkey should be a partner to the Iraqi Kurds, not their enemy. One can see that there has been a change of will in this direction in Ankara. Talabani's visit may serve as a turning point for cooperation and stability in the region, which will bring benefits to both parties.

A dialogue with the Iraqi Kurds through President Talabani will arouse feelings of sympathy among Turkish Kurds, who are content with the recent gains of the Iraqi Kurds. We should confess that we have not truly understood the feelings of our Kurds, who were extremely happy when Iraqi Kurds were saved from the persecution and mass executions of Saddam Hussein's regime. We have regarded the developments in northern Iraq as dangerous and, as a reflex of a "traditional" state, tried to block the process. What we have failed to understand was that when our Kurds were watching the developments in northern Iraq with interest and enthusiasm, this did not mean that they wanted to become a part of those developments. Their interest can be seen as a natural result of kinship and solidarity.

In the final analysis, Turkey's dialogue with the government in northern Iraq through Talabani's official visit to Ankara can also be regarded as a new attempt at normalization with Turkish Kurds. Any dialogue with Iraqi Kurds may serve to expand possibilities for dialogue within the country. Having normalized its relations with northern Iraq, Turkey may find more latitude in its economic and political initiatives toward its own Kurds.
08.03.2008

Constitutional change with consensus

The Turkish Parliament passed changes to two articles of the Constitution last week. The amended constitutional articles underline equality before the law and the right to education and are meant to remove a headscarf ban currently enforced on university campuses. It, however, sparked a heated debate not only about secularism but also about the way in which constitutional amendments are carried out. One criticism was that the amendments are not carried out by "consensus." Insistence on consensus reminded me of another constitutional amendment some 70 years ago.

In 1937 the six principles of the Republican People's Party (CHP) were imported into the constitution. The party principles of nationalism, republicanism, statism, secularism, populism and revolutionism became the state's principles. It was the final step for the marriage between the state and the party. By this constitutional change, a simple single-party rule had turned into a model very much reminiscent of European fascism of the time. Along with the integration of the party's principles into the constitutional order the secretary-general of the party was appointed the interior minister, the provincial party leaders became the governors.

The "consensus" in the parliamentary session on the amendment proposed by Prime Minister İsmet İnönü was 100 percent. Members of Parliament taking part in the vote in 1937 numbered 333 and those who endorsed the amendment totaled 333. This is I think what some people today call "consensus." What they do not know is that it was not "democratic consensus" but "consensus by force" under the authoritarian control of Parliament by the party. In any event, it was not a Parliament freely elected directly by the people but rather one appointed by the party. Many of those "parliamentarians" later said that they had in fact never been to cities that they were supposed to represent.

The proposal underlined that a constitution should define the features of the republic and suggested inserting the six arrows of the party into the constitution to define the state.
During the proceedings the first speech was delivered by Şükrü Kaya, interior minister, who argued that the "history of humanity started with the Turks, if there were no Turks there would be no history and no civilization" (to applauses and bravos from Parliament). Framed with such absurd arguments the party principles turned into state principles in February 1937.

Speaking during the "debate" in Parliament, Şemsettin Günaltay, the head of the Constitutional Committee and later prime minister, drew the limits of opposing views. In response to questions on whether opposing views to those principles could be expressed, Günaltay said: "Once these principles are enacted as the constitutional principles, it will be questioned whether counter-views could be expressed. For example, would a liberal defend the principles of liberalism or a communist advocate communism? No, they will and could not defend opposing views. As any act contrary to the constitution is a crime, opposition to these principles will also be considered a crime" (to applause and bravos).

Recep Peker, former secretary-general of the party and an architect of the state-party merger, stated that "all citizens shall believe in these principles, they shall all love and obey these principles, creating national harmony."

This example displays the mindset of Jacobin republicans in the 1930s. There was no room for different political views in their minds. The difficulty for Turkish democracy is this "founding Jacobin mindset" that did not allow democratic plurality. When the Democrat Party (DP) was formed in January 1946 under new circumstances following the end of World War II, it had to declare its loyalty to the constitution, including Article 2, which was, in fact, the principles of the opposing CHP. This was not only ironic but also reflective of mental and constitutional obstacles to developing a real democracy in the years ahead. Imagine a political party that formed the state and the nation according to its own principles from the top down then with a transition to multi-party politics after 1950 forced to seek the consent and approval of the people. It has always been difficult for those who think they founded the state as they believe the people should appreciate them instead of questioning the founders' right to rule.
18.02.2008

Democracy without democratic opposition

The main problem in Turkish politics is the absence of a democratic and reformist opposition that would push the governing Justice and Development Party (AK Party) to be more assertive in its reform agenda. Such a democratic opposition would have tested the AK Party's commitment to democratization, the EU process and overall human rights reforms. Unfortunately, the main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP), failing to draw any lesson from the July elections, continues to be nationalist, reactionary and pro status-quo, choosing not to rely on the people's support but on the approval of the "ideological instruments of the state."

The governing AK Party is constantly being questioned by some circles about its "Islamic" roots as a barrier to its commitment to democracy, despite the reforms it has enacted in the last five years that have strengthened Turkish democracy and brought Turkey ever closer to the European Union. But the CHP seems somehow immune from criticism about its commitment to democracy. We cannot consolidate Turkish democracy if the main opposition party does not believe in democracy.
Can anyone think of a democratic opposition party that reserves constitution-making for coup plotters? CHP leader Deniz Baykal said the other day: "Can a new constitution not be drafted? Of course, yes. … You can stage a coup, risk being hanged. And after that, the entire Constitution can be changed." This statement belongs to a leader whose party is still a member of Socialist International (SI). People are denied the right to change the Constitution by a politician who sought the people's mandate in elections. I think this tells us why the CHP has not won a single election in its entire history. Winning an election without believing in democracy and people power is not possible.
It is totally understandable to see the CHP and its leader provoke undemocratic processes, as they have already lost any hope of winning an election in democratic competition. It is enough for Baykal to be the banner of secularism, not of democracy. So long as secularism is viewed as under threat by his party's supporters, he knows very well that his leadership will not be questioned. We remember how his leadership was questioned after the July elections. Even some of his close friends left the party administration and are now campaigning for its leadership.

In order to understand why Baykal is aggressive about the latest constitutional amendments, we should remember that in March the CHP will have an extraordinary party congress in which Baykal's leadership will be challenged. The more Turkey is plunged into the secularism debate, the stronger Baykal's position will be within his own party. Baykal is pleased that with the headscarf debate the CHP's electoral performance under his leadership will fall on deaf ears.

The AK Party is being criticized by some on the ground of benefiting from the unsolved headscarf problem, which enables the party to manipulate the issue and attract popular support. This might be true to some degree, but the benefits the AK Party derived from the unresolved headscarf issue cannot be compared to those of the CHP. The AK Party's popular support has been growing ever since the 2002 elections. It started out with 34 percent in 2002, reached 42 percent in 2004 local elections and went up 47 percent in the elections held in 2007.

The main opposition party, with a stagnant 20 percent rate of support in the last three elections, is a single-issue party -- and that is "secularism." "Defense of secularism" is the only asset the CHP has. Imagine if a political party had a single argument concerning Turkish politics. Would it like for that issue to be resolved? The CHP's position is simple: sticking to its single issue, exaggerating, using and manipulating it in order to maintain even its 20 percent support -- even at the expense of democracy.
11.02.2008

Declaring freedom in universities

As the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) agree on a constitutional change to lift a ban on the headscarf at universities, the dispute between those for the ban and those against it has intensified. Meeting on Friday, a group of university rectors declared that lifting the ban on the headscarf will lead to the establishment of a religious state, replacing the current secular one. The rectors' declaration was countered by a group of independent academics whose number has surpassed 2,000 at the moment of this writing. Independent academics, based on the very concept of "university," argued that universities should be places where different ideas, beliefs, and lifestyles can be freely expressed. Pointing out that there is no headscarf ban in any university in liberal democratic countries they called for a removal of the headscarf ban.

The claims of pro-prohibition rectors are baseless. As the headscarf ban does not protect secularism, lifting the ban does not endanger it, either. The headscarf ban has been in effect for more than 20 years but pro-prohibition academics still argue that secularism is under threat. If that is the case then it is obvious that the headscarf has been less than effective in eliminating the threat against secularism over the last 20 years, so it is useless for the declared objective.

But, of course, this is not the point. The issue is not the threat per se but the hegemony the pro-prohibition groups establish by using the threat to silence the majority in Turkey. So for those who advocate a continuation of the ban, the "threat to secularism" is permanent; it will never disappear. Thus, they should remain in power for good in order to "protect" secularism from the people. It is crystal clear that the "threat to secularism" is a discursive tool to generate a "right to rule" over the people.

Radical secularists at universities have increasingly been marginalized. Their hegemony is being questioned and challenged by a group of independent academics who have declared that universities should be places where freedom, not bans, are the central idea (The Web site of this campaign is universitedeozgurluk.blogspot.com). Their declaration has underlined the fact that universities are not uniform institutions in terms of ideas, lifestyles, and beliefs. Instead, they are places of utmost diversity that should be respected and celebrated as such. The declaration has displayed that officials who advocate for a continuation of the headscarf ban do not represent the whole university. These academics agree that universities should be mentioned with the freedoms they offer to academics and students as well as the contribution that they are making to knowledge.

However, it is obvious that there is a group of authoritarian academics who at the moment happen to be in power at universities. For them diversity in terms of ideas and lifestyles is regarded as a threat. What kind of university do such pro-prohibition academics desire? Could such a place be called a university?

A leading pro-prohibition academic, Mesut Parlak, the rector of Turkey's largest and oldest university, openly stated that they would not be impartial toward their students who wear headscarves after the ban is lifted. This is a shocking admission that pro-prohibition academics are biased, dogmatic and ideologically oriented and that they do not and will not treat their students with equality. I cannot imagine an academic who discriminates against his or her students based on religion, belief, opinion or sex. This is a gross violation not only of law but professional ethics as well. Yet such an admission also reflects the fact that pro-prohibition academics are not interested in liberty, equality, non-discrimination and scholarly work, but are engaged in an ideological fight. It seems that they do not care for universities as such but use universities and their academic titles to suppress those who disagree with them.

Today we know more than ever that there are pro-liberty academics at universities who think that universities should not meddle in the way in which students think or dress.
04.02.2008

Perpetual peace between Turkey and Greece

Am I too naive to talk about a "perpetual peace" between Turkey and Greece given the fact that it took 49 years for a Greek prime minister to visit Turkey? Maybe, but once the two communities overcome "security-centric" perspectives and look to each other not as historical adversaries but as contemporary partners, a significant step in this direction will be taken.

The main obstacles before this "perpetual peace" are an exaggerated concern for "security" and historical prejudice that fuel each other. Turks are led to believe that the Greek Megalo Idea is still alive and can be reactivated at any moment, that the ecumenical claim of the Greek-Orthodox Patriarchate is a threat and that Greek islands in the Aegean are to be used to strangle Turkey. Greeks keep reminding themselves how they were swept out of Anatolia -- a remembrance that constructs their national identity by otherizing the historical image of the Turk.

I think both sides are learning to not be imprisoned by a particular narrative of history and an irrational sense of insecurity. Even historical memories are being invoked to rediscover how to live together as in the past. Turks and Greeks are surprised by their similarities as they get to know each other. Many might have already been bored of talking about common food, common words in the languages and even common patterns of behavior. Soothed with personal experiences, people at large would say that they are good friends who do not have any problem with the other side. It is almost always added that the problem is between states.

This might sound rather clichéd but there is truth in it, and a clue to settling the disputes for good. It suggests that the way to establish a perpetual peace between the two communities is to put people at the center of the relationship. This requires rescuing the fate of the two countries from a practice of "high politics" that has no room for compromise or cooperation. The practitioners of "power politics" know of nothing but military capabilities, war machines, and bullying. They even look at their own citizens, the Greeks in İstanbul and the Turks in western Trace, as hostages to be used against the other side. Let us, first of all, get rid of them.

Years ago, when Turkey and Greece were on the verge of war over the Aegean sea, Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Özal proposed a fresh "perspective" -- freeze politically sensitive issues for a while and instead develop economic and social interactions. This was not a solution per se but a new approach that would pave the way for solutions. The argument was a simple liberal view that economic and social engagement would in time turn high political disputes into irrelevant issues by establishing mutual benefits and unbreakable ties.

To some degree, this is being carried out. Two years ago the Greek National Bank took over Turkish Finansbank for around 3 billion Euros. The Greek company didn't just buy a bank in Turkey, it invested in the future of the country. A stable, prosperous and peace-loving Turkey that gets along with Greece is now in the interest of both the Greek and Turkish stakeholders of Finansbank.
Of course, there remain some big issues to be tackled on the table. The biggest is undoubtedly Cyprus. The Cyprus question is constantly awakening historical prejudices and mutual insecurities and legitimatizing the hardliners on both sides. Unless this dispute is somehow settled it will be really hard to expand and deepen cooperation between the two sides.

Other issues are of less significance. Opening the Greek Orthodox seminary in Turkey that was closed in 1971 is not a big deal. The ecumenical status of the patriarchate should also not be a great problem -- contrary to the exaggerations of some nationalists in Turkey. Conservative circles who oppose the ecumenical claim of the patriarchate should explain how they presume to override a right given by Mehmet the Conqueror.

In return, Greeks should overcome an insecure identity defined by reference to their historic struggle against the Turks.
28.01.2008