Can Barzani be a mediator?

No doubt Iraqi Kurdistan is the most peaceful and stable part of Iraq. As such it can be described as an island of stability in a region where conflicts among regional actors have recently been spreading.

Yet the peace and stability of Iraqi Kurdistan are fragile, too. It is vulnerable to the presence and activities of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in the north of the country.

With spring here, the PKK's cross-border operations are expected to increase, following a winter break, with assaults on targets in Turkey.

Security forces will certainly respond to any new wave of terrorist activities in Turkey. As the tension increases between Turkey and Syria, the former cannot afford to appear weak vis-à-vis the PKK. Furthermore, with the rising tension in the region, nationalist public reactions against Kurds within Turkey cannot be ruled out. All these will have destabilizing effects on the Iraqi Kurdish region.

Iraqi Kurds now have a golden opportunity to improve relations with Turkey. The only irritant between Turkey and the Iraqi Kurdish administration is the PKK. Once the PKK stops being a source of quarrels, the two sides will emerge as natural allies and partners in regional politics and further improve their economic cooperation.

This is recognized as such by the president of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), Massoud Barzani, who was on an official visit to Turkey last week. The way in which he was received is indicative of the potential for a full-fledged partnership.

To move in this direction Barzani seems willing to get rid of the PKK problem. I do not expect an open confrontation between Barzani and the PKK. This will be unacceptable to the Kurds of the region as a whole. But what I see is that Barzani has increasingly regarded the PKK as a burden for the future of Iraqi Kurds. And he is certainly right to see it this way.

The PKK concentrated its activities in camps in northern Iraq after being expelled from Syria in 1998. Exploiting the turmoil and lack of authority in the region, it turned Iraqi Kurdistan into a safe haven for its recruitment and training activities. For some time now the Kurdish administration has established itself in Iraqi Kurdistan, asserting authority and sovereignty. It is thus hard to explain the presence of a group described by the US and the EU as a terrorist organization within the territory the Kurdish administration claims controlled by the regional government in Arbil.

Stopping the activities and removing the presence of the PKK in Iraqi Kurdistan is a mission related to the statehood of the KRG in northern Iraq if it does not want its territory to be seen by its neighbors as a “no man's land” that everyone is free to intervene in.

I think it is a priority for Barzani to enhance stability and peace in the Kurdish region as this will speed up institutionalization and the legitimacy of the regional government. He will not wish to risk the achievements of the Iraqi Kurds by harboring the PKK, a terrorist network.

For this, Barzani called on the PKK during his visit to Ankara to “lay down [its] arms,” adding that they “won't get anywhere with weapons.” Another strong message Barzani gave was about the PKK presence in northern Iraq. He said, “I will not let the PKK prevail in northern Iraq.”

These messages may not persuade the PKK to lay down its arms and leave northern Iraq, but they will certainly put the PKK under strong pressure. Barzani does not control the PKK, but his influence over Kurds on both sides of the border is significant. This is not solely due to the historical struggle of the Barzani family for more than half a century in the region, but also due to Barzani's recent success in instituting semi-statehood in northern Iraq.

With this influence over Kurds and the trust of the Turkish government, Barzani can mediate a peace deal. The long-delayed Kurdish conference to be held in Arbil soon may be the beginning of a new era in which the PKK is compelled to come up with a “new thinking.”

The fall of the generals

The leader of the 1980 coup and the former “president” of Turkey, Gen. Kenan Evren, is now being tried in a court for staging a military coup.

It is really hard to believe this. Even those who voted in September 2010 for the amendment to the Constitution that lifted the protection from prosecution covering the military junta did not think that an actual trial was possible.

The idea of trying military personnel for plotting coups was inconceivable in this country. This was not only because of the lack of a legal and institutional framework for this but also because of the prevailing political culture that treated the military as untouchable. There was only one example of trying a coup plotter that took place, and this was in 1963. Then, Col. Talat Aydemir was executed after being tried in a military court for attempting a military coup. It is important to note that in this process, the government of the time and civilian powers did not play any role. The trial and execution were part and parcel of an internal power struggle within the military.

Col. Aydemir was a revolutionary who was a member of the junta that staged the coup of 1960. But at the time of the coup, he was abroad, so he did not get what he wished for in the post-coup administration. Despite this, he was appointed commander of the War Academy, an unconventionally high post for a colonel. But the colonel was not happy. All of his friends in the junta had higher offices after the coup. So he decided to stage his own coup. In 1962, he tried it by organizing the students of the War Academy. He almost succeeded. But when the air force failed to join in the operation on time, he failed in taking over the government. Despite his attempted coup, the government pardoned him as if nothing had happened. A year after, he tried and failed again. His persistent attempts annoyed the top military officers, not because he was trying to overthrow the government but because Col. Aydemir’s target was the top military brass who benefited from the 1960 coup but did not share the benefits with officers like himself. So, he was tried by the military court and executed in 1964.

In short, this affair, the first trial of a coup plotter, had nothing to do with civilian politics. Aydemir was a counter-revolutionary trying to counter the effects of the 1960 coup that excluded him from power.

So, the trial of the 1980 coup leaders that started last week is a turning point in Turkish politics. There had been a belief that a successful coup could not be brought before the courts. Once a junta succeeds in successfully staging a coup, it would escape trial forever. The trial of Gen. Evren disproves this belief that a “successful coup” cannot be tried.

It is a historic moment for Turkey. The trial will serve as the ultimate deterrent to the recurrence of similar incidents in Turkey. Thus, it is a process that will certainly enhance democracy in Turkey. But democracy will still remain incomplete unless the Constitution made by the junta in 1982 is replaced by a new one. It is not only the Constitution; the basic laws of the system are the making of the military regime. The Political Parties Law, Election Law and Higher Education Law were all introduced by the military junta. Thus, the leaders of the junta are on trial, but the junta’s laws and institutions are still intact.

If Turkey really wants to leave the period of military coups behind, it should eliminate the remaining legacy of the military regime. There is no point in trying the junta but ruling Turkey with its Constitution, laws and institutions.

Islam and the nuclear issue

Are nuclear weapons un-Islamic? Yes, according to Iranian religious leader Ayatollah Khamenei. His statement was reported by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who visited Iran and met with the country's religious leader after attending a nuclear summit in South Korea.

Khamenei, explaining that Iran is not interested in developing nuclear weapons, told the Turkish prime minister, “Islam does not allow weapons of mass destruction like nuclear ones.” So we should presumably be assured about the intentions of Iran, which is an Islamic republic and would not conduct any policy that is deemed un-Islamic.

I do not think there is anyone Muslim or non-Muslim who would believe such an explanation. Go and search for the record of human rights violations, corruption and usurpation of power in Iran. Encountering the voluminous evidence of all of these, one may wonder if such types of misconduct are allowed in Islam. The answer is of course negative. Iran is a typical example of a regime using Islam as a spiritual pretext to legitimate its worldly actions. I am sure if they develop a nuclear weapon and test it, Khamenei will quickly claim religious grounds for this.

It is all about politics and power, not religion. But “defending Islam” is a clever and popular excuse for one's actions. In this way a purely national quest for power and hegemony in the region is disguised as a policy of preserving the religion. This motive is still not admitted to by government officials. Yet on the street this logic works and appeals to common people.

The fact that a cultural outsider in the region, Israel, has nuclear weapons constitutes a perfect excuse for nuclear weapon seekers. Even Prime Minister Erdoğan, when speaking of Iran's nuclear program and its possibility of producing nuclear weapons, mentions Israel's nuclear weapons capability. It makes sense in the context of a call for a “nuclear-free region.” But it also taps into people's subconscious desire for an “Islamic bomb” to balance and deter Israel, to many the suspect aggressor in the Middle East.

Particularly when Israel bullies Iran about its nuclear program, Muslims side with Iran out of religious solidarity. Iranian leaders are very happy to see such solidarity among Muslims, even as it upsets regional Sunni governments. Israel's threats will therefore only justify Iran's quest for going nuclear in the minds of most Muslims.

If the world wants to stop Iran from going nuclear, it must first stop Israel from meddling in the process. Israel's visibility in this issue is totally counterproductive. When Israel threatens the United States by saying “you hit or I will,” it prevents the US from developing effective mechanisms to deal with the situation and to build a regional coalition to put pressure on Iran. In the upcoming negotiations taking place in İstanbul Israel should refrain from publically supporting a strike on Iran.

If Israel goes further and wages an attack on Iran, the region will descend into chaos. Such an attack will save Bashar al-Assad, stop the process of democratization in the region, put an end to the Arab Spring and destabilize the oil-rich Gulf monarchies.

An Israeli attack on Iran will have consequences that extend beyond the region. One of the first effects will be on the outcome of the presidential elections in the US. The moment Israel conducts such aggression against Iran, the chance President Barack Obama has for re-election will disappear.

The likelihood of an Israeli attack on Iran is very low, of course. It will only materialize if the Israeli government really wishes to sabotage President Obama's re-election chances.

Resolving or managing the Kurdish question?

The Kurdish question has proved to be very difficult to resolve since the actors involved are not prepared to take the risk of finding a solution.

Both the government and Kurdish nationalists are accustomed to “living with the problem” instead of taking the risk of the unknown, a settled Kurdish question.

I have reached this judgment on the basis of the fate of the 2009 opening that was torpedoed by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and abandoned by the government when national and regional conditions were really ripe for a solution.

There is now talk of a new government strategy on the Kurdish problem. Even if there is such a “new strategy,” I do not think it will produce a solution. This is so because the government is not prepared to take political risks to address the Kurdish question. The view of the government is that the Kurdish question is not the making of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and thus no one can blame the party for not finding a solution to it.

Besides, the Kurdish question does not seriously disturb the AK Party's governance of Turkey. The ruling party can live without finding a solution to the Kurdish question. Last year's election showed once more that the continuation of the Kurdish question does not prevent the AK Party from winning elections. Even among Kurds, the AK Party receives as many votes as the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP).

Will that be the case when the AK Party takes bold steps to solve the Kurdish question? That much is not guaranteed. The ruling party fears that a form of final settlement may alienate the Turks, and especially the nationalists, resulting in the risk of losing its nationalist constituency to the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP).

It is ironic that the political party that came to power 10 years ago with a view to challenge the status quo today sticks to the status quo on the Kurdish question. Indeed it is ironic to defend the status quo on the Kurdish question when it is in a position to challenge and change it, but this is not surprising at all because the status quo is regarded by the AK Party as “manageable” while a solution is “unsettling.”

What is also important to note in the “new strategy” is the emphasis made on the new decision not to talk to jailed PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan and the PKK. In the near past, we know that the government engaged both Öcalan and the PKK through the National Intelligence Organization (MİT) and the special representative of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, then-Prime Ministry Undersecretary Hakan Fidan. The government will no longer talk to them. Why? The reason for this policy change might be the fact that the former talks produced no results. But it may also be equally true that the recent crisis between the judiciary and MİT could have triggered such a decision on the part of the government. That is to say that the government may be concerned that a perceived “negotiation” with the PKK and Öcalan is not only politically risky but also legally problematic, given the divergence of views between the judiciary and the government. If this is true, then we can infer that the government has given in to the pressure of the judiciary and that it is even more unlikely now that it will go along with a solution model.

The government instead seems willing to talk to the BDP, the “extension of the PKK,” as described by the prime minister himself. So long as the BDP is portrayed as totally dependent on the PKK, it is not realistic to expect it to act independently and hold genuine negotiations with the government.

The bottom line is that the government has come to the end of its “democratic initiatives”; for the last two years or so there has been no attempt at democratizing the Kurdish issue. Instead, the government seems to have adopted a tough perspective of crushing the PKK presence and eliminating its organizational network in cities through operations targeting the Kurdish Communities Union (KCK). In response to this approach, the PKK has not surrendered but challenged the government in cities, as demonstrated during Newroz, in a quest to show its strength.

To sum up, the new strategy is not a strategy but part of “managing the Kurdish question,” limiting its damage and distancing its political risks on the part of the government.

Annexing Cyprus

The fever of Turkish nationalism can be measured by looking at the position taken towards the Cyprus question. Since the 1950s the Cyprus issue has been used to spread and radicalize Turkish nationalism.

I have recently observed that, after a long break starting in the early 2000s, the nationalist fever fueled by the Cyprus question has been on the rise. And the Turkish government, prepared to confront the EU in July 2012, does not mind fanning nationalism over Turkey's “national cause”: Cyprus. The Greek Cyprus' upcoming presidency of the European Council may provide the Turkish government, if it so desires, with a perfect excuse to break with the EU and withdraw its support for a negotiated solution on the island.

Last week Turkish European Affairs Minister Egemen Bağış listed “annexing northern Cyprus to Turkey” among the options Turkey has concerning the future of the island. Claiming later that he was misunderstood, the minister underlined that Turkey's policy remains unchanged: “Our sole objective is for a solution to be reached on the island, acceptable to both Cypriot sides.” He proceeded by saying, “But if no settlement emerges, all options are on the table.”

The problem lies in the meaning of “all options.” In his previous interview, given to a newspaper, Minister Bağış named the “options on the table” as follows: reunification agreed upon by the two communities in the island; if this fails, a two-state solution; or the annexation of Turkish Cyprus to Turkey.

Never, as far as I remember, has a minister of any Turkish government stated that “annexing the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus [KKTC]” is a policy option that is on the table. This was uttered by a number of ultranationalist politicians and opinion leaders, but not by a member of the government or a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

As has been declared numerous times, Turkey prefers and works for a negotiated settlement in the island. It has also been hinted several times that if negotiations do not progress well, Turkey will not wait forever but will consider pressing for the recognition of the KKTC. But an outright annexation has never been the policy of any Turkish government, nor of the AK Party government.

How then can we explain the minister's statement? Is it a new government policy or a slip of the tongue?

Since the government has remained silent and the minister did not denounce the option, we may assume that annexation is a policy option seriously being considered in Ankara.

But this contradicts Turkey's declared reason for the 1974 intervention on the island. Furthermore, all the defenses of this intervention that followed are de-legitimized by such a policy.

Beyond this, such a policy does a great injustice to the KKTC. Turkey officially recognizes the KKTC as a sovereign state. How can a state recognizing another as sovereign and independent talk of annexing it?

This talk is dangerous and self-defeating for Turkish diplomacy. The talk of annexing may only be an acknowledgment that Turkey keeps the KKTC under its occupation. Is this the case? If the Turkish government says yes, then its minister can talk of annexing it without consulting its government or people.

I suspect it was a movie that was watched by over 4 million people in Turkey these past few weeks, and probably the minister himself -- “Fetih 1453” (The Conquest 1453), that is to blame for this talk of “annexing Cyprus”! If Constantinople, why not Cyprus?

Is Kemalism an alternative to the AK Party?

A weak opposition unable to present itself as an alternative to the ruling party continues to be an important problem in Turkish politics. The lack of a viable alternative to the government boosts the ruling party’s self-righteous confidence and alienates dissident groups who have lost their hope in change through democratic competition resulting from engagement in politics.

The main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) is still in a state of internal strife. Its members are busy opposing their own party administration instead of their opponent, the Justice and Development Party (AK Party). Last week, the CHP held two party congresses at which changing the party’s internal code of conduct was discussed. But everyone knew that it was an occasion to question the leadership of Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu. Though the dissidents of the party lost the battle against the leadership, whose power was consolidated, the damage was also inflicted upon the party itself.

The CHP’s old guard seems concerned that Kılıçdaroğlu might change the party, breaking with the Kemalist tradition and ideological outlook. To me, this is a groundless fear. Even if Kılıçdaroğlu keeps the party under full control, he is unlikely and unwilling to embark on such a transformation.

There is of course pressure for the CHP to become more social democrat and less Kemalist, but the tutelage of the latter on the former within the party is almost impossible to break with. The party grassroots are overwhelmingly Kemalist and nationalist, and they view a social democrat and humanist/universalist political stance as unpatriotic. Moreover, within the party elite is a strong group of old Kemalist cadets who are ready to label proponents of change heretics and revisionists. And most important of all, Kılıçdaroğlu fears that without the support of the Kemalists, the CHP will not even get 26 percent of the vote in elections.

Anyhow, the CHP leadership should answer these questions: Does the CHP really want to win an election and rule the country? The answer is presumably yes. How, then, will this be achieved? Is the vote of the Kemalists enough to win an election? If not, whose votes will the CHP add to its own votes to win in an election?

In the last three elections, the CHP has been stuck around 20 percent of the vote. If it claims to be an alternative to replace the AK Party, it has to at least double its votes. Even if the CHP gets all of the votes of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) it cannot defeat the AK Party, which stands at around 50 percent of popular support. Thus the key to toppling the AK Party is not only for the CHP to double its votes but also to get votes that go to the AK Party. In other words, without attracting AK Party voters and persuading them to vote for the CHP, it is not possible to defeat the AK Party in elections.

This is why I keep saying that unless the CHP abandons Kemalism it cannot open up to new voters. When the CHP won 42 percent of the vote in the 1977 election it was a social democrat, populist and anti-militarist party under Bülent Ecevit. This was also the time when the CHP was the least Kemalist in its entire history. The leadership at the time was talking about change, social justice, and solidarity, not lifestyles, republican values, and secularism. As such, the CHP of the 1970s got closer to the people as departed from Kemalism.

Defeats at the hands of the AK Party led the CHP to go backward and to uphold Kemalism as the identity and ideology of the party as well as its social base. Meanwhile, the CHP also embraced its past, including the legacy of the period of one-party rule between 1925 and 1945 as the “founder of the state.” Yet this “historical legacy” that led to the birth of a particular “image” of the CHP forms barriers for the CHP when it tries to reach out to various social groups. The “victims” of this particular past of Kemalism – among them Kurds, Muslims, non-Muslims, and liberals -- were thus distanced from the CHP, the old and the new.

The CHP’s opponent, the ruling AK Party, was very happy to see the CHP going in this direction. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan constantly identified the current CHP with the historical one that ruled during the single-party period, reminding the country of practices that included the Dersim massacre, the Independence Tribunals, the mistreatment of Muslims and non-Muslims, etc. Erdoğan knew that such a historical memory works to the advantage of the AK Party and unites all victims and opponents of the CHP behind the AK Party.

If the CHP really wishes to compete with the AK Party, it should reach out to the victims of Kemalism -- namely, the Kurds, the conservative Muslims and the liberals who overwhelmingly vote for the AK Party. And this cannot be done without denouncing the past and abandoning Kemalism.

AK Party’s new mission

Should a state design its institutions and policies to create a “religious generation”? Even if it does this, can it achieve such an objective? On both accounts, I think Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who has described his government’s objective as “bringing up religious generation,” is mistaken.

Pursuing such an objective is obviously an attempt at social engineering. It assumes a hierarchical relationship between the state and society and assigns the state the duty and power to shape the minds, beliefs, and lifestyles of the next generations. This is what the Kemalists tried to do for decades. Their mission was to “enlighten” the people with positivist ideas that were expected to erode the influence of religion over society and thus make it easy to generate loyalty for the new secular regime. They dictated to the people what to think, believe in and how to dress. To do this, the Kemalists designed education, public institutions, and law. And in doing so, the Kemalists destroyed the right to choose, the right to be different, and thus strangled democracy and pluralism.

Does the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) now want to follow the same path as the Kemalists? I hope not. However, as a conservative political party, they may wish to see the spread of a conservative way of life. This is natural. But once they use state authorities and public funds to generate such a society they fall into the trap of authoritarian top-down social engineering. From this moment onwards they will lose the moral ground to criticize all other attempts of social engineering at the hands of the state. No one has the right to interfere in society to create his own “imagined” society. This indicates not only an authoritarian but also a totalitarian mindset.

In the long run, it is futile and also not practical. The Kemalists failed in creating their own “loyal generation.” If they had succeeded we would have all been Kemalists, positivists and non-religious. We are not. Such policies do not create new generations of either Kemalist or religious masses but only destroy pluralism and democracy. At the end of the Kemalist indoctrination that lasted for decades, an ex-Islamist politician is the prime minister today.

So social engineering does not work. The AK Party leadership should know this the best. But the issue is not whether it is possible to generate a “new generation,” the issue is that a government trying to do this will turn into an authoritarian one, dictating its own worldview to the people by using state authority and public funds.

It is more an issue of democracy and pluralism than secularism. Yet it clearly contradicts the notion of secularism defended by the AK Party itself as freedom of religion and conscience and neutrality of the state vis-à-vis all religions. Once the government asserts that “bringing up religious generations” is its governmental objective, this will constitute an intervention in the consciences of people. Here the term “religious generations” obviously refers to Islamic religiosity and a particular Sunni interpretation of it. Thus a state with such a mission violates the neutrality principle of secularism. In a normal secular state, even in the one so far advocated by the AK Party, it is not the duty of the state to bring up religious or non-religious generations.

You may wish to live in a society in which religious values and practices are upheld. This is perfectly fine. Individuals, civil society organizations, NGOs and religious circles should be free to spread their word.

The problem is that once you try to do it by using state authority and public funds, you may end up with a state with a religious mission.