New constitution: Is it possible?

The people's overwhelming demand for a new constitution has forced political parties to work together in Parliament. For this, a parliamentary commission consisting of four political parties, each with three members, was set up.

The first meeting of the Constitutional Reconciliation Commission, whose mission is to prepare a draft, is expected to take place this week. Because this is a historic opportunity to make a “democratic constitution” with the true participation of the people for the first time in history, expectations are high.

But we have to be realistic. It is not easy to reach a consensus among political actors as diverse as the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and the Republican People's Party (CHP) on one hand, and the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) on the other.

Before tackling the content of the new constitution, the Reconciliation Commission has to agree on the procedure for reaching a decision. A 100 percent agreement among the participating parties may be desirable but it is almost impossible on contentious issues like citizenship, secularism, compulsory religious education, Kemalism, the composition and elections of the high court and so on. A kind of qualified majority may be sought to pass decisions, but in this case, three-fourths of the commission may bypass the AK Party and reach an agreement among themselves, disregarding the AK Party's parliamentary majority, which precludes approval by Parliament, let alone the people's approval in a referendum. This is not a baseless concern, as something similar happened last year in a referendum on a constitutional amendment.

On the other hand, to give the AK Party a kind of veto power in the commission, given its parliamentary majority, will not be acceptable to other political parties, which accepted Parliament speaker Cemil Çiçek's invitation to the commission on the principle that each party is equally represented in the commission. Whether the draft prepared by the Reconciliation Commission will get through the formal Constitutional Commission, where the AK Party has the majority, is another issue to be resolved.

All these have to be resolved before there is a debate on the content of the new constitution. The “good office” of the speaker of Parliament may not be enough to resolve the differences in the procedure and the content of the new constitution in the preparation period.

Besides, it would be naïve to think that political parties will act “responsibly and constructively” in this process. The politicking will continue, this time in the background of the new constitution. The AK Party will try to appear enthusiastic about a new constitution, knowing that giving the nation a new constitution will be its own success in the end. It will discursively push for it because a new constitution is a great opportunity for the ruling party to underline its “reformist credentials,” which slowly fade away after years in power.

For the CHP, the making of a new constitution is a new battleground to fight against losing the constitutional bases of Kemalism as an ideology and the independence of its institutions from the government. The attempt at reinterpreting secularism in the constitution may provoke the CHP supporters.

For the MHP, the making of the new constitution is a perfect occasion to argue that the ruling AK Party is giving in to the demands of the Kurds and, should the CHP play soft on secularism, to show that it has abandoned its secularist sensitivities. The MHP will use this process in any way possible to make gains at the expense of the AK Party and the CHP, which manipulates the Kurdish question and secularism.

As for the BDP, the constitution-making process is an excellent opportunity to voice its demands for “democratic autonomy,” education in Kurdish, referring to Kurds as a constituent ethnic element in the constitution and so on. Let us assume that the BDP has decided not to exploit the situation, but be constructive and offer to work with the AK Party on the new constitution. Even in this scenario, I think the AK Party will refrain from making a new constitution with the support of the BDP, due to concerns about the possible reaction of the Turks and the MHP's exploitation of the situation at the expense of the AK Party.

The AK Party cannot make a new constitution on its own. It needs the support of other parties. The most likely candidate is still the CHP. This is because the CHP has lost is traditional power base in state institutions like the military, judiciary, and universities. Thus it needs, like all groups that feel insecure vis-à-vis the state power, constitutional protection. If the CHP leadership and supporters forget about their fixation on secularism and seek protection from the AK Party-controlled state, then they can push the AK Party for a genuinely liberal, pluralist and democratic constitution.

In short, Turkey certainly needs a pluralist and democratic constitution that is non-ideological and ethnically blind, but the likelihood of it coming through is slim.

A post-Kemalist constitution for Turkey

The Parliament elected in the June elections has gathered to begin its legislative activities.

The new constitution is high on its agenda. Political parties seem to have agreed to set up a special commission in Parliament to work together on the new constitution. It will certainly not be easy for political parties that differ fundamentally from each other to reach a consensus.

I have not paid much attention to the details. The most important thing is to make a new constitution liberating Turkey from the ideological straightjacket of Kemalism. The new Turkey needs a post-Kemalist constitution. I understand the call for a liberal and democratic constitution as a demand for a non-ideological constitutional base of the state.

This does not mean denouncing Kemalism as an “ideology,” but leave it to the people to choose among the set of ideologies available from the free market of ideas. Let the people follow ideologies if they chose, but keep the state neutral as the basis of a wider consensus on the mechanism of living together without threatening each other.

Turkey is too developed and diversified to be ruled by any ideology upheld in the constitution. The age of ideological states has passed, passed with great pains, agonies, and disappointments. What matters now is a state that provides people not with ideas, ideologies or lifestyles, but with services and protection.

Ideological states, be they socialist, fascist or Kemalist, have failed to meet their promises. They have failed to produce freedom, welfare, and security for their citizens.

To build anew or maintain an ideological state is practically impossible in the contemporary complexities of the global economy, social networks, and political interactions. It is a struggle against the current that risks confronting not only global trends but also the demands of the people at home. People want liberty, welfare, and security, which cannot be provided by an ideological state, as proven by the political history of the 20th century.

Any ideological state formations cannot survive in a flourishing open society, deepening market economy and penetrating globalization. So it is futile to resist.

The demand for a new constitution reflects the crisis of Kemalism in itself. First, it is the crisis of Kemalism as the elitist modernization model. With its revolutionary ethos, Kemalism does not allow for the establishment of a full democracy since it does not trust the choice of people. It is not inclined to leave the people to choose their lifestyles, leaders, and beliefs. People need to be guided, enlightened and ruled. This notion of tutelage that appoints vanguard institutions and actors over the people can no longer be sustained. People do not want tutelage from anyone, including the military and anything involving Kemalism. Thus, a new and post-Kemalist constitution is needed to form a polity that secures and enables the people to rule themselves through liberal democracy.

A new constitution has also become urgent due to the crisis of secularism established and practiced by Kemalism. It is now impossible to dictate that secularism is a way of life, and that those who are not secular in their lifestyles are treated unequally. Such a notion of secularism that excludes the conservatives and religious masses cannot be sustained. Thus a post-Kemalist constitution is needed to remove the authoritarian model of secularism and eliminate the artificial tension between the religious and non-religious groups, the latter being favored by the state and the constitution.

And third, we need a post-Kemalist constitution because the current Constitution's notion of a homogenized nation is not true. There is no point in pretending that there is only one ethnicity in Turkey called Turks. We have to accept the plurality of ethnicities among the citizens of Turkey. Not every citizen of this country is a Turk. But Kemalism from its inception imagined homogenous nationhood and those who did not subscribe to this notion were denied, suppressed and forced to be assimilated.

All the above explains why we need a new constitution to remove the major clashes between social reality and the official imagination of the state based on Kemalism.

Therefore, a post-Kemalist constitution will be a prelude to a fully functioning democracy and the rule of law in Turkey as well as to a peaceful relationship between the Kurds and the conservatives on the one hand and the state on the other.

Are we ever closer to a Kurdish solution amid violence?

The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) is committing suicide. It kills civilians, both Turkish and Kurdish, in various parts of Turkey. This obviously points to a desperate position on the part of the PKK.

As a result of the killings both in Ankara and Siirt last week, the PKK has received very harsh criticism and reaction from the Turks and the Kurds. A group of Kurdish activists started a campaign and called on the PKK “to not kill on my behalf.”

This indicates that the PKK is losing its moral high ground among the Kurds, who are denouncing the violence that is being directed at civilians. Even among the ranks of the BDP strong criticism has been voiced pointing out that even in times of war there are moral limits not to kill civilians.

It is therefore hard to understand the rationale and objective behind this new wave of terror. From an optimistic point of view, one could think the PKK is trying to put pressure on the government by using such violent acts in order to force it to accept a negotiated settlement. But we know that the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government is engaged with both Abdullah Öcalan in prison and the PKK’s other leaders to facilitate a solution. The leaked tape recordings of a dialogue between the National Intelligence Organization (MİT) and the PKK shows that even at a time when the Kurdish opening seemed publicly abandoned by the government, in practice, the same government was trying to negotiate with Öcalan and the PKK. Therefore, it is hard to question the government’s willingness to address the Kurdish question and even engage with the PKK for this matter.

We also know that negotiations with Öcalan continued right into the summer as Öcalan declared substantial progress in the talks with the state. What bothers many observers is that the PKK’s attacks were intensified following a message from Öcalan, where he claimed to have reached an agreement with the state and that there was no need to continue the war.

This gives rise to speculation that it is not the state but the PKK that is turning away from a negotiated solution. If this is not true for the entire PKK, there are at least some radical elements within the organization that may not approve the peace process conducted by Öcalan. Instead, by intensifying violence, they could be trying to convey a message that the counterpart of the state for negotiation is not Öcalan, but the warlords who effectively control the PKK on the ground. This takes us to a vicious circle. It took decades for the state to talk with Öcalan for peace and settlement, now if it appears that Öcalan is not the right person to speak with because he is not in control of the PKK then there could be no one on the table to talk to.

Anyway, it is a fact that the PKK can survive as a terrorist organization without Öcalan, but it cannot enjoy social and political support among the Kurds. So, Öcalan may not be in total control of the PKK, but the PKK warlords cannot survive without Öcalan’s blessing. If they, both Öcalan and his warlords, want peace and want to exist without violence they should stop wrestling with each other by killing innocent people, which has turned into a way of showing muscle, not only to the state but also to each other.

The PKK has come to a crossroads. While using violence can never be justified, the terrorist organization has even expanded the use of violence against civilians. This is self-defeating, irrational and inhuman. This should be stopped at once.

Despite the confusion over the objectives, rationale and actors behind the recent PKK violence I’m still keeping my hopes high. The rising violence may be heralding that peace is ever closer. Before a full-scale peace talk, both sides are trying to raise the stakes and signal that the current state of violence is not sustainable, affordable or favorable for either side.

Secularism for Arabs and Turks

Will the Arab Spring countries embrace secularism as described by the Turkish prime minister?

It is certainly odd to hear Recep Tayyip Erdoğan preaching about secularism in Egypt and Tunisia given that he comes from a political tradition that was constantly suppressed in the name of secularism and that his party, described as the center of anti-secular activities, was threatened with closure by the Constitutional Court only three years ago.

Now Erdoğan is advising the Arabs not to be afraid of secularism. What he has in mind, however, is of course not the secularism of the Kemalists or the Nasserites or the Baathists. He, in fact, is putting forward a notion of reformed secularism, the kind that is emancipatory and non-interventionist.

This is a departure from the one implemented in Turkey by the Kemalists. Turkey's experience with secularism is not a happy one. From its inception during the republican era, secularism was conceived as a “device” to exclude and oppress religious groups. Exclusion on the grounds of secularism served to delegitimize social and political actors and their demands while elevating the Kemalist elite as the legitimate vanguard of the system. Secularism was thus a shield behind which the Kemalists conducted a struggle for power vis-à-vis the conservative periphery.

It was not a model in which the state and religion were separated, with each commanding its own realm free of intervention from the other side. In the Turkish secular model the state-controlled religion -- the way in which it was organized, believed in and taught. Thus, while the state, in the name of secularism, kept religion at bay and even controlled it, religion was not supposed to define rules or norms of the state's affairs. As a result, Turkish secularism created its own institution of religion within the state apparatus so it could rule and regulate religious activities. Even in this, the state was not impartial since the institution was only in charge of Islam, and only one interpretation of it. So Sunni Islam became the “official religion,” in practice excluding non-Muslims and Alevis. Moreover, this notion of Islam became compulsory in schools reinforcing the state's monopoly over Islam, its interpretation and teaching.

While regulating the relationship with religion in such a way, on the other hand, Turkish secularism has also attempted to erode paradoxically public displays of Islam. This was conducted through an understanding of secularism as a “way of life.” So, on one hand, the state ran religious institutions, published religious books, employed preachers and taught Islam, but on the other religion/Islam was to be kept to one's self not appearing in social or political life.

To achieve secularism with democracy and social will result in removing the built-in authoritarian political content of radical secularism. There are two important aspects of secularism: impartiality and the equal treatment of all religions by the state. Secularism involves an institutional attitude and method that ensures that the state remains impartial and equidistant to all religions and thoughts, whereby secularism is essentially regarded as the freedom of religion and conscience. On the other hand, secularism guarantees emancipation for different beliefs and lifestyles.

This is an important ground on which secularists and Muslims can reach a consensus in Islamic communities.

Israel’s missed opportunity

I do not understand why the government of Israel finds it so difficult to apologize for a mistake that it has committed. Yes, it expressed regret that nine civilians were killed by its own soldiers and offered its condolences. Why not an apology, then? Is it worth triggering all this tension and provoking a potential hot conflict?

I am afraid that without a change in Israel’s attitude, the tension will continue to increase. The news that the Israeli government is considering countermeasures against Turkey that include extending a hand to the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and supporting efforts for the recognition of Armenian genocide claims have agitated the public and Turkish government further. With such news, it will be impossible for the Turkish government to calm down and mend the damage already done. Moreover, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will be touring Arab Spring countries Egypt, Tunisia and Libya this week. In his visits, the Turkish Prime Minister will certainly underline the importance of the people’s will, democratic institutions, and change as brought up by the Arab revolts, but I also expect that Erdoğan will speak up against Israel, denouncing the blockade of Gaza and calling on them to stand against Israel’s aggressive policies in the region. Thus, Erdoğan’s Middle East tour will, at least on a rhetorical level, increase tension between Turkey and Israel. The Arab Spring may turn into an anti-Israeli public and political rally through the efforts of the Turkish prime minister, whose popularity in the Arab street should not be underestimated. Some elements of this could be seen in Cairo in this last week’s demonstration against Israel.

Furthermore, Palestinians are to declare an independent Palestinian state before the UN on Sept. 20, a project enthusiastically supported by Turkey. The declaration will be an occasion to rally international support against Israel’s occupation, continuation to build settlements in the occupied territories and blockade of Gaza.

All these mean that in the coming days, Israel will face increasing pressure from the international community on a series of topics, including that the Israeli position is not defendable under either international law or civic morality.

Another development that places Israel under tremendous pressure is that the tension between Israel and Egypt is growing. The Camp David accord seems to have been demolished. The Egyptian masses are getting out of control, forcing the Israeli ambassador to flee, and the interim government is not willing or able to do anything to stop them. This and other incidents may lead the Israelis to believe that the Arab Spring may not be a “good thing” for Israel. This may be so if Israel is still stuck in the old habits of defying international law and preferring to deal with the autocrats in the region without taking the public mood into account. This “old Middle East” has gone, gone at least in the Maghreb and Mashriq regions. It is time for Israel to understand and act according to the parameters of the new, emerging Middle East, to which Israel can contribute by pursuing a policy of peace. This seems to not be the case so far, as demonstrated in Israel’s policy on Turkey. As a result, Israelis will feel more isolated, and thus threatened, in the coming days. Mending relations with Turkey with an apology over the Mavi Marmara raid would have brought relief for Israel. It seems that the extreme right-wing in the government has prevented such a reconciliatory move to enable Israel to cope with change in the Middle East and Turkey. The long-anticipated change has arrived in the Middle East, but not Israel.

Towards a Kurdish solution without the PKK

I think it is time to seriously consider a solution to the Kurdish question without the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). This is because the PKK does not seem interested in facilitating a solution even with the involvement of its leader, Abdullah Öcalan.

A comprehensive solution, of course, requires disarmament of the PKK, which could be negotiated with the PKK leadership. The Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government, in addition to a political initiative calling for a democratic opening within which the Kurdish demands could be met, also started a round of talks with Öcalan.

Yet, the Kurdish political movement regarded these initiatives as serious challenges to its very existence. While the “democratic opening” was viewed as an attempt of the ruling party to be more advantageous vis-à-vis the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) in the competitive political arena, “talks” with Öcalan were seen as a process of dissolving the PKK and selling out its members.

In short, the government's efforts were taken as threats, not as steps to ease the problems of Turkey's Kurdish populace. What naturally followed was not cooperation but obstruction on the part of the Kurdish political movement.

All these could have been tolerable if there had been no such acts of violence committed by the PKK. Within the last month, over 40 members of the Turkish security forces were killed by the PKK. The attacks in Silvan and Hakkari, in particular, sparked a public outcry calling for a response from the government, resulting in a cross-border airstrike by the Turkish military.

In today's political and psychological environment the best the government is expected to do is to carry on with the “democratic opening” while trying to “punish” the PKK with operations on the ground and stop talks with its imprisoned leader.

This means that at the end of this process, even if the “democratic opening” survives, “talks at Imrali [the prison where Öcalan is being held]” will not. That is to say, the PKK and Öcalan are out of the picture in the search for a settlement. This is not only due to the anger accumulated against the PKK following the recent attacks but also due to the emerging picture that there is no single PKK to talk to and that its leader Öcalan is not in control of his organization.

To me, it is clear that the PKK is no longer an organization controlled by a central and hierarchical leadership. The long imprisonment of its leader, Öcalan, has resulted in the emergence of new centers of power within the movement. The PKK is now a network of warlords without a central leadership.

There would be significant implications for such a structure. First, we will have difficulties in defining what the PKK is and who runs it. The PKK seems to have been divided up in various groups and their own perspectives. The recent acts of violence by the PKK in Silvan and Hakkari may be the acts of this or that group within the movement. It will be impossible to claim responsibility on the part of the organization and it has become obvious that we can no longer talk of a singular PKK.

If the organization is not clearly defined and if its leadership is not properly named then it is impossible to “talk” to the PKK. That is to say, even if the Turkish government is engaged in a “negotiation” with the PKK it cannot be certain whether the terms of a possible agreement would be accepted by the whole PKK structure.

I think the recent attacks of the PKK aimed to convey such a message to the Turkish state, implying that the state is talking to the “wrong” person, namely Öcalan.

If it is not to Öcalan himself then whom to talk to in the PKK in order to reach a settlement? This is the puzzle. I think the intended objective is to raise exactly such a question. The logical conclusion of this is to stop talking to Öcalan, who is not in a position to deliver on his promises.

Let's say the state has understood this message. What would be its response? Would it instead talk to several warlords within the PKK? I think no one would take a fragmented leadership seriously. Therefore all these would mean abandoning the talks with anyone associated with the PKK.

As a result, the PKK will be increasingly isolated in the region, in the international community and also among the Kurdish people. It will remain a terrorist organization but will lose its social base and support among the Kurds, which in the long run will result in the dismemberment of the PKK.

There is no need for the PKK that does not contribute to the solution of the Kurdish question.

The AK Party, 10 years later

There is no doubt that the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) is a success story. It is now celebrating its 10th anniversary and the party has been ruling the country for nine out of those 10 years.

This has been achieved despite the party leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan having been sentenced to a prison term when he was removed from his position as mayor of İstanbul and sent to prison just before founding the AK Party. So this party did not emerge from a position of strength but rather from disadvantage, to become the central actor in Turkish politics over the last 10 years.

The AK Party's success lies in the ability of its founding leaders to transform an Islamist movement, Necmettin Erbakan's Milli Görüş (National View), into a center-right mass political party. This took place at a time when conventional center-right parties and leaders like Süleyman Demirel had aligned themselves with the military and secularist forces, which alienated their conservative and anti-militarist social sectors, who were attracted by the AK Party's conservative and anti-militarist discourse.

In this context, the way in which Islamic social, political and economic actors were treated by the secularist establishment, led by the military and the judiciary, played a crucial and educating role for Islamic circles. During the Feb. 28 process, the so-called postmodern coup era, from 1997 to 1999 their political parties were banned, their NGOs were intimidated and closed down, and their businesses were boycotted.

The suppression of Islamic groups by the secularist establishment certainly played a role in speeding up and even facilitating a process of transformation. But there was more of an internal debate on how to survive politically, economically and socially in a strictly secularist and authoritarian environment. It seemed that the old way of confronting secularist opponents directly and on their own was bound to fail. They needed a new strategy, if not to come to power, certainly to secure protection vis-à-vis undemocratic and unlawful pressure by the secularist establishment.

The AK Party is the result of this search for security. But the new political strategy, the language developed and the circumstances in which all these took place were so positive that they came to power in the first general elections.

It would, however, be a mistake to explain the rise of the AK Party by merely looking at the political landscape. The leadership, identity, and policies of the party were also shaped by the emerging conservative middle class and business elites who had started to flourish in the mid-1980s under the liberalizing and export-oriented policies of Turgut Özal. Their expansion had been blocked in the late 1990s by an alliance of the secularist İstanbul based business elites and the military during the so-called Feb. 28 process, in which pro-Islamic Erbakan was forced to resign as prime minister in the summer of 1997. Their companies were blacklisted as “Islamist capital,” their associations were intimidated and some were even tried.

The new conservative business elite came to realize that the rise of Islamism under the banner of the Welfare Party (RP) was detrimental to their business interests and social existence.

Islamist intellectuals, NGO activists, journalists, etc., all experienced similar pressures. To get out of secularist pressures they needed to build alliances with non-religious, secular but democratic social and intellectual circles.

In order to do this first, they had to reform their political language, adopting democracy, human rights, liberties, pluralism and the rule of law as central values of the party. This was certainly a significant departure from a self-referential ambiguous Islamist terminology. This way, former Islamists were able to reach out to new social and political groups beyond religious people. In fact, the AK Party managed to develop a “shared agenda” with non-religious segments of society. Democratization, liberalization, EU membership and economic development were the key factors in these shared objectives. Thus the party assumed the role of an agency bestowed with transforming the authoritarian politics of Turkey and opening it up to the world.

Over the years it has been hard to deny that the AK Party has done pretty well. Winning a third consecutive term is proof that it has satisfied people's needs and demands. It has emerged as the most reformist party in Turkey in terms of democratization, the Kurdish question and civil-military relations.

The question now is whether the AK Party will remain this way, given resisting bureaucratic and judicial forces have been significantly weakened. In other words, will the AK Party be a reformist party on its own when it no longer feels insecure in a new constitutional and institutional environment?