Secularism for Arabs and Turks

Will the Arab Spring countries embrace secularism as described by the Turkish prime minister?

It is certainly odd to hear Recep Tayyip Erdoğan preaching about secularism in Egypt and Tunisia given that he comes from a political tradition that was constantly suppressed in the name of secularism and that his party, described as the center of anti-secular activities, was threatened with closure by the Constitutional Court only three years ago.

Now Erdoğan is advising the Arabs not to be afraid of secularism. What he has in mind, however, is of course not the secularism of the Kemalists or the Nasserites or the Baathists. He, in fact, is putting forward a notion of reformed secularism, the kind that is emancipatory and non-interventionist.

This is a departure from the one implemented in Turkey by the Kemalists. Turkey's experience with secularism is not a happy one. From its inception during the republican era, secularism was conceived as a “device” to exclude and oppress religious groups. Exclusion on the grounds of secularism served to delegitimize social and political actors and their demands while elevating the Kemalist elite as the legitimate vanguard of the system. Secularism was thus a shield behind which the Kemalists conducted a struggle for power vis-à-vis the conservative periphery.

It was not a model in which the state and religion were separated, with each commanding its own realm free of intervention from the other side. In the Turkish secular model the state-controlled religion -- the way in which it was organized, believed in and taught. Thus, while the state, in the name of secularism, kept religion at bay and even controlled it, religion was not supposed to define rules or norms of the state's affairs. As a result, Turkish secularism created its own institution of religion within the state apparatus so it could rule and regulate religious activities. Even in this, the state was not impartial since the institution was only in charge of Islam, and only one interpretation of it. So Sunni Islam became the “official religion,” in practice excluding non-Muslims and Alevis. Moreover, this notion of Islam became compulsory in schools reinforcing the state's monopoly over Islam, its interpretation and teaching.

While regulating the relationship with religion in such a way, on the other hand, Turkish secularism has also attempted to erode paradoxically public displays of Islam. This was conducted through an understanding of secularism as a “way of life.” So, on one hand, the state ran religious institutions, published religious books, employed preachers and taught Islam, but on the other religion/Islam was to be kept to one's self not appearing in social or political life.

To achieve secularism with democracy and social will result in removing the built-in authoritarian political content of radical secularism. There are two important aspects of secularism: impartiality and the equal treatment of all religions by the state. Secularism involves an institutional attitude and method that ensures that the state remains impartial and equidistant to all religions and thoughts, whereby secularism is essentially regarded as the freedom of religion and conscience. On the other hand, secularism guarantees emancipation for different beliefs and lifestyles.

This is an important ground on which secularists and Muslims can reach a consensus in Islamic communities.

Israel’s missed opportunity

I do not understand why the government of Israel finds it so difficult to apologize for a mistake that it has committed. Yes, it expressed regret that nine civilians were killed by its own soldiers and offered its condolences. Why not an apology, then? Is it worth triggering all this tension and provoking a potential hot conflict?

I am afraid that without a change in Israel’s attitude, the tension will continue to increase. The news that the Israeli government is considering countermeasures against Turkey that include extending a hand to the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and supporting efforts for the recognition of Armenian genocide claims have agitated the public and Turkish government further. With such news, it will be impossible for the Turkish government to calm down and mend the damage already done. Moreover, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will be touring Arab Spring countries Egypt, Tunisia and Libya this week. In his visits, the Turkish Prime Minister will certainly underline the importance of the people’s will, democratic institutions, and change as brought up by the Arab revolts, but I also expect that Erdoğan will speak up against Israel, denouncing the blockade of Gaza and calling on them to stand against Israel’s aggressive policies in the region. Thus, Erdoğan’s Middle East tour will, at least on a rhetorical level, increase tension between Turkey and Israel. The Arab Spring may turn into an anti-Israeli public and political rally through the efforts of the Turkish prime minister, whose popularity in the Arab street should not be underestimated. Some elements of this could be seen in Cairo in this last week’s demonstration against Israel.

Furthermore, Palestinians are to declare an independent Palestinian state before the UN on Sept. 20, a project enthusiastically supported by Turkey. The declaration will be an occasion to rally international support against Israel’s occupation, continuation to build settlements in the occupied territories and blockade of Gaza.

All these mean that in the coming days, Israel will face increasing pressure from the international community on a series of topics, including that the Israeli position is not defendable under either international law or civic morality.

Another development that places Israel under tremendous pressure is that the tension between Israel and Egypt is growing. The Camp David accord seems to have been demolished. The Egyptian masses are getting out of control, forcing the Israeli ambassador to flee, and the interim government is not willing or able to do anything to stop them. This and other incidents may lead the Israelis to believe that the Arab Spring may not be a “good thing” for Israel. This may be so if Israel is still stuck in the old habits of defying international law and preferring to deal with the autocrats in the region without taking the public mood into account. This “old Middle East” has gone, gone at least in the Maghreb and Mashriq regions. It is time for Israel to understand and act according to the parameters of the new, emerging Middle East, to which Israel can contribute by pursuing a policy of peace. This seems to not be the case so far, as demonstrated in Israel’s policy on Turkey. As a result, Israelis will feel more isolated, and thus threatened, in the coming days. Mending relations with Turkey with an apology over the Mavi Marmara raid would have brought relief for Israel. It seems that the extreme right-wing in the government has prevented such a reconciliatory move to enable Israel to cope with change in the Middle East and Turkey. The long-anticipated change has arrived in the Middle East, but not Israel.

Towards a Kurdish solution without the PKK

I think it is time to seriously consider a solution to the Kurdish question without the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). This is because the PKK does not seem interested in facilitating a solution even with the involvement of its leader, Abdullah Öcalan.

A comprehensive solution, of course, requires disarmament of the PKK, which could be negotiated with the PKK leadership. The Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government, in addition to a political initiative calling for a democratic opening within which the Kurdish demands could be met, also started a round of talks with Öcalan.

Yet, the Kurdish political movement regarded these initiatives as serious challenges to its very existence. While the “democratic opening” was viewed as an attempt of the ruling party to be more advantageous vis-à-vis the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) in the competitive political arena, “talks” with Öcalan were seen as a process of dissolving the PKK and selling out its members.

In short, the government's efforts were taken as threats, not as steps to ease the problems of Turkey's Kurdish populace. What naturally followed was not cooperation but obstruction on the part of the Kurdish political movement.

All these could have been tolerable if there had been no such acts of violence committed by the PKK. Within the last month, over 40 members of the Turkish security forces were killed by the PKK. The attacks in Silvan and Hakkari, in particular, sparked a public outcry calling for a response from the government, resulting in a cross-border airstrike by the Turkish military.

In today's political and psychological environment the best the government is expected to do is to carry on with the “democratic opening” while trying to “punish” the PKK with operations on the ground and stop talks with its imprisoned leader.

This means that at the end of this process, even if the “democratic opening” survives, “talks at Imrali [the prison where Öcalan is being held]” will not. That is to say, the PKK and Öcalan are out of the picture in the search for a settlement. This is not only due to the anger accumulated against the PKK following the recent attacks but also due to the emerging picture that there is no single PKK to talk to and that its leader Öcalan is not in control of his organization.

To me, it is clear that the PKK is no longer an organization controlled by a central and hierarchical leadership. The long imprisonment of its leader, Öcalan, has resulted in the emergence of new centers of power within the movement. The PKK is now a network of warlords without a central leadership.

There would be significant implications for such a structure. First, we will have difficulties in defining what the PKK is and who runs it. The PKK seems to have been divided up in various groups and their own perspectives. The recent acts of violence by the PKK in Silvan and Hakkari may be the acts of this or that group within the movement. It will be impossible to claim responsibility on the part of the organization and it has become obvious that we can no longer talk of a singular PKK.

If the organization is not clearly defined and if its leadership is not properly named then it is impossible to “talk” to the PKK. That is to say, even if the Turkish government is engaged in a “negotiation” with the PKK it cannot be certain whether the terms of a possible agreement would be accepted by the whole PKK structure.

I think the recent attacks of the PKK aimed to convey such a message to the Turkish state, implying that the state is talking to the “wrong” person, namely Öcalan.

If it is not to Öcalan himself then whom to talk to in the PKK in order to reach a settlement? This is the puzzle. I think the intended objective is to raise exactly such a question. The logical conclusion of this is to stop talking to Öcalan, who is not in a position to deliver on his promises.

Let's say the state has understood this message. What would be its response? Would it instead talk to several warlords within the PKK? I think no one would take a fragmented leadership seriously. Therefore all these would mean abandoning the talks with anyone associated with the PKK.

As a result, the PKK will be increasingly isolated in the region, in the international community and also among the Kurdish people. It will remain a terrorist organization but will lose its social base and support among the Kurds, which in the long run will result in the dismemberment of the PKK.

There is no need for the PKK that does not contribute to the solution of the Kurdish question.

The AK Party, 10 years later

There is no doubt that the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) is a success story. It is now celebrating its 10th anniversary and the party has been ruling the country for nine out of those 10 years.

This has been achieved despite the party leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan having been sentenced to a prison term when he was removed from his position as mayor of İstanbul and sent to prison just before founding the AK Party. So this party did not emerge from a position of strength but rather from disadvantage, to become the central actor in Turkish politics over the last 10 years.

The AK Party's success lies in the ability of its founding leaders to transform an Islamist movement, Necmettin Erbakan's Milli Görüş (National View), into a center-right mass political party. This took place at a time when conventional center-right parties and leaders like Süleyman Demirel had aligned themselves with the military and secularist forces, which alienated their conservative and anti-militarist social sectors, who were attracted by the AK Party's conservative and anti-militarist discourse.

In this context, the way in which Islamic social, political and economic actors were treated by the secularist establishment, led by the military and the judiciary, played a crucial and educating role for Islamic circles. During the Feb. 28 process, the so-called postmodern coup era, from 1997 to 1999 their political parties were banned, their NGOs were intimidated and closed down, and their businesses were boycotted.

The suppression of Islamic groups by the secularist establishment certainly played a role in speeding up and even facilitating a process of transformation. But there was more of an internal debate on how to survive politically, economically and socially in a strictly secularist and authoritarian environment. It seemed that the old way of confronting secularist opponents directly and on their own was bound to fail. They needed a new strategy, if not to come to power, certainly to secure protection vis-à-vis undemocratic and unlawful pressure by the secularist establishment.

The AK Party is the result of this search for security. But the new political strategy, the language developed and the circumstances in which all these took place were so positive that they came to power in the first general elections.

It would, however, be a mistake to explain the rise of the AK Party by merely looking at the political landscape. The leadership, identity, and policies of the party were also shaped by the emerging conservative middle class and business elites who had started to flourish in the mid-1980s under the liberalizing and export-oriented policies of Turgut Özal. Their expansion had been blocked in the late 1990s by an alliance of the secularist İstanbul based business elites and the military during the so-called Feb. 28 process, in which pro-Islamic Erbakan was forced to resign as prime minister in the summer of 1997. Their companies were blacklisted as “Islamist capital,” their associations were intimidated and some were even tried.

The new conservative business elite came to realize that the rise of Islamism under the banner of the Welfare Party (RP) was detrimental to their business interests and social existence.

Islamist intellectuals, NGO activists, journalists, etc., all experienced similar pressures. To get out of secularist pressures they needed to build alliances with non-religious, secular but democratic social and intellectual circles.

In order to do this first, they had to reform their political language, adopting democracy, human rights, liberties, pluralism and the rule of law as central values of the party. This was certainly a significant departure from a self-referential ambiguous Islamist terminology. This way, former Islamists were able to reach out to new social and political groups beyond religious people. In fact, the AK Party managed to develop a “shared agenda” with non-religious segments of society. Democratization, liberalization, EU membership and economic development were the key factors in these shared objectives. Thus the party assumed the role of an agency bestowed with transforming the authoritarian politics of Turkey and opening it up to the world.

Over the years it has been hard to deny that the AK Party has done pretty well. Winning a third consecutive term is proof that it has satisfied people's needs and demands. It has emerged as the most reformist party in Turkey in terms of democratization, the Kurdish question and civil-military relations.

The question now is whether the AK Party will remain this way, given resisting bureaucratic and judicial forces have been significantly weakened. In other words, will the AK Party be a reformist party on its own when it no longer feels insecure in a new constitutional and institutional environment?

What's next for Kurdish politics?

Can we still remain optimistic about the possibility of a final political settlement of the Kurdish question? Recent developments raise serious doubts about that.

Tension had risen even before the June elections, but many attributed this to the politicking of parties competing for an ever greater number of votes. Unfortunately, tension continued to rise after the elections. First, the decision of the Higher Election Board (YSK) to nullify the election of Hatip Dicle as a member of Parliament from Diyarbakir province, and later the verdict of the court not to free six other elected deputies currently in detention played a part in that. The result was the Peace and Democracy Party's (BDP) boycott of Parliament by not taking the oath and holding its weekly group meetings in Diyarbakir instead.

Meanwhile, increased activity by the Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK) in Diyarbakir signaled something was brewing in the region. The killing of two soldiers right in the very center of Yüksekova and the abduction of soldiers and civilians were testimony to that. Despite this upheaval, there were positive indicators as well. The BDP was engaged in a dialogue with the speaker of parliament and the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) to return to Parliament after receiving the go-ahead from Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK. Öcalan had been talking about the progress made in his talks with state authorities. He even disclosed that an agreement had been reached on the formation of a Peace Council and came as close as suggesting a permanent cease-fire.

Then, however, we got word of the killing of 13 soldiers in Silvan last Thursday, sending shockwaves through all parts of Turkey.

Given the recent developments, I summarized in the text above, my first reaction when I heard the news was that this act of violence was not only directed against Turkish soldiers but also against Öcalan. By conducting such an attack, some within the ranks of the PKK sent a message out to Öcalan, saying that he cannot negotiate a peace settlement on his own. The same message was also sent to the state, conveying that Öcalan is not in control of the organization and that the state is talking to the “wrong person.”

Some groups within an organization such as the PKK who think that their sacrifices have been in vain tend to resort to violence or the escalation thereof. This has happened with the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), too, so why not with the PKK?

The PKK has taken responsibility for the attack in Silvan and I guess Öcalan himself will not directly denounce the act because doing so would mean admitting he is not in control. This is the last thing Öcalan would do as the state has engaged in talks with him, assuming that he is still in charge of the PKK. So for him to appear not to be running things will significantly weaken his bargaining position with the state and diminish his hope of somehow getting out of prison one day. So he will swallow this. But the question remains: Who is in control of the PKK if not Öcalan?

This question is important if the government is still interested in talking to anyone associated with the PKK. At the moment I have serious doubts about this. With the latest attack, I think the PKK has risked becoming an irrelevant party in finding a solution for the Kurdish question. The organization and its associates, including the BDP, may never be taken seriously again as partners in political dialogue, leaving the PKK isolated and marginalized due to its continued use and support of violence. And no one in the world will question the decision to cut off all communication with an organization using violence for political purposes, would it come to that.

The signs, for now, are that the government -- while ending political dialogue with the BDP -- may go back to employing the old method of taking security measures and precautions against all kinds of violent acts and their political supporters. In doing so, the government is also in a position to mobilize regional and international pressure on the PKK given the turmoil in the Middle East.

Thus, while targeting the PKK and the BDP, the AK Party government can continue to increase investments in the Kurdish region, making social services available in order to underline its indispensable role in assuring the welfare of Kurds. These social policies may be accompanied with veiled identity policies with some Islamic overtones, but can just as well result in gaining a strong foothold for the AK Party among the Kurds. It is a fact that the support among Kurds for political parties tending to the BDP line is stuck at 5 to 6 percent of the vote in Turkey. This has not changed since 1995. With policies such as those of the AK Party, relying on providing social services and recognition of the Kurdish identity, coupled with Islamic overtones, may well halt the spread of the PKK and BDP's political influence in the region.

This is a strategy. The AK Party government may decide that Turkey is used to living with the threat of PKK terrorism anyway, so why should it take the risk of negotiating with Öcalan or advancing the “democratic opening” while at the same time it enjoys the support of a considerable section of the Kurdish people?

Well, the final analysis will take us back to where we started. The PKK, the BDP, and Öcalan should not take the risk of going back to square one. We have never been this close to resolving the Kurdish question and it should not be sabotaged by the PKK.

Judicial sabotage

Is the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) aware that it is being lured into a trap by the decisions of the judiciary? If it has not yet woken up, let me tell it what the trap is.

It is one that will prevent the party from making a constitution and resolving the Kurdish question, the two actions most needed for ultimate reform. It is really odd. Before the new Parliament has even commenced Turkish politics seems to have gotten out of hand. Once more Turkey’s judiciary has played a central role in driving politics into chaos. Political actors and democrats cannot allow the judiciary to hijack politics.

What I am referring to is two decisions taken by branches of the judiciary. One is the decision of the Supreme Election Board (YSK) to nullify the election of Hatip Dicle as a member of Parliament from Diyarbakır -- the same YSK that decided Dicle was eligible to be elected as a deputy. Now the same institution and the same judges have ruled Dicle is not eligible to be elected. Such a scandalous case cannot occur in any civilized country. Are they joking or committing institutional suicide?

There can be no defense against the argument that the law is clear on this matter and that anyone sentenced for “crimes against the state” would lose the right to be elected. First, if there is such a law, it is shameful. An ordinary criminal, say a rapist or a murderer, may be able to stand as a candidate and win a parliamentary seat, but anyone who is convicted of “thought crimes” cannot. How can we defend such a “law”?

Second, the YSK cannot hide behind even this shameful “law” simply because it does not have any authority written in any law to nullify the election of a deputy. Dicle, under the authorization of the YSK, entered the elections and the people of Diyarbakır elected him as their representative, period. From this moment onwards, the YSK is out of the picture and has no authority whatsoever over an elected member of Parliament. It is a shame on the part of the rest of Parliament and political parties that they do not defend “their space” against the unwarranted intervention of the YSK. I would have expected the AK Party, the majority party in Parliament, to act in a way to defend the will of the people who elected Dicle just two weeks ago. But, on the contrary, it remained silent and even rushed to take the offer made by the YSK in Diyarbakır, granting Dicle’s spot to another deputy from the list of the AK Party. It should have at least restrained itself from accepting the undeserved seat unjustly taken away from the BDP. I think this is not being faithful to the will of the people who elected Dicle as their representative.

The AK Party has nothing to win out of this one seat but a lot to lose: its commitment to the supremacy of the will of the people. Anyone who is elected as a deputy should be treated like a precious jewel of democracy for his/her representative capacity. Whoever he or she is -- whether an Ergenekon suspect or an ordinary person -- it does not matter. For the court not to decide to free the detained suspects in the Ergenekon case who have been elected as deputies is another blow to the will of the people and the belief in the supremacy of Parliament. I cannot accept that representatives of the people are kept in prison. The belief in the supremacy of Parliament and the people’s choice requires respect for anyone elected as a deputy. Apart from a moral high ground, there is also a practical reason why we should resolve these crises immediately. It is that we need this Parliament and we cannot afford damaging its public standing.

I am deeply upset about these two decisions of the judiciary because they damage the legitimacy of Parliament, the most important matter above all other concerns and gains. Once the legitimacy of the current Parliament is in question, it will become impossible for it to carry on with the most challenging task ahead: making a new constitution. For this, I am shocked and upset not only about the YSK decision but also the attitude of the ruling AK Party. I think it has been lured into a trap.

The trap is to render the AK Party unable to make a new constitution and resolve the Kurdish question. The decisions of the judiciary about Dicle, Mustafa Balbay, Mehmet Haberal, and Engin Alan are attempts at sabotaging Turkey’s normalization and democratization by hindering the making of a new constitution and the resolution of the Kurdish question.

Turkey the day after elections

It appears the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) has won another term in office. It is the first party in the last 50 years to have won three consecutive elections. This is a phenomenal success that has to be studied by political scientists.

However, Turkey post-elections will be a better country. The ballot box is the best cure for any kind of political or social disease, provided that all parties accept the rules of the game. For any reasonable community, there is no better alternative than upholding the will of the people. Let’s hope this election will be a turning point in coming to terms with the rules of the game. No one can question the mandate given to a political party disregarding its ideology, identity or program.

I think what the people are best aware of in this country is their power to determine who is to govern them. It is important to note that the people of this country have experience in determining who is to rule through the ballot box. This power has been in place since 1950. So it is better not to doubt the wisdom of the electorate.

Political parties have also behaved themselves despite the occasional tension and polemics. Campaigns conducted by all political parties reflected their priorities. Whatever they are, no one can argue that political campaigns are constrained in any way. Election campaigning in languages other than Turkish was possible for the first time. Therefore, Kurdish candidates from all political parties were able to use Kurdish to convey their messages to the people.

Polemics were commonplace among the political leaders, which is almost inevitable in an election campaign. It is hoped that these polemics will remain after the elections and that political parties will settle their differences on important issues.

Anyhow, I think what marked this election is the absence of ideological quarrels. We have not discussed the future of secularism and republican values being threatened by Islamization under the government of the AK Party.

During the second term of AK Party rule, one would have expected that Islamization of the state and society would have gone further, and thus the quest to defend secular values would have intensified. But this has not happened. On the contrary, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) has almost abandoned this issue, never mentioning such things either in its election manifesto or during public meetings.

What has changed since then? The sensitivity of the CHP towards secularism, or the intentions of the AK Party to undo secularism and the republic? What has happened to the “hidden agenda” of the AK Party?

If secularism and the republic are not in danger today, then they were also not in danger four years ago. So, what was the idea behind this? I think in the post-election period this will be discussed.

Nonetheless, it was good to experience an election period in which real issues were raised and discussed, and pledges were made concerning these real issues. This is certainly an indication of Turkey’s normalization.

Yet, the thing that will institutionalize Turkey’s normalization is to resolve the Kurdish question and to make a new, liberal, democratic and pluralistic constitution. And this is under the responsibility of the AK Party once more.