Is the Turkish state secular anyway?

“Defending secularism” has become a façade to hide the struggle to maintain the status quo. One hundred years ago it was the reactionary Islamic scholars who fought against change in the name of Islam; now it is reactionary positivist scholars who resist change in the name of secularism.

 Secularism has been used as a proper tool to control social and political opposition directed to the beneficiaries of the status quo. The rising peripheral forces with their liberal, conservative and democratic credentials are intimidated by a language of “secularism under threat.”

To demonstrate that the fight is not about secularism per se but a power struggle between the elite and peripheral forces, it is necessary to look at the practice of secularism in Turkey and see if the Turkish practice is really “secular.”

A secular state refers to a particular form of relationship between the state and religion. This relationship includes two fundamental components: first, separation of the state from religion and second, the neutrality of the state towards all religions and beliefs.

Is the current practice of secularism in Turkey in line with secularism defined in terms of the separation of the state and religion? Absolutely not. The Religious Affairs Directorate is part of the state organization with thousands of staff and hundreds of local branches. That is to say that the state is organized to serve a particular religion or maybe to keep religion under the surveillance and supervision of the state. Either way, it goes against the principles of a secular state. While some are concerned that religion, in our case Islam, is influencing state affairs, what we see in practice is that the state claims a total control over religious activities through its apparatus dealing with religious affairs. Religious groups, circles and dervish orders do not officially exist. By this, the state does not recognize a social and indeed an individual space for independent religious organizations. It is the state that interferes with religion and religious activities, and such a state cannot be called a secular one.

Is the current practice of secularism in line with secularism defined in terms of neutrality of the state towards all religions, sects, and creeds? Absolutely not. The state-organized religious affairs under the directorate impose a particular form of Islam on its citizens. As such, it is not neutral but partisan. Non-Muslim minorities are discriminated against on religious grounds by this secular state as restrictions have been imposed with regard to educational activities and properties of non-Muslim minorities. The Religious Affairs Directorate does not serve or represent non-Islamic religions which are observed by some Turkish citizens. Even more dramatic is the denial of an Islamic sect, the Alevis, by the state’s religious apparatus. The directorate teaches, preaches and practices not only Islam but a particular form of Islam: the Sunni-Hanefi version. It is not neutrality of a secular state, but the imposition of a particular form of Islam on its citizens. How can a “secular” state teach compulsory courses on a particular interpretation of Islam in elementary and high schools?

All these are serious deviations from the conception of a secular state. The state cannot and should not dominate religion and religious affairs and vice versa.

To settle the question once and for all is to build a secular state by really separating it from religion (Islam) and neutralizing it toward all religions and creeds.
20.09.2007

How to erase the legacy of the military regime: A new constitution

The debate on a new constitution requires a comprehensive questioning of the legacy of the military regime. A democratic regime cannot be thoroughly established in a constitutional order that constantly reminds us of the constituting power of the military.

In its original form, this Constitution had articles justifying a military coup, imposing unlawful bans on political party leaders beside its illiberal articles limiting freedom of expression and association. It is time for this country to prove that it is capable of making a democratic and liberal constitution both in content and the way it is made.

The 1982 constitution was drafted by a commission of the Advisory Council, the members of which were appointed by the junta named the National Security Council. The authority to finalize the draft before going for a referendum belonged to the junta. A referendum was held on Nov. 6, 1982, approving the constitution and simultaneously electing Gen. Kenan Evren, the leader of the junta as president. Other junta members maintained a “constitutional” position within the system as members of a Presidential Council. The result was a constitution carrying the junta structure and its priorities well into the era of the civilian government after 1983.

Neither the process of making the constitution nor the referendum took place in a free atmosphere. All was done under a military government when hundreds of thousands were under detention, censorship was in place and political debates were totally banned. What kind of constitution can one get in such circumstances?

Retaining the 1982 constitution demonstrates our inability to face the past as if we are destined to carry the burden of the past. We have been living with our past sins, yet pretending that we have overcome them. Not really. Not until we put an end to the legacy of the 1980 military regime.

We have not been able to confess and start with a new beginning, but our fellow Greeks have. They brought the colonels to justice and put them in prison, opening the way for the consolidation of Greek democracy and eventual membership in the EU. It took only seven years to achieve this, simply because they had the courage to face reality and change it.

What about us? We have pretended that by the end of 1983 democracy was restored without questioning the constitutional order established according to the needs and priorities of the military autocrats. The junta effectively survived until 1989. The first significant change in the constitution could only be introduced in 1995 that slightly broadened the sphere of political participation. And even then, it was not us who initiated the process with an understanding to eliminate at least some remaining elements of the military regime but rather, it was the EU. The European Parliament declared it would not approve the customs union with Turkey without some constitutional reform.

Thus it is due to the EU that a new process to amend the constitution was started. And since then almost half of the articles in the constitution were changed -- all motivated or required by the EU process. Where has been our will to establish real democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights? Even many reformists did not have the guts to call for democracy and human rights for its own sake but instead tried to justify their wish by referring to the EU membership requirement.

Now the emerging will and consensus for a new constitution is a rare opportunity to show that the “constituting” will in this country belong to people and not to the military.
17.09.2007

September 12 military regime: A reminder

Some seem to have forgotten what it was like to be under a military regime. Sept. 12 was marked by lawlessness and arbitrary rule. It was an assault on democracy and a catastrophe for civil and political rights.

Let’s take a look back. The generals dissolved Parliament and government and banned all political activities with their first “communiqué.” The leaders of four major political parties -- Süleyman Demirel, Bülent Ecevit, Necmettin Erbakan and Alpaslan Türkes -- were arrested. Martial law was declared over the whole country, and the martial law authorities were empowered to censor the press and appoint or dismiss civil servants. Two trade unions, the Confederation of Revolutionary Workers’ Unions (DİSK) and Confederation of Nationalist Workers’ Unions (MİSK) were closed down, and their leaders were arrested. The National Security Council (MGK), composed of five members of the junta, became the sole rule-making body with no authority or law above it.

All mayors and members of city councils were removed from their offices. The first two executions since 1972 were carried out immediately after the coup in October. By the end of the military regime, the number of executions reached 49. Right after the military takeover, a big hunt was launched for suspects and political activists -- 600,000 were detained; some 230,000 were tried, out of which 517 were sentenced to death and 50 were executed. The detention period without trial was officially extended to 90 days, but thousands were not brought to trial after exceeding that period. Around 400,000 people were denied passports, 14,000 were stripped of citizenship, hundreds died from torture and thousands were fired from public jobs, including from universities.

All lock-outs and strikes were declared illegal and freedom of the press was violated with many newspapers being banned indefinitely and journalists imprisoned. Mass trials were held to prosecute trade unionists, political party members, and others, with a shocking 7,000 decisions for the death penalty.

After being held in detention for a month, Ecevit and Demirel, the leaders of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Justice Party (AP), respectively, were released on the condition that they would refrain from political activities and statements. The other political leaders Erbakan and Türkes were charged with actions against the Constitution, the very Constitution that was wrecked by the military itself. Erbakan spent around a year in prison while Türkes spent five years.

To silence any political opposition, the junta issued a decree in June 1981 banning the release or publication of any political statement from former politicians and making any criticism of the ruling military regime illegal. So it was effectively forbidden to speak about politics or public affairs. Towards the end of 1981, the military formally closed down all political parties including the one established by Atatürk, the CHP. Former premier and then leader of the CHP Ecevit was given a prison sentence of four months for his political comments, contravening the MGK decree of June in his newly established weekly Arayış, which was shut down in March 1982. Ecevit was also tried and sentenced to three months for interviews he gave to the foreign press.

Are all of these actions acceptable, tolerable, desirable or bearable today? Only torturers and executioners would want another military regime in this country. A democratic regime is the key to having a decent and honorable life, so it is necessary that we nurture democracy and work hard to strengthen it. Yet in a country in which the leader of the main opposition party -- which also claims to be a social democrat one -- declares that democracy is threatening the republic, we still have a long way to go.
13.09.2007

From isolationism to nationalism and then to authoritarianism?

The latest Transatlantic Trends, a global public opinion survey issued by the German Marshall Fund, reveals some alarming data that are likely to block Turkey’s quest for opening up to the world economically and politically. A question arises if the government will face an even stronger nationalist resistance from society at large in response to its integrationist policies towards the EU in particular and global economy in general as people become seemingly more skeptical about the outside world.

According to the survey, while 40 percent of Turks favor Turkey’s EU membership, only 26 percent anticipate an eventual membership. A majority of Turkish people -- 56 percent -- see the leadership of the EU in world affairs as being undesirable. Only 35 percent view Turkey’s NATO membership as being essential for its security. The overall Turkish attitude towards world nations is rather “cool” and distanced. On a scale starting from 100, Palestinians score the highest with 42, followed by Iran (30), China (28), the EU (26), Russia (21) and the US (11).

These are symptoms of inward-looking, insecure and distrustful minds likely to create an asocial society in the family of nations, which is not only a disturbing factor for an international community but also a risk for an open, democratic society in this country. The distance between isolationist nationalism to an authoritarian society and state is not far.

It seems that the discourse surrounding Turkey being targeted by the outside world, particularly in the last couple of years, has been effective in winning the minds of Turks. With such a mindset we cannot go on with a policy of integration with the EU. The government should start effectively addressing issues that inflame isolationist and nationalist sentiments, which are fertile grounds for a reactionary and xenophobic nationalism. The killings of Father Andrea Santaro in Trabzon, missionaries in Malatya and Hrant Dink in İstanbul took place within such a social and political background. Fanning the flame of xenophobia disguised as nationalism should be stopped.

Firstly all political parties should abandon provoking and promoting a nationalist hysteria. We all remember how political parties’ election campaigns were shaped by an odd rivalry for nationalism. Each tried senselessly to prove that the “most nationalist” was theirs. In Turkey’s entire history we have never had an election period like the one we recently witnessed -- in which the flag of political parties was overshadowed by the national flag as a symbol of nationalism superimposed on all political parties.

Opposition parties like the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) based their election campaigns on their attempts to prove that Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the leader of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party), was soft on Turkey’s national interests. He was accused of selling Turkey out because of privatization policies and the selling of properties to the foreign nationals. The government was also accused of selling out Cyprus for its policies of supporting a settlement in Cyprus, of being subordinate to the demands of the EU and the US. Erdoğan was also accused of protecting Massoud Barzani as he refrained from invading northern Iraq.

We also recall how the opposition’s strong language forced the AK Party to respond by trying hard to prove that it too is a nationalist party. Both Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül referred to their nationalist credentials in the past to escape from the opposition’s accusations. Moreover, the AK Party hardly mentioned its EU performance during its election campaign in an attempt to avoid the accusation of having sold Turkey out to the EU. The AK Party’s İstanbul meeting, where around 1 million supporters gathered, was dominated by Turkish flags instead of party flags. The AK Party, too, was taken hostage by the nationalist upsurge.

But this cannot go on. Unless the surge in nationalism is brought under control, no political party can rule this country in a way to build a free and prosperous future. After the elections, many expect a new process of normalization which can only come through reducing the nationalist hysteria in people’s attitude and behavior.

The government is equipped to” tame” nationalism, which is a ticking bomb in its hands, too. Given the presence of nationalist elements within the AK Party and the nationalist credentials of its leader, Erdoğan, it is capable of doing so in the period ahead. Instead of conceding the nationalist fever as a constraint, the AK Party should pursue policies of “rehabilitation” for the growing nationalism in Turkey. This is an issue prone to be manipulated by the statist, elitist and anti-globalization groups in the face of attempts to introduce further economic and political reforms.

Unless we put the genie of nationalism back into the bottle, we will sink into a self-destructive isolationism or irredentism.
10.09.2007

A constitution without Kemalism

It is time to acknowledge the fact that is is impossible to have or maintain a Kemalist regime in an “open society,” with a “market economy” and through the “globalization process.” If we somehow uphold these three attributes of “contemporary civilization,” we need a post-Kemalist constitution.

Imagine a constitution that declares “no activity that contravenes Ataturk nationalism and the Ataturk principles and revolutions shall be protected.” This clearly amounts to an “official ideology” that sets limits to freedom of expression. It is futile to raise questions as to how these principles can be defined as constitutional principles and who are entitled to interpret them since there could be no satisfactory answer. Ideological dispositions, not the rules of interpreting a legal text, will shape the answers.

The fundamental problem is that references to the Ataturk principles and revolutions blur the boundaries between the “ideological” and the “legal,” which makes establishing a rule of law regime extremely difficult.

Many complain that the judiciary in Turkey is conservative and ideologically oriented, as recently displayed with the 367 decision of the Constitutional Court. The conservative ideology of the judiciary is Kemalism, as included in the Constitution. It is time to build the constitutional bases of liberal democracy by drawing a proper line between the legal and ideological and to drop protection of a particular “ideology” (Kemalism) at the expense of the others.

Ideological states, be they socialist, fascist or Kemalist, have failed to meet their promises. They have failed to produce freedom, welfare, and security for their citizens. The collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union heralded not only the end of the Cold War but also the demise of the ideological state.

To build anew or maintain an ideological state is practically impossible in the contemporary complexities of the global economy, social networks, and political interactions. It is a struggle against the current that risks confronting not only global trends but also the demands of the people at home. People want liberty, welfare, and security, which cannot be provided by an ideological state, as proven by the political history of the 20th century.

The modern state cannot impose a particular ideology on its citizens. In our age, it is not the ideological state but the “performative” state that is in use. The power and legitimacy of the state are not derived from its adherence to an ideology but from the services provided to the people.

Democracy requires a functional and performative state. If the founding principles of a state are informed by ideology, neither democracy nor the rule of law can be established, simply because constitutional order and institutions will be geared to protecting this or that ideological premise and not the citizens’ rights.

Such an ideological state provides the grounds for the arbitrariness of state authorities in the name of their raison d’état, which cannot be accepted by democratic measures. But for some in this country, their anachronistic power and privileges within the system are best served by sticking to an ideological Kemalist state.

The time of the ideological state has passed. If Turkey wants to bring itself to the level of contemporary civilization, it should abandon the notion of Kemalism as the basis of the state as outlined in the Constitution.

A constitution without Kemalism will be a prelude to a fully functioning democracy and the rule of law in Turkey.
13.08.2007

Representing the Kurds, presenting the solution

The July election brought the Democratic Society Party (DTP) into Parliament with 22 seats. Yet the DTP’s performance in the election was considerably lower than expected. The results indicate that the DTP is far from representing the Kurdish people on its own. In 12 out of 15 provinces in the East where the DTP ran with independents, the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) came first. While the AK Party doubled and, in some cases, tripled its votes in these cities, the DTP-rooted independents lost votes in all but Hakkari and Şırnak in comparison to the 2002 elections. In the metropolitan city of Diyarbakır -- where the DTP holds municipalities -- the AK Party almost tripled its votes, reaching 41 percent, while the DTP led with 45 percent of the vote, which is 10 percent lower than its 2002 vote count.

For the AK Party, these results are not surprising, since it managed to receive such a high percentage of votes across Turkey. But for the DTP there are lessons to learn from these results, which point to the limits of identity politics based on Kurdish ethnicity. Like the rest of the country, the people in the region want services, development and a decent democracy and a human rights regime. It seems that people not only questioned the DTP’s performance in municipalities but also its competence to resolve the Kurdish question. The self-marginalizing language and policies of the DTP are likely to make it irrelevant for the solution of the problem.

The Kurdish people in the region seemed to be “unionist” not “separatist,” and as such are prepared to look for representation from other political parties. The AK Party, with its reform packages, EU perspective, social services spending record and its display of restraint over the northern Iraq issue coupled with its recognition of Kurdish identity, has emerged as a strong representative of Kurdish discontent. The Kurdish interest in the AK Party also demonstrates the willingness of the Kurdish people to be part of national politics, provided that the national actors do not exclude their needs, demands, and identities. The DTP can no longer pretend to be the sole representative of the Kurdish people. As a matter of fact, the AK Party, given its electoral support in the region, is better positioned to represent the Kurdish people. This is a new phenomenon that suggests the DTP should change its strategy accordingly.

Anyhow, with the ruling AK Party and DTP deputies in Parliament, the Kurdish interest will be highly represented in Turkish national politics. The legitimacy of Kurdish representation in Parliament is beyond doubt. The integration of Kurdish demands into national politics, and their recognition by the “political center,” will reduce the separatist tendencies among the Kurds as well as distrust among the Turks toward Kurdish intentions. This may turn into a golden opportunity for a peaceful resolution of the Kurdish question, as the confidence and trust of the Turks and the Kurds in each other and in themselves grow.

I think the DTP should understand the message; that the Kurdish people see themselves not imprisoned to a politics wholly based on identity. The DTP is expected to read the post-election situation in a constructive manner that will enable it to go beyond identity politics. But it may still choose to carry on with a radical/nationalist course of action alongside the PKK, which will finish it off as an independent political actor. This will be a self-denying strategy for a political party supposedly engaging in peaceful political competition.

The DTP may also choose to be a moderating force in Turkish politics, building bridges between the Kurdish people and others. To start this, they should denounce violence as an instrument for political objectives. This is the universal principle for a party to be recognized as a legitimate counterpart engaging in constructive dialogue. Unless the DTP denounces violence and makes itself independent of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) it will be destined for the political margins, even among the Kurds.

The DTP leaders should appreciate the political choice of the people of this country for an open society, greater democracy, proper civilian-military relations, and European Union membership. Their presence in Parliament should not make the attainment of these objectives more difficult by producing excuses for the nationalist security establishment to make a comeback in this new post-July 22 period. I bet they are looking forward to being provided with some excuses, via DTP policies and statements in the new Parliament, in order to move in and constrain the political space. Will the DTP act responsibly to protect the civilian-political space vis-à-vis the excesses of the nationalists and the militarists?

The CHP and the question of the left after the elections

The loser in this election was not the left but the CHP, which ran its campaign with security-centric and nationalist jargon under the influence of some marginal neo-Kemalists. Instead of proposing a positive program to resolve real problems of the masses, the CHP chose to realign itself with the state elite, from the president to the chief of General Staff, to prompt a nationalist instinct to “save the state.” This was neither the expectation of the masses nor the social democrats. Such a realignment that became all apparent during the presidential elections crisis reinforced the CHP’s image as a party of the state and the state elite, an image doomed to be voted against in a popular democracy.

After decades of defeats at the polls the CHP is still unable to understand the rules of the game in democracy -- a party representing interests, demands and priorities of the state elite will never win in competitive elections. The CHP leaders cannot adapt themselves to the requirements of competitive democracy even years after their domination of Turkish politics under a single-party government ceased.

My advice to the CHP is that if they really want to play this game, the only game in town, they should abandon elements of authoritarianism within the party leadership, ideology and discourse. With a Recep Peker kind of world view, reincarnated in the personality of Onur Oymen, the deputy leader of the party, they will end up siding with bureaucratic despotism, not for pluralistic democracy.

It was such personalities as Oymen who stated his complete agreement with every word of the military memorandum issued on April 27. It was him again after the election last week for whom the election results lacked any logic, which is well illustrative of his and the CHP’s respect for democracy and the will of the people. With this “logic” of theirs they will neither be able to turn the party into a social democrat one nor win a general election for another 50 years.

The historical misfortune of the left in this country is that the CHP happens to represent the leftist political stance. For a party that views itself as the representative of the state interest and state ideology vis-à-vis the masses whose loyalty is constantly suspect, it is impossible to be the carrier of social democracy. The party was designed to protect the state from the people, not vice versa. Furthermore the CHP took up a leftist stance without questioning Kemalism that developed as a state ideology during the single-party years, under the heavy influence of Italian fascism and Soviet Bolshevism in terms of its notions of the state, society and ideology.

Unless the social democrats in Turkey abandon the Kemalist legacy with its authoritarian political tendencies, there is no possibility of having a real social democrat party. Kemalism as a homogenizing authoritarian state ideology is not only compatible with democracy but also with social democracy. I wonder for how long we shall wait for the social democrats to understand this simple truth.

The CHP leadership and the Kemalist elite always talk of a threat to secularism. The official line of the Kemalist elite and the CHP threatens the masses who do not share their view, but in reality the masses regard Kemalist “secular fundamentalism” as threatening pluralistic democracy and the supremacy of the will of the nation. The result is the widening gap between the main blocks of Turkish society and the CHP.

The only option for the CHP is to start anew to build a social democrat party with a real agenda focusing on the problems and demands of the disadvantaged people in society and abandon their notion of an authoritarian radical secularism. Another useful starting point for the party to explain the election defeats is that there is nothing wrong with the people but with the party, its leadership, discourse and program.

This cannot be achieved easily. As everybody knows Baykal has expelled any potential opponent in the party. Thus it is in unlikely that attempts to renew the party and its world view will come from within. Social democrats who have distanced themselves from the CHP should now actively engage in transforming the party into a modern, outward-looking and peace-oriented democrat party. In this the support of the Socialist International will be crucial, too. The external pressure over the CHP as regards the principles of social democracy will be extremely effective in pushing the party to rethink its views and positions.

If this does not come through, it is time for real social democrats in Turkey to throw the CHP into the dust bin of history, get rid of the burden of Kemalism and opt for a new beginning with a brand new social democrat mass party. And let the CHP remain an anachronistic party of the Kemalist nationalists with their secular fundamentalism.

30.07.2007