The future of the Kurds: democracy or partition?

For an ethnic entity under assault by a central power, there are two ways to go: to work for a central democratic regime that respects the existence and rights of that ethnicity or to attempt to secede if there is no hope of democratizing the center.

It would be wrong, however, to attribute the tendency to seek a separate state to only the nationalist drive of ethnic groups. I think the main responsibility lies with the center to demonstrate the possibility of coexistence and power sharing with ethnic minorities.

Without this, it is hard to put all the blame on the nationalist tendencies of ethnic groups. So long as their rights are denied and their demands for power sharing are ignored, no one can blame them for developing secessionist ambitions. While a separate state would not necessarily guarantee the enjoyment of these rights at the level of the individual, under such an independent political entity no one would be able to stop them from seeking such rights.

This has been the case of the Kurds of Iraq for decades.

“In 1970, a commission headed by Saddam Hussein visited Mullah Mustafa Barzani’s headquarter[s] in Saman, Arbil. There had been an ongoing Kurdish armed struggle for autonomy since 1961, and the Baghdad government was offering a new agreement in order to settle the Kurdish issue. Mullah Mustafa said that he would not lay down arms unless Baghdad recognizes the autonomy of Kurds. … Saddam Hussein accepted the conditions of Mullah Mustafa and the ceasefire began. During this meeting, [Massoud] Barzani, the son of Mullah Mustafa, asked Saddam Hussein how Baghdad would solve the democracy problem in all of Iraq. Saddam Hussein said that ‘the system [with which] we govern the rest of Iraq is none of your business. You will have autonomy in Kurdistan. Why do you care about this?’”

The relevance of Massoud Barzani’s question has come to be understood well over the years, according to Dr. Burak Bilgehan Özpek of the Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB) Economy and Technology University, who wrote the provocative and eye-opening article on the future of Iraqi Kurdistan from which the above has been excerpted and that was published in the summer issue of Insight Turkey (www.insightturkey.com).

In his article, titled “Democracy or Partition: Future Scenarios for the Kurds of Iraq,” Özpek warns all interested parties that the maintenance of Iraqi unity requires a functioning democracy in Baghdad and respect for power sharing between the center and the federal entity. “The centralization policy of [Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-] Maliki threatens the unity of Iraq rather than helping with consolidating the country,” according to Özpek.

Let’s read further.

“Despite the Kurds’ establishment of their regional government and attainment of increased autonomy, they have not initiated an assertive policy agenda of seeking secession from Iraq. This means that their gains have not encouraged them to go for independence. However, Kurdish politicians have started to hint that they will consider independence if the centralization of power under Nouri al-Maliki continues.”

And it continues, according to Özpek.

“Maliki, through his efforts to centralize power by controlling the strategic ministries, the military, the electoral commission and the economy, and by excluding Sunni and Kurdish figures from the political and bureaucratic system, is undermining the de facto power-sharing tradition implemented in Iraq after the US invasion.”

Massoud Barzani, president of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), defines Maliki as a dictator and, as quoted by Özpek, has said: “Unfortunately, after many years, the situation is being changed and turned into the previous version. We don’t accept the return of dictatorship. … The problem here is not only the Kurds, it is with all Iraq. If Iraq was democratic, federal and plural then it will be one and united. We don’t threaten the unity of Iraq; it is dictatorship that threatens the unity of Iraq.”

Massoud Barzani also said that “a dictator in Baghdad cannot rule Kurdistan and if Baghdad attempts to do so the Kurds would go their separate way. The process has already begun and it is only [a] matter of time and regional development to decide when and how it happens.”

While the Maliki government aims to subordinate the KRG by cutting their budget and imposing an Arab identity on the military, the KRG regards such attempts as those of a dictator to consolidate his power and centralize the political system. Thus, Maliki’s strategy reminds Kurds of their historical fears inherited from Baathist Iraq, which was a perfect model of a strong and central state.

If he were to meet Maliki, Massoud Barzani might ask the same question he asked Saddam Hussein 42 years ago and remind Maliki what happened to Iraq after Saddam’s arrogant response.

Unless a full-fledged democracy is established, it will be impossible to put an end to the secessionist tendencies of strong ethnic minorities that even hold regional autonomy. This is a lesson that Turkey should also seriously consider.

Good for the Kurds, bad for the Turks?

The Syrian crisis has turned into a crisis testing Turkey's attitude towards the Kurdish question and the Kurds. The likelihood of the Syrian Kurds gaining control of some northern parts of the country and eventually gaining some sort of autonomy from the center has alarmed the Turks and the Turkish government alike.

Almost all commentaries published in Turkish media have told the story with great concern. The prime minister and the minister of foreign affairs have stated that if it becomes necessary, Turkey will not hesitate to intervene in Syria. The opposition has started to accuse the government of idly watching the establishment of a second Kurdish entity on its borders.

Underlying all these reactions is the assumption that developments in favor of the Kurds in the region constitute a threat to Turkey. It is thus inferred that Turkey would prefer the Kurds being ruled by dictators like Saddam Hussein and Bashar al-Assad instead of having a say in their own future.

This is awkward, impossible to justify on any ethical or even practical ground. It is of course obvious that such an unethical position is the result of the security concerns of the state. Or, to put more accurately, it is due to the fact that there are demands from the Kurds of Turkey concerning their political and cultural rights. Once there is an emergence of a new entity populated by Kurds that provides the Kurds with more rights and freedoms, Turkey becomes worried that such improvements may set a “bad example” for its own Kurds. The well-being of Kurds thus is to be prevented by Turkey.

It is futile to try to build a future on the misfortune of the Kurds. Besides, in a world of changes towards democracy and self-government, it is unrealistic to assume that the Kurds will remain under the yoke of this or that nation or dictator. As the world transforms it is normal that the Kurds, too, are increasingly gaining their democratic rights and improving their standard of living.

Therefore this reflex of the government and the public at large of regarding any improvement in the conditions of the Kurds as automatically threatening Turkey is not realistic, prudent or right.

Even if there is a zero-sum game between the Turks and the Kurds, what about the Kurds of Turkey? Which side of the equation are they on?

In this line of thinking, the Turkish public and officials thus miss a fundamental point that there are Kurds in this country, and these Kurds enthusiastically welcome developments both in Iraq and Syria through which their ethnic relatives are likely to be better off politically and economically as a result.

It is not unnoticed or regarded as unimportant that the official prevailing view that what is good for the Kurds is bad for the Turks alienates the Kurds of Turkey from this country. Such an attitude serves to justify the position of the secessionists Kurds. The Kurds of Turkey tend to think that they do not have a common bond with the Turks and the Turkish state.

I think it is time to rethink and refute this presumption. And this requires constructing a new language about the “outside Kurds” who are not outsiders in fact to our politics and society.

So long as the gains of the Kurds are regarded as the losses of the Turks there can be no persuasive argument for a common future between the Kurds of Turkey and the Turks. This is simply because it excludes the Kurds from a common “us.” If we do not include the Kurds as part of “us” in practice, it is impossible to tell them that we really want to live together as equal citizens.

Emergence of the ‘new AK Party'

The Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government enjoys the advantage of being without an alternative. That is certainly a luxury, in a country where the average life of a government in the democratic era before the emergence of the AK Party did not exceed two years.

The ruling party is now in its 10th year in government and still does not have any significant challenger. It is very likely that Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will be elected as president in 2014 if things continue as they are, and that his party will win another round of general elections in 2015.

Such predictions of continued success naturally boost the confidence of the party and its leadership. It is extremely difficult to tell a political party that sustains the support of more than half the population that it is doing something wrong.

Even if you tell them they will not listen to you. What counts in a competitive democracy is the number of votes. As long as a political party garners the support of enough people to bring it to power, the very objective of its political activity will be fulfilled. There can be no stronger incitement to change than a drop in the number of the votes, which does not seem to be on the cards with regard to the AK Party.

As a result, the government, instead of deepening democratic reforms, resolving the Kurdish question and making a new constitution, opts for populist conservatism, with economic and social policies designed to satisfy its supporters. This strategy manifests clearly: While the demands of conservative members of society are met with symbolic gestures, such as reintroducing the religious schools, building a gigantic mosque in Istanbul and debating the banning of abortion, funds are deftly spent on social projects for the creation of a loyal conservative bourgeoisie.

The result is perfectly satisfactory both for the party and the people at large, despite expressions of disappointment from some liberal and democrat circles claiming that the AK Party has abandoned its original reformist, democratizing and pluralistic political characteristics.

It is no surprise, of course, to see that this transformative agent of Turkey over the last decade, the AK Party, has also transformed itself. It would be a grave mistake to confuse the current AK Party with the one that emerged in 2002, which was regarded as an anomaly by the establishment, or with the one that was threatened by a coup attempt in 2007 over the election of the president, or the one that faced a closure case in 2008. All have passed, and by passing have transformed the AK Party.

Now the party has established itself within the system and become capable of utilizing the available instruments, including the military, the ideological educational structure and the centralized religious institution, the Directorate of Religious Affairs. By coercive means and through the ideological instruments of the state, the “new AK Party” is now capable of perpetuating its political power, social legitimacy, and economic strength.

Thus the AK Party today occupies all social and political space, leaving almost nothing outside its reach. This is further justified by the discourse that the AK Party is the party of the whole nation and that every person should find a place for himself or herself within the party. This “invitation” to all is understandable. But it also implies that the party sees itself as the embodiment of the nation, the same way the Republican People's Party (CHP) viewed itself in the 1930s.

We should not forget that to claim to represent all different ideas, identities, and interests within a single party is a homogenizing attitude that does not leave a free social and political space for autonomous self-expression of difference. If the agency is monopolized by a single actor that sees itself as the embodiment of the state, there will be no room for democracy and pluralism.

Who can solve the Kurdish question?

Hopes of resolving the Kurdish question are never exhausted. This is not because the likelihood of settling the issue is high and all sides are eager for a solution. I think hopes are always high because we wish to see an end to the bloodshed. Sometimes these high hopes turn us into unrealistic, naïve beings. We tend to see the positive and ignore the negative and exaggerate good-willed steps and play down the obstacles -- in short, blow the slightest possibility out of proportion.

This is obviously risky as we cannot separate between the imagined and the real. One day it is the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan that we invest our hopes in to resolve the Kurdish question, and the next it is Abdullah Öcalan. Once they are unable to meet our expectations for peace we turn to Iraqi President Jalal Talabani and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) leader Massoud Barzani, or senior Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leader Murat Karayılan and the “moderates” in the Kandil Mountains.

So the search for peace continues. Whoever appears to give a chance for peace raises hopes across the country among both the Kurds and Turks. The meeting of Leyla Zana with Erdoğan was yet another such occasion. Just before, the meeting between Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the leader of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), with Erdoğan had similarly raised hopes. But within days, expectations for a new process faded as both leaders went back to making heavy accusations against each other.

Does the Zana-Erdoğan meeting mark the beginning of a new process? Again, we hope so… But I have personally gotten tired of disappointments and so try not to raise any hopes for this latest round of initiatives. Besides, I have started to think that the actors capable of resolving the question on both sides are not really willing to resolve the question. The comfort of the current state of affairs, however, marked by violence it is, seems to be preferred to the risks of a settlement. I do not mean, of course, risks for the Turks and the Kurds in general, but the risks for the political leaders on both sides.

Violence and confrontation have become routine, part of daily life and in fact, the meaning of life. Without a Kurdish question, for example, the Kurdish leadership team, the Turkish security forces, and the nationalist bloc are not sure how they can justify their existence. Thus established habits, structures, mentalities and political practices prevent both sides from making decisive decisions to settle the issue.

Take the example of the ruling party. The AK Party leadership team is well aware of the fact that a continuation of the current state of the Kurdish question will not cost it to lose an election. Limited violence and activities of the PKK do not cause much harm but, on the contrary, underlines the need for a strong government, an attribute of the AK Party. Besides no one can blame the AK Party for creating the Kurdish question. The party can always and rightly claim to have changed Turkey’s decades-old policies of denial, thus becoming the one who has contributed to the betterment of Kurds’ lives.

What about the PKK? I do not think that the PKK is ready to risk a solution, either. It is an organization designed to wage guerilla warfare with an outdated ideology. Labeling itself as the organizational embodiment of the Kurdish nation, it does not tolerate any dissenting voices within its ranks or among Kurds. So it is not a “normal” political party that can adapt itself to the conditions of “normal politics” after a solution. Thus they encounter this big question: Is there a life for the PKK after the solution? This is the toughest question for the PKK cadres. They are the ones who have been making sacrifices in the mountains for years, but the “white Kurds” who have not been involved will take the trophy of a solution away in an actual struggle. The best they can hope for is the life of a refugee in a European city.

In short, we have gotten accustomed to living with the Kurdish question and its accompanying violence.

It is thus not surprising that following the meeting of Zana and Erdoğan, all kind of confusing statements came from the PKK, the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) and government circles. I think Zana could no longer resist the pressures of being her own “actor” which she has been experiencing since her release from prison in 2004. But the complexities of Turkish and Kurdish politics are unlikely to give way to the well-intended initiative of Zana. The question is rooted in the structure of the success and survival system of Turkish and Kurdish politics, and thus it can hardly be resolved by individual actors and initiatives. Let’s see what happens to Zana’s initiative, but it is better to be realistic.

Kurdish solution by offering gifts

It is good to hear the Kurdish question debated rather than read reports about violence committed by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) or the state’s security forces. This path has been re-opened by Republican People’s Party (CHP) leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, who certainly deserves applause.

The meeting of Kılıçdaroğlu and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan last week was important because it indicated that the “new CHP” would not exploit government initiatives to resolve the Kurdish question, which was the case during the “democratic initiative” of 2009. Back then the CHP under the leadership of Deniz Baykal accused the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) of plotting against the unity of the country by acceding to the demands of the PKK. The tactic of the opposition then was to bury the ruling party under the Kurdish question with the expectation that Turks disturbed by the AK Party initiative would gather under the CHP.

This did not happen. But it nevertheless played a part in the hesitation of the ruling party that felt alone in addressing such an important issue. Severe opposition and the continued PKK violence indeed worried the ruling party, which shelved the solution process in order to avoid the political cost of appearing to meet the demands of the PKK.

Therefore the CHP’s changing attitude has been significant in encouraging the ruling party to renew its initiative. Sharing the cost and benefits among the governing and opposition parties eases the process. But I am still not sure how far the CHP can go when models of a solution come to the table with the fear of losing its nationalist power base. The same applies to the AK Party, too. It also has a strong nationalist constituency and is concerned that giving in to the demands of the Kurds may alienate its nationalist elements. So the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) by remaining outside of such a solution poses as an alternative for the nationalist voters both in the CHP and the AK Party, which are well aware of this.

Amid such political calculations, the latest proposal of the AK Party about Kurdish being an elective course in public schools is significant. It indicates that the ruling party is still capable of taking bold political steps to address Kurdish demands. Though a selective course on Kurdish does not satisfy the demands of the Kurds, who ask for education in the Kurdish language, we should note that the latest decision of the government may indeed be a groundbreaking move leading to education in Kurdish.

The only problem here is that the government has taken such a decision without engaging with the Kurdish constituency. Like broadcasting Kurdish on the state-owned Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT), the elective courses on Kurdish come through a unilateral decision of the government. As such they are seen as “gifts” from the state to the people, not rights negotiated and then gained. This is important because unilateral decisions by the government deny agency to the Kurds. As the Kurds (or their representatives) are not engaged in the decision-making process, they feel excluded and thus obliged to reject the idea. This is, in fact, the state of mind that describes elective Kurdish courses as an “attempt of assimilation.” It may not be enough to meet the demands of the Kurds at large but it is also not an attempt to assimilate the Kurds.

To avoid such “politicking” by actors from both the Kurdish and Turkish sides we need to bring them into a process of engagement. It is not easy but a must, especially as without the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) being engaged in the process, it is hard to find a solution to the Kurdish question by taking unilateral steps. Leyla Zana’s latest statement about the AK Party and Erdoğan may open up a new avenue of dialogue and engagement between the ruling party and representatives of Kurdish demands.

The Kurds of the AK Party

Thanks to the initiative of the leader of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the Kurdish question is back on Turkey’s agenda in terms of achieving a resolution. It is clear from the outset that a parliamentary committee with the participation of all political parties could not be established as the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) has already positioned itself against such an initiative. Even if a lesser committee is established without the MHP, I am not optimistic about a positive outcome.

I am not optimistic because each party has its own political Achilles’ heel. The CHP has in the past played the “nationalist” on the Kurdish question and has had extreme difficulty persuading even its own constituency of its new position. Turks in the Western regions of Turkey who vote for the CHP will be upset with their party’s changing stance on the issue. When the democratic initiative was announced by the government in the summer of 2009 the CHP was its most ardent opponent. Now a new and weak party leader cannot explain or justify this collaboration with the ruling party and the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) to find an answer to the Kurdish question.

As for the Justice and Development Party (AK Party), I do not see any reason why it should take up a comprehensive new initiative. For some time the ruling party has seemed to limit its search for a solution, resolving either to finish off the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) through security measures or wait for Mesud Barzani to persuade the PKK to lay down its arms. Otherwise, the government is of the opinion that the AK Party is not responsible for the existence of the PKK, that terrorism has been a fact of life for decades preceding AK Party rule and that the people are accustomed to living with violence. In short, as the PKK violence is “bearable” for the government in political terms, it is unlikely to take an unbearable toll.

As the government regards the situation as “manageable” it naturally refrains from taking political risks. Any major policy initiative addressing the root causes of the Kurdish issue and responding to the demands of the Kurds is viewed as an unnecessary risk. The ruling party is not under any kind of pressure to hasten to find a solution. The existence and terrorist activities of the PKK do not push the government to seek a political solution; on the contrary, I believe it justifies the government’s security-centric perspective.

There is one thing likely to force the ruling party to take the Kurdish question seriously: the pressure of its own Kurds. It is a fact that more than half of the Kurds in this country vote for the AK Party. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan proudly boasts that he can travel all around the country and hold public meetings everywhere, including Kurdish areas. He has also used the Kurdish vote to enhance the popular “legitimacy” of the government. The Kurdish votes enable Erdoğan to claim that he and his party are champions of the integrity of Turkey. This strategy was employed particularly in the early years of the party, when its legitimacy was questioned by secularists and, more vehemently, by the military, as well as during the party closure case in 2008.

So the support of the Kurds has always meant more than mere numbers; it has accorded the AK Party democratic pluralism, social heterogeneity and political legitimacy. Without the Kurdish votes, the AK Party would appear to be a party of nationalist Turks.

I think Kurdish voters, local party leaders and members of parliament (said to be between 70 and 100) are unaware of their importance to the AK Party. As Erdoğan leans toward a nationalist and statist position on the Kurdish question in order to appease the nationalists in the party and appeal to MHP voters, the Kurdish constituency of the AK Party remains silent, unable to articulate its demands. While Turkey debates various aspects of the Kurdish question, the Kurdish elite of the AK Party does not engage in the debate. They cannot even speak up against the minister of the interior, who continuously downplays the sorrows of the Uludere victims.

In short, the Kurdish elite of the AK Party has failed to become an actor within the party, to push for a solution to the Kurdish question. Knowing this, and assuming that the Kurdish supporters of the AK Party have been locked down, Erdoğan and his minister of the interior safely navigate the nationalist waters of Turkish voters.

What is wrong with the AK Party?

The governing Justice and Development Party (AK Party) has increasingly been criticized for going authoritarian.

These criticisms do not come from diehard Kemalist opponents of the AK Party but from liberal circles that supported the party’s agenda of democratization. And these recent criticisms are not altogether baseless. The once reformist party of Turkey seems to have developed statist, nationalist and even Islamist tendencies, which are the likely grounds for a new authoritarian politics. These tendencies can be discerned in the government’s approach to the Uludere incident, in which 34 civilians mistaken for terrorists were killed during a military airstrike near the Turkish-Iraqi border, as well as its attempts to legislate conservative values into law. We can start with Uludere, where the government, from the beginning, acted inconsistently, first admitting there was a mistake and then making statements to the contrary. An investigation was initiated, but after six months there still is no answer to the simple question of who is responsible and what really happened on that particular day. Knowing state tradition, I do understand why we are not getting straight answers to these questions. What disturbed me most is the attitude of the government towards the victims. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan pointed to the compensation paid to the families of the victims, saying, “The government paid the compensation, even more than required by law.” Instead of apologizing Erdoğan seemed to reduce the matter to compensation. This did not fit well in his own discourse of “human-based politics.” What is more is that last week he asked “why smugglers do not step on the mines,” implying that the villagers who were killed by Turkish fighter jets were collaborating with the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), while in fact it is known that this particular village was, in fact, the one armed by the state, known as a “korucu” village. The government’s Interior Minister İdris Naim Şahin went further by saying that in the Uludere incident where 34 people were killed by security forces “nothing happened that would warrant an apology on the part of the government.” He appalled many when he added, “if those villagers had not been killed, they would have been tried for smuggling anyway. Now the smuggling case against them is dropped.” For his remarks, the minister of interior was congratulated by Devlet Bahceli, the leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). In this picture what is obvious is that the ruling party sides with and protects state officials and security forces who made the mistake of killing 34 innocent people. This, however, not in line with the AK Party’s previous rhetoric and policies that prioritized the people over the state. The statist and nationalist tradition that was inherited from the Islamist “national view” movement is being revived within the AK Party government. The most recent debate about abortion reveals another disturbing ideological element in the AK Party. It has become an observable fact that the ruling party is trying to enact its conservative values into law. Two weeks ago this slipped out from the mouth of Erdoğan, who said, “One country, one nation, one flag, and one religion, yes I say religion.” He repeated his motto adding “one religion” into it in two subsequent speeches, but after facing severe opposition in the media he stepped back, saying that the addition of “one religion” to the motto was a mistake. Mistake or not the fact is that religion has become a constant reference point in the political arena. The process started some months ago with a statement from Prime Minister Erdoğan, who said he wants to “raise a religious generation.” This “wish” was put into practice by introducing a new education law that included optional Quran courses and courses on the Prophet’s life throughout middle and high schools. I think these were indications that the AK Party is inclined to use the “secular” state institutions to raise a “religious generation,” which is basically the Kemalist policy of “creating a new society” in reverse. Then started a new debate on abortion that is leading to a new law banning abortion. It is indeed not part of a global debate between “pro-life” and “pro-choice” lines of argument. The government’s move to ban abortion is due to a sudden discovery that abortion is a trap for the future of the nation. Prime Minister Erdoğan justified his sudden anti-abortion stand on the argument that “there is an international conspiracy to erase this nation from the world.” Welcome back to Erbakan’s world of conspiracies!!! The following statements from the government side were revealing indeed. Health Minister Recep Akdağ said: “Even if the pregnancy is due to rape the mother should give birth. If a mother does not want to raise the child, the state will look after it.” Then came another appalling statement from the head of the Human Rights Commission in Parliament, Ayhan Sefer Üstün who supported his minister’s stand that even rape victims should give birth by giving the unfortunate example of the Bosnian rape victims, saying, “Didn’t the Bosnian women give birth?” I am having difficulties in understanding the recent discourse and policies of the AK Party. It seems that something is changing dramatically. I think the state power that is now fully controlled is poisoning the AK Party.

Turkish foreign policy: Time for a re-evaluation

The foreign policy of a country is not singularly directed abroad, it may also be a tool for domestic political purposes. Even if it is not instrumental in formulating domestic politics its repercussion on domestic politics is inevitable.

Foreign policy perceptions, choices, and orientations may strengthen a particular “order of things” at home. For decades, Turkish foreign policy not only reflected but also reinforced a “siege mentality” that portrayed its neighbors as enemies with territorial ambitions on Turkey. This created a tense relationship with neighbors with whom not only the state but the people of Turkey developed a deep distrust.

Such a portrayal of the outside world made sense, especially in the cold war years. Constant threats coming from the region justified the authoritarian power structure inside. Thus people at home had to be united against immediate threats in the region and be even aware of their internal extensions. Under such a continuous existential treat the idea of a fully functioning liberal democracy, human rights, and pluralism were regarded as a luxury and even risky. The politics of survival laid the ground for an authoritarian politics supervised by the military, denial of the existence of the Kurds and Kurdish identity, delays in democratization and widespread-cross ideological nationalism. Survival and the security of the state were used as justification for authoritarian state formation. In short, the threat perception that was exemplified through practical foreign policy issues served to tie down social demands, political actors and intellectual debates in Turkish politics. This mechanism started to change after 1999 when Turkey was declared as a candidate country for EU membership. As democratization, economic development and good neighborly relations were required to be a full member in the EU the Turkish governments, as well as social forces, pushed hard to change this mechanism of foreign policy that served to the securitization of Turkish political and social spaces. As a result of what I call the “liberal turn in Turkish foreign policy” foreign policy ceased to be a ground for the securitization of Turkish politics.

A paradigm shift occurred from pure power politics to a liberal foreign policy agenda seeing the countries of the region not as adversaries, but as partners prioritizing cooperation over conflict and soft power over military might and bullying. This opened the avenues of mutual understanding, trust, and cooperation in the region elevating Turkey as a country of mediation, engagement, and multilateralism. Out of this new paradigm of cooperation, Turkish companies, civil societal organizations, think tanks, individuals entered into a deep interaction in the neighborhood. Later these social and economic actors acted as driving forces for continued political dialogue and good relationships in the region.

When the Arab revolutions occurred many expected Turkey’s cooperation and dialogue-based soft power approach would continue. But the resistance of the Syrian regime to change last year and Turkey’s inability to persuade Syrian President Bashir al-Assad to introduce reforms has displayed the limits of Turkey’s soft power to influence change in Syria on which the Turkish leaders believed to have great leverage. Realizing that their very image in the “neighborhood” as a capable country is at stake the Turkish leaders have moved from persuasion to coercion against Syria.

Meanwhile after the total withdrawal of the US in Iraq, the central government under Nouri al-Maliki backed by Iran and driven by the Syrian crisis confronted Turkey. While Turkish business in Baghdad suffers from this change of wave in the bilateral relations the government in Ankara realizes again the limits of its soft power to persuade Maliki to mend the damage. The same goes for Iran which regards Turkey as a regional rival.

The Arab spring and the ensuing debate about “Turkey as a model” has added to the overconfidence of Turkish political actors. The Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs started to talk about “constructing a new order” and “a new Middle East” under the leadership of Turkey. This new language goes obviously beyond the liberal premises of the AK Party’s earlier stand of cooperation, engagement, and dialogue. Questions are increasingly raised as to whether Turkey has abandoned the “zero problem policy” and “soft power” approach, and embraced a policy of regional hegemony even domination.

My concern is that these indicators of yet another paradigm shift in Turkish foreign policy might be due to internal political developments like whether Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will run as the presidential candidate in 2014 and who will replace him in the ruling party. An internal power struggle may radicalize Turkish foreign policy in the near future.

Changing positions in Turkish politics

Instead of a structural change, Turkish politics brings a change to a tradition of the elite serving in old structures. It is, in fact, a matter of the loyalty of the elite -- whether loyalty is directed towards Kemalism and its institutional representatives or towards the agencies of the “new Turkey” under the Justice and Development Party’s (AK Party) rule.

Allegiance is certainly important; public authorities should have allegiances towards democratically elected rulers of the country, not towards an ideology and its vanguard within the state. Yet the change that Turkey needs should transcend a simple shift in loyalty. Interestingly for some, including the government, this seems satisfactory enough.

The changing attitude towards the military is the case in point. Only one or two years ago the military used to be regarded by the government and its allies as an obstacle to full democracy. Its personnel and activities were thus constantly scrutinized and transparency and accountability were demanded. Now thinking that it is in full control of the appointments within the military and thus breaking the autonomy of the military, the government is in defense of the military, its operations, and secrecy.

The Uludere incident in which 34 Kurdish civilians were massacred by Turkish jets by “mistake” is an example. Even after it became clear that Turkish jets made an incredible mistake and bombed innocent civilians, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan congratulated the military and the chief of General Staff. To this day the Uludere controversy continues and Prime Minister Erdoğan has not moved from his position of defending the military. It is still unknown what happened on that particular day, who gave the order to bomb and why. What we hear instead from the government and its allies in the media is that “we should trust our military and not weaken its spirit in the fight against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party [PKK].”

Surprisingly though, the main opposition party has become very critical of the military. Its leader, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, questioned the stance on the Uludere incident the other day asking, “Who is governing the country, the government or the military?” This displays the changing positions of the actors towards the military depending on the shifting loyalties on the part of institutions.

Another most recent case is a column written by journalist Bekir Coşkun, a strong Kemalist and an old ally of the military, who wrote a fable about a dog called Paşa. The column undoubtedly criticized the new form of relationship between the generals and the AK Party government. The military issued a strongly worded statement, just like the old days when such statements were issued against the conservatives and liberal writers and newspapers. It was the herald of the new relationship between the government and the military in which the Turkish military issued a statement condemning a Kemalist journalist. This time, while the conservative media remained silent against the statement, the Kemalist writers and newspapers reacted. Over this issue, Prime Minister Erdoğan called on all generals to sue Coşkun for insulting all paşas, including Kemal Atatürk. Indeed, the General Staff headquarters eventually filed a complaint against Coşkun, the most famous Kemalist writer and journalist.

All these events tell us that once loyalty of institutions and their administrators have shifted, the stances change as well: Old-time pro-military Kemalists turn against the military while the conservatives, once the victims of the military, come around and defend the generals. Another case in point is the Higher Education Board (YÖK). Last month an academic who is also a columnist in a conservative daily wrote, “Apart from its name, nothing is left to change in YÖK.” This reflects the attitude towards the old institutions inherited from the Kemalist era: So long as they are staffed by “our men,” there is no need for structural change.

Everyone knows that YÖK is one of the key institutions established by the military regime in 1982. The liberals, democrats, socialists, and conservatives have criticized it for its centralized, commanding and ideologically driven administration. Instead of regulating higher education, it tried to turn it into an ideological instrument of the state. As a result, throughout Turkey students were suppressed for wearing headscarves, or using Kurdish in their activities, and academics were intimidated.

These days are over but the structure remains unchanged. However, trusting in the new rulers at the top, can we say, “Nothing is left to change?” This is the greatest challenge for the “new Turkey” if we are interested in building democracy instead of simply replacing the old Kemalist tutelage.

Post-Kemalist tutelage

Kemalism is dead. No longer does it command the Turkish state. The bureaucratic elite that traditionally acted as the spokesperson of Kemalism has lost its status within the state apparatus, while the business elite have queued up to collect the benefits distributed by the state run now by a non-Kemalist political elite. The military and the judiciary, the two strongholds of Kemalism, have bowed to their new master.

Ideologically speaking, too, Kemalism is dead. The two faces of Kemalism, namely radical secularism and ethnic nationalism, desperately need facelifts. Secularism as a mechanism to exclude and oppress the conservatives cannot be sustained. It should be included in a democratic content that enables all faith groups to exercise full freedom for their activities. An imagined “single nation of the Turks” is not convincing, even for nationalist Turks. Recognition of the Kurdish ethnicity and identity is a must to build social peace and political order.

All of these would be good for the practice of democracy in Turkey if only the “new elite” were immune to the bad habits of the old elite. We see continuities in the usage of the state apparatus to construct a “particular type of person”. It seems that “state-made citizens” is the constant objective of governments in Turkey, be them Kemalist or conservative. The end results they seek may be different in form and in terms of values, but the means used and objectives sought have not changed.

What I am trying to say is that social engineering at the hands of the state is somehow continuing with the Justice and Development (AK Party) government. This has become visible in the field of education and cultural policies. It seems that Primer Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's stated objective “to raise religious generations” is shaping the government's educational and cultural policies. The use of state power to “form” the minds, habits, and lifestyles of citizens obviously cannot be reconciled with liberal values. For the AK Party, such a policy would be defended as part and parcel of its conservative identity.

But the problem is that once the AK Party uses the state apparatus to construct “conservative citizens,” by, for instance, reorganizing the educational system “to raise religious generations,” it appears to be following the path of Kemalism, which for years sought to create “secular and nationalist Turkish citizens.”

Such a path is not only unethical but is also impractical. One should also not forget the tension and conflict generated by cultural policies to create uniform citizens by state intervention.

It is futile to construct “identities” through state institutions and policies. If a particular identity is imposed by the state, it will either fail or succeed. If such a project were to fail, it would mean the resources used to this end would have been wasted. Additionally, there would be the cost of the conflict likely to erupt between the society subjected to identity transformation and the state imposing its own values.

If such a policy succeeds, you end up with a society subservient to and dependent on the state that has lost its dynamism, creativity, and plurality.

This has been the case in Turkey since the formation of the republic, when the Kemalist state imposed its own secular and ethnic values on the masses and the people resisted these state-imposed identities.

So, it is futile to try again, with the state this time imposing conservatives values that are “nationalized” by the state.

Besides, such a state would not only be dictating conservative values to “secular” people, it would also be imposing a particular set of conservative values on the conservatives who may be denied their own choice of conservatism. The teaching religion in all schools, as envisaged by the recent change in the education system, will empower the state over society and grant it greater presence in religious affairs, which is supposed to belong to the realm of society.

A state that teaches the people their religion steps into the realm of society, which is where religion belongs. Out of this, a hierarchical relationship will be built between the state and society, in favor of the former.

In short, using the same Kemalist means and methods “to create a conservative society” will result in a post-Kemalist tutelage, not a post-Kemalist democracy. Conservative social forces will not be better off under such a regime because the state will occupy all social space, eliminating independent social forces, including the conservative ones.

What do the Kurds want?

The quest for a new constitution continues despite the fact that the hope for its realization is dim. Almost every day public events are held in various cities, proposals are made and new research is conducted. All these indicate the determination of the Turkish people to make their own constitution.

It is widely acknowledged that one of the reasons why Turkey needs a new constitution is to address the Kurdish question. Issues about general rights, citizenship, the language of education and the administrative structure all have a bearing on the Kurdish question.

What about the Kurds? What do they expect from a new constitution? Recent research by the Center for Political and Social Research (SAMER), a Diyarbakır-based think tank, conducted an important survey assessing the expectations of Kurds in east and southeast Turkey.

According to SAMER’s research, 87 percent of the people in the region point to the need for a new constitution. The Kurds surveyed are also of the view that the new constitution should be made through the widest possible participation of individuals, civil society associations, trade unions, political parties, and similar groups. But the concern is expressed about the accessibility of the Constitutional Reconciliation Commission, in charge of drafting the constitution. Fifty-seven percent believe that their views have not been heard by the commission while 33 percent think that their views have been heard by the commission somewhat or to a satisfactory extent.

The top problem of Kurds in the region is cited as the Kurdish question (51 percent), followed by the economy (34 percent). This shows that two problems dominate for Kurds in the East and Southeast: identity and poverty.

On the relationship between the Kurdish question and the new constitution, people were asked: “To what extent would a democratic, civil and pluralistic constitution resolve the Kurdish question?” Responses showed hope is high. People surveyed expect that the new constitution will resolve the question. While 52 percent say the new constitution will resolve the question completely, 23 percent expect it to resolve the problem partially. We will see if these expectations can be met or not by political parties in Ankara.

Kurds of the region expect the new constitution to be based on democracy, human rights and the rule of law (95 percent), and the recognition of plurality in society (93 percent). Apart from desiring that these highly praised values be included in the new constitution, there are some values that the respondents wish to see excluded. For example, only 18 percent want the new constitution to be based on Kemalist nationalism. In short, Kurds of the East and Southeast want a democratic and pluralistic constitution and not a Kemalist one.

When it comes to the status of the Kurds in the new constitution, the respondents’ preferences are as follows: 19 percent favor independence, 41 percent favor democratic autonomy, 12 percent favor the current federal governance and 9 percent favor a decentralized system.

As for the issue of Turkey’s official language, 44 percent favor “Turkish as an official language while all other languages should be freely used,” 19 percent prefer naming Turkish and Kurdish as official languages, with others to be freely used. Similar results appear about the issue of the language of instruction in schools. Only 8 percent approve of the current model. Thirty-five percent think that education should be conducted in the mother tongue and other languages should be elective. There is also major support for education being in Turkish but Kurdish being an elective language in education (35 percent). This shows that Kurdish elective courses will address the demands of one-third of the Kurds.

Concerning ethnic references in the constitution, the Kurds are very clear: They reject the current model based on “Turkishness.” Thirty-three percent prefer no ethnic reference in the constitution while 62 percent want to see Turkish, Kurdish and other ethnicities referred to together. When asked what term should be used instead of “the Turkish nation” in the new constitution, 13 percent respond “citizens of Turkey,” 32 percent say “people of Turkey” and 42 percent favor “all citizens.”

In short, the Kurds have high expectations of the new constitution. Whether they will be met or not will determine the allegiance of these Kurds towards the Republic of Turkey. A final note: As for the demands and expectations of the Kurds, the SAMER research does not find much difference in responses between voters who support the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) and those who support the Justice and Development Party (AK Party). I think this is extremely important to take note of for the ruling party.

Can Barzani be a mediator?

No doubt Iraqi Kurdistan is the most peaceful and stable part of Iraq. As such it can be described as an island of stability in a region where conflicts among regional actors have recently been spreading.

Yet the peace and stability of Iraqi Kurdistan are fragile, too. It is vulnerable to the presence and activities of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in the north of the country.

With spring here, the PKK's cross-border operations are expected to increase, following a winter break, with assaults on targets in Turkey.

Security forces will certainly respond to any new wave of terrorist activities in Turkey. As the tension increases between Turkey and Syria, the former cannot afford to appear weak vis-à-vis the PKK. Furthermore, with the rising tension in the region, nationalist public reactions against Kurds within Turkey cannot be ruled out. All these will have destabilizing effects on the Iraqi Kurdish region.

Iraqi Kurds now have a golden opportunity to improve relations with Turkey. The only irritant between Turkey and the Iraqi Kurdish administration is the PKK. Once the PKK stops being a source of quarrels, the two sides will emerge as natural allies and partners in regional politics and further improve their economic cooperation.

This is recognized as such by the president of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), Massoud Barzani, who was on an official visit to Turkey last week. The way in which he was received is indicative of the potential for a full-fledged partnership.

To move in this direction Barzani seems willing to get rid of the PKK problem. I do not expect an open confrontation between Barzani and the PKK. This will be unacceptable to the Kurds of the region as a whole. But what I see is that Barzani has increasingly regarded the PKK as a burden for the future of Iraqi Kurds. And he is certainly right to see it this way.

The PKK concentrated its activities in camps in northern Iraq after being expelled from Syria in 1998. Exploiting the turmoil and lack of authority in the region, it turned Iraqi Kurdistan into a safe haven for its recruitment and training activities. For some time now the Kurdish administration has established itself in Iraqi Kurdistan, asserting authority and sovereignty. It is thus hard to explain the presence of a group described by the US and the EU as a terrorist organization within the territory the Kurdish administration claims controlled by the regional government in Arbil.

Stopping the activities and removing the presence of the PKK in Iraqi Kurdistan is a mission related to the statehood of the KRG in northern Iraq if it does not want its territory to be seen by its neighbors as a “no man's land” that everyone is free to intervene in.

I think it is a priority for Barzani to enhance stability and peace in the Kurdish region as this will speed up institutionalization and the legitimacy of the regional government. He will not wish to risk the achievements of the Iraqi Kurds by harboring the PKK, a terrorist network.

For this, Barzani called on the PKK during his visit to Ankara to “lay down [its] arms,” adding that they “won't get anywhere with weapons.” Another strong message Barzani gave was about the PKK presence in northern Iraq. He said, “I will not let the PKK prevail in northern Iraq.”

These messages may not persuade the PKK to lay down its arms and leave northern Iraq, but they will certainly put the PKK under strong pressure. Barzani does not control the PKK, but his influence over Kurds on both sides of the border is significant. This is not solely due to the historical struggle of the Barzani family for more than half a century in the region, but also due to Barzani's recent success in instituting semi-statehood in northern Iraq.

With this influence over Kurds and the trust of the Turkish government, Barzani can mediate a peace deal. The long-delayed Kurdish conference to be held in Arbil soon may be the beginning of a new era in which the PKK is compelled to come up with a “new thinking.”

The fall of the generals

The leader of the 1980 coup and the former “president” of Turkey, Gen. Kenan Evren, is now being tried in a court for staging a military coup.

It is really hard to believe this. Even those who voted in September 2010 for the amendment to the Constitution that lifted the protection from prosecution covering the military junta did not think that an actual trial was possible.

The idea of trying military personnel for plotting coups was inconceivable in this country. This was not only because of the lack of a legal and institutional framework for this but also because of the prevailing political culture that treated the military as untouchable. There was only one example of trying a coup plotter that took place, and this was in 1963. Then, Col. Talat Aydemir was executed after being tried in a military court for attempting a military coup. It is important to note that in this process, the government of the time and civilian powers did not play any role. The trial and execution were part and parcel of an internal power struggle within the military.

Col. Aydemir was a revolutionary who was a member of the junta that staged the coup of 1960. But at the time of the coup, he was abroad, so he did not get what he wished for in the post-coup administration. Despite this, he was appointed commander of the War Academy, an unconventionally high post for a colonel. But the colonel was not happy. All of his friends in the junta had higher offices after the coup. So he decided to stage his own coup. In 1962, he tried it by organizing the students of the War Academy. He almost succeeded. But when the air force failed to join in the operation on time, he failed in taking over the government. Despite his attempted coup, the government pardoned him as if nothing had happened. A year after, he tried and failed again. His persistent attempts annoyed the top military officers, not because he was trying to overthrow the government but because Col. Aydemir’s target was the top military brass who benefited from the 1960 coup but did not share the benefits with officers like himself. So, he was tried by the military court and executed in 1964.

In short, this affair, the first trial of a coup plotter, had nothing to do with civilian politics. Aydemir was a counter-revolutionary trying to counter the effects of the 1960 coup that excluded him from power.

So, the trial of the 1980 coup leaders that started last week is a turning point in Turkish politics. There had been a belief that a successful coup could not be brought before the courts. Once a junta succeeds in successfully staging a coup, it would escape trial forever. The trial of Gen. Evren disproves this belief that a “successful coup” cannot be tried.

It is a historic moment for Turkey. The trial will serve as the ultimate deterrent to the recurrence of similar incidents in Turkey. Thus, it is a process that will certainly enhance democracy in Turkey. But democracy will still remain incomplete unless the Constitution made by the junta in 1982 is replaced by a new one. It is not only the Constitution; the basic laws of the system are the making of the military regime. The Political Parties Law, Election Law and Higher Education Law were all introduced by the military junta. Thus, the leaders of the junta are on trial, but the junta’s laws and institutions are still intact.

If Turkey really wants to leave the period of military coups behind, it should eliminate the remaining legacy of the military regime. There is no point in trying the junta but ruling Turkey with its Constitution, laws and institutions.

Islam and the nuclear issue

Are nuclear weapons un-Islamic? Yes, according to Iranian religious leader Ayatollah Khamenei. His statement was reported by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who visited Iran and met with the country's religious leader after attending a nuclear summit in South Korea.

Khamenei, explaining that Iran is not interested in developing nuclear weapons, told the Turkish prime minister, “Islam does not allow weapons of mass destruction like nuclear ones.” So we should presumably be assured about the intentions of Iran, which is an Islamic republic and would not conduct any policy that is deemed un-Islamic.

I do not think there is anyone Muslim or non-Muslim who would believe such an explanation. Go and search for the record of human rights violations, corruption and usurpation of power in Iran. Encountering the voluminous evidence of all of these, one may wonder if such types of misconduct are allowed in Islam. The answer is of course negative. Iran is a typical example of a regime using Islam as a spiritual pretext to legitimate its worldly actions. I am sure if they develop a nuclear weapon and test it, Khamenei will quickly claim religious grounds for this.

It is all about politics and power, not religion. But “defending Islam” is a clever and popular excuse for one's actions. In this way a purely national quest for power and hegemony in the region is disguised as a policy of preserving the religion. This motive is still not admitted to by government officials. Yet on the street this logic works and appeals to common people.

The fact that a cultural outsider in the region, Israel, has nuclear weapons constitutes a perfect excuse for nuclear weapon seekers. Even Prime Minister Erdoğan, when speaking of Iran's nuclear program and its possibility of producing nuclear weapons, mentions Israel's nuclear weapons capability. It makes sense in the context of a call for a “nuclear-free region.” But it also taps into people's subconscious desire for an “Islamic bomb” to balance and deter Israel, to many the suspect aggressor in the Middle East.

Particularly when Israel bullies Iran about its nuclear program, Muslims side with Iran out of religious solidarity. Iranian leaders are very happy to see such solidarity among Muslims, even as it upsets regional Sunni governments. Israel's threats will therefore only justify Iran's quest for going nuclear in the minds of most Muslims.

If the world wants to stop Iran from going nuclear, it must first stop Israel from meddling in the process. Israel's visibility in this issue is totally counterproductive. When Israel threatens the United States by saying “you hit or I will,” it prevents the US from developing effective mechanisms to deal with the situation and to build a regional coalition to put pressure on Iran. In the upcoming negotiations taking place in İstanbul Israel should refrain from publically supporting a strike on Iran.

If Israel goes further and wages an attack on Iran, the region will descend into chaos. Such an attack will save Bashar al-Assad, stop the process of democratization in the region, put an end to the Arab Spring and destabilize the oil-rich Gulf monarchies.

An Israeli attack on Iran will have consequences that extend beyond the region. One of the first effects will be on the outcome of the presidential elections in the US. The moment Israel conducts such aggression against Iran, the chance President Barack Obama has for re-election will disappear.

The likelihood of an Israeli attack on Iran is very low, of course. It will only materialize if the Israeli government really wishes to sabotage President Obama's re-election chances.

Resolving or managing the Kurdish question?

The Kurdish question has proved to be very difficult to resolve since the actors involved are not prepared to take the risk of finding a solution.

Both the government and Kurdish nationalists are accustomed to “living with the problem” instead of taking the risk of the unknown, a settled Kurdish question.

I have reached this judgment on the basis of the fate of the 2009 opening that was torpedoed by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and abandoned by the government when national and regional conditions were really ripe for a solution.

There is now talk of a new government strategy on the Kurdish problem. Even if there is such a “new strategy,” I do not think it will produce a solution. This is so because the government is not prepared to take political risks to address the Kurdish question. The view of the government is that the Kurdish question is not the making of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and thus no one can blame the party for not finding a solution to it.

Besides, the Kurdish question does not seriously disturb the AK Party's governance of Turkey. The ruling party can live without finding a solution to the Kurdish question. Last year's election showed once more that the continuation of the Kurdish question does not prevent the AK Party from winning elections. Even among Kurds, the AK Party receives as many votes as the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP).

Will that be the case when the AK Party takes bold steps to solve the Kurdish question? That much is not guaranteed. The ruling party fears that a form of final settlement may alienate the Turks, and especially the nationalists, resulting in the risk of losing its nationalist constituency to the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP).

It is ironic that the political party that came to power 10 years ago with a view to challenge the status quo today sticks to the status quo on the Kurdish question. Indeed it is ironic to defend the status quo on the Kurdish question when it is in a position to challenge and change it, but this is not surprising at all because the status quo is regarded by the AK Party as “manageable” while a solution is “unsettling.”

What is also important to note in the “new strategy” is the emphasis made on the new decision not to talk to jailed PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan and the PKK. In the near past, we know that the government engaged both Öcalan and the PKK through the National Intelligence Organization (MİT) and the special representative of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, then-Prime Ministry Undersecretary Hakan Fidan. The government will no longer talk to them. Why? The reason for this policy change might be the fact that the former talks produced no results. But it may also be equally true that the recent crisis between the judiciary and MİT could have triggered such a decision on the part of the government. That is to say that the government may be concerned that a perceived “negotiation” with the PKK and Öcalan is not only politically risky but also legally problematic, given the divergence of views between the judiciary and the government. If this is true, then we can infer that the government has given in to the pressure of the judiciary and that it is even more unlikely now that it will go along with a solution model.

The government instead seems willing to talk to the BDP, the “extension of the PKK,” as described by the prime minister himself. So long as the BDP is portrayed as totally dependent on the PKK, it is not realistic to expect it to act independently and hold genuine negotiations with the government.

The bottom line is that the government has come to the end of its “democratic initiatives”; for the last two years or so there has been no attempt at democratizing the Kurdish issue. Instead, the government seems to have adopted a tough perspective of crushing the PKK presence and eliminating its organizational network in cities through operations targeting the Kurdish Communities Union (KCK). In response to this approach, the PKK has not surrendered but challenged the government in cities, as demonstrated during Newroz, in a quest to show its strength.

To sum up, the new strategy is not a strategy but part of “managing the Kurdish question,” limiting its damage and distancing its political risks on the part of the government.

Annexing Cyprus

The fever of Turkish nationalism can be measured by looking at the position taken towards the Cyprus question. Since the 1950s the Cyprus issue has been used to spread and radicalize Turkish nationalism.

I have recently observed that, after a long break starting in the early 2000s, the nationalist fever fueled by the Cyprus question has been on the rise. And the Turkish government, prepared to confront the EU in July 2012, does not mind fanning nationalism over Turkey's “national cause”: Cyprus. The Greek Cyprus' upcoming presidency of the European Council may provide the Turkish government, if it so desires, with a perfect excuse to break with the EU and withdraw its support for a negotiated solution on the island.

Last week Turkish European Affairs Minister Egemen Bağış listed “annexing northern Cyprus to Turkey” among the options Turkey has concerning the future of the island. Claiming later that he was misunderstood, the minister underlined that Turkey's policy remains unchanged: “Our sole objective is for a solution to be reached on the island, acceptable to both Cypriot sides.” He proceeded by saying, “But if no settlement emerges, all options are on the table.”

The problem lies in the meaning of “all options.” In his previous interview, given to a newspaper, Minister Bağış named the “options on the table” as follows: reunification agreed upon by the two communities in the island; if this fails, a two-state solution; or the annexation of Turkish Cyprus to Turkey.

Never, as far as I remember, has a minister of any Turkish government stated that “annexing the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus [KKTC]” is a policy option that is on the table. This was uttered by a number of ultranationalist politicians and opinion leaders, but not by a member of the government or a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

As has been declared numerous times, Turkey prefers and works for a negotiated settlement in the island. It has also been hinted several times that if negotiations do not progress well, Turkey will not wait forever but will consider pressing for the recognition of the KKTC. But an outright annexation has never been the policy of any Turkish government, nor of the AK Party government.

How then can we explain the minister's statement? Is it a new government policy or a slip of the tongue?

Since the government has remained silent and the minister did not denounce the option, we may assume that annexation is a policy option seriously being considered in Ankara.

But this contradicts Turkey's declared reason for the 1974 intervention on the island. Furthermore, all the defenses of this intervention that followed are de-legitimized by such a policy.

Beyond this, such a policy does a great injustice to the KKTC. Turkey officially recognizes the KKTC as a sovereign state. How can a state recognizing another as sovereign and independent talk of annexing it?

This talk is dangerous and self-defeating for Turkish diplomacy. The talk of annexing may only be an acknowledgment that Turkey keeps the KKTC under its occupation. Is this the case? If the Turkish government says yes, then its minister can talk of annexing it without consulting its government or people.

I suspect it was a movie that was watched by over 4 million people in Turkey these past few weeks, and probably the minister himself -- “Fetih 1453” (The Conquest 1453), that is to blame for this talk of “annexing Cyprus”! If Constantinople, why not Cyprus?

Is Kemalism an alternative to the AK Party?

A weak opposition unable to present itself as an alternative to the ruling party continues to be an important problem in Turkish politics. The lack of a viable alternative to the government boosts the ruling party’s self-righteous confidence and alienates dissident groups who have lost their hope in change through democratic competition resulting from engagement in politics.

The main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) is still in a state of internal strife. Its members are busy opposing their own party administration instead of their opponent, the Justice and Development Party (AK Party). Last week, the CHP held two party congresses at which changing the party’s internal code of conduct was discussed. But everyone knew that it was an occasion to question the leadership of Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu. Though the dissidents of the party lost the battle against the leadership, whose power was consolidated, the damage was also inflicted upon the party itself.

The CHP’s old guard seems concerned that Kılıçdaroğlu might change the party, breaking with the Kemalist tradition and ideological outlook. To me, this is a groundless fear. Even if Kılıçdaroğlu keeps the party under full control, he is unlikely and unwilling to embark on such a transformation.

There is of course pressure for the CHP to become more social democrat and less Kemalist, but the tutelage of the latter on the former within the party is almost impossible to break with. The party grassroots are overwhelmingly Kemalist and nationalist, and they view a social democrat and humanist/universalist political stance as unpatriotic. Moreover, within the party elite is a strong group of old Kemalist cadets who are ready to label proponents of change heretics and revisionists. And most important of all, Kılıçdaroğlu fears that without the support of the Kemalists, the CHP will not even get 26 percent of the vote in elections.

Anyhow, the CHP leadership should answer these questions: Does the CHP really want to win an election and rule the country? The answer is presumably yes. How, then, will this be achieved? Is the vote of the Kemalists enough to win an election? If not, whose votes will the CHP add to its own votes to win in an election?

In the last three elections, the CHP has been stuck around 20 percent of the vote. If it claims to be an alternative to replace the AK Party, it has to at least double its votes. Even if the CHP gets all of the votes of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) it cannot defeat the AK Party, which stands at around 50 percent of popular support. Thus the key to toppling the AK Party is not only for the CHP to double its votes but also to get votes that go to the AK Party. In other words, without attracting AK Party voters and persuading them to vote for the CHP, it is not possible to defeat the AK Party in elections.

This is why I keep saying that unless the CHP abandons Kemalism it cannot open up to new voters. When the CHP won 42 percent of the vote in the 1977 election it was a social democrat, populist and anti-militarist party under Bülent Ecevit. This was also the time when the CHP was the least Kemalist in its entire history. The leadership at the time was talking about change, social justice, and solidarity, not lifestyles, republican values, and secularism. As such, the CHP of the 1970s got closer to the people as departed from Kemalism.

Defeats at the hands of the AK Party led the CHP to go backward and to uphold Kemalism as the identity and ideology of the party as well as its social base. Meanwhile, the CHP also embraced its past, including the legacy of the period of one-party rule between 1925 and 1945 as the “founder of the state.” Yet this “historical legacy” that led to the birth of a particular “image” of the CHP forms barriers for the CHP when it tries to reach out to various social groups. The “victims” of this particular past of Kemalism – among them Kurds, Muslims, non-Muslims, and liberals -- were thus distanced from the CHP, the old and the new.

The CHP’s opponent, the ruling AK Party, was very happy to see the CHP going in this direction. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan constantly identified the current CHP with the historical one that ruled during the single-party period, reminding the country of practices that included the Dersim massacre, the Independence Tribunals, the mistreatment of Muslims and non-Muslims, etc. Erdoğan knew that such a historical memory works to the advantage of the AK Party and unites all victims and opponents of the CHP behind the AK Party.

If the CHP really wishes to compete with the AK Party, it should reach out to the victims of Kemalism -- namely, the Kurds, the conservative Muslims and the liberals who overwhelmingly vote for the AK Party. And this cannot be done without denouncing the past and abandoning Kemalism.