Why do we need a post-Kemalist republic?

Unless Turkey abandons Kemalism as a constituent element of the state and society, we cannot consolidate democracy and resolve the Kurdish question. The best a Kemalist paradigm can offer is a “tutelage democracy” under the supervision of the military.

Kemalism has left its mark on the state apparatus, the political culture, and the national psyche. In its essence, Kemalism envisages a homogenized nation and a disciplined society. Since the nation was not homogeneous but diverse ethnically and religiously, the state apparatus was used to eliminate sources of difference, or at least silence claims of difference. This resulted in assimilation efforts aimed at Kurds and the expulsion of many non-Muslims during the republican period. This positioned the state elite as a hegemonic authority vis-à-vis society that was subjected to the interferences of the state.

Moreover, the top-down modernization project as reflected in the radical reform movement in the early republican period assumed the possibility of constructing a “new society” in accordance with the ideological proposition of the state elite. Society was supposed to be “modern, secular, Turkish and loyal,” as taught to them by the Kemalist vanguard. Viewing society as subject to the interferences of the state elite to be modernized, secularized and nationalized built a “hierarchical relationship between the state and society.”

All these reflected the belief that a “new society” can be built through state intervention according to the model imagined by the Kemalist elite. It is obvious that democracy which prioritizes society over the state could not be established under such a hierarchical relationship. This Jacobin attitude that still prevails among the secularists and the Kemalists prevents them from embracing democracy and its political outcomes. It is then possible to assert that under a strict Kemalist order, which places the state and its ideological vanguards above society, democracy cannot flourish. To make the democratization process irreversible and consolidate democracy in Turkey then, a post-Kemalist republic is needed.

A related problem is the form of military-civilian relations. Since the 1960 military coup, the military established itself as autonomous from the political sphere. With the 1961 constitution, it created tutelage over politics. While it was autonomous from politics, the latter was subordinated to the priorities and preferences of the military. This was done by claiming that the military was the vanguard of the Kemalist republic. Such a self-appointed role after the 1960 military coup constituted the grounds for the constant interference of the military in political affairs.

Thus Kemalism of the formative years was reinvented in the 1960s to limit democratic politics and justify a role for the military to assert its will over the people’s will. Backing up Kemalism with the armed forces created a fatal power against democratic forces. To get out of this trap what is essential is to reform the military as a “professional” unit and not as an ideological one seeking political power, which requires total control of the military by civilians. This, however, cannot be done in a Kemalist state in which powerful institutions will always try to derive the right to rule from their ideological commitment to Kemalism. Thus, a post-Kemalist state is needed to eliminate the possibility of using ideological justifications over the national will and representative institutions.

Another reason for the need to form a post-Kemalist order concerns the Kurdish question. It is not only the continuation of the question itself but its usage by the state elite that is an obstacle to democratization. The Kurdish question has always been used as a pretext for authoritarian political formations in Turkey. This was first carried out over the Kurdish rebellion in 1925 by Sheikh Said. To suppress the rebellion, the regime in Ankara did not limit its measures to the Kurdish areas and people. But the occasion was used to suppress all opposition in Ankara and İstanbul. The new opposition party, the Progressive Republican Party, was closed down and the dissenting İstanbul press was silenced as part of the crackdown following the Sheikh Said rebellion.

Since then the pattern has not changed: “Kurdish demands” have been used by the authoritarian elements in the state to postpone full democracy, suppress human rights, ignore the rule of law and spread a militarist political culture provoked using the threat the Kurdish demands were supposed to pose to the integrity of Turkey. Therefore, to build and consolidate democracy in this country, the Kurdish question should be resolved. The Kurdish question has to be resolved, first to address the demands of the Kurdish question and second to deprive the state of an excuse to postpone meeting the requirements of full democracy.

And the Kurdish question cannot be resolved within the paradigm of Kemalism that imagines a homogeneous Turkish nation denouncing even the presence of the Kurdish people. In short, we need to have a post-Kemalist republic in order to consolidate democracy, establish civilian control over the military and resolve the long-standing Kurdish question.

Is the AK Party experience relevant for the Middle East?

Demands for reform shaking the Middle East have once again brought up the debate over the model that Turkey can offer its region. For years some thought Turkey could be a “secular-democratic model” for the Muslim Middle East. But the problem was that Turkey’s secularism was authoritarian, not leaving any autonomous space for religion and, moreover, significantly limiting freedom of conscience.

So it was not something to aspire to. Second, Turkey’s democracy was far from a model to be imported as it was under the tutelage of the military, which intervened regularly to discipline political actors and society when there was any deviation from a strict Kemalist ideology. The “old Turkey” had nothing to offer, but as Turkish secularism and democracy have been in the process of restructuring under the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) rule, “Turkey as a model” has more relevance today. But on this topic, I still think it is not Turkey per se but the experience of its ruling party, the AK Party, and its conservative constituency that can offer a model for the democracy-aspiring masses in the Middle East.

The AK Party’s story has relevance for the people of the Muslim Middle East. It demonstrates that Islamic identity is not in contradiction to democracy and that there is no inevitable clash between Islamic identity and the West, globalization and the market economy. The AK Party’s story tells Islamic movements in the Middle East that once they abandon their radical political stand and thereby manage to reach out to a broader public, they will be better equipped to deal with an authoritarian state apparatus. The AK Party experience tells them that instead of fighting against globalization, getting the system behind your cause for greater freedom and greater welfare for people will make your objective more reachable. The story of the party is the one that demonstrates what a reformed Islamic party can achieve through democracy. The party rejects describing itself as a political movement with Islamist roots or objectives. It has transformed itself from a marginal Islamist movement to a mass political party. No doubt it originated as an Islamic-oriented party, the Welfare Party (RP), which was closed down in 1998 on the grounds that it was a center for anti-secular activities. Having won two subsequent elections since 2002 and having been able to elect the new president, Abdullah Gül, from among its own ranks, the party is now poised to win for the third time in the 2011 elections. It claims to represent the “center” in Turkish politics, not a marginal Islamist or nationalist trend.

Since its establishment in 2001, the AK Party has developed a three-layered strategy. First, it adopted a language of human rights and democracy as a discursive shield. Second, it mobilized popular support as a form of democratic legitimacy. Third, it built a liberal-democratic coalition with modern/secular sectors at home and abroad that recognize the AK Party as a legitimate political actor. By gaining discursive supremacy over its opponents and building a broader social and political front, it has managed to outmaneuver its secularist/Kemalist opponents. It seems that the AK Party has overcome the central problem of its predecessor, namely legitimacy and systemic security, by speaking the language of human rights, democracy and popular will that built up its democratic credentials.

As they witnessed their political parties being closed down, their leaders banned from political activities and their associations and foundations intimidated, the old Islamists have moved to embrace the language of civil and political rights that provided them with both an effective leverage against the pressures of the state and a base on which to build up international coalitions. And they forged a unique coalition with pro-reform groups at home and abroad that bolstered the position of the Islamic polity vis-à-vis their Kemalist/secularist opponents.

Thus, the main body of the Islamic movement has adopted a new and positive stance on approaching the West, Turkey’s membership in the EU and the integration of Turkey into the global structures and process. This was a clear break from its tradition that used to be based on an outright rejection of the West, a deep suspicion of modern political discourse and an objection to the Turkish experience of Westernization. It was this transformation that paved the way for an electoral victory in 2002 for the AK Party, which has been ruling the country since then. AK Party leaders seem to be aware of the fact that to have an Islamist agenda, or to develop one, would be a self-defeating strategy for the party. The AK Party has chosen to be a party representing those conservatives and democrats on the center-right, not ideological rigidity. As a mass political movement, the AK Party carries messages and credentials that are conservative, nationalist, Islamic and democratic. Its social base is heterogeneous, too, made up of both the urban and rural, the rich and poor, as well as the highly educated and less educated.

If studied properly, I think the AK Party can offer a new way of thinking about Islam, democracy and the West in the “new” Middle East.