The French disconnection

The resemblance between France and “old Turkey” is striking. One similarity regards their attitudes towards history. The French government is attempting to construct a “historical truth” for its citizens, who are not considered capable of making up their own minds about the events of the past.

I know this Jacobin attitude very well from the Kemalist experimentation in creating a “new nation” with a constructed history and identity. But France is the birthplace of imposing “good” on the minds of the “folk,” down in the streets. From this perspective, the rulers thought they knew what to believe and how to think better than ordinary citizens.

It is not a simple coincidence that French President Nicolas Sarkozy told Turkey not to interfere with French beliefs. So President Sarkozy thinks that he or Parliament is in a position to pass a law that regulates people's beliefs in any history or faith and punishes those who do not subscribe to the official belief.

This is obviously nonsense but makes perfect sense given the Jacobin legacy in France that seems to be experiencing a revival under Sarkozy's presidency.

The French Parliament, with a ridiculously low level of participation (only around 50 members of Parliament were in attendance when the bill was approved), has attempted to construct an “official belief” on the Armenian massacre of 1915.

The bill describes the 1915 massacre of Armenians as “genocide” and allows for the punishment of those who express a contradictory opinion. So France has moved into an era where it punishes the beliefs that contradict its officially imposed belief. This certainly reminds me of the Inquisition, fires, stakes and the Middle Ages.

There can be no official belief or official history in open and democratic societies. People are free to explore, experience and expose different claims to truth.

A democratic state cannot attempt to hold a monopoly on historical interpretation. Democracy is about plurality of interpretations. Only totalitarian states claim to monopolize interpretations and control people's minds.

The French Parliament has gone too far to discredit its reputation. This has been done while Turkey, despite its authoritarian state tradition, has come to face its past. Only two weeks ago Prime Minister Erdoğan apologized in the name of the state for the massacre of the Dersim people in 1937-1938. This is certainly a move forward towards confronting Turkey's troubling past.

It should also be remembered that Prime Minister Erdoğan, while referring to past atrocities directed at non-Muslims including the Armenians, stated in May 2009, “Through fascist approaches, we forced many non-Muslims to leave this country.” He asked, “Did we do any good?”

While Turkey seems to be abandoning its “official history,” it is really ironic that France is writing one for itself. It is up to the French people to decide whether they silently accept the Parliament's intervention in their freedom of expression. It is, after all, primarily the French citizens whose freedom of expression is severely violated by their Parliament's decision. If the French people accept that their government is in a better position to think and pass judgment on their behalf, it is fine for me.

Regardless, the French attitude neither helps the Armenians who suffered nor the Turks who do not acknowledge their suffering. We can right the atrocities of the past not by labeling them but by discussing them. Calling them genocide is the shortest way to close the debate.

I wrote some time ago: “Anyone who wants to close the debate on what happened to Armenians in 1915 should start by describing the events as genocide. They are, of course, free to speak as they wish. But if Turks are expected to be part of this debate, then a more constructive approach is needed. This requires avoiding language that closes the debate when, in fact, a lively discussion has already been going on.”

A war America lost

American troops left Iraq last week. President Barack Obama declared that the objectives in Iraq were accomplished.

This I do not agree with. The occupation of Iraq was a big mistake by the US, led then by a neoconservative gang. The cost of the war was high for the US. Five-thousand died, 30,000 were injured and over a trillion dollars were spent.

All these may still be bearable losses, but when we look at the Iraqi side, the scope of destruction goes beyond one's imagination. The number of dead is said to be at around 1.2 million. Those who fled from their homes numbered 2 million. These figures tell us the extent of the human cost the Iraqis had to bear.

While credit for the removal of Saddam Hussein certainly goes to the US, moral and political responsibility for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis falls on the US as well.

Despite this heavy human cost and financial burden, the US did not get what it wanted.

The occupation has handed the power in Iraq to Shiite groups, a scenario of power-sharing that the Americans would have never considered prior to the war. Given the historical and theological relationship between Iraqi Shiites and Iran, it will now be very difficult to prevent the influence of Iran on Iraqi politics. Even Shiite elements that are relatively distant from Iran come under the pressure of pro-Iranian groups, as both derive their legitimacy from the teachings of Shiites, heavily influenced historically by Iranians.

After the US left Iraq, the rising power in the region is certainly Iran. The occupation of Iraq only facilitated the spread of Iranian influence in the region, and particularly in Iraq. Did American policy-makers envisage such an outcome, detrimental to their regional standing in the Middle East?

While the central government of Iraq has to a very large extent fallen to Shiites, the country appears divided along sectarian and ethnic lines. Once Iraqis fail in power-sharing among the Shiites, the Kurds, and the Sunnis, the country may fall to pieces. Thus the occupation has resulted in a new power configuration that shakes the feasibility of Iraq as a state. Will such a divided Iraq serve American interests in the region? I doubt it.

As a result of the war, the US also lost support worldwide. Before and after the invasion of Iraq, mass demonstrations were held in different parts of the world. Anti-Americanism hit its highest levels. This was not only a phenomenon in the Middle East among Muslims but was seen all over the world, including in Europe and Latin America. America lost its soft power once it used its hard power against Iraq. The global standing of the US suffered tremendously as the war dragged on, with hundreds of thousands of civilian casualties and the revelation of atrocities committed by American troops against civilians and prisoners. Only recently has the US begun to recover from its dark decade of anti-Americanism fueled by the Iraqi occupation due to worldwide affinity for President Obama.

The US also lost some of its allies. The unilateralism of the Bush administration alienated US friends in Europe. Those who supported the American war in Iraq, like Tony Blair of Britain, lost their own political battles at home.

Moreover, relations with Turkey were severely damaged as a result of the war. At some point, this even took the form of hostility. The trust between the two sides at the governmental level disappeared. Many in Turkey believed that the neocons in Washington had plotted with their Turkish supporters against the Turkish government to end the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) rule. Moreover, anti-Americanism rose to a record high among the people of Turkey. The relationship between the two sides was repaired only after the US started to contemplate withdrawal from Iraq.

In short, the occupation of Iraq shows the limits of using military power, even for a superpower. Iraq will continue to haunt America in the Middle East and the world at large.

Reforming Europe, abandoning Turkey

Looking at the economic crisis that led a number of member states to the brink of bankruptcy, some question the future of the European Union.

Whether the EU is an effective institutional framework for dealing with economic crises and bringing prosperity to its citizens may be debated, but it is premature to question the EU’s future.

The EU is the Europeans’ most ambitious project in modern history. I don’t think it will easily be given up. It is a zone of peace and prosperity despite the presence of some countries shaken by recent economic crises.

For the anti-EU circles, there is still no ground to celebrate. The union is not passé. Criticism of the EU should not underestimate the ability of the EU to overcome challenges and adapt itself to changing circumstances.

It is a union bringing together different national interests, styles, and identities. We always hear about how difficult it is to make decisions in such a big and diverse community. But we see that the union is capable of making speedy and fundamental decisions concerning itself.

Just take last week’s European Council meeting in Brussels as an example. Amid a debate on the future of the EU and the failures of its economic institutions and policies, European leaders decided to enhance integration, not loosen it. Within three months a new union treaty is going to be prepared to tighten financial management within the union.

This decision means that the current crisis will not lead to the disintegration of the union, as argued by some. On the contrary, it will trigger further integration within Europe.

This reaction of the EU to the crisis tells us an important characteristic of the union; namely, that is able to understand the change in the environment and respond accordingly.

There is indeed a history of this. Just think of the union treaties made since the end of the Cold War. Starting with Maastricht and moving on to Amsterdam and Nice, and now to the Lisbon Treaty, the EU has been more flexible, responsive and changing than it is given credit for. What we have is a union that has made four “constitutions” in the post-Cold War era, and agreed to make a new one.

This tells us about the EU’s ability to renew itself in the face of crisis, and also its flexibility to change despite a heavy Brussels bureaucracy and diverse membership profile. This is so, I think because the Europeans are still convinced that peace, prosperity, and liberty will best be brought about by European-level cooperation that requires working together instead of going on their own.

Compare the EU’s responsiveness to the changing circumstances in terms of coming up with a new set of rules and norms to Turkey. We have been ruled by a military-made Constitution since 1982. There were numerous amendments introduced since then, but we failed to make a new one despite overwhelming public demand. Even now it is rather doubtful if the new Parliament will reach an agreement on a new democratic constitution.

In trying to catch up with the EU, Turkey sped up its reforms since the late 1990s, strengthening its democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights. But as of today, the EU lost its role to push Turkey for democratic reform not only because Turkey reached a point at which it does not need an external stimulus for democratization but also because the EU is no longer willing or cares to play such a role.

Such thinking prevails on both sides and neither serves the interests of Turkey nor those of Europe. I hope Turkey won’t be an abandoned or failed case of Europeanization as a result of ignorance or false confidence.

Abandoning the old paradigm in the Cyprus dispute

Abandoning an ever-widening scope of Turkish foreign policy, the Cyprus question no longer occupies center stage as it once used to. Yet it is still likely to emerge as an important issue in the coming year. Two imminent developments make this inevitable: The first is the upcoming rotating presidency of the European Council by the “Republic of Cyprus” and the second is the exploration of natural resources around the island.

Perhaps it is in response to these that negotiations seemed to have been sped up. The last round of negotiations among parties in New York at the end of last month was deemed positive and productive. Thus they have raised expectations. However, there are still delicate issues to agree upon before an agreement is reached.

Yet even if an agreement is reached between Turkish and Greek political leaders on the island, the people of both sides, who are still skeptical, will still have the final word. The referendum in 2004 proved that public opinion does matter. Unless each community is fully prepared to live together with risks and opportunities, their political leaders cannot resolve the dispute among themselves. It is not an issue to address at the top but requires engaging the people at the grassroots.

Hopefully, there will be new initiatives taken up by non-governmental actors in Cyprus to bring members of the two communities together with a common agenda. One such new civic initiative is the Cyprus Academic Dialogue (CAD) established by Turkish and Greek Cypriots to work towards preparing the public, pressuring governments and coming up with concrete suggestions on controversial issues.

This unique group organized a workshop this weekend in İstanbul bringing academics, journalists, and writers from both sides of Cyprus and Turkey together. For the first time, Cypriot Greeks and Turks as academics and intellectuals worked together to agree upon a joint statement in which the main parameters of a solution were outlined. This is, I think, a historic initiative. Civil society on both sides of the island is taking the matter (that is, in fact, their common future) into their own hands.

Such initiatives are important because they come from the people, the ultimate source of legitimacy and sovereignty. We know that even if an agreement is reached at the political level, it has to be sold to the public. Therefore, CAD's efforts are paving the way to build a “common vision” for the island by engaging in a constructive and courageous search for alternatives in settling the dispute on the island.

We know that their task is really difficult. This is because finding a solution on the island requires abandoning the old paradigm of the “national idea” that still prevails on both sides. I do not blame them for this. Given that the history of the conflict on the island and looking at the experiences of mainland Turkey and Greece, the idea of living together with the principle of political equality in an ethnically and religiously diverse state seems very difficult to “imagine.” In fact, the modern history of Turkey and Greece is the history of a quest to create a “nation-state” with ethnic and religious homogeneity.

I think we, Turks and Greeks, are the victims of our “nation-states,” imagined as survival units necessitating subordination and, if possible, the elimination of ethnic and religious diversities. The result is that we, Greeks and Turks on the mainland and on the island, have forgotten how to live and share with the “other.”

Now we are asking Cypriots to forget this “national idea” and form a “federal state.” This totally goes against our experiences. The islanders have the memory of a short-lived experiment in the early 1960s that only vindicated their separate “national ideas.”

My point is that it is really challenging to get out of this old but comfortable paradigm and go for a “post-national state.” It is not easy to materialize such a mental transformation.

Are the people of Cyprus prepared to live together even in a bi-communal and bi-zonal community? I am not sure. I think people are anxious. The issues of returnees, the rotating presidency, cross-voting, etc., are all related to this anxiety.

The root of the anxiety is that this “federal” model goes against the notion of “good” and “ideal state,” as we have grown to learn in our separate “national idea.”

I think Cypriots also feel that they are going against the current. As the world gets ever more fragmented along ethnic lines and witnesses the emergence of new nation-states, they are asked to become united and forget about their national ideas.

Well, this sense of going against the current makes a united federal Cyprus even more worthwhile. Cypriots, who once achieved this, may set a new example and trend with a moral high ground. It is a relief to see that there are people on both sides of Cyprus who defend a “post-national” united state as a way out of the deadlock.

Are the Islamists ready to govern?

The Arab Spring is not only an opportunity for Islamists but also a test case. How the Ennahda movement of Tunisia and the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt respond to the challenges will determine the future of both the Arab Spring and the Islamists.

Islamist political movements in Tunisia and Egypt are poised to come to power through the electoral process. This is a new challenge for democracy expected to emerge from the Arab Spring. The question is whether Islamists, once in power, will remain committed to and respectful of democratic institutions and processes. As such, it is also a challenge for Islamists as well, who used to be excluded and oppressed by the prevailing authoritarian regimes in the region.

It is a challenge for Islamists to adapt themselves to the new circumstances. Their ability to change is being tested. Political Islamism is designed as an opposition movement. In an authoritarian political environment where all dissenting voices were suppressed, opposition in the name of Islam was the only remaining ground to challenge the oppressive governments. This is what happened in almost all Muslim countries in the Middle East. Opposition in the name of Islam appeared as the only legitimate form of opposition, with discursive superiority over authoritarian ruling regimes, and it also promised strong popular support, given the influence of religion in the formation of Muslim's identities.

Thus from the 1970s onwards, political Islam emerged as a platform for the opposition, a kind of protest movement challenging the established order. It called for a change in the midst of the stagnant political orders of Arab authoritarianism. Following the failures of Arab nationalism and other secular ideologies, the simple slogan of “Islam is the solution” made sense to the Arab masses and attracted them. It was expected to resolve all the problems of the Muslims, from unemployment to healthcare, from education to housing. Islamism was the blueprint. What the secular-nationalist Arab regimes failed to produce was to be provided by the Islamists.

Islamist opposition movements, however, never developed a comprehensive program on how to resolve all the problems the people encountered. It did not really matter because the authoritarian Arab regimes never allowed them to perform in government. And it was unlikely for the Islamists to one day be in a position to make good on their promises. The Islamists in the region remained for a very long period in opposition, a position in which they could freely criticize the regimes without having to offer anything as an alternative. This was really comfortable. They did not have to offer something concrete in terms of programs and projects as a solution to the problems of the people. They remained in the opposition, comfortably criticizing the government in a way that also increased radicalism and the sweeping political stance of the Islamists.

It was not therefore only the oppression the Islamists experienced that radicalized them, but also the absence of governmental responsibility.

With the Arab Spring, the Islamists now face, at least in Tunisia and Egypt, a new situation.

First, they have been freed from governmental oppression. Now they are in a position to express themselves and appeal to the masses with a positive agenda, not just a series of criticisms directed against the ruling regimes, as in the old days. So they have to develop reasonable programs and come up with sensible projects to address the problems of the people. The old days in which mere criticism of the regimes and an assertion that “Islam is the solution” are gone, and this will not be enough to come to and then remain in power.

Thus the Islamists in the region face their first serious challenge before the people. Will they be able to deliver what they promise?

This is the question. In opposition, they were radical, uncompromising and comfortable. When they are in power on their own or share it with others on the political terrain, things will be fundamentally different. Responsibility in government requires meeting demands and delivering services. What also changes under governmental responsibility is the radicalism of the Islamists, who will not be able to hold on to their radical political stance.

This will be so because people who bring the Islamists to power will not be satisfied by mere radical rhetoric; they will also ask for concrete achievements in delivering services.

So, as the Islamists get closer to taking over governments through democratic means, like in Tunisia and Egypt, they moderate their discourse, embrace non-Muslim social groups and appeal to the West.

The success of the Arab Spring will be measured by the extent to which people's power is institutionalized in the form of democracy. This requires the integration of the Islamist movements in the democratic process, which in turn requires that the Islamists transform their political language and strategies to adopt the “rules of the game.”

New constitution: Is it possible?

The people's overwhelming demand for a new constitution has forced political parties to work together in Parliament. For this, a parliamentary commission consisting of four political parties, each with three members, was set up.

The first meeting of the Constitutional Reconciliation Commission, whose mission is to prepare a draft, is expected to take place this week. Because this is a historic opportunity to make a “democratic constitution” with the true participation of the people for the first time in history, expectations are high.

But we have to be realistic. It is not easy to reach a consensus among political actors as diverse as the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and the Republican People's Party (CHP) on one hand, and the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) on the other.

Before tackling the content of the new constitution, the Reconciliation Commission has to agree on the procedure for reaching a decision. A 100 percent agreement among the participating parties may be desirable but it is almost impossible on contentious issues like citizenship, secularism, compulsory religious education, Kemalism, the composition and elections of the high court and so on. A kind of qualified majority may be sought to pass decisions, but in this case, three-fourths of the commission may bypass the AK Party and reach an agreement among themselves, disregarding the AK Party's parliamentary majority, which precludes approval by Parliament, let alone the people's approval in a referendum. This is not a baseless concern, as something similar happened last year in a referendum on a constitutional amendment.

On the other hand, to give the AK Party a kind of veto power in the commission, given its parliamentary majority, will not be acceptable to other political parties, which accepted Parliament speaker Cemil Çiçek's invitation to the commission on the principle that each party is equally represented in the commission. Whether the draft prepared by the Reconciliation Commission will get through the formal Constitutional Commission, where the AK Party has the majority, is another issue to be resolved.

All these have to be resolved before there is a debate on the content of the new constitution. The “good office” of the speaker of Parliament may not be enough to resolve the differences in the procedure and the content of the new constitution in the preparation period.

Besides, it would be naïve to think that political parties will act “responsibly and constructively” in this process. The politicking will continue, this time in the background of the new constitution. The AK Party will try to appear enthusiastic about a new constitution, knowing that giving the nation a new constitution will be its own success in the end. It will discursively push for it because a new constitution is a great opportunity for the ruling party to underline its “reformist credentials,” which slowly fade away after years in power.

For the CHP, the making of a new constitution is a new battleground to fight against losing the constitutional bases of Kemalism as an ideology and the independence of its institutions from the government. The attempt at reinterpreting secularism in the constitution may provoke the CHP supporters.

For the MHP, the making of the new constitution is a perfect occasion to argue that the ruling AK Party is giving in to the demands of the Kurds and, should the CHP play soft on secularism, to show that it has abandoned its secularist sensitivities. The MHP will use this process in any way possible to make gains at the expense of the AK Party and the CHP, which manipulates the Kurdish question and secularism.

As for the BDP, the constitution-making process is an excellent opportunity to voice its demands for “democratic autonomy,” education in Kurdish, referring to Kurds as a constituent ethnic element in the constitution and so on. Let us assume that the BDP has decided not to exploit the situation, but be constructive and offer to work with the AK Party on the new constitution. Even in this scenario, I think the AK Party will refrain from making a new constitution with the support of the BDP, due to concerns about the possible reaction of the Turks and the MHP's exploitation of the situation at the expense of the AK Party.

The AK Party cannot make a new constitution on its own. It needs the support of other parties. The most likely candidate is still the CHP. This is because the CHP has lost is traditional power base in state institutions like the military, judiciary, and universities. Thus it needs, like all groups that feel insecure vis-à-vis the state power, constitutional protection. If the CHP leadership and supporters forget about their fixation on secularism and seek protection from the AK Party-controlled state, then they can push the AK Party for a genuinely liberal, pluralist and democratic constitution.

In short, Turkey certainly needs a pluralist and democratic constitution that is non-ideological and ethnically blind, but the likelihood of it coming through is slim.

A post-Kemalist constitution for Turkey

The Parliament elected in the June elections has gathered to begin its legislative activities.

The new constitution is high on its agenda. Political parties seem to have agreed to set up a special commission in Parliament to work together on the new constitution. It will certainly not be easy for political parties that differ fundamentally from each other to reach a consensus.

I have not paid much attention to the details. The most important thing is to make a new constitution liberating Turkey from the ideological straightjacket of Kemalism. The new Turkey needs a post-Kemalist constitution. I understand the call for a liberal and democratic constitution as a demand for a non-ideological constitutional base of the state.

This does not mean denouncing Kemalism as an “ideology,” but leave it to the people to choose among the set of ideologies available from the free market of ideas. Let the people follow ideologies if they chose, but keep the state neutral as the basis of a wider consensus on the mechanism of living together without threatening each other.

Turkey is too developed and diversified to be ruled by any ideology upheld in the constitution. The age of ideological states has passed, passed with great pains, agonies, and disappointments. What matters now is a state that provides people not with ideas, ideologies or lifestyles, but with services and protection.

Ideological states, be they socialist, fascist or Kemalist, have failed to meet their promises. They have failed to produce freedom, welfare, and security for their citizens.

To build anew or maintain an ideological state is practically impossible in the contemporary complexities of the global economy, social networks, and political interactions. It is a struggle against the current that risks confronting not only global trends but also the demands of the people at home. People want liberty, welfare, and security, which cannot be provided by an ideological state, as proven by the political history of the 20th century.

Any ideological state formations cannot survive in a flourishing open society, deepening market economy and penetrating globalization. So it is futile to resist.

The demand for a new constitution reflects the crisis of Kemalism in itself. First, it is the crisis of Kemalism as the elitist modernization model. With its revolutionary ethos, Kemalism does not allow for the establishment of a full democracy since it does not trust the choice of people. It is not inclined to leave the people to choose their lifestyles, leaders, and beliefs. People need to be guided, enlightened and ruled. This notion of tutelage that appoints vanguard institutions and actors over the people can no longer be sustained. People do not want tutelage from anyone, including the military and anything involving Kemalism. Thus, a new and post-Kemalist constitution is needed to form a polity that secures and enables the people to rule themselves through liberal democracy.

A new constitution has also become urgent due to the crisis of secularism established and practiced by Kemalism. It is now impossible to dictate that secularism is a way of life, and that those who are not secular in their lifestyles are treated unequally. Such a notion of secularism that excludes the conservatives and religious masses cannot be sustained. Thus a post-Kemalist constitution is needed to remove the authoritarian model of secularism and eliminate the artificial tension between the religious and non-religious groups, the latter being favored by the state and the constitution.

And third, we need a post-Kemalist constitution because the current Constitution's notion of a homogenized nation is not true. There is no point in pretending that there is only one ethnicity in Turkey called Turks. We have to accept the plurality of ethnicities among the citizens of Turkey. Not every citizen of this country is a Turk. But Kemalism from its inception imagined homogenous nationhood and those who did not subscribe to this notion were denied, suppressed and forced to be assimilated.

All the above explains why we need a new constitution to remove the major clashes between social reality and the official imagination of the state based on Kemalism.

Therefore, a post-Kemalist constitution will be a prelude to a fully functioning democracy and the rule of law in Turkey as well as to a peaceful relationship between the Kurds and the conservatives on the one hand and the state on the other.

Are we ever closer to a Kurdish solution amid violence?

The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) is committing suicide. It kills civilians, both Turkish and Kurdish, in various parts of Turkey. This obviously points to a desperate position on the part of the PKK.

As a result of the killings both in Ankara and Siirt last week, the PKK has received very harsh criticism and reaction from the Turks and the Kurds. A group of Kurdish activists started a campaign and called on the PKK “to not kill on my behalf.”

This indicates that the PKK is losing its moral high ground among the Kurds, who are denouncing the violence that is being directed at civilians. Even among the ranks of the BDP strong criticism has been voiced pointing out that even in times of war there are moral limits not to kill civilians.

It is therefore hard to understand the rationale and objective behind this new wave of terror. From an optimistic point of view, one could think the PKK is trying to put pressure on the government by using such violent acts in order to force it to accept a negotiated settlement. But we know that the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government is engaged with both Abdullah Öcalan in prison and the PKK’s other leaders to facilitate a solution. The leaked tape recordings of a dialogue between the National Intelligence Organization (MİT) and the PKK shows that even at a time when the Kurdish opening seemed publicly abandoned by the government, in practice, the same government was trying to negotiate with Öcalan and the PKK. Therefore, it is hard to question the government’s willingness to address the Kurdish question and even engage with the PKK for this matter.

We also know that negotiations with Öcalan continued right into the summer as Öcalan declared substantial progress in the talks with the state. What bothers many observers is that the PKK’s attacks were intensified following a message from Öcalan, where he claimed to have reached an agreement with the state and that there was no need to continue the war.

This gives rise to speculation that it is not the state but the PKK that is turning away from a negotiated solution. If this is not true for the entire PKK, there are at least some radical elements within the organization that may not approve the peace process conducted by Öcalan. Instead, by intensifying violence, they could be trying to convey a message that the counterpart of the state for negotiation is not Öcalan, but the warlords who effectively control the PKK on the ground. This takes us to a vicious circle. It took decades for the state to talk with Öcalan for peace and settlement, now if it appears that Öcalan is not the right person to speak with because he is not in control of the PKK then there could be no one on the table to talk to.

Anyway, it is a fact that the PKK can survive as a terrorist organization without Öcalan, but it cannot enjoy social and political support among the Kurds. So, Öcalan may not be in total control of the PKK, but the PKK warlords cannot survive without Öcalan’s blessing. If they, both Öcalan and his warlords, want peace and want to exist without violence they should stop wrestling with each other by killing innocent people, which has turned into a way of showing muscle, not only to the state but also to each other.

The PKK has come to a crossroads. While using violence can never be justified, the terrorist organization has even expanded the use of violence against civilians. This is self-defeating, irrational and inhuman. This should be stopped at once.

Despite the confusion over the objectives, rationale and actors behind the recent PKK violence I’m still keeping my hopes high. The rising violence may be heralding that peace is ever closer. Before a full-scale peace talk, both sides are trying to raise the stakes and signal that the current state of violence is not sustainable, affordable or favorable for either side.

Secularism for Arabs and Turks

Will the Arab Spring countries embrace secularism as described by the Turkish prime minister?

It is certainly odd to hear Recep Tayyip Erdoğan preaching about secularism in Egypt and Tunisia given that he comes from a political tradition that was constantly suppressed in the name of secularism and that his party, described as the center of anti-secular activities, was threatened with closure by the Constitutional Court only three years ago.

Now Erdoğan is advising the Arabs not to be afraid of secularism. What he has in mind, however, is of course not the secularism of the Kemalists or the Nasserites or the Baathists. He, in fact, is putting forward a notion of reformed secularism, the kind that is emancipatory and non-interventionist.

This is a departure from the one implemented in Turkey by the Kemalists. Turkey's experience with secularism is not a happy one. From its inception during the republican era, secularism was conceived as a “device” to exclude and oppress religious groups. Exclusion on the grounds of secularism served to delegitimize social and political actors and their demands while elevating the Kemalist elite as the legitimate vanguard of the system. Secularism was thus a shield behind which the Kemalists conducted a struggle for power vis-à-vis the conservative periphery.

It was not a model in which the state and religion were separated, with each commanding its own realm free of intervention from the other side. In the Turkish secular model the state-controlled religion -- the way in which it was organized, believed in and taught. Thus, while the state, in the name of secularism, kept religion at bay and even controlled it, religion was not supposed to define rules or norms of the state's affairs. As a result, Turkish secularism created its own institution of religion within the state apparatus so it could rule and regulate religious activities. Even in this, the state was not impartial since the institution was only in charge of Islam, and only one interpretation of it. So Sunni Islam became the “official religion,” in practice excluding non-Muslims and Alevis. Moreover, this notion of Islam became compulsory in schools reinforcing the state's monopoly over Islam, its interpretation and teaching.

While regulating the relationship with religion in such a way, on the other hand, Turkish secularism has also attempted to erode paradoxically public displays of Islam. This was conducted through an understanding of secularism as a “way of life.” So, on one hand, the state ran religious institutions, published religious books, employed preachers and taught Islam, but on the other religion/Islam was to be kept to one's self not appearing in social or political life.

To achieve secularism with democracy and social will result in removing the built-in authoritarian political content of radical secularism. There are two important aspects of secularism: impartiality and the equal treatment of all religions by the state. Secularism involves an institutional attitude and method that ensures that the state remains impartial and equidistant to all religions and thoughts, whereby secularism is essentially regarded as the freedom of religion and conscience. On the other hand, secularism guarantees emancipation for different beliefs and lifestyles.

This is an important ground on which secularists and Muslims can reach a consensus in Islamic communities.

Israel’s missed opportunity

I do not understand why the government of Israel finds it so difficult to apologize for a mistake that it has committed. Yes, it expressed regret that nine civilians were killed by its own soldiers and offered its condolences. Why not an apology, then? Is it worth triggering all this tension and provoking a potential hot conflict?

I am afraid that without a change in Israel’s attitude, the tension will continue to increase. The news that the Israeli government is considering countermeasures against Turkey that include extending a hand to the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and supporting efforts for the recognition of Armenian genocide claims have agitated the public and Turkish government further. With such news, it will be impossible for the Turkish government to calm down and mend the damage already done. Moreover, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will be touring Arab Spring countries Egypt, Tunisia and Libya this week. In his visits, the Turkish Prime Minister will certainly underline the importance of the people’s will, democratic institutions, and change as brought up by the Arab revolts, but I also expect that Erdoğan will speak up against Israel, denouncing the blockade of Gaza and calling on them to stand against Israel’s aggressive policies in the region. Thus, Erdoğan’s Middle East tour will, at least on a rhetorical level, increase tension between Turkey and Israel. The Arab Spring may turn into an anti-Israeli public and political rally through the efforts of the Turkish prime minister, whose popularity in the Arab street should not be underestimated. Some elements of this could be seen in Cairo in this last week’s demonstration against Israel.

Furthermore, Palestinians are to declare an independent Palestinian state before the UN on Sept. 20, a project enthusiastically supported by Turkey. The declaration will be an occasion to rally international support against Israel’s occupation, continuation to build settlements in the occupied territories and blockade of Gaza.

All these mean that in the coming days, Israel will face increasing pressure from the international community on a series of topics, including that the Israeli position is not defendable under either international law or civic morality.

Another development that places Israel under tremendous pressure is that the tension between Israel and Egypt is growing. The Camp David accord seems to have been demolished. The Egyptian masses are getting out of control, forcing the Israeli ambassador to flee, and the interim government is not willing or able to do anything to stop them. This and other incidents may lead the Israelis to believe that the Arab Spring may not be a “good thing” for Israel. This may be so if Israel is still stuck in the old habits of defying international law and preferring to deal with the autocrats in the region without taking the public mood into account. This “old Middle East” has gone, gone at least in the Maghreb and Mashriq regions. It is time for Israel to understand and act according to the parameters of the new, emerging Middle East, to which Israel can contribute by pursuing a policy of peace. This seems to not be the case so far, as demonstrated in Israel’s policy on Turkey. As a result, Israelis will feel more isolated, and thus threatened, in the coming days. Mending relations with Turkey with an apology over the Mavi Marmara raid would have brought relief for Israel. It seems that the extreme right-wing in the government has prevented such a reconciliatory move to enable Israel to cope with change in the Middle East and Turkey. The long-anticipated change has arrived in the Middle East, but not Israel.

Towards a Kurdish solution without the PKK

I think it is time to seriously consider a solution to the Kurdish question without the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). This is because the PKK does not seem interested in facilitating a solution even with the involvement of its leader, Abdullah Öcalan.

A comprehensive solution, of course, requires disarmament of the PKK, which could be negotiated with the PKK leadership. The Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government, in addition to a political initiative calling for a democratic opening within which the Kurdish demands could be met, also started a round of talks with Öcalan.

Yet, the Kurdish political movement regarded these initiatives as serious challenges to its very existence. While the “democratic opening” was viewed as an attempt of the ruling party to be more advantageous vis-à-vis the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) in the competitive political arena, “talks” with Öcalan were seen as a process of dissolving the PKK and selling out its members.

In short, the government's efforts were taken as threats, not as steps to ease the problems of Turkey's Kurdish populace. What naturally followed was not cooperation but obstruction on the part of the Kurdish political movement.

All these could have been tolerable if there had been no such acts of violence committed by the PKK. Within the last month, over 40 members of the Turkish security forces were killed by the PKK. The attacks in Silvan and Hakkari, in particular, sparked a public outcry calling for a response from the government, resulting in a cross-border airstrike by the Turkish military.

In today's political and psychological environment the best the government is expected to do is to carry on with the “democratic opening” while trying to “punish” the PKK with operations on the ground and stop talks with its imprisoned leader.

This means that at the end of this process, even if the “democratic opening” survives, “talks at Imrali [the prison where Öcalan is being held]” will not. That is to say, the PKK and Öcalan are out of the picture in the search for a settlement. This is not only due to the anger accumulated against the PKK following the recent attacks but also due to the emerging picture that there is no single PKK to talk to and that its leader Öcalan is not in control of his organization.

To me, it is clear that the PKK is no longer an organization controlled by a central and hierarchical leadership. The long imprisonment of its leader, Öcalan, has resulted in the emergence of new centers of power within the movement. The PKK is now a network of warlords without a central leadership.

There would be significant implications for such a structure. First, we will have difficulties in defining what the PKK is and who runs it. The PKK seems to have been divided up in various groups and their own perspectives. The recent acts of violence by the PKK in Silvan and Hakkari may be the acts of this or that group within the movement. It will be impossible to claim responsibility on the part of the organization and it has become obvious that we can no longer talk of a singular PKK.

If the organization is not clearly defined and if its leadership is not properly named then it is impossible to “talk” to the PKK. That is to say, even if the Turkish government is engaged in a “negotiation” with the PKK it cannot be certain whether the terms of a possible agreement would be accepted by the whole PKK structure.

I think the recent attacks of the PKK aimed to convey such a message to the Turkish state, implying that the state is talking to the “wrong” person, namely Öcalan.

If it is not to Öcalan himself then whom to talk to in the PKK in order to reach a settlement? This is the puzzle. I think the intended objective is to raise exactly such a question. The logical conclusion of this is to stop talking to Öcalan, who is not in a position to deliver on his promises.

Let's say the state has understood this message. What would be its response? Would it instead talk to several warlords within the PKK? I think no one would take a fragmented leadership seriously. Therefore all these would mean abandoning the talks with anyone associated with the PKK.

As a result, the PKK will be increasingly isolated in the region, in the international community and also among the Kurdish people. It will remain a terrorist organization but will lose its social base and support among the Kurds, which in the long run will result in the dismemberment of the PKK.

There is no need for the PKK that does not contribute to the solution of the Kurdish question.

The AK Party, 10 years later

There is no doubt that the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) is a success story. It is now celebrating its 10th anniversary and the party has been ruling the country for nine out of those 10 years.

This has been achieved despite the party leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan having been sentenced to a prison term when he was removed from his position as mayor of İstanbul and sent to prison just before founding the AK Party. So this party did not emerge from a position of strength but rather from disadvantage, to become the central actor in Turkish politics over the last 10 years.

The AK Party's success lies in the ability of its founding leaders to transform an Islamist movement, Necmettin Erbakan's Milli Görüş (National View), into a center-right mass political party. This took place at a time when conventional center-right parties and leaders like Süleyman Demirel had aligned themselves with the military and secularist forces, which alienated their conservative and anti-militarist social sectors, who were attracted by the AK Party's conservative and anti-militarist discourse.

In this context, the way in which Islamic social, political and economic actors were treated by the secularist establishment, led by the military and the judiciary, played a crucial and educating role for Islamic circles. During the Feb. 28 process, the so-called postmodern coup era, from 1997 to 1999 their political parties were banned, their NGOs were intimidated and closed down, and their businesses were boycotted.

The suppression of Islamic groups by the secularist establishment certainly played a role in speeding up and even facilitating a process of transformation. But there was more of an internal debate on how to survive politically, economically and socially in a strictly secularist and authoritarian environment. It seemed that the old way of confronting secularist opponents directly and on their own was bound to fail. They needed a new strategy, if not to come to power, certainly to secure protection vis-à-vis undemocratic and unlawful pressure by the secularist establishment.

The AK Party is the result of this search for security. But the new political strategy, the language developed and the circumstances in which all these took place were so positive that they came to power in the first general elections.

It would, however, be a mistake to explain the rise of the AK Party by merely looking at the political landscape. The leadership, identity, and policies of the party were also shaped by the emerging conservative middle class and business elites who had started to flourish in the mid-1980s under the liberalizing and export-oriented policies of Turgut Özal. Their expansion had been blocked in the late 1990s by an alliance of the secularist İstanbul based business elites and the military during the so-called Feb. 28 process, in which pro-Islamic Erbakan was forced to resign as prime minister in the summer of 1997. Their companies were blacklisted as “Islamist capital,” their associations were intimidated and some were even tried.

The new conservative business elite came to realize that the rise of Islamism under the banner of the Welfare Party (RP) was detrimental to their business interests and social existence.

Islamist intellectuals, NGO activists, journalists, etc., all experienced similar pressures. To get out of secularist pressures they needed to build alliances with non-religious, secular but democratic social and intellectual circles.

In order to do this first, they had to reform their political language, adopting democracy, human rights, liberties, pluralism and the rule of law as central values of the party. This was certainly a significant departure from a self-referential ambiguous Islamist terminology. This way, former Islamists were able to reach out to new social and political groups beyond religious people. In fact, the AK Party managed to develop a “shared agenda” with non-religious segments of society. Democratization, liberalization, EU membership and economic development were the key factors in these shared objectives. Thus the party assumed the role of an agency bestowed with transforming the authoritarian politics of Turkey and opening it up to the world.

Over the years it has been hard to deny that the AK Party has done pretty well. Winning a third consecutive term is proof that it has satisfied people's needs and demands. It has emerged as the most reformist party in Turkey in terms of democratization, the Kurdish question and civil-military relations.

The question now is whether the AK Party will remain this way, given resisting bureaucratic and judicial forces have been significantly weakened. In other words, will the AK Party be a reformist party on its own when it no longer feels insecure in a new constitutional and institutional environment?

What's next for Kurdish politics?

Can we still remain optimistic about the possibility of a final political settlement of the Kurdish question? Recent developments raise serious doubts about that.

Tension had risen even before the June elections, but many attributed this to the politicking of parties competing for an ever greater number of votes. Unfortunately, tension continued to rise after the elections. First, the decision of the Higher Election Board (YSK) to nullify the election of Hatip Dicle as a member of Parliament from Diyarbakir province, and later the verdict of the court not to free six other elected deputies currently in detention played a part in that. The result was the Peace and Democracy Party's (BDP) boycott of Parliament by not taking the oath and holding its weekly group meetings in Diyarbakir instead.

Meanwhile, increased activity by the Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK) in Diyarbakir signaled something was brewing in the region. The killing of two soldiers right in the very center of Yüksekova and the abduction of soldiers and civilians were testimony to that. Despite this upheaval, there were positive indicators as well. The BDP was engaged in a dialogue with the speaker of parliament and the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) to return to Parliament after receiving the go-ahead from Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK. Öcalan had been talking about the progress made in his talks with state authorities. He even disclosed that an agreement had been reached on the formation of a Peace Council and came as close as suggesting a permanent cease-fire.

Then, however, we got word of the killing of 13 soldiers in Silvan last Thursday, sending shockwaves through all parts of Turkey.

Given the recent developments, I summarized in the text above, my first reaction when I heard the news was that this act of violence was not only directed against Turkish soldiers but also against Öcalan. By conducting such an attack, some within the ranks of the PKK sent a message out to Öcalan, saying that he cannot negotiate a peace settlement on his own. The same message was also sent to the state, conveying that Öcalan is not in control of the organization and that the state is talking to the “wrong person.”

Some groups within an organization such as the PKK who think that their sacrifices have been in vain tend to resort to violence or the escalation thereof. This has happened with the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), too, so why not with the PKK?

The PKK has taken responsibility for the attack in Silvan and I guess Öcalan himself will not directly denounce the act because doing so would mean admitting he is not in control. This is the last thing Öcalan would do as the state has engaged in talks with him, assuming that he is still in charge of the PKK. So for him to appear not to be running things will significantly weaken his bargaining position with the state and diminish his hope of somehow getting out of prison one day. So he will swallow this. But the question remains: Who is in control of the PKK if not Öcalan?

This question is important if the government is still interested in talking to anyone associated with the PKK. At the moment I have serious doubts about this. With the latest attack, I think the PKK has risked becoming an irrelevant party in finding a solution for the Kurdish question. The organization and its associates, including the BDP, may never be taken seriously again as partners in political dialogue, leaving the PKK isolated and marginalized due to its continued use and support of violence. And no one in the world will question the decision to cut off all communication with an organization using violence for political purposes, would it come to that.

The signs, for now, are that the government -- while ending political dialogue with the BDP -- may go back to employing the old method of taking security measures and precautions against all kinds of violent acts and their political supporters. In doing so, the government is also in a position to mobilize regional and international pressure on the PKK given the turmoil in the Middle East.

Thus, while targeting the PKK and the BDP, the AK Party government can continue to increase investments in the Kurdish region, making social services available in order to underline its indispensable role in assuring the welfare of Kurds. These social policies may be accompanied with veiled identity policies with some Islamic overtones, but can just as well result in gaining a strong foothold for the AK Party among the Kurds. It is a fact that the support among Kurds for political parties tending to the BDP line is stuck at 5 to 6 percent of the vote in Turkey. This has not changed since 1995. With policies such as those of the AK Party, relying on providing social services and recognition of the Kurdish identity, coupled with Islamic overtones, may well halt the spread of the PKK and BDP's political influence in the region.

This is a strategy. The AK Party government may decide that Turkey is used to living with the threat of PKK terrorism anyway, so why should it take the risk of negotiating with Öcalan or advancing the “democratic opening” while at the same time it enjoys the support of a considerable section of the Kurdish people?

Well, the final analysis will take us back to where we started. The PKK, the BDP, and Öcalan should not take the risk of going back to square one. We have never been this close to resolving the Kurdish question and it should not be sabotaged by the PKK.

Judicial sabotage

Is the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) aware that it is being lured into a trap by the decisions of the judiciary? If it has not yet woken up, let me tell it what the trap is.

It is one that will prevent the party from making a constitution and resolving the Kurdish question, the two actions most needed for ultimate reform. It is really odd. Before the new Parliament has even commenced Turkish politics seems to have gotten out of hand. Once more Turkey’s judiciary has played a central role in driving politics into chaos. Political actors and democrats cannot allow the judiciary to hijack politics.

What I am referring to is two decisions taken by branches of the judiciary. One is the decision of the Supreme Election Board (YSK) to nullify the election of Hatip Dicle as a member of Parliament from Diyarbakır -- the same YSK that decided Dicle was eligible to be elected as a deputy. Now the same institution and the same judges have ruled Dicle is not eligible to be elected. Such a scandalous case cannot occur in any civilized country. Are they joking or committing institutional suicide?

There can be no defense against the argument that the law is clear on this matter and that anyone sentenced for “crimes against the state” would lose the right to be elected. First, if there is such a law, it is shameful. An ordinary criminal, say a rapist or a murderer, may be able to stand as a candidate and win a parliamentary seat, but anyone who is convicted of “thought crimes” cannot. How can we defend such a “law”?

Second, the YSK cannot hide behind even this shameful “law” simply because it does not have any authority written in any law to nullify the election of a deputy. Dicle, under the authorization of the YSK, entered the elections and the people of Diyarbakır elected him as their representative, period. From this moment onwards, the YSK is out of the picture and has no authority whatsoever over an elected member of Parliament. It is a shame on the part of the rest of Parliament and political parties that they do not defend “their space” against the unwarranted intervention of the YSK. I would have expected the AK Party, the majority party in Parliament, to act in a way to defend the will of the people who elected Dicle just two weeks ago. But, on the contrary, it remained silent and even rushed to take the offer made by the YSK in Diyarbakır, granting Dicle’s spot to another deputy from the list of the AK Party. It should have at least restrained itself from accepting the undeserved seat unjustly taken away from the BDP. I think this is not being faithful to the will of the people who elected Dicle as their representative.

The AK Party has nothing to win out of this one seat but a lot to lose: its commitment to the supremacy of the will of the people. Anyone who is elected as a deputy should be treated like a precious jewel of democracy for his/her representative capacity. Whoever he or she is -- whether an Ergenekon suspect or an ordinary person -- it does not matter. For the court not to decide to free the detained suspects in the Ergenekon case who have been elected as deputies is another blow to the will of the people and the belief in the supremacy of Parliament. I cannot accept that representatives of the people are kept in prison. The belief in the supremacy of Parliament and the people’s choice requires respect for anyone elected as a deputy. Apart from a moral high ground, there is also a practical reason why we should resolve these crises immediately. It is that we need this Parliament and we cannot afford damaging its public standing.

I am deeply upset about these two decisions of the judiciary because they damage the legitimacy of Parliament, the most important matter above all other concerns and gains. Once the legitimacy of the current Parliament is in question, it will become impossible for it to carry on with the most challenging task ahead: making a new constitution. For this, I am shocked and upset not only about the YSK decision but also the attitude of the ruling AK Party. I think it has been lured into a trap.

The trap is to render the AK Party unable to make a new constitution and resolve the Kurdish question. The decisions of the judiciary about Dicle, Mustafa Balbay, Mehmet Haberal, and Engin Alan are attempts at sabotaging Turkey’s normalization and democratization by hindering the making of a new constitution and the resolution of the Kurdish question.

Turkey the day after elections

It appears the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) has won another term in office. It is the first party in the last 50 years to have won three consecutive elections. This is a phenomenal success that has to be studied by political scientists.

However, Turkey post-elections will be a better country. The ballot box is the best cure for any kind of political or social disease, provided that all parties accept the rules of the game. For any reasonable community, there is no better alternative than upholding the will of the people. Let’s hope this election will be a turning point in coming to terms with the rules of the game. No one can question the mandate given to a political party disregarding its ideology, identity or program.

I think what the people are best aware of in this country is their power to determine who is to govern them. It is important to note that the people of this country have experience in determining who is to rule through the ballot box. This power has been in place since 1950. So it is better not to doubt the wisdom of the electorate.

Political parties have also behaved themselves despite the occasional tension and polemics. Campaigns conducted by all political parties reflected their priorities. Whatever they are, no one can argue that political campaigns are constrained in any way. Election campaigning in languages other than Turkish was possible for the first time. Therefore, Kurdish candidates from all political parties were able to use Kurdish to convey their messages to the people.

Polemics were commonplace among the political leaders, which is almost inevitable in an election campaign. It is hoped that these polemics will remain after the elections and that political parties will settle their differences on important issues.

Anyhow, I think what marked this election is the absence of ideological quarrels. We have not discussed the future of secularism and republican values being threatened by Islamization under the government of the AK Party.

During the second term of AK Party rule, one would have expected that Islamization of the state and society would have gone further, and thus the quest to defend secular values would have intensified. But this has not happened. On the contrary, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) has almost abandoned this issue, never mentioning such things either in its election manifesto or during public meetings.

What has changed since then? The sensitivity of the CHP towards secularism, or the intentions of the AK Party to undo secularism and the republic? What has happened to the “hidden agenda” of the AK Party?

If secularism and the republic are not in danger today, then they were also not in danger four years ago. So, what was the idea behind this? I think in the post-election period this will be discussed.

Nonetheless, it was good to experience an election period in which real issues were raised and discussed, and pledges were made concerning these real issues. This is certainly an indication of Turkey’s normalization.

Yet, the thing that will institutionalize Turkey’s normalization is to resolve the Kurdish question and to make a new, liberal, democratic and pluralistic constitution. And this is under the responsibility of the AK Party once more.

Politics of elections, politics of change

When compared to the last general elections, which took place in 2007, the June elections appear calm and normal. There is no controversy surrounding the future of the regime, secularism and the secular lifestyle being threatened by the ruling party or over Turkey becoming Islamized. Now the debates evolve around personal matters and the promises of political parties.

If politics is persuading people on how to meet their needs and fulfill their demands, the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) has an advantage since it has been in power for the last nine years and has done a great deal with respect to this. Thus, in its election campaign, the AK Party underlines its “successes” the management of the economy and foreign policy. Under the AK Party government advancements have also taken place in the fields of health care, education, and transportation as well as social security and solidarity.

Moreover, Primer Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan appeals to the public and manages political debate through mega projects like the ones in İstanbul. He also refers to the new constitution as the “greatest project of the AK Party.” This, however, does not stop some criticism that the AK Party has abandoned its efforts to reform the political realm, concentrating only on self- developmental efforts. An understanding of politics without a democratic perspective has been the weakness of central-right politics since the 1950s. Whether or not the AK Party falls into this trap will be clear after the elections.

The novelty of this election is the position of the Republican People’s Party (CHP). It is good for the country that the CHP has stopped basing its politics against the ruling AK Party on the grounds of “regime security” and “secularism.” These themes have not only proved “ineffective” to stop the rise of the AK Party but also poisoned the will of people with different lifestyles to live together.

Now the new leadership of the CHP has devised a new language of opposition. It accuses the AK Party of being a pro-status quo party and presents itself as the party of change. It constantly tries to distance itself from the state and claims to represent “people power.” In its election manifesto, there is no reference to Kemalism and its six principles. Where it mentions the “six arrows” of the CHP it refers to secularism, republicanism and for a surprise, democracy. The party defines itself as advocates of freedoms, solidarity, equality, and pluralism.

All these indicate a change of mind, or at least strategy, on the party of the CHP. Whether this is sustainable or not depends, I think, on the election results. If the party manages to get a vote of around 30 percent, the new leadership may be able to hold on to its position and continue with its ideological transformation of the CHP, which is the sine qua non for the normalization of Turkish politics.

The way in which the AK Party responds to the “new CHP” shows that it is not really prepared to deal with such new political language. Thus, it resorts to highlight the policies of the old CHP, like the one that banned the publication of a Kurdish literary classic, “Men u Zin.” Erdoğan also rightly capitalizes on the exaggerated promises of CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, which damages the credibility of the latter.

The Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) is expected to increase its seats in Parliament. With “civil disobedience” in the region it is mobilizing Kurds to back the independent candidates it supports. The central strategy of the BDP is to stop, and if possible, rollback, the success of the AK Party in the Kurdish populated cities. This was done to some extent in the 2009 local elections. Now, by pushing the AK Party out of the region, the BDP tries to live up to its claim that it is the sole representative of the Kurdish people. Even if the AK Party continues to lose some votes in the region this does not mean that all Kurds will abandon the AK Party. I think Kurds will continue to be represented by both the AK Party and the BDP, which is, in fact, a good thing to address the Kurdish question.

And the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP)… I think the fate of the elections will be determined by this party. If it falls short of the national threshold of 10 percent the parliamentary composition will be advantageous for the AK Party. Yes, in such a case the representative character of Parliament will be questioned. But my main concern is that if the MHP is left in the street unable to be represented in Parliament we may not be able to address two fundamental questions that will come up after the elections: the new constitution and the Kurdish issue. Radical nationalism of the MHP under new leadership that is more inclined to put pressure through the streets may block “great solutions” and threaten the stability of Turkey.

A constitution without an official ideology

The June elections seem predictable. The ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) is expected to win another term. What is not predictable is the process of drafting a new constitution or its contents.

In the aftermath of the elections, a new constitution will be high on the national agenda. Political parties, as well as the public, have already been mobilized on this. According to a survey conducted by MetroPOLL in April, 69 percent of people want a new constitution.

It is not only people at large but civil society that seems enthusiastic about a new constitution. Almost all civil society organizations have been engaged in background preparations to start the process after the elections. They have been organizing conferences and workshops, establishing principles and writing their own preliminary drafts.

All these activities indicate the presence of a high level of sensitivity among people who are unlikely to leave the making and content of the new constitution to the politicians. As political parties continue to talk of “participation” as being key to the drafting of the new constitution it seems that civil society is already gearing up to participate qualitatively in the process. All this is good news and it does not really leave any choice for political parties but to engage with civil society. This also means that the drafting of the new constitution is not solely dependent on the goodwill of the AK Party; there is a genuine popular demand and preparations by civil society. Certainly, it will not be easy, since a new constitution means a redistribution of all state power within the system. There may be resistance and unreasonable demands that cannot be met, but there is still a basic principle on which a consensus can easily be built. That is, in fact, the very logic of a constitution, which is to guarantee the rights and freedoms of citizens vis-à-vis the state authority.

I guess we may not be far off from agreeing on the principle that, irrespective of who is in government or who has the majority in Parliament, people should be safe from the assaults of state authorities. The citizens of Turkey should see that it is not “their” political parties but “their” constitution that guarantees their rights and freedoms.

I believe a set of principles outlined last week by the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) is worth examining closely. Prepared by notable academics and opinion leaders and written by professors of constitutional law Mustafa Erdoğan and Serap Yazıcı, the TESEV report has created high expectations. Any step back would be regarded as a serious deviation from a democratic constitution. As stated in the TESEV report, we should first agree on a very fundamental principle that a democratic state does not own an “official ideology.” Because an ideologically neutral state will enable us to view the state and society in the right order; that is, it is a society that builds the state, not vice versa. Thus it will prevent us from constructing a system in which the state, its ideology, and its elite dominate society. If we mean to achieve an emancipated society, the first place to start is by getting rid of an ideology of state built into the constitution.

Who will oppose this and on what grounds? If an ideology is turned into a state ideology protected by the constitution then there could be no competition among various ideologies. It would mean that one is superior to the rest.

There can be no ideology of the state, and people may have more than one. There is more than one ideology competing in the free market of ideas. Therefore, a democratic constitution guarantees the free competition of ideas, ideologies, lifestyles and belief systems. There should be no single superior one that has privileges over the others.

On this and other issues, we do not really know much about what the political parties are thinking and planning. In their election manifestos, all are calling for a new constitution but without going into detail about the content and basic principles of their vision for this new constitution.

If the new Parliament is to draft a new constitution after the elections, political parties should be disclosing more of their opinions on this issue. Some time ago Ergun Özbudun, a professor of constitutional law, called on political parties to prepare and share their drafts for a constitution in advance of the elections, thus enabling people to cast their votes accordingly. But none have done so. It has turned out now that this is also the expectation of the people. MetroPOLL’s recent public opinion survey shows that 75 percent of people want to see drafts from political parties before the elections.

What this means is very simple: People want some sort of guarantee, not only for the drafting of a new constitution but also for the content. While the outcome of the upcoming elections seems pretty predictable, I guess debate about the new constitution after the elections will be more heated and unpredictable.

Towards normalization of Turkish politics?

The election campaigns have started. Political parties have nominated their candidates for Parliament and announced their election manifestos.

But just when things seemed pretty normal, the Supreme Election Board (YSK) vetoed the nominations of some independent candidates supported by the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), creating a wave of political and social reaction. But it quickly took a step back and rectified the situation. However, what has remained are agitated supporters of the BDP and the increasing sensitivity of Turkish nationalists. The short-lived crisis benefited both.

Despite this short-lived crisis, so far Turkish politics certainly appears more stable and predictable when compared to the circumstances prior to the elections of 2007. Then the military was in the game of politics, determined to block the election of a president by the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) majority in Parliament. Moreover, the opposition to the ruling party was based on an Islamist-secularist divide without putting forward any policy alternative. It was a time described by opponents of the AK Party as when the republic was in “danger.”

Four years later this nonsense has been stopped. The military seems to have understood that its attempts to influence the election process often backfire. People tend to react democratically and side with those victimized by the military. So, I expect that the military will remain silent during this election process.

In addition, the main opposition party seems more sensible in its approach to political competition. With the resignation of the old leader of the party, Deniz Baykal, also went the old form of politics based on defending the state and the regime against the people. This old perspective utterly failed in creating an alternative to the AK Party. It is no surprise to me that the June elections will take place without Baykal’s leadership. The day after the 2007 general elections I wrote in this column that “Baykal has led his last election campaign as leader of the CHP.”

Since then, the CHP has changed not only its leader but also its political discourse. The 2011 election manifesto of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) presents a break from the CHP of 2007. It no longer calls on the people to defend the regime, secularism, and Kemalism but instead outlines how the CHP will protect and empower the people. In many ways, the election promises of the CHP are crude populism, but nevertheless, they indicate that the CHP is now much more interested in addressing the needs and demands of the people. This is good for both the CHP and Turkey as the party becomes less ideological and more policy-oriented.

So this election will be an election in which “visions” of political parties will compete with each other, signifying the normalization of Turkish politics.

This might be advantageous for the ruling AK Party as it has mastered developing projects and delivering services during its years in power. No doubt its strength lies in its performance over the last nine years. Management of the economy, which has generated remarkable economic growth under low inflation, is one of its greatest assets. With projects that improved services in health care, transportation, education, and social security, as well as conditions in villages and small towns, the AK Party government has managed to satisfy the needs and demands of large segments of society. Steps taken in the direction for democratization that include constitutional changes and the Kurdish initiative are also very positive.

But a problem for the AK Party is that although it has a very strong record to defend in this field of projects and services, it is not used to this kind of opposition. Because it was futile for opposition parties to organize their resistance against the AK Party on secularism and the lifestyle issues, the AK Party felt most comfortable countering this form of opposition. The CHP with a new policy style is a challenge for the AK Party. It may push the AK Party to be defensive, as turned out to be the case with the issue about the duration of compulsory military service.

Anyhow, Turkey is sailing in the realm of rational politics, not the realm of irrational fears about the future of the regime, as we witnessed four years ago.

Central bank governor and the poverty of White Turks

I keep writing that the old business elite and the White Turks are incapable of understanding the new Turkey. They are blinded by their Kemalist and secularist prejudice, coupled with their thirst for privileges.

Their opposition to the appointment of Erdem Başçı as governor of the Central Bank of Turkey in 2006 and the later smear campaign against Durmuş Yılmaz, who was eventually appointed governor, clearly illustrate how poorly they see the new dynamics and new actors in Turkey. Today some of the Kemalist White Turks are ashamed of themselves, given the outstanding performance of these two economists leading the central bank.

Başçı is now the governor of the central bank. His appointment is yet another indication of the defeat of the so-called White Turks, who the new Turkey does not need.

Başçı’s appointment was vetoed in 2006 by the then Kemalist President Ahmet Necdet Sezer. The reason for this veto was that Başçı’s wife wore a headscarf. This “simple-minded” attitude back in 2006 tells us a lot about the poverty of the myopic White Turks. They were not looking for merit but checked whether he was religious or not, and for that looked at his wife’s choice of clothing.

It is not really difficult to understand why the Kemalist White Turks have lost. For them what matters is not merit and qualification but loyalty to the Kemalist ideology and the continuation of their privileges. They are educated but ignorant, and rich but poorly connected to society and the world around them.

The fact that the international financial sector increased Turkey’s credit rating on Başçı’s appointment is, I think, a slap in the face of the arrogant but incompetent White Turks, who had blocked his appointment as governor five years ago.

This is only one side of the situation. On the other side is a shameful episode brought on by the White Turks. Back in 2006, when Başçı was vetoed, the Kemalist president had no choice but to appoint another person, Yılmaz, as governor, but the appointment was accompanied by an immediate smear campaign. Journalists poked into his private life, revealing his house and his wife, publishing big pictures of shoes left outside the door. The self-proclaimed ideologue of the White Turks, Ertuğrul Özkök, then wrote in his column in the Hürriyet daily commentary on Yılmaz, his lifestyle, his wife and his house. It was disgusting. Even as I write these sentences I find myself scowling as if I were looking at those dirty, revolting campaigns conducted by Özkök’s Hürriyet.

The campaign against Yılmaz was a reflection of hatred and jealousy, implying that while there are “presentable” White Turks ripe for this prestigious job, the government nominates those “ordinary” Turks with Islamic lifestyles. Then and now I only feel pity for them. Pity on them who have lost their privileges, turning them into “ordinary” Turks like the ones they look down on. But these “ordinary” Turks who lost their privileges are not able to compete in the free market of ideas and skills with real “ordinary Turks.”

On succession in the Turkish Central Bank, the Wall Street Journal writes: “The new governor will take over an institution whose credibility with markets has improved dramatically over the past decade. Mr. Yılmaz’s five-year tenure saw Turkey’s inflation rate fall to record lows, while the economy rebounded strongly from the impact of a global recession.”

Poor White Turks, the person they tried to belittle has succeeded in running the central bank with first-rate performance. In doing so, Yılmaz’s main aide was Başçı, whose appointment was vetoed by the Kemalist president in 2006. No doubt Yılmaz was one of the best governors in the world and, as a result, was recognized as the best central bank governor by Euromoney in 2009.

The right to stop dictators like Gaddafi

There are limits not to cross even for dictators. They think they have the right to do whatever they wish to their people. But the conscience of people and the dynamics of global politics do not allow them.

Likewise, the international community stood up and told Libya’s Gaddafi that he has no right to massacre his own people. This is a late but welcome move. Its importance goes beyond the Libyan case as it sends a clear message to all dictators of the world that they are not free to kill.

Once more we understand the moral limits to territorial sovereignty and the old principle of non-intervention. No one can hide behind these outdated terms from the 19th century to go ahead with massacres under the protective shield of sovereignty and non-intervention. No concept can serve to protect a state that engages in massive, widespread and systematic killings of its own citizens.

The borders of a state are not the walls of a prison in which the lives of its “inmates” are left to the mercy of the “guards,” that is, the dictators. The conscience of the people, as well as international humanitarian law, does not accept turning a country into a prison camp. People interfere, international organizations get involved, democratic governments take part to stop the dictators who cross moral limits. However late, limited, calculated and in some cases ineffective these may be, the dictators would know that one day they will be held accountable by their own people and the international community.

In this context humanitarian intervention is a means to force dictators to comply with international human rights laws. I know some who, based on the idea of sovereignty and order, would oppose humanitarian intervention. To them, we should issue the reminder that the “rights of states” come from the rights of individuals/citizens and therefore do not have any autonomous moral standing. The right of autonomy and thus sovereignty for states is derived from the respect on the part of the state for the right of the individual’s autonomy. If the ultimate justification for the existence of states is the protection of the natural/basic rights of citizens, then, as Fernando Teson argues in his book “Humanitarian intervention,” “a government that engages in substantial violation of human rights betrays the very purpose for which it exists.” As a result, the government loses not only domestic but also international legitimacy. Therefore, in such a case even foreign armies are morally entitled to help victims of oppression in overthrowing dictators.

The subject of international direct action should not be confined to genocide, enslavement and mass murder; serious, disrespectful, yet not genocidal oppression also justifies international military action.

Moreover, international order and peace are sustained better in an international system that consists of countries respectful to the basic rights of its citizens. This is repeatedly acknowledged by the UN Security Council (UNSC) in the post-Cold War era. Starting with Resolution 688 on Northern Iraq, the UNSC considered humanitarian crises emanating from massive human rights violations as “threats to international peace and security,” authorizing the use of force under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. Today it is crystal clear that there is a linkage between international peace and security and humanitarian crisis.

Furthermore from an international law perspective, it can be argued that the non-intervention principle is not an absolute norm in the contemporary international normative system. The UN Charter 2(7) forbids intervention in matters that are within the domestic jurisdiction of another state. But what are the “matters that are within the domestic jurisdiction”? International lawyers argue that to the extent a matter has been internationalized, the traditional prohibition against “intervention in the domestic jurisdiction of a state” is inapplicable. International undertakings have transformed the human rights violations that constitute a humanitarian crisis from domestic jurisdiction to international jurisdiction.

When and if, as Michael Walzer writes in his book “Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad,” the violation of human rights is on a scale which “shocks the moral conscience of mankind,” direct military action authorized by the UN is morally and legally justified to stop the continuation of gross violations of human dignity and rights. This applies to the Libyan case as well.

My only concern is that this humanitarian cause should not be sacrificed to the eccentricities of French President Nicolas Sarkozy and his tendencies to show off in order to secure re-election next year. This will be really, really ugly.

Gaddafi’s right to bomb his own people

Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi is exercising his “right” to bomb his own people. This is a “right” enjoyed by dictators. But the implementation of such a “right” threatens not only the nationals of Libya but regional and international security, thus the international community cannot remain indifferent to the massacres of people in Libya by Gaddafi.

The UN Security Council decided to impose sanctions and the International Criminal Court will be investigating the events in Libya to determine whether they constitute a crime against humanity. These are all welcoming measures but they still may prove ineffective to stop the massacres of the people.

Imposing an arms embargo, a travel ban and freezing the assets of Gaddafi, his family and his close associates, will not prevent the regime from committing further crimes. Besides, contrary to the claims by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, they do not harm the Libyan people. The UN Security Council sanctions can only be criticized for not being strong enough. I think more should be done.

The Libyan case forces us to rethink the link between a legitimate regime based on respect for human and citizens’ rights and international security. We should be aware of the fact that there exists a link between respect for human rights and maintaining national and international security. A working human rights regime constitutes one of the prerequisites for providing national security, which is domestic peace based on a wide-ranging social consensus concerning the legitimacy of a political regime.

Those who approach politics from a security-centric point of view should keep in mind that demands for human rights are, in fact, generated from the security concerns of individuals. Thus, human rights in their essence reflect the search for the physical and moral integrity of individuals. The idea of the inviolability of basic rights and freedoms aims at “securing” the individual as a moral agent. Thus one can ground human rights in a search for security at the individual level with undeniable links to security at a national level.

There exists, therefore, a tight link between individual security put forward as demands for human rights, and collective security at the national level. It is rather impossible to reach the objective of national security in countries where systematic and persistent human rights violations take place, let alone the massacres we have been seeing in Libya. Massive human rights violations destroy domestic peace and security by undermining the legitimacy of the political system. What is left then is not a legitimate government but a sheer mechanism of violence.

Furthermore, global peace and security are built through a legitimate government nationally that respects the basic rights of its citizens. Therefore, while the respect for human rights enhances national security, the state that is involved in systematic and massive violations of human rights endangers not only national but also international peace and security.

It is necessary and relevant to investigate the interplay between respect for human rights and international security for at least two reasons. First, the behavior of a state in the international arena cannot be separated from the way in which it treats its own citizens at home. This is to say that the kind of political regime prevalent domestically strongly influences its policy towards the outside world. Second, violations of human rights do not only harm individuals, groups or the people in the country concerned but may well endanger others, particularly in regional countries, as the repercussions of human rights violations cannot be confined within national borders. For instance, the outflow of refugees, which is one of the most tragic outcomes of human rights violations, may reach a massive scale in some cases with grave security implications for both the sending and receiving countries, damaging both regional and international security. This is clearly being seen in the Libyan case as hundreds of thousands of foreign workers are either trapped in Libya and the outpouring into neighboring countries, which is creating a humanitarian crisis.

Hence, the kind of political regime and the form of state-society relationship lay at the heart of the stability-instability problem determining, to some extent, prospects for international peace. This is to say that international security is dependent on domestic peace, which is in turn heavily influenced by the level of respect for human rights and a legitimate national government.

No ruler has the absolute right to treat its people any way he wishes. There are moral and legal limits to a sovereign’s right to kill his own people. And I think Gaddafi has passed that limit and this necessitates measures to stop him.

Why do we need a post-Kemalist republic?

Unless Turkey abandons Kemalism as a constituent element of the state and society, we cannot consolidate democracy and resolve the Kurdish question. The best a Kemalist paradigm can offer is a “tutelage democracy” under the supervision of the military.

Kemalism has left its mark on the state apparatus, the political culture, and the national psyche. In its essence, Kemalism envisages a homogenized nation and a disciplined society. Since the nation was not homogeneous but diverse ethnically and religiously, the state apparatus was used to eliminate sources of difference, or at least silence claims of difference. This resulted in assimilation efforts aimed at Kurds and the expulsion of many non-Muslims during the republican period. This positioned the state elite as a hegemonic authority vis-à-vis society that was subjected to the interferences of the state.

Moreover, the top-down modernization project as reflected in the radical reform movement in the early republican period assumed the possibility of constructing a “new society” in accordance with the ideological proposition of the state elite. Society was supposed to be “modern, secular, Turkish and loyal,” as taught to them by the Kemalist vanguard. Viewing society as subject to the interferences of the state elite to be modernized, secularized and nationalized built a “hierarchical relationship between the state and society.”

All these reflected the belief that a “new society” can be built through state intervention according to the model imagined by the Kemalist elite. It is obvious that democracy which prioritizes society over the state could not be established under such a hierarchical relationship. This Jacobin attitude that still prevails among the secularists and the Kemalists prevents them from embracing democracy and its political outcomes. It is then possible to assert that under a strict Kemalist order, which places the state and its ideological vanguards above society, democracy cannot flourish. To make the democratization process irreversible and consolidate democracy in Turkey then, a post-Kemalist republic is needed.

A related problem is the form of military-civilian relations. Since the 1960 military coup, the military established itself as autonomous from the political sphere. With the 1961 constitution, it created tutelage over politics. While it was autonomous from politics, the latter was subordinated to the priorities and preferences of the military. This was done by claiming that the military was the vanguard of the Kemalist republic. Such a self-appointed role after the 1960 military coup constituted the grounds for the constant interference of the military in political affairs.

Thus Kemalism of the formative years was reinvented in the 1960s to limit democratic politics and justify a role for the military to assert its will over the people’s will. Backing up Kemalism with the armed forces created a fatal power against democratic forces. To get out of this trap what is essential is to reform the military as a “professional” unit and not as an ideological one seeking political power, which requires total control of the military by civilians. This, however, cannot be done in a Kemalist state in which powerful institutions will always try to derive the right to rule from their ideological commitment to Kemalism. Thus, a post-Kemalist state is needed to eliminate the possibility of using ideological justifications over the national will and representative institutions.

Another reason for the need to form a post-Kemalist order concerns the Kurdish question. It is not only the continuation of the question itself but its usage by the state elite that is an obstacle to democratization. The Kurdish question has always been used as a pretext for authoritarian political formations in Turkey. This was first carried out over the Kurdish rebellion in 1925 by Sheikh Said. To suppress the rebellion, the regime in Ankara did not limit its measures to the Kurdish areas and people. But the occasion was used to suppress all opposition in Ankara and İstanbul. The new opposition party, the Progressive Republican Party, was closed down and the dissenting İstanbul press was silenced as part of the crackdown following the Sheikh Said rebellion.

Since then the pattern has not changed: “Kurdish demands” have been used by the authoritarian elements in the state to postpone full democracy, suppress human rights, ignore the rule of law and spread a militarist political culture provoked using the threat the Kurdish demands were supposed to pose to the integrity of Turkey. Therefore, to build and consolidate democracy in this country, the Kurdish question should be resolved. The Kurdish question has to be resolved, first to address the demands of the Kurdish question and second to deprive the state of an excuse to postpone meeting the requirements of full democracy.

And the Kurdish question cannot be resolved within the paradigm of Kemalism that imagines a homogeneous Turkish nation denouncing even the presence of the Kurdish people. In short, we need to have a post-Kemalist republic in order to consolidate democracy, establish civilian control over the military and resolve the long-standing Kurdish question.