Call for the army!

What is the army's mission? Being prepared to defend the country, protecting the country against attacks by enemy armies, possessing the necessary equipment, human resources, preparedness and the power of deterrence to do this.

Our army still delivers the "domestic politics" message. If the country is surrounded by enemies, if there are important developments going on in the Caucasus; if Iraq is still a threat; if there is serious tension between Iran and Syria and the West; if terror is still influential, then what needs to be done is not to criticize "postmodernism." Let the academics and writers do this.

It is our right to expect a speech from Land Forces Commander Gen. Işık Koşaner in the handover ceremony that would reference the country's preparedness, readiness, capacity, ability, and strength vis-à-vis the threats and dangers emerging in Turkey's near surroundings and deter enemies, instead of a speech on postmodernism and globalization. The army needs to go back to its actual mission right away, especially at this time when the security problems surrounding us have become more imminent.

Gen. Koşaner spoke as if he was a political leader -- and not a military commander. Let us review the thesis: "Nation-states are subjected to dissolution in the name of democracy and human rights." He suggests that democracy destroys nation-states while human rights divide them. The reality is just the opposite of this argument. Both democracy and human rights fortify the state. Nation-states that fail to embrace democracy and protect human rights are disappearing because when these noble values are absent, the legitimacy of the state becomes questionable; even the most repressive administrations have to submit to the demands for freedoms and rights.

Another argument is that the EU harmonization laws made the security forces' job in their combat against terrorism harder. Let us ask this question: When were the EU laws adopted at Parliament? In February 2002. If the harmonization laws made the security forces ineffective, why did the army fail to eliminate the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) terror in the absence of these laws before 2002? It is necessary to think about this question and avoid blaming the "liberties" for this failure.

The commander's description of the reforms introduced for EU membership as "impositions" and his attempt to present the EU criteria as "pressure and threat" shows that there are serious problems. Most importantly, this implies that the army is outside the institutional and social consensus on EU membership.

Civil society activities cannot be described as "security issues with destructive impact" by the army in a democratic country. The image of a civil society whose international affiliation is seen as dangerous is the extension of a vision of a Turkey that has closed its doors to the outside world. All individuals and institutions with connections abroad are seen as dangerous. This approach -- held by a commander of a country that has been a NATO member for over five decades -- to globalization and "the outside world" should be considered a reflection of the army's nationalist reflex since the end of the Cold War. We have frequently heard the statement, "The army is the pioneer of modernization in Turkey." But the army as described by the mentality in that speech seems to have embraced an anti-modernist stance.

Gen. Koşaner holds that the media, academics, capital circles, and civil society organizations, as "a postmodern layer" that has been "designed by the global forces," work tirelessly to "undermine and dissolve national unity, national value and security parameters" relying on their "web of propaganda and influence." What would those who hold such grave misunderstandings do? They would keep records on media, academia, capital holders and civil society actors and stage a psychological war against them.

The speech by Gen. Koşaner is a political manifesto that opposes the EU, democracy, human rights, market economy, and globalization, and it has nothing to do with the army. Those who are eager to be involved in politics should take the uniform off, take part in political activities or grab a pen to participate in the discussions. Nobody should ever promote their political agenda on behalf of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK).
31.08.2008

Foreign policy challenges

After months of uncertainty about the future of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and its leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkish politics seem pretty calm now.

The picture is as follows: The ruling party continues to enjoy substantial popular support, while the opposition parties are still unable to present a viable alternative, and the military and the judiciary are adopting a relatively low-profile opposition to the government. Despite this "stable" domestic political scene, Turkey's foreign affairs are going through challenging times.

The war in the Caucasus is the number-one challenge. The conflict involves two indispensable partners for Turkey. Georgia is the only land corridor linking Turkey with the Caspian region and Central Asia, the center of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline. Maintaining cooperation with Georgia is therefore crucial for Turkey's strategic width, reaching out the Caspian and Central Asia. Russia, in recent years, has become an important economic partner for Turkey. The early political tension in the aftermath of the cold war was overcome with a strategy of cooperation in the economic and political arenas. But this was based on a non-assertive policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia on the part of both Turkey and Russia. With the invasion of Georgia, it seems that Russia has now moved to an assertive policy in the region, claiming a zone of influence. Instead of confronting Russia bilaterally, the Turkish response has been to propose multilateral diplomacy by suggesting a Caucasia Stability and Cooperation Platform. The idea of the Caucasia Stability and Cooperation Platform sounds timely and functional, but maybe unrealistic given the global and regional dynamics. The key is the attitude of Russia, which seems rather unenthusiastic about the idea. Instead, the Russians prefer to manage the situation within the Commonwealth of Independent States if multilateral diplomacy is needed. Moreover, bringing Armenia and Azerbaijan and, of course, Turkey together within such a platform is not easy. If the Turkish government is really serious about this idea, it should begin developing its relations with Armenia without delay. What about the role of Iran? Such a platform cannot be established by excluding Iran, which has always had a great interest in Caucasian affairs.

Given all these complications and also the reluctance of the West especially the US the initiative may not result in a concrete organization institutionalizing stability and cooperation in the region but lose yet high-level diplomatic contacts. The crisis in the Caucasus has also raised other problems for Turkey in the region and in its relations with the West. It will be difficult for Turkey to engage with both Iran and Syria as these countries move closer to Russia in response to recent developments. If Russia is willing to intensify tensions with the West, Iran and Syria may see this as an opportunity for leverage, putting Turkey in an awkward position. But recent developments in the Caucasus vindicate Turkey's attempts to diversify its energy resources and reduce its dependence on Russian gas. The same is true for Europe, as well. The crisis may, therefore, be an opportunity for Europe to engage with Iran, instead of Russia, as a country linking Caspian and Central Asian energy resources to Europe. The Iraq issue remains a challenge for Turkey, as well. The possible withdrawal of American troops next year may complicate the matter even more if post-occupation Iraq proves incapable of holding itself together. Anyhow, establishing a working relationship with the Kurdish administration in northern Iraq is the key to managing the domestic Kurdish problem and the fight against the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK). Yet a self-sufficient Kurdish administration in northern Iraq may prove to be more difficult to deal with in the absence of American troops in Iraq persuading the Kurds to cooperate with the Turkish government.

Another challenge for Turkish foreign policy is an old one: Cyprus. The upcoming negotiations between presidents Mehmet Ali Talat and Dimitris Christofias have raised hopes about the possibility of a final settlement. Such an outcome will certainly accelerate Turkey's EU integration, an objective recently reasserted by the government as a priority. But it will not be easy to sell any settlement in Cyprus to the Turkish public, which is likely to start a new wave of heated debate provoked by Turkish nationalism. Knowing that foreign policy is never merely a matter of an "externally oriented" set of decisions, but a realm greatly influenced by domestic political developments, we can conclude that the stability of Turkish politics depends on establishing a peaceful regional setting.
25.08.2008

Lessons for government and opposition

The verdict of the court not to close the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) is certainly a relief, not only for the AK Party but for Turkish democracy as well. It may herald the beginning of a new era that rules out closing a political party that does not use or encourage violence. Thus democrats and AK Party supporters may hail the decision of the court as opening the path for democratic competition among political parties alone, no longer inviting the judiciary to meddle in political affairs. It may be inferred from the decision of the court that political quarrels should be settled by political means, not by the interference of the judiciary or the military.

But the court also ruled that the AK Party has become a "focal point of anti-secular activities," a point tacitly criticized by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who in his initial reaction to the court ruling asserted that "the AK Party has never been and will never be a focal point of anti-secular activities."

Thus secularism may remain the central issue of political debate in the future. Constrained by the verdict, the AK Party may speed up its evolution into a center-right political identity by pushing for more democratization and EU accession. In the new period, the AK Party may, therefore, try to expand its democratic credentials by seeking reformist policies reminiscent of its first three years in power. The court verdict would also have some ramifications on opposition politics. In a way, the court provided new ammunition to opponents of the AK Party who base their opposition on secularism. Yet this may not bring about any fresh argument against the AK Party. If the opposition continues to focus on secularism in order to push the AK Party into a corner, this would only serve to reinforce the current political division, a division that favors the AK Party. People who are concerned with secularism being used to limit the power of the people, the national will and democracy will continue to rally behind the AK Party.

Therefore, the decision of the court may also be interpreted as the end of secularism being the focal point of Turkish politics. The opposition block may be satisfied with the fact that the court declared the AK Party as anti-secularist and move on to challenge the ruling party on more concrete social and economic issues. This is the strategy that would normalize Turkish politics. It is also more likely to beat the AK Party in coming elections on such a down-to-earth opposition instead of a single issue of secularism, which has proven ineffective in bringing down the AK Party government in the last election.

In this line of reasoning, there is a possibility that the court verdict may lead to a process of "rethinking" secularism by the radical secularist block that may embrace a "moderate secularism" in an attempt to address the concerns of Turkey's religious people, a kind of rediscovering of the late Bülent Ecevit's notion of "secularism that is respectful of religion."

This may be wishful thinking given the inflexibility of the secularist-Kemalist block, but they have to try something new. Why not attempt to understand sensitivities and concerns of religious/conservative social segments? It is now a common saying that the ruling AK Party should address the concerns of secularists and win over their trust. Why do we not expect the same prudence and wisdom from the secularist/Kemalist bloc? If there is to be a reconciliation in Turkey, the secularist/Kemalist block has responsibilities as well. To start with, they should understand the need to lift the headscarf ban at universities and take the initiative to overcome this problem. Remember, around 70 percent of people want this ban lifted. If we are to seek compromise, reconciliation, and consensus, let us start removing the headscarf ban, a very effective way to win the sympathy of conservative/religious people.
04.08.2008