US and Turkey: cooperating or not?

The way in which the land operation in northern Iraq was terminated and the debate that ensued are perfect examples of mismanagement of an otherwise successful political and military endeavor.
The emerging picture of misunderstandings between American and Turkish statesmen goes against the cooperation between the two countries seen post-Nov. 5, which was expected to repair the damage in the strategic alliance over the Iraq war. A new era of understanding had developed after the November meeting in which President Bush declared the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) as the enemy of the US. Built on this understanding the US apparently shared intelligence with the Turkish authorities on the PKK and cleared airspace in northern Iraq to enable Turkish jets to conduct an air operation in the region. Even further the Turks and Americans continued to cooperate during the land operation of Turkish troops in northern Iraq between Feb. 21 and Feb. 29 against the PKK through intelligence sharing and the opening of airspace.

As everyone spoke of a return to a strategic partnership between the two countries, something happened toward the end of the Turkish land operation. Understandably the US side, acknowledging Turkey's right to fight against terrorism and endorsing the Turkish incursion into northern Iraq, asked Turkish troops to leave northern Iraq soon, as Secretary of Defense Robert Gates put it, "within weeks." On Feb. 28 President Bush wanted the withdrawal to take place "as soon as possible." The Turkish side responded by insisting that the troops will stay as long as it takes to eliminate the PKK's presence in the region. Chief of General Staff Gen. Yaşar Büyükanıt said "one day or one year." Anyhow, the "quick withdrawal" demanded by the Americans did not mean within hours. But within hours after Gates left Ankara Turkish troops were back to their bases in Turkey. The chief of General Staff declared that the decision to withdraw on Feb. 29 had been made even before Gates' arrival in Ankara.

Does this story explain why Turkey appears to have withdrawn its troops from northern Iraq under pressure from the American administration? Or who is responsible for the appearance that Turkey submitted to the demands of the US? Was such a diplomatic and political disaster not avoidable?
I think the day of Gates' visit to Ankara should be explained in detail. On the same day, two top-level warnings were shot from the American side. Why? Did the Americans not get any signal that the Turks were preparing to withdraw? If the two sides were cooperating in the operation, it would not look strange to exchange information on the withdrawal process. Did the Turkish side not hint at a quick withdrawal so that Gates and Bush would not go public in their call for a "quick withdrawal"?
Some in Ankara, including Speaker of Parliament Köksal Toptan, believe that the Americans deliberately announced their demand to make the Turkish appear as having acted under American pressure. This was assumed to serve American strength in the region and de-emphasize Turkish capabilities, military and political, to engage in unilateral action in its region.

In any case, a new element of misunderstanding has emerged between the two sides as many expected a new period of cooperation between Turkey and the US.

The whole affair has been reduced to the question of whether Turkey received an "order" from the US or not. I can understand two allies making decisions together, but to present Turkey as submitting to the will of the US will have serious implications on Turkish politics as well as on Turkey-US relations. It will only contribute to the growth of anti-Americanism in Turkey and be used by radical nationalists to discredit not only the government this time but also the command chain of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK).
10.03.2008

Dialogue with Kurds

Iraqi President Jalal Talabani is currently visiting Ankara. It is an important meeting, though a bit delayed. Establishing a dialogue with Kurdish groups in Iraq just after Turkey's cross-border military operation against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) may usher in new developments. To frequently declare that Iraq's integrity is a major concern for Turkey while avoiding meeting with its head of state has never been a consistent policy.

By the way, some groups and even some institutions in Turkey should quit labeling Iraqi Kurds a community that consists of clans. To prevent the PKK from using northern Iraq as a launchpad for its attacks in Turkey, Iraqi forces must establish their authority in this region. It is obvious that the Kurdish government in the region is the primary candidate to do this. Consequently, it is inevitable that Turkey will establish sound dialogue and cooperation with the regional administration as well as with the central government. And this can only be done by avoiding the disparaging and humiliating language that suggests, "Turkey does not address clan leaders."

No doubt such cooperation will prove beneficial to Iraqi Kurds as well. If the Iraqi Kurds claim to be a legitimate player in the region, they should not allow any "alien" or terrorist groups in their territory. An administration that cannot be dominant over its own territory will have to give consent to external interventions. Thus, the expulsion of the PKK from the region should be considered a step toward the institutionalization of the regional government. Otherwise, the authority of the regional government will be automatically ignored by the PKK and the PKK's existence will legitimately pave the way for Turkish military incursions into the region. In both cases, northern Iraq will not be treated as "sovereign territory." For this reason, the preservation and maintenance of the Iraqi Kurds' gains will be dependent on the dialogue they establish with Turkey both in economic and political terms. To this end, they must cooperate with Turkey in the removal of the PKK from the region. History has examples of such cooperation: Just a decade ago, Massoud Barzani and Talabani sided with Turkey in the fight against the PKK and, in return, Turkey from time to time acted as a mediator in the conflicts between groups led by Barzani and those led by Talabani. This cooperation is easier today than in the past. Furthermore, Iraqi Kurds should remember that they must act responsibly to protect their gains. Internationally, cooperation in counterterrorism is a central theme and those who give support or condone the terrorist organization will have no legitimacy.

The stability and development of northern Iraq are dependent on cooperation against the PKK. Turkey should be a partner to the Iraqi Kurds, not their enemy. One can see that there has been a change of will in this direction in Ankara. Talabani's visit may serve as a turning point for cooperation and stability in the region, which will bring benefits to both parties.

A dialogue with the Iraqi Kurds through President Talabani will arouse feelings of sympathy among Turkish Kurds, who are content with the recent gains of the Iraqi Kurds. We should confess that we have not truly understood the feelings of our Kurds, who were extremely happy when Iraqi Kurds were saved from the persecution and mass executions of Saddam Hussein's regime. We have regarded the developments in northern Iraq as dangerous and, as a reflex of a "traditional" state, tried to block the process. What we have failed to understand was that when our Kurds were watching the developments in northern Iraq with interest and enthusiasm, this did not mean that they wanted to become a part of those developments. Their interest can be seen as a natural result of kinship and solidarity.

In the final analysis, Turkey's dialogue with the government in northern Iraq through Talabani's official visit to Ankara can also be regarded as a new attempt at normalization with Turkish Kurds. Any dialogue with Iraqi Kurds may serve to expand possibilities for dialogue within the country. Having normalized its relations with northern Iraq, Turkey may find more latitude in its economic and political initiatives toward its own Kurds.
08.03.2008