A constitution without Kemalism

It is time to acknowledge the fact that is is impossible to have or maintain a Kemalist regime in an “open society,” with a “market economy” and through the “globalization process.” If we somehow uphold these three attributes of “contemporary civilization,” we need a post-Kemalist constitution.

Imagine a constitution that declares “no activity that contravenes Ataturk nationalism and the Ataturk principles and revolutions shall be protected.” This clearly amounts to an “official ideology” that sets limits to freedom of expression. It is futile to raise questions as to how these principles can be defined as constitutional principles and who are entitled to interpret them since there could be no satisfactory answer. Ideological dispositions, not the rules of interpreting a legal text, will shape the answers.

The fundamental problem is that references to the Ataturk principles and revolutions blur the boundaries between the “ideological” and the “legal,” which makes establishing a rule of law regime extremely difficult.

Many complain that the judiciary in Turkey is conservative and ideologically oriented, as recently displayed with the 367 decision of the Constitutional Court. The conservative ideology of the judiciary is Kemalism, as included in the Constitution. It is time to build the constitutional bases of liberal democracy by drawing a proper line between the legal and ideological and to drop protection of a particular “ideology” (Kemalism) at the expense of the others.

Ideological states, be they socialist, fascist or Kemalist, have failed to meet their promises. They have failed to produce freedom, welfare, and security for their citizens. The collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union heralded not only the end of the Cold War but also the demise of the ideological state.

To build anew or maintain an ideological state is practically impossible in the contemporary complexities of the global economy, social networks, and political interactions. It is a struggle against the current that risks confronting not only global trends but also the demands of the people at home. People want liberty, welfare, and security, which cannot be provided by an ideological state, as proven by the political history of the 20th century.

The modern state cannot impose a particular ideology on its citizens. In our age, it is not the ideological state but the “performative” state that is in use. The power and legitimacy of the state are not derived from its adherence to an ideology but from the services provided to the people.

Democracy requires a functional and performative state. If the founding principles of a state are informed by ideology, neither democracy nor the rule of law can be established, simply because constitutional order and institutions will be geared to protecting this or that ideological premise and not the citizens’ rights.

Such an ideological state provides the grounds for the arbitrariness of state authorities in the name of their raison d’état, which cannot be accepted by democratic measures. But for some in this country, their anachronistic power and privileges within the system are best served by sticking to an ideological Kemalist state.

The time of the ideological state has passed. If Turkey wants to bring itself to the level of contemporary civilization, it should abandon the notion of Kemalism as the basis of the state as outlined in the Constitution.

A constitution without Kemalism will be a prelude to a fully functioning democracy and the rule of law in Turkey.
13.08.2007

Representing the Kurds, presenting the solution

The July election brought the Democratic Society Party (DTP) into Parliament with 22 seats. Yet the DTP’s performance in the election was considerably lower than expected. The results indicate that the DTP is far from representing the Kurdish people on its own. In 12 out of 15 provinces in the East where the DTP ran with independents, the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) came first. While the AK Party doubled and, in some cases, tripled its votes in these cities, the DTP-rooted independents lost votes in all but Hakkari and Şırnak in comparison to the 2002 elections. In the metropolitan city of Diyarbakır -- where the DTP holds municipalities -- the AK Party almost tripled its votes, reaching 41 percent, while the DTP led with 45 percent of the vote, which is 10 percent lower than its 2002 vote count.

For the AK Party, these results are not surprising, since it managed to receive such a high percentage of votes across Turkey. But for the DTP there are lessons to learn from these results, which point to the limits of identity politics based on Kurdish ethnicity. Like the rest of the country, the people in the region want services, development and a decent democracy and a human rights regime. It seems that people not only questioned the DTP’s performance in municipalities but also its competence to resolve the Kurdish question. The self-marginalizing language and policies of the DTP are likely to make it irrelevant for the solution of the problem.

The Kurdish people in the region seemed to be “unionist” not “separatist,” and as such are prepared to look for representation from other political parties. The AK Party, with its reform packages, EU perspective, social services spending record and its display of restraint over the northern Iraq issue coupled with its recognition of Kurdish identity, has emerged as a strong representative of Kurdish discontent. The Kurdish interest in the AK Party also demonstrates the willingness of the Kurdish people to be part of national politics, provided that the national actors do not exclude their needs, demands, and identities. The DTP can no longer pretend to be the sole representative of the Kurdish people. As a matter of fact, the AK Party, given its electoral support in the region, is better positioned to represent the Kurdish people. This is a new phenomenon that suggests the DTP should change its strategy accordingly.

Anyhow, with the ruling AK Party and DTP deputies in Parliament, the Kurdish interest will be highly represented in Turkish national politics. The legitimacy of Kurdish representation in Parliament is beyond doubt. The integration of Kurdish demands into national politics, and their recognition by the “political center,” will reduce the separatist tendencies among the Kurds as well as distrust among the Turks toward Kurdish intentions. This may turn into a golden opportunity for a peaceful resolution of the Kurdish question, as the confidence and trust of the Turks and the Kurds in each other and in themselves grow.

I think the DTP should understand the message; that the Kurdish people see themselves not imprisoned to a politics wholly based on identity. The DTP is expected to read the post-election situation in a constructive manner that will enable it to go beyond identity politics. But it may still choose to carry on with a radical/nationalist course of action alongside the PKK, which will finish it off as an independent political actor. This will be a self-denying strategy for a political party supposedly engaging in peaceful political competition.

The DTP may also choose to be a moderating force in Turkish politics, building bridges between the Kurdish people and others. To start this, they should denounce violence as an instrument for political objectives. This is the universal principle for a party to be recognized as a legitimate counterpart engaging in constructive dialogue. Unless the DTP denounces violence and makes itself independent of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) it will be destined for the political margins, even among the Kurds.

The DTP leaders should appreciate the political choice of the people of this country for an open society, greater democracy, proper civilian-military relations, and European Union membership. Their presence in Parliament should not make the attainment of these objectives more difficult by producing excuses for the nationalist security establishment to make a comeback in this new post-July 22 period. I bet they are looking forward to being provided with some excuses, via DTP policies and statements in the new Parliament, in order to move in and constrain the political space. Will the DTP act responsibly to protect the civilian-political space vis-à-vis the excesses of the nationalists and the militarists?

The CHP and the question of the left after the elections

The loser in this election was not the left but the CHP, which ran its campaign with security-centric and nationalist jargon under the influence of some marginal neo-Kemalists. Instead of proposing a positive program to resolve real problems of the masses, the CHP chose to realign itself with the state elite, from the president to the chief of General Staff, to prompt a nationalist instinct to “save the state.” This was neither the expectation of the masses nor the social democrats. Such a realignment that became all apparent during the presidential elections crisis reinforced the CHP’s image as a party of the state and the state elite, an image doomed to be voted against in a popular democracy.

After decades of defeats at the polls the CHP is still unable to understand the rules of the game in democracy -- a party representing interests, demands and priorities of the state elite will never win in competitive elections. The CHP leaders cannot adapt themselves to the requirements of competitive democracy even years after their domination of Turkish politics under a single-party government ceased.

My advice to the CHP is that if they really want to play this game, the only game in town, they should abandon elements of authoritarianism within the party leadership, ideology and discourse. With a Recep Peker kind of world view, reincarnated in the personality of Onur Oymen, the deputy leader of the party, they will end up siding with bureaucratic despotism, not for pluralistic democracy.

It was such personalities as Oymen who stated his complete agreement with every word of the military memorandum issued on April 27. It was him again after the election last week for whom the election results lacked any logic, which is well illustrative of his and the CHP’s respect for democracy and the will of the people. With this “logic” of theirs they will neither be able to turn the party into a social democrat one nor win a general election for another 50 years.

The historical misfortune of the left in this country is that the CHP happens to represent the leftist political stance. For a party that views itself as the representative of the state interest and state ideology vis-à-vis the masses whose loyalty is constantly suspect, it is impossible to be the carrier of social democracy. The party was designed to protect the state from the people, not vice versa. Furthermore the CHP took up a leftist stance without questioning Kemalism that developed as a state ideology during the single-party years, under the heavy influence of Italian fascism and Soviet Bolshevism in terms of its notions of the state, society and ideology.

Unless the social democrats in Turkey abandon the Kemalist legacy with its authoritarian political tendencies, there is no possibility of having a real social democrat party. Kemalism as a homogenizing authoritarian state ideology is not only compatible with democracy but also with social democracy. I wonder for how long we shall wait for the social democrats to understand this simple truth.

The CHP leadership and the Kemalist elite always talk of a threat to secularism. The official line of the Kemalist elite and the CHP threatens the masses who do not share their view, but in reality the masses regard Kemalist “secular fundamentalism” as threatening pluralistic democracy and the supremacy of the will of the nation. The result is the widening gap between the main blocks of Turkish society and the CHP.

The only option for the CHP is to start anew to build a social democrat party with a real agenda focusing on the problems and demands of the disadvantaged people in society and abandon their notion of an authoritarian radical secularism. Another useful starting point for the party to explain the election defeats is that there is nothing wrong with the people but with the party, its leadership, discourse and program.

This cannot be achieved easily. As everybody knows Baykal has expelled any potential opponent in the party. Thus it is in unlikely that attempts to renew the party and its world view will come from within. Social democrats who have distanced themselves from the CHP should now actively engage in transforming the party into a modern, outward-looking and peace-oriented democrat party. In this the support of the Socialist International will be crucial, too. The external pressure over the CHP as regards the principles of social democracy will be extremely effective in pushing the party to rethink its views and positions.

If this does not come through, it is time for real social democrats in Turkey to throw the CHP into the dust bin of history, get rid of the burden of Kemalism and opt for a new beginning with a brand new social democrat mass party. And let the CHP remain an anachronistic party of the Kemalist nationalists with their secular fundamentalism.

30.07.2007