AK Party’s new mission

Should a state design its institutions and policies to create a “religious generation”? Even if it does this, can it achieve such an objective? On both accounts, I think Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who has described his government’s objective as “bringing up religious generation,” is mistaken.

Pursuing such an objective is obviously an attempt at social engineering. It assumes a hierarchical relationship between the state and society and assigns the state the duty and power to shape the minds, beliefs, and lifestyles of the next generations. This is what the Kemalists tried to do for decades. Their mission was to “enlighten” the people with positivist ideas that were expected to erode the influence of religion over society and thus make it easy to generate loyalty for the new secular regime. They dictated to the people what to think, believe in and how to dress. To do this, the Kemalists designed education, public institutions, and law. And in doing so, the Kemalists destroyed the right to choose, the right to be different, and thus strangled democracy and pluralism.

Does the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) now want to follow the same path as the Kemalists? I hope not. However, as a conservative political party, they may wish to see the spread of a conservative way of life. This is natural. But once they use state authorities and public funds to generate such a society they fall into the trap of authoritarian top-down social engineering. From this moment onwards they will lose the moral ground to criticize all other attempts of social engineering at the hands of the state. No one has the right to interfere in society to create his own “imagined” society. This indicates not only an authoritarian but also a totalitarian mindset.

In the long run, it is futile and also not practical. The Kemalists failed in creating their own “loyal generation.” If they had succeeded we would have all been Kemalists, positivists and non-religious. We are not. Such policies do not create new generations of either Kemalist or religious masses but only destroy pluralism and democracy. At the end of the Kemalist indoctrination that lasted for decades, an ex-Islamist politician is the prime minister today.

So social engineering does not work. The AK Party leadership should know this the best. But the issue is not whether it is possible to generate a “new generation,” the issue is that a government trying to do this will turn into an authoritarian one, dictating its own worldview to the people by using state authority and public funds.

It is more an issue of democracy and pluralism than secularism. Yet it clearly contradicts the notion of secularism defended by the AK Party itself as freedom of religion and conscience and neutrality of the state vis-à-vis all religions. Once the government asserts that “bringing up religious generations” is its governmental objective, this will constitute an intervention in the consciences of people. Here the term “religious generations” obviously refers to Islamic religiosity and a particular Sunni interpretation of it. Thus a state with such a mission violates the neutrality principle of secularism. In a normal secular state, even in the one so far advocated by the AK Party, it is not the duty of the state to bring up religious or non-religious generations.

You may wish to live in a society in which religious values and practices are upheld. This is perfectly fine. Individuals, civil society organizations, NGOs and religious circles should be free to spread their word.

The problem is that once you try to do it by using state authority and public funds, you may end up with a state with a religious mission.

Murder as a collective crime

It was five years ago: three days after the murder of Hrant Dink, I wrote that he was “the victim of the nation-state and nationalism.”

Since then he continues to be victimized by the same mindset that prevails in Turkish security institutions, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in the judiciary.

The Dink case is a reminder of how deep-rooted and widespread Turkish nationalism, which has defined itself silently vis-à-vis the Armenian question since 1915, is. I think the Turkish subconscious is marked by the events of 1915 so that it cannot recover from it and treat the remaining Armenians, including Dink, as fellow citizens and compatriots.

A year after Dink was murdered then Minister of Defense of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government Vecdi Gönül declared openly for the first time, “If the Armenians had remained where they had lived in Anatolia, we could not have established such a nation-state.” When Minister Gönül uttered these words he rightly faced criticism that he was a “Unionist,” referring to the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) in power during the 1915 massacre of the Armenians. But the fact of the matter is that this is the unspoken and yet common belief among Turks, nationalists, conservatives, leftists, you name it.

By linking the establishment of a Turkish nation-state and the Armenian massacre, they implicitly endorse what was done to the Armenians in 1915. This is what I refer to as the subconscious of the Turks being marked by the Armenian question; their “presence” was only possible at the expense of the “absence” of the Armenians. This I think gives way to a guilt complex that cannot be admitted and expressed and a deep sense of insecurity. When Armenians exist, they panic that this happens at the expense of the Turks’ absence. So the presence of Dink as an Armenian in the public sphere deeply disturbed the “Turkish psyche.”

As a result, we have all kinds of barriers to the investigation of Dink’s murder. It started right after the murder. The person who killed Dink was photographed in front of a Turkish flag flanked by two soldiers when he was arrested. These photographs were distributed to the media to trigger nationalist sentiments against the Armenians. Again, right after the murder, the İstanbul chief of police declared that the murderer was motivated and led by nationalist sentiments. Hürriyet Editor-in-Chief Ertuğrul Özkök wrote that we should try to understand (i.e., sympathize with) the murderer.

All these have turned the Dink murder into an act justifiable simply because it was committed against an Armenian.

So there was complacency all over. It is now a fact that security forces in Trabzon and İstanbul knew well that a plan to assassinate Dink was being prepared. They knew and did not do anything to stop it. How can this be explained? If the “victim” is an Armenian, then “collaboration” or “silence” is the attitude. We also know for sure that he was warned and threatened by an intelligence officer in the office of the deputy governor of İstanbul before his murder.

Even the AK Party government that was receptive to the demands of minorities and in return supported by them did not stand by Dink. I do not remember any member of the AK Party government who attended the Dink’s burial (except an adviser to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan).

Later on, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the leadership of Ahmet Davutoğlu submitted a defense to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) for the Dink case in which Dink was compared to a Nazi leader, and it was argued that restrictions on his writings could not be regarded as a breach of freedom of expression since they contained “hate speech.” As if this embarrassing comparison was not enough, the defense by the Turkish government also implied that Dink’s murderers were justified: It was Dink who was to blame for his own murder because he was found guilty of insulting Turkishness by the Turkish judiciary.

Apart from this shameful “defense”, there are many cases that show authorities did not collaborate to investigate the murder case. At the end, the court placed all responsibility on a “lone wolf” without going deeper into his connections. Everyone knows this is a cover-up, not only of the network that murdered Dink but also of our relationship with Armenians. The decision of the court turns Dink’s murder into a “collective crime.”

Racism, immigrants and the state in Germany

I am not exaggerating: Not only does the durability of peace but also the future of democracy in Europe depend on the way in which immigrants are treated by their host countries.

Racism, discrimination and right-wing violence may now appear to be directed at immigrants, but they will, in the end, destroy European civilization as we know it. Racists and those who are silent and complacent in the face of racism cannot cleanse Europe from immigrants without destroying Europe's democratic civilization. What is at stake, thus, is not only the life and welfare of immigrants in Europe but the very values Europe claims to uphold.

Some two months ago a link between the murders of nine immigrants, eight of them Turks, between 2000 and 2006 and the neo-Nazi National Socialist Underground (NSU) came to light. The disclosures disturbed many, especially when alleged links were established between the neo-Nazi NSU and German intelligence units. With such shocking allegations in mind, I wondered how Turks in Germany felt. They must have felt vulnerable, unprotected and abandoned.

Last week I got my answers from research conducted by Dr. Murat Erdoğan from Hacettepe University's Center for Immigration and Politics. The research, titled “Racist neo-Nazi murders in Germany: Opinions and Feelings of Turks,” provided very valuable information for anyone interested in the way in which Turks living in Germany react to neo-Nazi violence, the German state, and the German people. In a nutshell, the Turks in Germany think that the neo-Nazi murderers were protected or tolerated by German authorities.

For the Turks, who were invited to Germany as “guest workers” by the state itself 50 years ago, this is a shocking end. Did the state that invited them 50 years ago conspire with the neo-Nazi gangs to kill their compatriots? This in itself is unimaginable. Yet the research, based on an empirical survey among Turkish immigrants by Dr. Erdoğan, shows that the trust between Turks in Germany and the German state has been broken.

It displays that the prevailing feeling is one of sorrow (74 percent), while 12 percent feel anger and only 8 percent sense “fear.” The racist murders seem to prompt not fear but rage. What is alarming for the “host country” is the perception among immigrant Turks that the “German state supported or protected the neo-Nazi murderers.” This perception stands at 66 percent among the Turks of Germany, while 21 percent do not see such support and protection on the part of the German state. This is really worrisome. It points not to the anger or fear but to the sense of insecurity among immigrants, whose murderers are linked to the state that is supposed to protect them.

Maybe the most critical question of the survey is whether the Turks are considering leaving Germany and returning to Turkey due to such racist killings. It is really interesting to see that 77 percent of Turks do not consider this as an option. They demonstrate their determination to continue to live in Germany. If the objective of the neo-Nazis targeting the Turks is to intimidate, terrorize and thus force them to leave Germany, it is clear that they will not reach their objective.

Those who say they will return to Turkey number only 9 percent. This means Turks living there have become a permanent feature of Germany after all.

Despite the fact than an overwhelming majority of Turks there is suspicious of the German state when it comes to the neo-Nazi connection, the Turks still seek shelter under the roof of the German state. This is still good news. But in return, the German state owes these people one single and simple thing: security, the most basic function and responsibility of a state.

You may remember that, after the new discoveries about the murders, the Bundestag expressed shame and regret, and issued an apology. Dr. Erdoğan's research also asks Turks about this apology to understand their reaction. The majority of the Turks interviewed did not find the apology sincere (58 percent). This is understandable given their perception that the state did not protect them or properly investigate the racist murders.

The lack of trust among Turkish immigrants is discernible. Sixty-two percent think the apology is part of a cover-up, while 70 percent do not see this as a sign of regret. Those who believe German politicians regret the events and are trying to find a solution stand at a mere 35 percent. Trust has been lost.

This is important, especially given the fact that 66 percent expect the racist killings to continue. So they think that they will be targeted and sense that they cannot trust the state that is supposed to protect them. What is promising, though, is the separation between the Germans as a whole and the racists. Sixty-eight percent of the Turks think that racist attacks are the doing of a marginal group. So while there is a deep crisis of trust between the German state and Turkish immigrants, there is still room to mend the problem as the Turks in Germany still disassociate the German people from the racists.

In sum, unless immigrants feel safe, social peace, harmony, integration and the long-term sustainability of democracy cannot be secured in Europe.

A difficult period for the AK Party

In June of last year, the ruling party won the elections with 50 percent of the vote after almost 10 years in power.

Since then, public opinion polls have shown that its votes are not unstable but continue to rise, though slowly, while support for other political parties is either stagnant or falling.

Given such a political scene, how can one talk of “a difficult period” for the Justice and Development Party (AK Party)? This is certainly a legitimate question, and I will explain why.

When the AK Party came to power in 2002 it represented people power vis-à-vis the state power. It was the state power that had oppressed the conservative masses and their political, social and economic agents during the Feb. 28 process in the late 1990s on the one hand and looted banks during the crisis and redistributed their resources to İstanbul and the “white Turks,” the supporters of the state elite.

After winning the elections in 2002, the AK Party was very careful not to lose its support and so tried hard to isolate its opponents and fortify a wide front against them. To do so, it pursued a policy of building alliances both at home and abroad with pro-reform democrat groups as a “defense line” against the secularist/militarist elements within the state. The agenda of democratization, which included curbing the military's power, spreading welfare to the masses and seeking EU membership, was thus linked to the AK Party's search for security vis-à-vis the state that was controlled by Kemalist-secularist institutions and actors that regarded the AK Party as an anomaly.

The struggle within the state and society continued between the AK Party based on conservative social support and aligned with pro-reform democrats, and the secularists/Kemalists that held significant institutional power and enjoyed widespread media backing.

Out of this struggle, it appeared that while the AK Party was in power holding the majority in Parliament it acted as if it were an opposition party trying to overcome the resistance put up by the Kemalist state elite to democratization. This relationship constantly rejuvenated the AK Party's democratic credentials within the system in comparison to other political currencies and institutional traditions. It thus emerged as the most progressive and reformist party.

But, it continued to face bureaucratic resistance. The military as an institution directly called on the government to step down and refrain from electing a president in April 2007 -- the 27 memorandum of the military. Holding almost two-thirds of the majority in Parliament, the AK Party was obstructed from electing a president due to the military's unacceptable interference and an unlawful decision made by the Constitutional Court. Even after the AK Party's victory in the 2007 elections the state power continued to intimidate the ruling party. It was almost shut down by the Constitutional Court in 2008.

In short, the AK Party was in government but not in control of the military, judiciary and high bureaucracy, largely regarded as the “state.” This historical binary between the state and the government worked to the advantage of the AK Party and made the ruling party almost immune from criticism. The priority of the AK Party was to take the state under the control of the democratically elected government. This, to a very large extent, was achieved by a constitutional referendum on Sept. 12, 2010, which changed the balance of power within the state in favor of the elected government.

Now the AK Party seems to hold the state power while at the same time representing people power. And here comes the predicament for the ruling party: No longer can it hide behind the excuse that it cannot control the “reactionary forces within the state.” Thus, the AK Party government is accountable for whatever the “state” does, including bombing to death 35 civilians in Sirnak.

The intelligence mistakes that the National Intelligence Organization (MİT) makes, whose president is the appointee of the government, are the mistakes of the AK Party government. It is no longer possible to escape criticism by pointing to the state. Such a defense is no longer possible. The state is the AK Party.

The operational mistakes of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK), whose commanders are appointed by the government, are the mistakes of the AK Party. So when the Taraf daily runs a headline like “The state bombs its own people,” it is a state that includes the AK Party. Knowing this, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan comes out and says, “The state does not bomb its own people.” But it was him who apologized only a week ago for the massacre of the people in Dersim by the state, which bombed the entire area back in 1937-1938. A government in control of the “state” is accountable to the people for whatever the state does.

Any judicial mistakes made by the courts, whose central institutions -- including the High Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) -- are determined by the government, will be the mistakes of the AK Party. So, for all the detentions, long prosecution periods, miscarriages of justice, etc., it is the government that is accountable and responsible.

The AK Party cannot hide behind the excuse that it cannot control certain “reactionary” institutions within the state. It is now in a position -- and proud to be -- where it can determine all these institutions. Yet by “defending” the state, the AK Party risks becoming a pro-status quo power and diminishing its democratic credentials.

The French disconnection

The resemblance between France and “old Turkey” is striking. One similarity regards their attitudes towards history. The French government is attempting to construct a “historical truth” for its citizens, who are not considered capable of making up their own minds about the events of the past.

I know this Jacobin attitude very well from the Kemalist experimentation in creating a “new nation” with a constructed history and identity. But France is the birthplace of imposing “good” on the minds of the “folk,” down in the streets. From this perspective, the rulers thought they knew what to believe and how to think better than ordinary citizens.

It is not a simple coincidence that French President Nicolas Sarkozy told Turkey not to interfere with French beliefs. So President Sarkozy thinks that he or Parliament is in a position to pass a law that regulates people's beliefs in any history or faith and punishes those who do not subscribe to the official belief.

This is obviously nonsense but makes perfect sense given the Jacobin legacy in France that seems to be experiencing a revival under Sarkozy's presidency.

The French Parliament, with a ridiculously low level of participation (only around 50 members of Parliament were in attendance when the bill was approved), has attempted to construct an “official belief” on the Armenian massacre of 1915.

The bill describes the 1915 massacre of Armenians as “genocide” and allows for the punishment of those who express a contradictory opinion. So France has moved into an era where it punishes the beliefs that contradict its officially imposed belief. This certainly reminds me of the Inquisition, fires, stakes and the Middle Ages.

There can be no official belief or official history in open and democratic societies. People are free to explore, experience and expose different claims to truth.

A democratic state cannot attempt to hold a monopoly on historical interpretation. Democracy is about plurality of interpretations. Only totalitarian states claim to monopolize interpretations and control people's minds.

The French Parliament has gone too far to discredit its reputation. This has been done while Turkey, despite its authoritarian state tradition, has come to face its past. Only two weeks ago Prime Minister Erdoğan apologized in the name of the state for the massacre of the Dersim people in 1937-1938. This is certainly a move forward towards confronting Turkey's troubling past.

It should also be remembered that Prime Minister Erdoğan, while referring to past atrocities directed at non-Muslims including the Armenians, stated in May 2009, “Through fascist approaches, we forced many non-Muslims to leave this country.” He asked, “Did we do any good?”

While Turkey seems to be abandoning its “official history,” it is really ironic that France is writing one for itself. It is up to the French people to decide whether they silently accept the Parliament's intervention in their freedom of expression. It is, after all, primarily the French citizens whose freedom of expression is severely violated by their Parliament's decision. If the French people accept that their government is in a better position to think and pass judgment on their behalf, it is fine for me.

Regardless, the French attitude neither helps the Armenians who suffered nor the Turks who do not acknowledge their suffering. We can right the atrocities of the past not by labeling them but by discussing them. Calling them genocide is the shortest way to close the debate.

I wrote some time ago: “Anyone who wants to close the debate on what happened to Armenians in 1915 should start by describing the events as genocide. They are, of course, free to speak as they wish. But if Turks are expected to be part of this debate, then a more constructive approach is needed. This requires avoiding language that closes the debate when, in fact, a lively discussion has already been going on.”

A war America lost

American troops left Iraq last week. President Barack Obama declared that the objectives in Iraq were accomplished.

This I do not agree with. The occupation of Iraq was a big mistake by the US, led then by a neoconservative gang. The cost of the war was high for the US. Five-thousand died, 30,000 were injured and over a trillion dollars were spent.

All these may still be bearable losses, but when we look at the Iraqi side, the scope of destruction goes beyond one's imagination. The number of dead is said to be at around 1.2 million. Those who fled from their homes numbered 2 million. These figures tell us the extent of the human cost the Iraqis had to bear.

While credit for the removal of Saddam Hussein certainly goes to the US, moral and political responsibility for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis falls on the US as well.

Despite this heavy human cost and financial burden, the US did not get what it wanted.

The occupation has handed the power in Iraq to Shiite groups, a scenario of power-sharing that the Americans would have never considered prior to the war. Given the historical and theological relationship between Iraqi Shiites and Iran, it will now be very difficult to prevent the influence of Iran on Iraqi politics. Even Shiite elements that are relatively distant from Iran come under the pressure of pro-Iranian groups, as both derive their legitimacy from the teachings of Shiites, heavily influenced historically by Iranians.

After the US left Iraq, the rising power in the region is certainly Iran. The occupation of Iraq only facilitated the spread of Iranian influence in the region, and particularly in Iraq. Did American policy-makers envisage such an outcome, detrimental to their regional standing in the Middle East?

While the central government of Iraq has to a very large extent fallen to Shiites, the country appears divided along sectarian and ethnic lines. Once Iraqis fail in power-sharing among the Shiites, the Kurds, and the Sunnis, the country may fall to pieces. Thus the occupation has resulted in a new power configuration that shakes the feasibility of Iraq as a state. Will such a divided Iraq serve American interests in the region? I doubt it.

As a result of the war, the US also lost support worldwide. Before and after the invasion of Iraq, mass demonstrations were held in different parts of the world. Anti-Americanism hit its highest levels. This was not only a phenomenon in the Middle East among Muslims but was seen all over the world, including in Europe and Latin America. America lost its soft power once it used its hard power against Iraq. The global standing of the US suffered tremendously as the war dragged on, with hundreds of thousands of civilian casualties and the revelation of atrocities committed by American troops against civilians and prisoners. Only recently has the US begun to recover from its dark decade of anti-Americanism fueled by the Iraqi occupation due to worldwide affinity for President Obama.

The US also lost some of its allies. The unilateralism of the Bush administration alienated US friends in Europe. Those who supported the American war in Iraq, like Tony Blair of Britain, lost their own political battles at home.

Moreover, relations with Turkey were severely damaged as a result of the war. At some point, this even took the form of hostility. The trust between the two sides at the governmental level disappeared. Many in Turkey believed that the neocons in Washington had plotted with their Turkish supporters against the Turkish government to end the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) rule. Moreover, anti-Americanism rose to a record high among the people of Turkey. The relationship between the two sides was repaired only after the US started to contemplate withdrawal from Iraq.

In short, the occupation of Iraq shows the limits of using military power, even for a superpower. Iraq will continue to haunt America in the Middle East and the world at large.

Reforming Europe, abandoning Turkey

Looking at the economic crisis that led a number of member states to the brink of bankruptcy, some question the future of the European Union.

Whether the EU is an effective institutional framework for dealing with economic crises and bringing prosperity to its citizens may be debated, but it is premature to question the EU’s future.

The EU is the Europeans’ most ambitious project in modern history. I don’t think it will easily be given up. It is a zone of peace and prosperity despite the presence of some countries shaken by recent economic crises.

For the anti-EU circles, there is still no ground to celebrate. The union is not passé. Criticism of the EU should not underestimate the ability of the EU to overcome challenges and adapt itself to changing circumstances.

It is a union bringing together different national interests, styles, and identities. We always hear about how difficult it is to make decisions in such a big and diverse community. But we see that the union is capable of making speedy and fundamental decisions concerning itself.

Just take last week’s European Council meeting in Brussels as an example. Amid a debate on the future of the EU and the failures of its economic institutions and policies, European leaders decided to enhance integration, not loosen it. Within three months a new union treaty is going to be prepared to tighten financial management within the union.

This decision means that the current crisis will not lead to the disintegration of the union, as argued by some. On the contrary, it will trigger further integration within Europe.

This reaction of the EU to the crisis tells us an important characteristic of the union; namely, that is able to understand the change in the environment and respond accordingly.

There is indeed a history of this. Just think of the union treaties made since the end of the Cold War. Starting with Maastricht and moving on to Amsterdam and Nice, and now to the Lisbon Treaty, the EU has been more flexible, responsive and changing than it is given credit for. What we have is a union that has made four “constitutions” in the post-Cold War era, and agreed to make a new one.

This tells us about the EU’s ability to renew itself in the face of crisis, and also its flexibility to change despite a heavy Brussels bureaucracy and diverse membership profile. This is so, I think because the Europeans are still convinced that peace, prosperity, and liberty will best be brought about by European-level cooperation that requires working together instead of going on their own.

Compare the EU’s responsiveness to the changing circumstances in terms of coming up with a new set of rules and norms to Turkey. We have been ruled by a military-made Constitution since 1982. There were numerous amendments introduced since then, but we failed to make a new one despite overwhelming public demand. Even now it is rather doubtful if the new Parliament will reach an agreement on a new democratic constitution.

In trying to catch up with the EU, Turkey sped up its reforms since the late 1990s, strengthening its democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights. But as of today, the EU lost its role to push Turkey for democratic reform not only because Turkey reached a point at which it does not need an external stimulus for democratization but also because the EU is no longer willing or cares to play such a role.

Such thinking prevails on both sides and neither serves the interests of Turkey nor those of Europe. I hope Turkey won’t be an abandoned or failed case of Europeanization as a result of ignorance or false confidence.